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Central Thesis
At the core of the Christian understanding of sacrament, as exemplified in the 
Eucharist, exist two   irreducible “stumbling-blocks” (skandalon) to theological 
thinking: language and the body.   While sacred theology can think through this 
scandal only at significant risk to its own stability, the fictional discourses of literature 
and the arts are free to explore this scandal in a manner that simultaneously augments 
and challenges notions of sacrament and sacramentality, and by extension, what it 
means to conceive of the Church as a “eucharistic community.”
Abstract
In spite of the realities of an increasingly post-ecclesial world, sacrament 
continues to appear as a theme in contemporary culture, often in places least expected. 
What   it   means   to   describe   something   –   a   text,   ritual,   experience,   etc   –   as 
“sacramental” derives from the unique yet complex conception of sacrament as 
practiced (liturgy) and theorized (theology) within the Christian tradition.  Indeed, 
whilst simultaneously upheld as the “constitutive” action and foundational sacrament 
of Christ's Body called church, the Eucharist has confounded the Christian faith 
throughout its history.  Its symbolism points to the paradox of the incarnation of God 
in Jesus of Nazareth, and his sacrificial death on Calvary, which St. Paul describes as 
a stumbling-block (skandalon) and foolishness (1 Cor. 1:23).  And yet this scandalous 
quality of sacramentality, not only illustrated by but enacted in the Eucharist, has not 
been sufficiently accounted for in the ecclesiologies and sacramental theologies of the 
Christian tradition.
Following the image from the Fourth gospel of “the word made flesh,” this 
interdisciplinary study examines the scandal of sacramentality along the two-pronged 
thematic of the scandal of language (word) and the scandal of the body (flesh).  While 7
sacred theology can think through this scandal only at significant risk to its own 
stability, the fictional discourses of literature and the arts are free to explore this 
scandal   in   a  manner   that   simultaneously  augments   and   challenges   notions   of 
sacrament and sacramentality, and by extension, what it means to describe the Church 
as a “eucharistic community.”
Our aim is less a reassertion of the vitality of traditional sacramental rituals 
even within contemporary culture and more an effort to understand why the notion of 
sacrament and sacramentality has held such staying power, despite significant cultural 
shifts and movement away from the traditional practices of the Christian faith.  Why 
do novelists, artists, theologians, philosophers and religious communities continue to 
make use of and draw upon the language and evocation of ‘sacrament’?  Our thesis is 
that it is precisely the scandalous, subversive power of the eucharistic mystery, the 
thematic and symbolic tensions and destabilizing effect inherent to sacramentality, 
that make it such a fertile trope for artists and writers, especially within a postmodern 
context preoccupied with the themes of language, embodiment, presence/absence, 
immanence/transcendence, and so on.8
~ Introduction ~
Our contemporary fascination with presence...is based 
on a longing for presence that in the contemporary 
context can only be satisfied in conditions of extreme 
temporal fragmentation.
1
0.1 Thinking “Sacrament”
This thesis is an interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature of sacrament and into 
the relationship between the Eucharist – the ritual partaking of the body and blood of 
Christ in the symbols of bread and wine – as the sacrament  par excellence,  and 
sacramental  themes   or  “traces”  of  sacramentality that appear  in  contemporary 
fictional narratives.  In a “post-Christian” (or at the very least “post-ecclesial”) age 
characterized by waning participation in traditional Christian practices,
2 a surprising 
persistence and relevance of sacramental themes and eucharistic allusions may be 
observed within contemporary literature and the creative arts more broadly.   One 
wonders, then – apart from the legitimizing role of the Church in her theology and 
liturgy   –   from   whence   the   Eucharist,   or   even   a   more   vague   concept   of 
“sacramentality,”   derives   any   meaning.     In   seeking   to   understand   why   the 
sacramental/eucharistic continues to capture the contemporary imagination, this 
project pursues several questions: What is a sacrament?  Why has Christian theology 
1 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford UP, 
2004), p. 20.
2 See, e.g., Steve Bruce,  God is Dead: Secularization in the West  (Oxford and Malden, MA: 
Routledge,   2002);   Callum   G.   Brown,  The   Death   of   Christian   Britain:   Understanding 
Secularisation, 1800-2000  (London:  Routledge, 2001);  Grace Davie,  Religion in Britain Since 
1945: Believing Without Belonging (T & T Clark: London and New York, 1994).9
found sacrament to be such a contentious concept?  How has the notion of sacrament, 
most fully realized in the celebration of the Eucharist, both defined and been defined 
by the Church?  How is sacrament related to language and the body?  How is the 
notion of a sacramental or eucharistic “real presence” figured within contemporary 
postmodern narratives and practices?  And what new insights into traditional Christian 
sacramental and liturgical practice might contemporary literature and the arts provide, 
and what impact might this in turn have on Christian faith and practice?
While they have, at least since the Enlightenment, enjoyed a certain freedom 
from the liturgical and theological constraints of the Church, throughout history the 
creative arts have maintained a complicated relationship to Christianity, and Christian 
worship in particular.  The arts have of course been employed in Christian worship as 
supplemental or illustrative tools – as, so to speak, a “handmaiden” to the aims of 
theology and liturgy – but the arts also offer a unique perspective on the scandalous 
and subversive implications of the Christian faith; thus we might call the relationship 
between the arts and Christian ritual a “deconstructive” relationship.  The arts seem to 
understand and wrestle with the profanity inherent to the sacred in a way that theology 
is rarely, if ever, capable of.  This essay’s central thesis is that literature and the arts 
are able to “think through” the deconstructive core of the Eucharist in ways that 
theology undertakes only at its own peril.  That is to say, theology takes seriously this 
deconstruction – which we will develop according to the theme of  scandal
3  (Gk. 
3 While we have developed this heuristic to meet the demands of this project, several other thinkers 
deserve credit for providing the useful theme of scandal/skandalon: Prof. David Jasper first pointed 
out that the Pauline concept ”stumbling block” was the Gk. term skandalon, and he has utilized the 
theme of scandal in his recent study The Sacred Body: Asceticism in Religion, Literature, Art, and 
Culture (Waco, TX: Baylor UP, 2009), e.g. p. 33 'the scandal of the crucified.' Nathan Mitchell 
points in this direction, e.g. 'On the cross, God subverts all we know of “God.” Such a searing 
scandal cannot be grasped  conceptually'; see  Meeting Mystery: Liturgy, Worship, Sacraments 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2006), p. 37. See also Vítor Westhelle, The Scandalous God: The Use and 
Abuse of the Cross (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006). In all these examples, as in St. Paul's 
usage, the skandalon is the crucified Christ.  The only precedent we know of for relating sacrament 
directly to skandalon in the Pauline sense is Louis-Marie Chauvet's Symbol and Sacrament: A 
Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1995), 
which is foundational to this thesis in many ways, e.g. “The Sacramental Stumbling Block” (pp. 10
skandalon,   literally  “stumbling   block”)   –  only  by  risking   the  stability  of  the 
eucharistic community itself: the Church, under the headship of the Christ re-
presented in the eucharistic celebration, which may be understood as the church's 
“constitutive action.”  Yet the Eucharist itself, which simultaneously (de)stabilizes and 
(con)founds the Church and her theology, demands, and indeed enacts, this risk.  In 
other words, on one level, the Eucharist “guarantees” God's grace
4  and Christ's 
presence to the Church, while simultaneously problematizing and unsettling  every 
foundation.  The effort to “found” the Church upon Christ's eucharistic presence, then, 
results in the “foundering” of the Church itself; for Christ's body – both historical and 
eucharistic – refuses to be “nailed down.”
5
This thesis proposes to undertake an interpretation of the Church’s eucharistic 
practice as inherently and irreducibly scandalous, as demonstrated in the literary and 
artistic explorations to which we will attend; and then to apply the implications of this 
scandal to the liturgical and sacramental practices of the Church today, as well as to 
the secular cultural context which the Church inhabits.   This will require close 
readings of a variety of texts: liturgical, theological and historical sources, as well 
literary and artistic texts which illuminate the questions at hand.  What will emerge is 
a reimagining of the Eucharist as participation in this  skandalon, and of the 
eucharistic community as an assembly (ecclesia), a gathering, which is con-voked, 
called together, by this scandal, even as it is torn asunder by it.  In this sense, the 
153-54), 'For this true scandal is that God...continues to raise up for himself a body in the world' (p. 
187), 'there is something particularly scandalous about the Eucharistic presence of Christ' (p. 383), 
passim. Finally, while we will disagree with him on certain points, we must cite the influence of 
Graham Ward's discussion of 'the ontological scandal' of the eucharistic 'is' ('this is my body') in 
relation to Christ's 'displaced body' and the 'broken bodies of postmodernity' in chs. 3-4 of Cities of 
God (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 81-116.
4 Following Chauvet, grace from the standpoint of Christian sacramentality implies graciousness as 
well as gratuitousness, i.e. that which is beyond economy and utility; see Symbol and Sacrament, p. 
108-09.
5 See Stephen D. Moore, God's Gym: Divine Male Bodies of the Bible (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 37-39.11
Church (or any assembly which might be described as eucharistic) is a community 
founded upon a scandal, and it is this scandal which necessarily un-founds and up-
roots this community.  A community that is properly called eucharistic is not one 
which possesses the Eucharist, but one which is possessed by the Eucharist.  This 
possession by the Eucharist is a dis-possession of every possession, a risk that can 
never be fully avoided, the same risk God ultimately undertook in the Incarnation of 
Christ: the risk of death, that is, the absolute loss of self.
Even prior to the Cross, the central symbol of the eucharistic community is the 
broken body of the Crucified One.  It is this symbol of brokenness which unites the 
Church, and has done so throughout the ages.  The loss of the centrality of this symbol 
is nothing less than the loss of the Church-as-Church.  But we can understand this 
only by understanding the Church as a community that interprets death – a particular 
death – as its very  life  and reason for being.   The Church, then, has an entirely 
different perspective than the world, one that understands death-as-presence (and 
correspondingly, resurrection-as-absence), as we shall see in our examination of 
biblical sources.   This is the scandal of the Eucharist today, a scandal which has 
typically been domesticated by the Church, but which, we argue, must be continually 
sought and upheld as essential to the very be(com)ing of the Church as the Body-of-
Christ broken for the life of the world.
0.2  The Eucharist in Theology and Literature
The problem with the Eucharist has always been primarily a problem of 
interpretation; indeed, we might propose that the attempt to interpret the Eucharist is 
an exercise in futility from the outset.   The Reformation debates about how the 
Eucharist “works” – how Christ’s real presence is manifest in the present, whether 
according to notions of transubstantiation, consubstantiation, commemoration or 12
otherwise – simply brought to a climax the Church’s ongoing attempt to understand 
and articulate the meaning of Christ’s declaration “this [bread] is my body...this [cup] 
is my blood,” and what, if any, direct relationship those identifications have to the 
Church’s leitourgia.  
Long before they were inscribed in the writings that would comprise the New 
Testament, Jesus’ words and actions at the Last Supper were repeated by those 
followers who believed in his bodily resurrection from the dead.  From their first 
repetition began a ritual tradition and with it the project of interpreting these words 
and actions.  David Power is clear on this point: 'tradition is first and foremost the 
transmission of life in Christ and the Spirit, down through time and across cultures. 
This has its doctrinal, theological...devotional, and sacramental expressions.  As far as 
these   are   concerned,   the   action   of   tradition   involves   a   constant   process   of 
interpretation.'
6   So we ask, what did Jesus mean by “this is my body...this is my 
blood”?  By “do this” (touto poieite)?  By “remembrance” (anamnēsin)?  What did 
Jesus mean for them, and us, to “do,” and what did he mean for us to understand by 
it?
These are significant and in some ways irresolvable questions; and yet, in an 
important sense, understanding is not the point of the Eucharist at all.  Christ does not 
instruct his followers to comprehend or explain or interpret the mystical action, but 
rather simply to do it.  Theology, however, has never quite been able to cope with 
such an apophatic posture toward the mystery.  David Jasper puts it thus:
In this lack of a beyond, utterly immanent yet wholly 
transcendent, lies the sacramental heart of the insistent “real 
presence” of the Eucharist in which, even from the time of 
St. Paul, the followers of Christ took the intolerable flesh 
into their own bodies in the Eucharist even as they were 
consumed by it.   Yet the oblivion of theology itself has 
6 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 39. For a more detailed account of Power's hermeneutical approach to 
sacraments as “language” (drawing upon the work of David Tracy), see pp. 48-49 of the same work.13
tended   to   obliterate   this   scandal,   the   scandal   of   the 
crucified, unwatchable body, the body in hell, that yet we 
take into ourselves.
7
Indeed, theo-logy’s task is necessarily iterative; it is to reason or speak a word (logos) 
about God (theos).   Theology, it would seem, is genetically predisposed to resist 
silence and absence.   And while theology has always left a little room for the 
apophatic way of the via negativa, its dominant mode is to speak and reason endlessly 
about those divine matters which are its concern.
Literature, on the other hand, and the arts more broadly, is able to cope with 
silence and absence, even when attempting to inscribe it into its own narrative. 
Where theologians have often sought to overcome or explain away the divine 
mystērion, the work of artists and writers have been able to sustain the mystery, albeit 
in obscured, inverted, subverted, perverted and otherwise scandalous and scandalizing 
ways.
8   Theology seeks to define, in the service of ecclesiastical doctrine, and to 
construct speculative systems which “make sense” of the complex interrelationship 
between God, humankind, creation, sin, scripture, and so on; such delineation tends to 
limit the scope of its subject matter.  Art (literary or otherwise), on the other hand, 
seeks to “make sense” (i.e. create meaning) as well, not by delineating but by 
transgressing boundaries, by de-limiting in a less or even un-systematic mode.  Art 
does not serve doctrine or dogma, or else it ceases to be art, and instead becomes 
propaganda; its “narratives,” such as they may be called, do not seek to construct 
intellectual systems but to deconstruct rigid patterns of thought and action so as to 
7 D. Jasper, The Sacred Body, p. 33.
8 See Regina Mara Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism: When God Left the 
World (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2008). Very near to our own thesis, Schwartz’s suggests that the 
Reformers’ rejection of the doctrine of transubstantiation enables (even forces?) the sacramental to 
spill over into poetry, the arts, culture, etc: “Aspects of the Eucharist began showing up in the 
poetry of the Reformation, albeit in completely unorthodox ways” (p. 7-8).  Her last statement is 
key   –   this   displacement   of   sacramental   presence   results   in  unorthodox  expressions   of 
sacramentality – expressions that scandalize and subvert traditional, orthodox understandings of the 
Eucharist.14
open new pathways and possibilities for human thinking and being.
In this sense, literature and the arts pick up where theology leaves off.  While 
this is an “interdisciplinary” study, one cannot act as theologian and literary critic in 
equal-but-autonomous measure.  While this essay might blur them on occasion, the 
boundaries between these disciplines remain in tact.
9  The underlying concerns and 
driving motivations for this project are theological, and indeed, insofar as they 
concern Christian liturgy and sacrament, as well as ecclesial and ecclesiological.  Our 
engagements with literature are not undertaken simply for the sake of adding another 
page to the volumes of secondary criticism on the works treated herein.  Rather, they 
seek to open possibilities for theological thinking that theology has either forgotten or 
never fully known.
10  Furthermore, in an era that has been described as 'post-secular,' 
'post-Christian,' and even 'post-atheist,'
11  the theological discipline seems to have 
become uncertain as to whether or not it still exists to serve the Church at all (so long 
9 This would be impossible anyway, as literary critic Stanley Fish has pointed out in his essay “Being 
Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard to Do,” in There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It's a Good 
Thing, Too (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994). Of interdisciplinary studies, he posits “either 
they  are   engaging   in   straightforwardly  disciplinary  tasks   that   require  for  their   completion 
information and techniques on loan from other disciplines, or they are working within a particular 
discipline at a moment when it is expanding into territories hitherto marked as belonging to 
someone else...or they are in the process of establishing a new discipline, one that takes as its task 
the analysis of disciplines, the charting of their history and of their ambitions....Nor is there 
anything reprehensible about these activities. Depending on one's own interests and sense of what 
the situation requires, the imperial ambitions of a particular discipline may be just what the doctors 
ordered; and it may equally well be the case that, from a certain point of view, the traditional 
disciplines have played themselves out and it is time to fashion a new one” (p. 242).
10 Without being presumptuous, it is our guess that the present work corresponds most closely to 
Fish's second possibility: indeed, we are working within the theological discipline, and pursuing 
theological questions, at a point when the parameters of what theology  means  and  does  are 
expanding (or perhaps vanishing).  As students of the interdisciplinary study of literature, theology 
and the arts continue to develop hermeneutical tools that allows these discourses to be engaged 
simultaneously, a new discipline altogether has begun to emerge, wherein, for example, theological 
writing may be regarded as a form of literary or poetic discourse, and literature and the arts may be 
recognized as valid expressions of theology.  Following Carl Raschke and David Jasper, we prefer 
to describe such interdisciplinary work as “theological thinking”; see Carl A. Raschke, Theological 
Thinking: An Inquiry (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1988), and David Japser, “From Theology to 
Theological Thinking: The Development of Critical Thought and its Consequences for Theology,” 
in Literature and Theology 9/3 (1995), pp. 293-305.
11 See Phillip Blond, ed., Post-Secular Philosophy: Between Philosophy and Theology (Routledge: 
New York and London, 1998); Gabriel Vahanian, The Death of God: The Culture of Our Post-
Christian Era (George Braziller: New York, 1961); and Clive Marsh, Christianity in a Post-Atheist 
Age (SCM Press: London, 2002), respectively.15
as churches linger), or whether it must refigure its purpose as purely academic, 
whether that means being swallowed up under the canopy of “religious studies” or 
“sociology of religion,” or as a substrata of the humanities.  On a kind of meta-level, 
therefore, this project is an attempt to confront theology with the delusion of its own 
self-sufficiency,
12  exposing   it   to   a   method   of   theological   thinking   that   may 
reinvigorate or even reinvent it to address the changing cultural and intellectual 
landscape into which it desires to speak.
To summarize, then: this project explores the possibility of sacramentality, 
based upon eucharistic theology, which takes seriously the contribution postmodern 
literature and culture, which challenges contemporary Christian theology and liturgy 
to risk its own stability – and indeed to understand this instability as grace itself – 
while also calling attention to the sacramental and even specifically eucharistic traces 
that   appear   in   contemporary   literature,   arts   and   culture.     It   is   precisely   this 
scandalizing risk – this unavoidable (self-)deconstruction that yet clears the way for 
new constructions, uncharted possibilities – that fascinates us.  It is a risk that, we 
assert, must be taken.  As they endeavor to think what is for theology unthinkable, 
Christian theologians cannot afford to ignore the prophetic voices of literature and the 
arts, even to the point of allowing those voices to challenge theology’s basic 
assumptions and expose its  scandalous, de/constructive core.
13
To be clear, we highlight this inherent scandal not to undermine the validity of 
12 Contra the theological program known as Radical Orthodoxy which seeks to subjugate every other 
discipline to the meta-narrative of Christian theology; for the most complete development of this 
thesis, see John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (2
nd ed.) (Malden, 
MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), esp. his final chapter (pp. 382-442). Cf. Radical Orthodoxy: A 
New Theology, John Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, eds. (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1999) for a representative collection of essays by many scholars whose subsequent work 
extends this agenda.
13 In The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity (Cambridge and London: MIT 
Press, 2003) Slavoj Žižek unveils a similar hidden “core,” which he calls “perverse”; namely, an 
“internal gap” within Godself, exemplified in God-in-Christ’s self-abandonment on Calvary.  As it 
relates to the present work, we would argue that Žižek’s “perverse core of Christianity” is given 
concrete form within sacrament, and is enacted within the symbolic matrix of the Church's 
eucharistic celebration.16
Christian theology and/or liturgy – this is not self-indulgent iconoclasm – but to 
reveal the cracks and fissures that always already exist in the foundation; to unsettle 
false and unexamined certainties about Christian thought and practice; and to clear the 
way for the kind of thinking (and the kind of worship) that is truly constituted by the 
Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love.  In short, we hope to expose Christian faith 
and practice to some of its tendency toward idol-worship – the idols of knowledge, 
power, and possession – and to point instead toward the “more excellent way” (1 Cor. 
13:1) enfleshed in the Christ event and re-presented in the Church's eucharistic action.
0.3 The Two-fold Scandal of Sacramentality: An Overview
According to the writer of the Fourth Gospel, “the Word became flesh and 
made his dwelling among us” (John 1:14).  Acknowledging the postmodern fixation 
on language and the body, we have chosen to explore the scandal of sacramentality 
according to a two-pronged thematic: that of the word and the flesh, of language and 
the body.
14  By no means do we pit these two terms against one another; indeed, the 
overcoming of the dualisms and opposing binaries of  logocentrism  is central to 
postmodern thought.  Rather, these two concepts represent distinct but parallel modes 
of the symbolic operation of the Christian notion of sacrament, exemplified by the 
Eucharist.  Returning to John 1, the Christ event encapsulates the collision of word 
and flesh, the creative logos of God becoming incarnate within the created order 
spoken into being by that selfsame Word.  The Eucharist, therefore, which points to 
14 What we are calling the two-fold scandal of sacramentality – that of language and that of the body 
– is a heuristic at which we have arrived as a result of the influence of (at least) two key sources. 
The first is Louis-Marie Chauvet's Symbol and Sacrament, whose postmodern sacramental theology 
has perhaps influenced this project more than any other single work. Chauvet deals extensively with 
language as mediation (pp. 84-109) as well as the relationship between symbol and body (pp. 110-
55). The other key text is Catherine Pickstock's After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of 
Philosophy (New York and London: Blackwell, 1999), in which the author seeks to establish the 
'co-primacy of sign and body' in her account of the liturgy and the liturgical subject. She posits that 
'the coincidence of sign and body is most manifest in the event of the Eucharist' (p. xv).17
the Word-made-flesh, Christ the “primordial sacrament,”
15  makes present the co-
incidence or con-fusion of word and flesh: of language taking on a body; of the 
immaterial entering into and taking on materiality; of the sacred coming to inhabit the 
profane.   So, not as a dualism but as a coincidence of opposites (coincidentia 
oppositorum is the Cusan term),
16 we shall explore the Eucharist and the notion of 
sacrament(ality), along these two trajectories, each of which are of central concern to 
postmodern thought.
This   study   is   organized   in   two   parts.     Part   One,   “The   Scandal   of 
Sacramentality,”   articulates   the   theoretical   framework   upon   which   the 
interdisciplinary explorations of Part Two rely.  Three chapters comprise Part One. 
Chapter 1 (“Skandalon: Stumbling over Sacrament”) examines the concepts of 
sacrament and sacramentality, highlighting the inherent difficulty of defining these 
terms.  In seeking to understand what a sacrament is, we shall look to sources ancient 
(Augustine) and modern (Tillich) to relate sacrament to both sign and symbol.  In 
dialogue with theologians of the East (Zizioulas) and West (Rahner, de Lubac), we 
shall   establish   the   centrality   of   Christ   and   describe   sacrament   as   that   which 
simultaneously makes and breaks the Church.
In Chapter 2 (“The Word...: The Problem of Language”) we shall consider the 
scandal of sacramentality in relation to the basic problem of language, so thoroughly 
critiqued in post-structuralist and postmodern thought.  The Eucharist originates with 
15 See E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, 1963), esp. §1.2 “Christ the Primordial Sacrament” (pp. 13-39). He writes: 'Consequently if 
the human love and all the human acts of Jesus possess a divine saving power, then the realization 
in human shape of this saving power necessarily includes as one of its aspects the manifestation of 
salvation: includes, in other words, sacramentality.   The man Jesus, as the personal visible 
realization of the divine grace of redemption, is the sacrament, the primordial sacrament, because 
this man, the Son of God himself, is intended by the Father to be in his humanity the only way to 
the actuality of redemption.' (p. 15). Like his contemporary Karl Rahner, Schillebeeckx also regards 
the Church as the “Sacrament of the Risen Christ” (see ch. 2, pp. 47-89).
16 "On Learned Ignorance" (De docta ignorantia, 1440) contains Nicholas of Cusa's notion of the 
coincidence of opposites (coincidentia oppositorum); in H. Lawrence Bond, ed. and trans., 
Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Writings (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997), pp. 87-206. 
See Bond's “Introduction,” pgs. 19-36 for a helpful synopsis.18
the symbolic and metaphoric speech of Jesus; is inscribed within the narrative and 
epistolary texts of the New Testament; and has been and is disseminated through the 
liturgical books and actions of the Church throughout history.   Therefore, the 
skandalon of sacramentality is, on the one hand, a linguistic scandal.  We shall think 
through the impact of postmodern shifts in our understanding of language and 
textuality upon the Eucharist in particular, attending to poststructuralism (Derrida), 
the Radical Theology of the “death of God” movement (Altizer), and the liturgical 
reforms of the Second Vatican Council, at the heart of all of which resides an anxiety 
about the ability of language to convey meaning.  Guided by Catholic theologian 
David Power's description of sacrament as “the language of God's giving,”
17 we shall 
relate sacrament to metaphor (Ricoeur) and arrive at what we wish to call the 
“de/constructive core” of sacramentality.
To restate, the idea of sacrament is on the one hand a language problem.  On 
the other hand, an extension of the Creation and the Incarnation, sacraments convey 
spiritual presence to human bodies via the material elements such as the bread and 
wine.   Thus the Christian conception of sacrament is also a  corporeal  or bodily 
scandal.  This is the focus of Chapter 3 (“...Made Flesh: The Problem of the Body”). 
The discussion shifts toward the issue of the Eucharist as embodied performance, as 
physical/bodily liturgical action; as well as the physical ritual instantiation of God’s 
body in the incarnate and crucified Christ, made mystically but no less real-ly present 
in the sacramental act.  According to the narratives and creeds of Christianity, God 
first speaks creation into being, and then in the ultimate redemptive act, the Divine 
becomes enfleshed in the body of a woman; enters the world in the body of an infant; 
grows into the body of a carpenter from Nazareth called Jesus, whose body is 
executed on a cross and buried in a tomb.  After that lifeless body is found missing 
17 D. Power, Sacrament [italics added].19
from the tomb, it appears resurrected to hundreds of followers before ascending to the 
Father.  The Church is described as the Body of Christ, a lingering physical presence 
of the ascended Christ within human history.   In the Eucharist, the Church’s 
'quintessential sacrament,'
18 the bread is transfigured as Christ’s body and the wine as 
his blood.   The participation of Christ’s ecclesial body in his sacramental body 
constitutes the Church as the body of Christ, drawing individual members into the 
communion of Christ’s body.   To paraphrase Augustine’s famous phrase, in the 
sacrament, the Church receives that which it is.
Hence, the body is of particular significance.  Divinity wrapped in a body is 
not only difficult to conceive of but difficult to cope with as well; for where there is a 
body, there is pleasure and pain; hunger, eating, drinking and excreting; sensuality and 
sexuality.  None of this sits easily with our common notions of the Divine or the 
Sacred.  In addition to Jesus' words in John 6:63 - 'It is the spirit that gives life; the 
flesh is useless' - and certain writings of St. Paul (e.g. Phil. 3:3), our Platonic 
inheritance (which, it must be said, is not necessarily indigenous to the biblical 
witness, but has held considerable influence over the Christian faith) has led us to 
polarize flesh against spirit in such a way.   But we must confront the truth that 
sacraments are, in Louis-Marie Chauvet's potent phrase, 'the word of God at the 
mercy of the body.'
19  By the end of Part One, it should be clear that this two-pronged 
conception of language and body actually reveals itself to be an interconnected matrix 
of significance, such that the body-of-the-text and the text-of-the-body may be 
conceived as inextricably related; the “problem” or  skandalon  of sacramentality 
comes down to the (im)possibility of grasping the Body-Language of God.
18 R. Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics, p. 7. 
19 Louis-Marie Chauvet, The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body (Collegeville, 
MN: The Liturgical Press, 2001). This work's subtitle in the original French is 'parole de Dieu au 
Risque du corps' – lit. 'the word of God at the  risk  (or  hazard) of the Body.' It would seem, 
therefore, that Chauvet is keenly aware of the scandalizing role the Body plays in sacrament. Also 
note the dual meaning of the French corps as both body and corpse.20
Part   Two   (“The   Eucharist   in   Literary   and   Theological   Perspectives”) 
undertakes a practical application of the theoretical framework outlined in Part One 
by engaging in close readings of select literary and artistic texts which demonstrate a 
theological thinking about sacrament and sacramentality, and about the Eucharist in 
particular.  Some of these texts explore the Eucharist and/or sacramentality in fairly 
traditional ways (indeed, several of the authors have a literary imagination profoundly 
shaped by Catholicism), and others in a decisively un-orthodox, and hence scandalous 
and scandalizing, ways.   We have found it useful to organize these explorations 
thematically.   Chapter 4 (“Fracturing: Brokenness and Sacrament”) considers the 
sacramentality of broken and wounded bodies in three novels, Graham Greene's 
Monsignor Quixote, Ron Hansen's Mariette in Ecstasy and Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight 
Club.  Mikhail Bakhtin's characterization of the degradation of the body in his study 
of Rabelais' grotesque realist fiction provides additional theoretical support for our 
suggestions about the sacramentality of the body broken.
Chapter 5 (“Consuming: Cannibalism and Sacrament”) turns toward the 
virtually universal cultural taboo of cannibalism.  Of course, cannibalism is something 
Christians have been accused of and the Eucharist has been confused with since its 
earliest practice,  as witnessed it the writings  of Justin  Martyr  and Tertullian. 
However, this aspect of the sacrament's symbolic matrix – eating the body of God – 
must   be   fully   confronted,   not   avoided   or   simply   dismissed   as   ignorance   or 
misperception.   Two novels in particular, Patrick White's  A Fringe of Leaves  and 
Patrick Süskind’s Perfume: The Story of a Murderer, depict cannibalistic acts in a 
sacramental light, whether implicitly or explicitly, serving as a reminder that this 
connotation, however taboo, is in fact an irreducible feature of eucharistic thought and 
practice, as evinced by Jesus 'bread of life' discourse in John 6.
Süskind’s novel describes the closing scene of bodily consumption as an act of 21
'Love'; Chapter 6 (“Penetrating: Eroticism and Sacrament”) explores this transgressive 
theme further into the domain of the erotic.
20   There is a clear tradition within 
Christian history, especially amongst the writings of female mystics, of ecstatic and 
even amorous attachments to the Eucharist.  The connotations of communing bodily 
with Christ – of ingesting him, taking him into oneself, being interpenetrated by him – 
are not hidden very far beneath the surface of the Eucharist's symbolic matrix.  We 
look to Aidan Mathews' novella Lipstick On the Host as a literary examination of the 
sacramentality of sex, and the sensuality of the sacrament.  However, a more deeply 
profane examination of the erotic is also close at hand.  J. G. Ballard’s apocalyptic 
novel Crash, as well as the work of Georges Bataille, particularly The Story of the 
Eye, provide the literary resources for this final avenue of exploration.  Here the 
collision of language and the body is most fully probed.  Both authors are interested in 
the limits of language and story to communicate erotic experience; both seek a 
language   by   which   to   discuss   the   relationship   between   sexual   and   religious 
experience; eroticism and death; sacrality and profanity, pleasure and pain, presence 
and absence, brokenness and wholeness, beauty and the grotesque.  We will assert this 
“erotics” to be the unvanquishable  skandalon  of the Eucharist, the a/theological, 
unthought and unthinkable de-stabilizing “other” of Christian sacramentality.
0.4 A Methodological Note: Interpreting Sacrament
This interdisciplinary project, which transgresses the boundaries of theology, 
philosophy and literature, ultimately reveals itself to be an experiment in “sacramental 
hermeneutics.”  Hermeneutics, the name given to the art or theory of interpretation, 
alludes to the Greek god Hermes, who moved fluidly between the divine and human 
20 Jean-Luc Marion’s recent study of the erotic lends legitimacy to this avenue of exploration; see The 
Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 2007).22
spheres to deliver messages from one to the other.  But as Joyce Zimmerman points 
out, Hermes, who on one hand enables communication between gods and mortals, 'is 
also a thief and a trickster and patron of bargainers; he is the guide of souls to the 
underworld…[and] the wayfinder for travelers.  All these images suggest to us that the 
art of interpretation is a tricky, multifaceted journey.'
21   Considering these various 
faces of Hermes helps us to see that the basic problem is that of communication itself. 
Communication, to which  communion  (and hence sacrament, Eucharist)  is 
closely linked, only occurs by mediation.  Hermes conveys the messages of Zeus, his 
father, to the mortals down below, and relays their response to the heavenly realms. 
Without the correspondent, the word of one interlocutor to the other would never meet 
its mark.   In other words, Hermes’ job is the  translation  (“to carry across”) of 
messages across an otherwise uncrossable barrier.  However, this translation is also 
transgression (“to travel or move across”), and Hermes is guilty of transgressions as 
well.  Communication is tricky business wherever Hermes is involved.  Messages 
might be lost or stolen along the way, or become tangled and twisted.
Further, and in keeping with Hermes’ many faces, communication is based 
upon a bargain between the parties involved, an agreement that words and messages 
will mean what they are intended to mean.  This bargain, like all bargains, places a bet 
on the truthfulness of the interlocutor, and trusts that the linguistic or symbolic 
conventions established by previous experience will hold true once again.   All 
communication is founded upon this extension of trust, and therefore entails a 
fundamental risk that trust will be broken and truth will be distorted.
Zimmerman offers another less commonly noted insight into the task of 
hermeneutics.  She observes that Hermes’ name derives from the root word herm, 'a 
21 Joyce Ann Zimmerman, Liturgy and Hermeneutics (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999) p. 5.23
square, stone post.'
22  In noting this etymology, Zimmerman emphasizes the dialectical 
character of interpretation, namely that the stable, steadfast  herm  stands in stark 
contrast to the winged Hermes, always in motion.  However, and in keeping with 
these multiplicitous meanings, might not this square stone herm also be construed as 
the skandalon, the stumbling block that obstructs one’s journey or trips one up as she 
goes on her way?  In other words, just as Christ is described as the “stone that the 
builders rejected, which has become the cornerstone” (Psalm 118:22; Mark 12:10) as 
well as the skandalon or stumbling block to faith (1 Cor. 1:23); that very thing which 
one might trust for surety and stability – the foundational post we can build on – 
might also de-stabilize, unfound, and cause one to stumble.  Our assertion vis-a-vis 
sacrament is that the Eucharist fully and authentically re-presents Christ in precisely 
this paradoxical manner, as both cornerstone and stumbling block.  And while this 
study makes the claim more by implication and interpretation than by irrefutable, 
empirical analysis, we shall conclude with the suggestion that, similarly, the arts – 
including but not limited to literature – have a similar function in their relationship to 
theology: one which de/constructs and destabilizes the foundational discourses of the 
Christian faith by providing a voice that theology simply cannot afford to ignore.
22 Ibid., p. 5.24
PART ONE:
The Scandal of Sacramentality25
~ Chapter One ~
Skandalon:
Stumbling Over Sacrament
One stumbles, then, on the sacrament, as one stumbles 
on the body, as one stumbles on the institution, as one 
stumbles on the letter of the Scriptures – if at least one 
respects it in its historical and empirical materiality. 
One stumbles against these because one harbors a 
nostalgia   for   an   ideal   and   immediate   presence   to 
oneself, to others, and to God.  Now, in forcing us back 
to   our   corporality,   the   sacraments   shatter   such 
dreams.
23
1.1 What is a Sacrament?
Before we are able to discuss sacrament as a linguistic or a corporeal scandal, 
we must have a basic understanding of what a sacrament is.  In this chapter, we will 
establish what we mean by sacrament and sacramentality, and examine the reasons 
this concept has been a stumbling-block to Christian theology and liturgy.   Any 
understanding of sacrament must be tethered closely to the entire Christ event, to the 
biblical witness concerning the person of Jesus Christ and the sacred meal he 
instituted in the Last Supper.   However, sacraments must also be understood as 
cultural artifacts of a sort; indeed the Christian concept of sacrament derives directly 
from an existing concept found with the surrounding Roman cultural context.  We 
must take this into account as well.  Finally, sacrament must be understood in relation 
to signs and symbols.  The writings of St. Augustine and Paul Tillich will assist us in 
23 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 154.26
understanding the characteristics of sacrament as a unique species of religious 
symbol.
Once this is established, we will turn our attention to the relationship of the 
sacraments, and the Eucharist in particular, to the Church.
24  Any Christian concept of 
sacrament is meaningless apart from the person and work of Christ, and indeed from 
its inception the Eucharist has been regarded as the Body and Blood of Christ.  But 
the Church is also understood to be the Body of Christ, a designation that derives 
directly from the eucharistic action of the Church.  Therefore, we must determine how 
the Church is constituted as Church by the Eucharist – how the Eucharist makes the 
Church.  Yet inherent to the scandal of sacramentality is the tendency to both stabilize 
and de-stabilize, or as David Power has observed of all rites, to both gather and 
scatter.
25   That which provides the Church with her very being and identity, her 
sacramental function and form, is also that which strips the Church of every 
possession, power and authority, calling her to be broken and poured out, like the 
eucharistic elements and the Body and Blood of Christ they represent.  In this way, 
the Eucharist simultaneously makes and breaks the Church.
The word sacrament comes from the Latin word sacramentum, which, along 
with mysterium, was used to transcribe the Greek term mystērion or “mystery” in 
Latin translations of the New Testament.
26   Henri de Lubac points out that in the 
24 A more precise definition of “Church” is required here. We have taken a deliberately eclectic, wide-
angle approach to ecclesiastical and doctrinal history, attending variously the Roman Catholic, 
Anglican and Eastern Orthodox traditions as we have found them most useful to the discussion at 
hand, while acknowledging the differences between these traditions in ecclesiology, theology and 
liturgy.   We   use   “Church”   (capitalized)   to   refer   in   the   broadest   sense   to   the   Church 
universal/catholic, as a kind of trans-historical and pan-ecclesial, yet always thoroughly contextual 
and this-worldly entity. While acknowledging the legitimacy of a “cosmic” or mystical conception 
of the Church as the Body of Christ, our interest never strays from the particularity of the Church as 
both an expression of and reaction to its given historical and cultural context. Wherever it appears, 
“church” is used in reference to a specific local church or the traditions/denominations that 
comprise the Church.
25 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 94.
26 It is noteworthy that these scriptural instances of even the Gk. term mystērion, later translated 
sacramentum in the Vulgate, do not refer directly to the Lord's supper or any ritual act, but simply 
to a mystery or in some modern translations, a secret; e.g. Mark 4:11 (KJV), 'And he said unto 27
'language of the liturgy, as with that of exegesis, mystery and sacrament are often used 
interchangeably.  The Latin version of the New Testament translate mystērion equally 
by either word.'
27  As de Lubac has demonstrated in detail, the phrase “mystical body” 
(corpus mysticum) of Christ was first applied to the Eucharist – that is, Christ's 
sacramental body which mediates his historical body – but the phrase was gradually 
detached from the Eucharist and transposed into an exclusive link with Christ's 
ecclesial body, the Church.
28  This shift represents a significant step in an incremental 
departure   from  the   mysterious   and   mystical   nature   of   sacraments   in  Western 
Christianity in particular, and by extension in Western thought in general.
29   By 
making this point, we wish to highlight the fundamental mystery of the Christian 
sacraments, which were and still are referred to as mysteries in Eastern Christianity. 
This mystical and mysterious quality must not be forgotten or neglected, for it is an 
even more originary concept to the meaning ascribed to the ancient Christian rituals 
commonly called sacraments.
Sacramentum  was borrowed from the surrounding Roman cultural context, 
where it might refer to a ritual oath sworn by a Roman soldier in allegiance to the 
emperor, or more generically to something set aside for sacred or religious uses.  The 
them, Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God'; Rom. 16:25 (KJV), 'Now 
to him that is of power to stablish you according to my gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, 
according to the revelation of the mystery, which was kept secret since the world began.'
27 Henri Cardinal de Lubac, SJ, Corpus Mysticum: The Eucharist and the Church in the Middle Ages, 
historical survey (London: SCM, 2006), p. 45.
28 Ibid., pp. 13-119.
29 It is not far-fetched to suggest that the de-mystification of the “sacred mysteries” of the church is in 
fact a central chapter in the entire narrative of secularization. In The Legitimacy of the Modern Age 
(Chicago and London: U of Chicago P/Reaktion Books, 1983), Hans Blumenberg points out that 
the entire concept of secularization only makes sense when approached with certain theological 
presuppositions: 'Early Christianity found itself in what was, in view of its foundational documents, 
the difficult position of having to demonstrate the trustworthiness of its God to an unbelieving 
surrounding world not by the fulfillment of His promises but by the postponement of this 
fulfillment….In order to demonstrate its usefulness to the surrounding world, which, while it is a 
source of affliction, is also itself afflicted, the ancient Church ‘secularizes’ itself into (takes on the 
worldly role of) a stabilizing factor' (p. 44). For similar readings of secularization, cf. Gianni 
Vattimo, After Christianity (New York: Columbia UP, 2002); R. Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics.28
term is not adopted in Christian theology to describe various rites of Christian 
worship until its usage by Tertullian near the end of the 2
nd century.  One of the 
struggles of the early church was against persecution by a surrounding culture which 
did not recognize Christianity as an acceptable religion.  In fact, after Justin Martyr, 
Tertullian is one of the earliest apologists for the societal legitimacy of Christianity. 
With this struggle emerges the inevitable but somewhat problematic tendency to 
define Christian faith and practice according to extant religious traditions already 
deemed acceptable by the surrounding culture.   And so, in their effort to defend 
themselves as good citizens and harmless practitioners of their faith, the apologists 
borrowed concepts like “mystery” or “sacrament” from the surrounding culture to 
explain their own practices.  In the long-term, this tactic would shape Christianity's 
understanding of its own rites in significant and lasting ways.
However, this is not a point to be passed over too quickly, for it proves central 
to the argument we offer here.   We contend that to formulate any meaningful 
understanding of sacrament in a postmodern milieu, one must look to corresponding 
traces from the surrounding culture, for in such a way, the Christian notion of 
sacrament came into being in the first place.  The sacred meal in which the the early 
Christians partook of the bread and the cup as a “sharing” (1 Cor. 10:16)
30 in the body 
and   blood   of   Christ   pre-dates   any   application   of   the   concepts  mystērion  or 
sacramentum to this ritual.  As Christian faith and practice expanded and became 
more codified over time, these concepts from the broader (pagan or “secular”) culture 
were usefully appropriated to explain the significance of what appeared to the 
uninitiated to be at best secretive and at worst criminal religious rituals.  Over time, 
these initially foreign concepts became indispensable to the Christian understanding 
30 The NRSV translates the  Gk.  koinōnia  as “sharing”; other translations include “participation” 
(NIV) and “communion” (KJV).   In  Corpus Mysticum, de  Lubac remarks that  'in Christian 
antiquity... communio – together with the Greek koinōnia– implies no other idea except that of the 
reception of the sacrament' (p. 18).29
of their own sacred rites.  This observation is by no means a deconstruction of the 
primacy or integrity of the Eucharist or the theology of the sacraments – for indeed, 
the ritual predates the terminology and theology later applied to it – but rather 
demonstrates that to approach the notion of sacrament in the first instance, one is 
already firmly within the realm of hermeneutics, for to refer to the Lord's Supper as a 
sacrament is to have already performed an act of interpretation or translation, the 
“carrying across” of meaning from one concept to another.
31
We have discussed the origins of the term sacrament and how it came to be 
applied to the Christian ritual partaking of the Lord's Supper.  We must extend this 
understanding by tracing the Lord's Supper, through scripture and the earliest 
Christian practice, to the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper and ultimately 
to the entire Christ event encompassing the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and 
ascension of Jesus Christ.  But before we proceed to these theological connections, we 
must continue to pursue the question what is a sacrament? by considering the concept 
of sacrament in relation to the broader categories of sign and symbol.
1.2 Sign, Symbol and Sacrament
Looking  back   across  Christian   history,  sacraments  have  been  described 
variously as “sacred signs,” “means of grace,” “visible words,” and especially in 
Protestant thought, as “symbols.”  We shall address all of these descriptions in due 
course, but to begin with, we will examine sacraments as signs, and then sacraments 
as symbols.  A sacrament is a unique type of religious symbol, and a symbol, whether 
religious or not, is a special type of sign.  Therefore, any discussion of sacrament or 
31 cf. D. Power,  Sacrament:  'Sacraments  have to be interpreted as liturgical celebrations […]. 
Interpretations of the sacraments have to face the diverse character of the scriptural texts 
proclaimed in their celebration and of the rites celebrated.  They cannot reduce the texts to a single 
grand narrative or overarching symbolism, nor the rites to a clearly demarked essence of matter and 
form. Interpretation respects the pluriformity of faith in Christ already evident in the New 
Testament...' (pp. 48-49).30
sacramentality,   and   hence   any   sacramental   theology,   must   begin   with   an 
understanding of the nature of sign systems and the processes of signification, as well 
as symbol and the symbolic matrix according to which sacraments derive their unique 
form and function.
St. Augustine is the first Christian thinker to clearly differentiate between the 
sign and that which the sign signifies.   In Book II of  On Christian Teaching, 
Augustine writes that at the most fundamental level, ‘a sign is a thing which of itself 
makes some other thing come to mind, besides the impression that it presents to the 
senses.’
32   A sign, in other words, points beyond itself to something besides the 
sensory reception (as a sound, shape, color, etc) of the sign itself.  A sign “calls to 
mind” something other than itself, and is thus different from that which it represents. 
Augustine thus establishes the relationship between the sign and the thing signified as 
a relationship characterized by difference or (dis)continuity, we might say, by placing 
the interpreter of the sign at a distance from that which the sign represents.
33
According to Augustine, there are ‘natural’ signs, which signify ‘without a 
wish or any urge to signify,’ and with which Augustine is not particularly interested 
(e.g. animal tracks; smoke).   Far more interesting to Augustine are ‘given’ signs 
(which might be better understood in contemporary parlance as  symbols), which 
begins to approach the even more exclusive concept of sacrament.  Given signs are 
exchanged between ‘living things’ to convey that which is invisible or un-depictable, 
namely emotions, feelings, knowledge and so on.  He explains: 'There is no reason for 
32 Augustine, On Christian Teaching (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), p. 30. Augustine’s examples include 
a footprint being a sign of the creature that left it, and smoke signifying the presence of a fire.
33 While this distance or difference is not fully developed in Augustine's semiotic theory, it will be of 
significant interest to postmodern thought, leading such contemporary thinkers as John Caputo to 
read Augustine as something of a proto-postmodern thinker; cf. John D. Caputo and Michael J. 
Scanlon, eds, Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, IN: Indiana UP, 2005), and Robert Dodaro, “Loose Canons: Augustine and Derrida on 
Their Selves,” in Caputo and Scanlon, eds., God, The Gift, and Postmodernism (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, IN: Indiana UP, 1999), pp. 79-111.31
us to signify something (that is, to give a sign) except to express and transmit to 
another’s mind what is in the mind of the person who gives the sign.'
34  Signs of this 
kind, therefore, require interpretation – and so again, we cannot avoid hermeneutics, 
the art of interpretation, which involves a wrestling with the text (sign).   This 
wrestling  renders or brings forth the meaning of the sign.  However, as the very 
presence of the sign itself emphasizes the distance between the interpreter and the 
thing  interpreted,  this   wrestling  also  rends  and   creates   tears  in  the  fabric  of 
signification, by delineating this gap.
35
This image of wrestling is not inappropriate, for as Augustine points out, ‘it is 
much more pleasant to learn lessons presented through imagery, and much more 
rewarding to discover meanings that are won only with difficulty.’
36 This calls to mind 
Jesus’ teachings, specifically about his Body and Blood, which the disciples describe 
as ‘hard teachings’ (John 6:60); however difficult, the interpreter will be rewarded 
with pleasure when meaning is discovered.  We will return more comprehensively to 
the themes of tearing, disruption and pleasure in Part Two, but for now let us only 
briefly allude to Karmen MacKendrick's observation that 'Pleasure is destabilizing 
and threatening not only to the political and cultural orders but to all manner of 
orders.'
37   Certainly the pleasure of sacramentality, closely linked with the erotic 
nature of sacramental participation and interpenetration, is part of sacrament's risky 
and destabilizing scandal.
Sacraments are not merely signs, but are symbols, and specifically symbols of 
a religious nature.  Symbol comes from the Greek term symbolon meaning “token” or 
34 Augustine, On Christian Teaching, p. 30.
35 In Chapter 2, we will further pursue this notion of the gap between the signifier and the signified in 
our discussion of the problem of language, especially as it is expounded upon by Saussure and 
Derrida.
36 Augustine, On Christian Teaching, p. 33.
37 Karmen MacKendrick, Counterpleasures (SUNY Press: Albany, NY, 1999), p. 6.32
“watchword,” which was first used by Cyprian of Carthage (c. 250) to describe the 
Apostles' Creed as the distinguishing mark of a Christian.  Etymologically, a symbol 
is something thrown or cast together: 'sym'- (“together”) + 'bole' (from ballein, “to 
throw”).
38  In the ancient context, a symbol could be a physical token, such as a coin, 
something cast as an integrous whole, which would be broken in two and given to two 
people, so that the authenticity of an agreement, relationship or other claim could later 
be established by the coming together of the two halves of the symbol.  Chauvet 
explains:
The ancient symbolon is precisely an object cut in two, one 
part of which is retained by each partner in a contract.  Each 
half   evidently   has   no   value   in   itself   and   thus   could 
imaginatively signify anything; its symbolic power is due 
only to its connection with the other half.  When, years or 
even generations later, the partners or their descendants 
come together again to “symbolize” their two portions by 
joining   them   together,   they   recognize   this   act   as   the 
expression of the same contract, of the same alliance.  It is 
thus   the   agreement   between   the   two   partners   which 
establishes the symbol; it is the expression of a social pact 
based on mutual recognition and, hence, is a mediator of 
identity.
39
This ancient understanding undergirds later developments in the theory of symbols. 
Chauvet's analysis is incredibly detailed, and merits consideration beyond the scope 
of this project, but apropos to our purposes, he demonstrates that 'symbol, and 
especially ritual symbol, is the very epiphany of mediation in its most contingent and 
most culturally determined aspects.'
40   Further, this understanding of symbol reveals 
'the tear, the “fissure” that splits every symbol, that belongs to the very definition of 
38 See   “symbol”   in  Online   Etymology   Dictionary  <http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?
term=symbol> accessed 08 March 2010.
39 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pg. 112. In chapter 4 (“Symbol and Body”), Chauvet 
presents a rich analysis of symbol and symbolization in relation to Christian sacramentality (see pp. 
110-55).
40 Ibid.,  pp. 110-11. Chauvet's study eventually leads us 'from the symbol to the body...[as] the 
primordial and arch-symbolic form of mediation' (p. 111); we will postpone this until ch. 3.33
symbols.  Symbols crack; that is ultimately the source of their power.'
41
In his essay “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” Paul 
Tillich constructs a theory of religious symbols beginning with five characteristics of 
all representative symbols.  First, in accordance with St. Augustine’s understanding of 
signs, he notes that, like signs, it is ‘the character of all symbols to point beyond 
themselves...to something which cannot be grasped directly but must be expressed 
indirectly, namely, through the symbolic material.’
42   Second, unlike signs, all 
symbols ‘participate in the reality of that which they represent....It radiates the power 
of being and meaning of that for which it stands.’
43   Samuel Taylor Coleridge's 
description   is   unsurpassed   in   its   richness:   ‘a   symbol   is   characterized   by 
a...translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal.  It always partakes of the 
reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as 
a living part in that unity of which it is the representative.’
44
A third characteristic Tillich observes is that, unlike signs, which can be 
created and replaced as necessary, symbols cannot ‘be created at will.  It is not a 
matter of expediency and convention, as signs are.’
45  Even where individual creative 
talent is responsible for bringing a symbol to birth – as with the design of a flag, or a 
photograph or work of art that becomes iconic to a social body – it is only by virtue of 
its acceptance by a larger group that an image or object becomes truly symbolic.  In 
other words, in a certain sense symbols require the ratification of a community. 
41 N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, p. 52. This characteristic of symbol will be more fully explored in 
ch. 2.
42 Paul Tillich, “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” in David E. Klemm, ed. 
Hermeneutical Inquiry, Vol. I (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), p. 165. (Klemm’s introduction to 
Tillich’s essay is extremely helpful.) See also Tillich’s similar discussion of the meaning of symbols 
in Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 41-43, reprinted as “The Meaning of 
Symbol” in F. Forrester Church, ed., The Essential Tillich (New York: Collier Books / Macmillan, 
1987), pp. 41-43.
43 P. Tillich, “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” p. 166.
44 S. T. Coleridge, The Statesman’s Manual; in Richards, ed., The Portable Coleridge, p. 388.
45 P. Tillich, “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” p. 166.34
Fourth, representative symbols have the ‘power of opening up dimensions of reality’ 
otherwise inaccessible or inarticulable.  And fifth, symbols have an ‘integrating and 
disintegrating power’ to both individuals and groups.  Tillich contrasts the ‘elevating, 
quieting, and stabilizing power of religious symbols’ and ‘the “healing” power of 
religious symbols’ with what he calls the ‘disintegrating effect: causing restlessness, 
producing depression, anxiety, fanaticism, etc.’
46  Thus, according to Tillich, symbols 
comport a ‘tremendous power of creation and destruction.  By no means are they 
harmless semantic expressions.’
47   In this final characterization, Tillich hints at the 
dangerous, risky, and destabilizing power of symbols – an idea to which we have 
alluded already, and which shall continue to surface.  These are the characteristics of 
all representative symbols, and as sacraments are representative symbols, these 
characteristics apply to their definition as well.  However, sacraments are religious 
symbols, which requires unique characterization.
Later in the same essay, Tillich declares that ‘Nothing is prevented from 
becoming a sacred thing.  Only historical contingencies prevent it.’
48  Subtly, Tillich is 
pointing us toward a kind of inherent sacrality that pervades ‘everything that is,’ a 
sacra(menta)lity inescapable in the human experience of the created, material order. 
According to Tillich, the ‘authenticity’ of all symbols, including religious symbols, is 
determined according to their ‘adequacy’ to that which they express – so, for religious 
symbols,  we  are  interested   in  their   adequacy  to   express  religious   experience. 
Authentic symbols exist in contrast to 'nonauthentic' symbols 'which have lost their 
experiential basis, but which are still used for reasons of tradition or because of their 
46 Ibid.,  p. 166. In another essay, Tillich refers to the “ambiguity” of religion in general, and by 
extension, religious language and symbols: ‘meaning that it is creative and destructive at the same 
time.’  See Paul Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language” (in F. Church, ed., The Essential 
Tillich), p. 50 [excerpted from “Religious Symbols and Our Knowledge of God,” Christian Scholar 
(Sept. 1955), pp. 189-197].
47 Ibid., p. 167.
48 Ibid., p. 168.35
aesthetic value.’
49  But there is more to it than this: the ‘truth’ of a religious symbol is 
distinct from its authenticity.  Rather a religious symbol’s truth is ‘the degree to which 
[the particular symbol] reaches the referent of all religious symbols.’
50   This is a 
complex notion, for it seems to suggest that all religious symbols share, at least on 
one level, a common referent (the Sacred; in Tillich's perspective, 'Ultimate Concern'). 
So while on the one hand, we have the religious symbol in its ‘self-negation and 
transparency to the referent for which it stands’ – this Tillich calls ‘the negative 
quality,’ the degree to which the symbol annuls or empties itself on behalf of its 
referent.  And on the other hand we must consider ‘the value of the symbolic material 
used in [the symbol],’ which is ‘the positive quality which determines the truth of a 
religious symbol.’
51  To give a concrete example, from a Tillichean framework it is 
viable to suggest that bread is both more authentic and truthful a symbol for Christ's 
body than, for instance, meat or cheese, because the significance of bread as a basic 
unit of human subsistence transcends history, geography, religion and culture.  Bread 
is a recurring theme in the biblical witness, specifically in direct association with life 
itself, life in-the-body, which of necessity requires nourishment.
52  As David Klemm 
has observed, 'Bread and wine are symbols of fundamental or essential human 
49 Ibid.,  p. 168. Closely related is Paul Ricoeur conception of metaphor’s passage from ‘living’ 
(authentic) to ‘dead’: ‘In the metaphorical statement (we will not speak any longer of metaphor as 
word, but of metaphor as statement), the contextual action creates a new meaning, which truly has 
the status of event since it exists only in the present context.  At the same time, however, it can be 
reidentified as the same, since its construction can be repeated.  In this way, the innovation of an 
emergent meaning can be taken as a linguistic creation.  And if it is adopted by a significant part of 
the linguistic community, it in turn can become a common meaning and add to the polysemy of 
lexical entities, thus contributing to the history of the language as code or system.  But at this final 
stage, where the meaning-effect we call metaphor has become this shift of meaning that increases 
polysemy, the metaphor is then no longer living, but a dead metaphor.  Only authentic metaphors, 
that is, living metaphors, are at once meaning and event.’ See The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation 
of Meaning in Language (London and New York: Routledge, 1977), p. 115. We will return to 
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor in Ch. 2.
50 P. Tillich, “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” p. 170.
51 Ibid., p. 170.
52 e.g. manna in the OT (Exodus 16); Jesus' miraculous feedings (Lk. 9:10-17, Mt. 14:13-21, Mk. 
6:30-44, Jn. 6:1-14); Jesus' “Bread of Life” discourse (Jn. 6:22-65). The same could be said, with 
some limitation, for wine, e.g. Jesus' first miracle at the wedding at Cana (Jn. 2:1-11) and his self-
identification as the “vine” (Jn. 15:1-8)36
activity.  They represent in great simplicity the fruits of human labor in dwelling on 
earth and the basic sources of human nourishment'; additionally, 'Bread and wine 
symbolize the capacity for human fellowship.'
53 For these reasons, bread and wine 
occupy a privileged place over other possible symbols for Christ's physical body and 
blood in the celebration of the Eucharist.
This brings us to  sacrament.  St. Augustine also gave us one of the most 
enduring definitions of sacraments when he described them as visible signs of an 
invisible reality.
54  De Lubac notes that 
the classical definitions of a St. Augustine or a St. Isidore of 
Seville are well known and have been endlessly repeated. 
The   word  sacramentum  essentially   means   a   sign....St. 
Augustine insists on using its first adjective sacred, which 
brings   it   near   to  sacrifice:  sacrifice,   as   if   made 
sacred;...Isidore   underlines   its   second   adjective,  secret, 
which makes it look more intimately akin to  mystery. 
Already in St. Cyprian both senses can be found.
55
This is the basis of the common definition of sacrament, set forth by the Council of 
Trent, of sacrament as an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.
56
Most doctrinal and catechetical definitions of sacrament follow this formula. 
53 David E. Klemm, ““This is My Body”: Hermeneutics and Eucharistic Language,”  Anglican 
Theological Review 64:3 (1982), p. 294.
54 This idea is present in several places in Augustine's writings, e.g. De Civitate Dei, Book 10, ch. 5: 
'A sacrifice, therefore, is the visible sacrament or sacred sign of an invisible sacrifice'; available 
online at <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120110.htm>, accessed 12 March 2010. Cf.  De 
Catechizandis Rudibus (“On the Catechising of the Uninstructed”), § 26.50: 'On the subject of the 
sacrament, indeed, which he receives, it is first to be well impressed upon his notice that the signs 
of divine things are, it is true,  things visible, but that the  invisible things themselves are also 
honored in them' [ital. Added]; available online at <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1303.htm>, 
accessed 12 March 2010. Augustine's definition is foundational to Aquinas's thorough examination 
of sacrament in questions 60-65 of the Summa Theologica, Part III, especially Q. 60 “What is a 
sacrament?”;   available   online   at   <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4060.htm>,   accessed   12 
March 2010.
55 H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p. 45.
56 Sess. XIII of the Council of Trent (1551) addresses sacraments, and the Eucharist in particular. 
Trans. available online at <http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct13.html> accessed 12 March 
2010. De Lubac also notes the subtle difference between  mystery  and  sacrament  in ancient 
Christian thought, quoting Algerius of Liège (De Sacramentis): 'A sacrament and a mystery differ 
in this respect that sacrament is a visible sign signifying something, while a mystery is something 
hidden that it signifies.  However one can be used for the other...with the consequence that a 
mystery is both concealing and concealed, and a sacrament both signifying and signified' (p. 49).37
For instance, the Anglican Articles of Religion state that
Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens 
of Christian men’s [sic] profession, but rather they be 
certain sure witnesses, and effectual signs of grace, and 
God’s good will towards us, by the which he doth work 
invisibly   in   us,   and   doth   not   only   quicken,   but   also 
strengthen and confirm our Faith in him.
57
This is consistent with St. Thomas Aquinas, whose description of sacrament as 
'causes' of grace draws attention to another unique feature of that differentiates 
sacrament from other signs; namely, that sacraments do not simply mean something 
but in fact do something.  Like all signs, they re-present that which they signify, but 
they also effect the grace contained within that which they signify.
58   Sacraments, 
then, are not simply signs but ‘effectual signs.’  To borrow Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 
conception of language itself, they are 'living Things,' 'Spirits and Living Agents,' and 
‘living educts of the Imagination.’
59  These are not ‘mere’ signs but rather signs which 
accomplish something: namely, the bestowal of God’s grace upon the participant.
To cite another modern Anglican source, the catechism of the Episcopal 
Church (USA) answers the question ‘What are the sacraments?’ thus: ‘The sacraments 
are outward and visible signs of inward and spiritual grace, given by Christ as sure 
and certain means by which we receive that grace.’
60  This well-established doctrinal 
57 Art. XXV, BCP p. 872
58 T. Aquinas, ST III.62.1: 'only God can cause grace, for grace is no other than a participation in the 
divine nature...in this way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, for they are instituted by 
God to be used for the giving of grace.' (Excerpted in An Aquinas Reader, ed. M. Clark. New York: 
Fordham UP, 1988; p. 485).
59 David Jasper highlights these phrases from Coleridge in The Sacred Body, p. 121 and p. 158 (citing 
the original sources in his endnotes). Interestingly, by the modern era, Romantic thinkers such as 
Coleridge consider this effectual/'living' quality hitherto unique to sacrament as applicable to all 
language, as though with the collapse of the 'liturgical city'  of the high medieval era (cf. C. 
Pickstock, After Writing, pp. 135-58), the sacramentality of the Christian rites becomes diffused and 
disseminated into the world itself, which is accessible to us in any meaningful way only through 
language.  Regina Schwartz draws similar conclusions in Sacramental Poetics, focusing in on the 
literature of the early Reformation.
60 BCP p. 857. Of course, it would be virtually impossible to catalogue every doctrinal statement on 
sacrament in the contemporary Christian context, especially with so many independent churches 
having drafted their own unique statements and articles of faith. While our selection of sources is 
admittedly idiosyncratic, we will most often look to the doctrine of the Western Catholic and 
Anglican traditions.38
and catechetical definition goes on to clarify that ‘God does not limit himself to these 
rites; they are patterns of countless way by which God uses material things to reach 
out to us.’
61   Sacraments, therefore, according to Christian teaching, are more than 
mere ‘reminders’ or mundane ‘signs’ of grace, but are the medium or means by which 
that grace is given and made manifest.
62  In this way the Eucharist, as the sacrament of 
God's redemption of the world by Christ’s broken body and shed blood upon Calvary, 
may indeed be said to re-present – literally, make present again – Christ’s gracious 
giving of himself for the life of the world.
This definition also includes a vital caveat that the Eucharist in particular, or 
the sacraments in general, are by no means the only manner by which God’s grace is 
conveyed.  However, the sacraments make clear that God’s grace comes to us through 
materiality, through the physical matter of the created order.  They are, in Chauvet's 
phrase, 'the grace of God at the mercy of the body,' or in David Power's phrase, 'the 
language of God's giving' – two key phrases which will guide the next two chapters' 
exploration of sacrament as a scandal of language and of the body.  As regards the 
Divine, sacraments are an acknowledgment of the Creator’s relationship to and 
participation in the creation.   As regards the human, to quote David Brown, 
61 BCP p. 861. Aquinas lies behind this understanding as well: 'man's salvation....must be brought to 
spiritual and intelligible reality through corporeal and sensible things...sinning subjected him to 
corporeal things by his affections. But any healing remedy must be given to man so as to reach the 
part affected by the disease' (ST III.61.1).
62 We recognize that many Protestant churches, especially in the North American context, reject this 
understanding of sacrament; indeed, many reject the language of “sacrament” altogether and hold 
Baptism and the Lord's Supper to be “ordinances” instituted by Christ, which the scriptures 
command us to obey. However, we argue that our conception of the Church and of sacramentality 
still includes such “non-sacramental” traditions because it is demonstrably true that these churches 
hold a view of the Bible, of the “conversion experience,” and in some cases, of the “gifts” or 
manifestations of the Holy Spirit (speaking in tongues, words of prophecy, etc) that is unmistakably 
“sacramental,” in spite of the rejection of this language.  Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
priority given to the Eucharist (or Communion or the Lord's Supper, as it is called in many 
Protestant churches) in our study excludes churches like the Salvation Army or the Society of 
Friends (Quakers), which do not partake of bread and wine/grape juice as a remembrance of 
Christ's broken body and shed blood. However, it is noteworthy that neither of these ecclesial 
bodies employ the term “church” in their self-description: one is an “army,” the other is a “society.” 
In any case, our earlier claim holds true of these churches as well: while they may reject the idea of 
sacrament, and even the Eucharist, they are not without a sense of the sacramental, even if it has 
been displaced by other symbols and experiential practices of the faith.39
sacraments 'guarantee the believer's continuing engagement with Christ's humanity.'
63 
Therefore, it must not be overlooked that, while never limiting or confining the 
gracious action of God, sacraments provide a glimpse into the ways in which God 
works graciously through and within material reality.
Tillich holds such a robust or high view of symbol that it is difficult to identify 
how he distinguishes between symbol and sacrament.   Sacraments  are  symbols, 
although not all symbols are sacraments, but at times it seems that, for Tillich (as for 
Coleridge), all symbols possess a sacramental or sacrament-like quality.  Tillich notes 
that, like symbols, ‘Sacraments cannot be created arbitrarily; they originate only by 
virtue of historical fate.   All sacramental realities depend upon a tradition which 
cannot be abandoned arbitrarily or exchanged with some other tradition.’
64  It appears, 
then,   that   sacraments   differ   from  symbols   in   that   sacraments   are  not  merely 
conventional, like symbols, but are traditioned, and tradition-bound.  While symbols 
may be abandoned when they have outlived their usefulness, sacraments have a 
staying power that comes from outside the sacrament itself; this 'outside' is not simply 
the ratification of the community that has elevated these particular symbols to the 
level of sacrament – though a sacrament could not exist without this – but is some real 
and active participation in the Holy itself.   So symbols  may  be abandoned or 
exchanged  arbitrarily,   while  sacraments cannot.   However,  sacraments are not 
immune from what Tillich calls 'prophetic criticism,'
65 which speaks or acts on behalf 
of the Divine and can therefore call for the creation or destruction of sacraments.
In addition, it is not the ‘literal’ but precisely the symbolic character of the 
sacramental that makes it significant – that makes it ‘true’ in the Tillichean sense.  For 
63 David Brown, God and Grace of Body: Sacrament in Ordinary (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007), p. 390.
64 Paul Tillich, “Nature and Sacrament,” in Mark Kline Taylor, ed., Paul Tillich: Theologian of the 
Boundaries (San Francisco, CA, Ontario and London: Collins, 1987), p. 94.
65 Ibid., p. 94.40
‘the literal is not more but less than symbolic....The sacrament is not only a sign.’
66 
Tillich cites the very real and lasting differences between the sacramental thought of 
Luther, who affirmed that the materiality of the eucharistic elements participate 
‘really’ (that is, ‘symbolically’) in the reality of Christ’s body and blood, and Zwingli, 
who reduced the sacramental materials to the status of ‘mere’ symbol.   Tillich 
remarks, ‘Even in that period there was semantic confusion.  And let us not be misled 
by this.  In the real sense of symbol, the sacramental materials are symbols.  But if the 
symbol is used as  only  symbol (i.e. only signs), then of course the sacramental 
materials are more than this.'
67 What should be evident by this point is the observation 
that these terms – sign, symbol, sacrament – are highly ambiguous; clear, nuanced 
definitions require us to bracket the rather careless manner in which they are 
employed in common usage.   Still, following Tillich, one may assert a clear 
progression, beginning with sign as the broadest and most inclusive, but also the most 
mundane category; followed by symbol as a more restrictive and specialized type of 
sign; culminating finally in sacrament, as an exclusive type of religious symbol which 
bears a particular connection to the Holy and allows the Holy to be made uniquely 
and materially present in physical, tangible form.
This  material  and  immanent plane of religious symbols is precisely the 
domain of the sacramental, which ‘is nothing else than some reality becoming the 
bearer of the Holy in a special way and under special circumstances.’
68 However, this 
symbolic connection between the sacramental and the Holy is by no means infallible: 
‘It is the danger and an almost unavoidable pitfall of all religious symbols' – including 
66 P. Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language,” op. cit., p. 54 [ital. added].
67 Ibid., p. 54. Cf. Douglas Templeton’s statement in The New Testament as True Fiction: Literature, 
Literary Criticism, Aesthetics (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999): 'Literature differs from 
history as fiction differs from fact…History and literature are equally modes of dealing with, of 
finding language for, reality' (p. 305).
68 P. Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language,” p. 54.41
but not limited to sacraments – 'that they bring about a confusion between themselves 
and that to which they point.  In religious language this is called idolatry.’
69  In other 
words, we must not mistake the symbol for its referent, or allow the two to be 
identified so closely that it becomes difficult or impossible to differentiate between 
them, for ‘participation is not identity; [religious symbols] are not themselves the 
Holy.’
70   Tillich's observation here is prescient: sacraments are not immune to 
idolization, precisely because they are this-worldly artifacts.  Like every element of 
the created order, they may be used or abused.  They may be means of grace, or they 
may become demonic, for as Tillich observes:
In all sacramental activities of religion, in all holy objects, 
holy books, holy doctrines, holy rites, you find this danger 
which we will call “demonization.” They become demonic 
at the moment in which they become elevated to the 
unconditional and ultimate character of the Holy itself.
71
The difference is perspectival, as the same artifact may function as sacramental or 
demonic,   depending   on   the   orientation   or   vantage   point   of   the   practitioner 
(viewer/recipient).
72   This characteristic is not inherent to the religious symbol or 
sacrament, although, to return to Tillich's conception of the 'authenticity' and 'truth' of 
69 P. Tillich, “The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols,” p. 170. Tillich explains further: 
‘[Symbols] always have the tendency (in the human mind, of course) to replace that to which they 
are supposed to point, and to become ultimate in themselves....they become idols.  All idolatry is 
nothing else than the absolutizing of symbols of the Holy, and making them identical with the Holy 
itself’ (“The Nature of Religious Language,” in F. Church, ed., Essential Tillich, p. 50).
70 P. Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language,” p. 49.
71 Ibid., pp. 50-51. It is noteworthy that in this essay, Tillich draws a clear connection between 
liturgical and poetic language: ‘There are words in every language which are more than this [i.e. 
arbitrary and discontinuous signs], and in the moment in which they get connotations which go 
beyond some thing to which they point as signs, then they can become symbols...[In] liturgical or 
poetic language...words have a power through centuries, or more than centuries.   They have 
connotations in situations in which they appear so that they cannot be replaced.  They have become 
not only signs pointing to a meaning which is defined, but also symbols standing in for a reality in 
the power of which they participate’ (p. 46).
72 In this regard Tillich might be seen as prefiguring the work of Jean-Luc Marion on the difference 
between the icon and the idol. For Marion, the icon diverts the ‘gaze’ of the viewer away from itself 
toward the unrepresentable which lies beyond its frame, beyond its material depiction, while the 
idol freezes or fixes the gaze upon the 'envisagable', that is, material symbol itself. See J-L. Marion, 
The Idol and Distance: Five Studies (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2001) and God Without Being: 
Hors-texte (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1991), especially ch. 1.42
symbols, the capacity for sacrament to point toward not only its referent but to the 
referent of all religious symbols is the measure of its authenticity, or, we may say, it's 
'sacramentality' – the truth-quality of the sacrament which makes it appropriate to 
regard it as a sacrament.
Having   considered   Augustine   and   Tillich,   and   consulted   briefly   with 
catechetical literature on the topic, we can now assert that according to this 
perspective, sacraments:
1. are more than mere signs or symbols
2. cannot be created, but arise from and are dependent upon 
tradition
3. cannot be abandoned, but may be subject to prophetic 
critique
4. make present the Holy/divine/sacred under special 
circumstances.
5. participate in the reality they represent, yet remain distinct 
from it
6. derive their ‘truth’ not from their literal but rather from their 
symbolic (or we might say literary or aesthetic) quality
7. are susceptible to a dangerous, even demonic, tendency to 
supplant or become confused with that for which they stand 
in (i.e. idolatry)
1.3 Sacramental(s) and Sacramentality
Some comment should be made on two variations of the root word sacrament 
which shall appear throughout this essay.  In our discussion of sacraments, we will 
employ the terms  sacramental  and  sacramentality  in specific ways.   The Second 
Vatican Council's “Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy” (discussed further in Chapter 
2) addresses sacramentals in articles 60 and 61, stating they are
sacred signs  by which,  somewhat after the manner of 
sacraments, effects of a spiritual nature, especially, are 
symbolized   and   are   obtained   through   the   church’s 43
intercession.  By them, people are made ready to receive the 
much   greater   effect   of   the   sacraments,   and   various 
occasions in life are rendered holy.  Thus, for well-disposed 
members of the faithful, the liturgy of the sacraments and 
sacramentals sanctifies almost every event of their lives 
with the divine grace which flows from the paschal mystery 
of the passion, death and resurrection of Christ.  From this 
source all the sacraments and sacramentals draw their 
power.  There is scarcely any proper use of material things 
which   cannot   thus   be   directed   toward   people’s 
sanctification and the praise of God.
73
From this statement it is clear that as early as 1963, the Catholic understanding of 
sacramentals was rather fluid: they are 'sacred signs...somewhat after the manner of 
sacraments,' which are 'directed toward people's sanctification.' Liturgical dictionaries 
often include a separate entry for sacramentals, referring to sacred actions, instituted 
by the Church (in contrast to the dominical institution of Christ), which are not 
sacraments in the proper sense, but are usually but not exclusively employed within 
liturgical celebrations of the sacraments and which 'make explicit the meaning of the 
sacramental action although they are by no means indispensable to it.'
74   However, a 
more recent definition admits that 'any theology of sacramentals must run parallel to 
an emerging theology of sacraments, at times with no meaningful distinction between 
the two....today an understanding of sacramentals is very open-ended.'
75  While this 
latter definition is nearer to the our understanding, sacramentals in its noun form will 
not play a role in the present work.  We shall, however, utilize the adjectival form 
sacramental, as employed by Tillich, as a descriptor for anything that exhibits 
“sacrament-like”   qualities   and   might   therefore   be   appropriately   described   as 
73 “The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy,” p. 139 [ital. added]. In Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., Vatican 
II: The Sixteen Basic Documents (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 1996).
74 “Sacramentals” in J. G. Davies, ed. A New Dictionary of Liturgy and Worship (London: SCM, 
1986), p. 473. This definition goes on to note the triple immersion in baptism, the sign of the cross, 
the kiss of peace at the Eucharist, the blessing of palms or the consecration of a church as examples 
of sacramentals.
75 Kenan B. Osborne, “Sacramentals,” in Paul Bradshaw, ed., The New Westminster Dictionary of 
Liturgy and Worship (Louisville, KY and London: Westminster John Knox, 2002), p.  417.44
sacramental.
Returning momentarily to Tillich’s broader notion, we agree that ‘Any object 
or event is sacramental in which the transcendent is perceived to be present.’
76  The 
implication of Tillich’s assertion is that the number of things – objects, events, but 
also people, experiences, texts – which might be regarded as ‘sacramental’ is virtually 
without limit.   The key criterion for Tillich is individual perception, which does 
differentiate this view from traditional conceptions of the sacraments proper; in this 
view, the biblical ordinance of Christ, nor the acting authority of the Church, 
necessarily determines what is or is not ‘sacramental’ – the final determination rests 
on the experience and perception of the individual participant.  However, ‘there can 
be no sacramental object apart from the faith that grasps it.  Apart from the correlation 
between faith and sacrament, there can be no sacrament.’
77  In other words, that which 
might be perceived as sacramental or as a sacrament proper might also be perceived 
as perfectly mundane and religiously neutral by those without eyes of faith – and not 
faith in a generic sense, but the specific, traditioned faith according to which a 
sacrament is accepted as sacrament.  Tillich understands that the ability to perceive 
life as sacramental is indeed itself an act of faith.   In fact, 'Faith,' writes Nathan 
Mitchell, 'is desire for that utterly Other, desire whose goal is not possession (grasping 
God on our terms) but dispossession.'
78  And so the sacramental, and the faith required 
to experience the sacramental, is at its core 'not  grasping  something...but  letting 
oneself be grasped.
79  In this sense, it is wholly other; it does not come from within 
the Self, but comes from beyond as the gratuitous gift of grace.
Finally, we shall frequently employ the term sacramentality to refer to the 
76 P. Tillich, “Nature and Sacrament,” op. cit., p. 91.
77 Ibid., p. 93.
78 N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, p. 69.
79 Ibid., p. 68.45
distinctive character or quality of sacrament qua sacrament.  In other words, just as 
persons have and are defined by their personality, and texts operate according to an 
inherent textuality, so sacraments exhibit an intrinsic sacramentality which in turn 
assists us in defining what is mean by sacrament in the broadest sense.  It should be 
noted that we have not coined this term.  To consider one recent example, while we 
generally accept his premise, Kevin Irwin’s use of sacramentality appears slightly 
more restrictive than ours: ‘signs of what is both human and divine’; he goes on to 
write of ‘the broad meaning of sacramentality, namely that God is disclosed and 
discovered here and now on earth and in human life is the ground on which 
sacraments per se are based.’
80  However, his use of the term sacramental more nearly 
approaches ours when he writes: ‘By “sacramental” I want to underscore… the unity 
of both the divine and human and the sacred and the secular.  By “sacramental” I also 
mean that God is both revealed and yet also remains hidden...all sacramentality both 
reveals and hides the complete reality of God.’
81  Irwin emphasizes, as does this essay, 
the  paradoxical  quality of sacrament, which simultaneously veils and unveils the 
Divine within the realm of human experience.   That which deserves to be called 
sacramental  confuses and confounds the tidy distinctions between such binary 
opposites as immanence and transcendence, the material and the spiritual, the sacred 
and the secular/profane, and so on.
This paradox is central to the scandal of sacramentality.    As Catholic 
theologian Karl Rahner writes, 'The grace of God no longer comes (when it does 
come) steeply down from on high, from a God absolutely transcending the world, and 
in a manner that is without history, purely episodic; it is permanently in the world in 
tangible historical form, established in the flesh of Christ as a part of the world, of 
80 Kevin Irwin, “A Sacramental World – Sacramentality As The Primary Language for Sacraments,” 
in Worship 76.3 (May 2002), p. 201.
81 Ibid., p. 202.46
humanity and of its very history.'
82   Rahner is one of the most influential Roman 
Catholic theologians of the 20
th century and a key contributor to the liturgical reforms 
of Vatican II.  In this quotation, he asserts in no uncertain terms the “this-worldliness” 
and historicity of the grace of God.  The “worldliness” of God’s grace is, to reiterate, 
'established in the flesh of Christ.'  Rahner is making the radical claim that grace does 
not reside outwith the world, (e.g. in heaven) and then come into the world “from on 
high”, but rather is in the world, part of the created order.  This is all due to the 
kenosis of the enfleshed, incarnate Christ, who “poured himself out” (Phil. 2) to take 
on humanity.   So we can say that grace is present in the world.  And yet, as the great 
creeds of the Church profess, the resurrected, bodily Christ 'ascended into heaven and 
is seated at the right hand of the Father.'  Thus the question of presence and absence is 
brought to the fore.  How is Christ “present” in the world via the Church and the 
sacraments?
1.4  The Centrality of Christ
The Christ-event is, in our estimation, a crisis or scandal in the life of God, a 
scandal which then infuses the Christian faith and is expressed, however covertly, in 
Christian sacramental worship.  Reflecting on Jacob’s wrestling with the angel/God in 
Genesis 32, Geoffrey Wainwright employs similar language: 'The ‘scandal of God’s 
defeat’…points, theologically, to the ‘scandalous’ divine self-giving represented first 
by creation and then by the Cross.'
83  In both cases, the out-pouring of God in creation 
and in the Christ-event, the creative Logos of God is the principle actor.  It appears 
that, by the incarnation of God in Christ, God is scandalized.  One thing must be made 
clear: this scandalous characteristic of sacrament we are tracing is only inherent to 
82 Karl Rahner, The Church and the Sacraments (Exeter: Burns & Oates, 1986), p. 15 [ital. added].
83 Geoffrey Wainwright,  Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine and Life  (London: 
Epworth Press, 1980), p. 44.47
sacrament insofar as sacrament itself, the Eucharist in particular, is rooted in the 
Christ-event.
84   Jesus’ life, death and resurrection are the apex of the out-pouring 
(kenosis) of God which begins with creation and culminates in the eschatological 
reconciliation of the entire created order to God.
As Tillich affirms, 'No sacrament, in Christian thought, can be understood 
apart from its relation to the new being in Jesus as the Christ.'
85   To pursue this 
christological   basis   of   sacramentality,   let   us   further   examine   Karl   Rahner’s 
sacramental thinking.  Rahner refers to Christ as the 'primal sacramental word of God' 
and the Church as the 'the abiding presence of that sacramental word of definitive 
grace'; therefore 'the Church is truly the fundamental sacrament, the well-spring of the 
sacraments   in   the   strict   sense.     From  Christ  the   Church   has   an   intrinsically 
sacramental structure.'
86     In Rahner's conception, a hierarchy of the sacramental 
mediation of the Divine is established: 
The Godhead > 
The incarnate Christ (primal sacrament of God) > 
The Church / Body of Christ (fundamental sacrament of Christ)
The Church is in fact 'the source of redemptive grace.'
87   Rahner claims his 
understanding of the Church-as-fundamental-sacrament is derived not 'by a vague 
84 By “Christ-event,” we intend to encompass entire narrative of the Incarnation, life, death, 
resurrection and ascension of God in the historical figure Jesus of Nazareth.  Behind this historical 
figure lies the theological doctrine of the co-eternal second person of the Trinity, God-the-Son, the 
creative Logos of the Father, etc; and in front of this lies the continued spatio-temporal presence of 
Christ in the Church (as the Body of Christ); but neither of these implications are intended when we 
use the term “Christ-event.”  To be clear, we are not interested in what may or may not lie “behind 
the text,” for we take seriously the poststructuralist critiques, namely Jacques Derrida’s assertion 
that 'There is nothing outside of the text'; see J. Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore, MD and 
London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997), p. 158.  We are interested in the Christ-event as re-presented in 
the literary narratives of the New Testament and in the “texts” of the Church's liturgical celebrations 
throughout history.  This is in no way to diminish the “truth” of these literary instantiations, but 
rather to clearly focus on the irreducible “textuality” of the Christ-event, of the Eucharist, and by 
extension, of sacramentality in general.
85 P. Tillich, “Nature and Sacrament,” p. 90.
86 K. Rahner, Church and Sacraments, p. 18.
87 Ibid., p. 22.48
borrowing from the concept of sacrament known to us already from the current 
teaching about the sacraments' but rather 'from Christology' itself.
88  This is consistent 
with our assertion that the sacraments, and the Eucharist in particular, point back first 
and most significantly to the person and work of Jesus Christ: the entire narrative of 
his incarnation, life, ministry, death, resurrection, ascension, and his sending of the 
Holy Spirit.  But Rahner enters into the equation the necessity of the Church, as 
Christ's Body on earth to whom the administration of the sacraments has been 
entrusted.  The Church is therefore considered the fundamental sacrament; 'custodian' 
and even 'source' of the sacraments, by virtue of an authority derived from Christ 
himself.   Rahner upholds the primacy of the Church, and the centrality of the 
sacraments to the Church’s identification as the vehicle of God’s redemptive activity:
But when the Church in her official, organized, public 
capacity precisely as the source of redemptive grace meets 
the individual in the actual ultimate accomplishment of her 
nature, there we have sacraments in the proper sense, and 
they can be seen to be the essential functions that bring into 
activity the very essence of the Church herself.  For in them 
she herself attains the highest degree of actualization of 
what she always is: the presence of redemptive grace for 
men, historically visible and manifest as the sign of the 
eschatologically victorious grace of God in the world.
89
In other words, the Church in the world, by way of her sacramental activity, becomes 
both  sign  and  source  of redemptive grace – a reminder that signs, symbols, and 
therefore sacraments participate in the reality of and indeed effect that to which they 
refer.  
Rahner continues to work out his definition of sacrament: 'the sacraments 
precisely as signs are causes of grace…causation by symbols.'
90  In an effort to follow 
this train of thought, let us reword Rahner’s statement slightly, recollecting Aquinas's 
88 Ibid., p. 23. 
89 Ibid., p. 22 [italics added].
90 Ibid., p. 37.49
formulation
91: the sacraments cause grace.   As signs/symbols, they are not merely 
means, channels, or conduits for grace to be transmitted, but they are in fact the 
indispensable source of grace.  It is precisely as signs or symbols that sacraments are 
causes of grace.  Yet does Rahner’s definition open up the possibility that the converse 
could be true: that in fact those signs or symbols which cause grace are appropriately 
called sacraments?  If a sacrament is a sign or symbol that causes grace, then could 
we not also say that any sign or symbol that effects grace is a sacrament?  In seeking 
to understand how grace is caused by symbols, is it appropriate to begin with a 
theological concept of sacrament, or should we rather arrive at a concept of sacrament 
by understanding and experiencing grace via signs or symbols?  And historically, and 
even scripturally, which would be the more sound understanding?  It occurs to us that 
although Rahner's proposal goes no further than the former, the latter – by giving 
primacy   to  grace  (rather   than  sacrament),   and   by   acknowledging   the   utter 
contingency of all signs and symbols – is the more appropriate conclusion.  Rather 
than beginning with a theological definition of sacrament in the sense of limited, 
identifiable, liturgically instantiated means of grace, we should begin with the 
understanding that a sign/symbol which causes or mediates grace
92  is that which 
deserves to be called a  sacrament.   As  Schillebeeckx asserts, 'every supernatural 
reality which is realized historically in our lives is sacramental.'
93  It is plausible, then, 
to assert that the Church cannot ultimately constrain the notion of sacrament on the 
basis of its rubrics and formulae (although we are at the same time reminded of the 
“traditioned”   and   tradition-bound   character   of   all   religious   symbols,   including 
sacraments).   If Christ is the ultimate referent of the sacraments, the Church – 
91 Aquinas, ST III.62.1
92 Any   distinction   between  causality  and  mediation,   we   contend,   is   practically   as   well   as 
experientially irrelevant.
93 E. Schillebeeckx, O.P., Christ the Sacrament, p. 5.50
however true it may be that she is custodian of and charged with the right 
administration of the sacraments – must be seen as deriving her identity as the Body 
of Christ first from Christ and then only by extension from her participation in the 
sacraments.  It is the grace of God, supremely manifest in Christ, made available in 
the Eucharist, which makes the Church.
1.5 The Eucharist Makes the Church
94
The earliest cultic practice of the Christian faith, which scripture affirms 
included the breaking of bread (cf. Acts 2:42), took place in absence of textual 
recollection or written liturgical instruction.  Yet liturgy, as text and performance, and 
as   the   original   context   for   eucharistic   action,   precisely   embodies   the   root 
hermeneutical ambiguity we face.   We often associate “a liturgy” with a textual 
artifact, something bound within a prayer book or ecclesiastical manual of some kind. 
Liturgies “script” our worship.  Today, if one asks if a given church has a “liturgy,” 
what is invariably meant is, does the church worship according to a script or text 
which provides the words and prayers by which sacraments are “guaranteed” to be 
biblically and theologically sound.  In short, liturgical worship is worship “by the 
book.”  But it is a mistake to associate liturgy only with the textual guide or formula 
for worship, for the work of the people only authentically occurs in the actual 
performance – local yet universal – of the liturgical text or rite.   In this sense, 
Christian liturgy, at the center of which lies the Eucharist, is irreducibly performative: 
the bodily senses are engaged by word, gesture, song, movement, food.   Bodies 
interact with one another in the liturgy.  A community is formed around the Word and 
94 The phrase belongs to de Lubac: 'Literally speaking, therefore, the Eucharist makes the Church. It 
makes of it an inner reality.   By its hidden power, the members of the body come to unite 
themselves by becoming more fully members of Christ, and their unity with one another is part and 
parcel of their unity with the one single Head' (Corpus Mysticum,  p. 88).   It is used by Paul 
McPartlan as the title of his study The Eucharist Makes the Church: Henri de Lubac and John 
Zizioulas in Dialogue (San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins, 1993).51
the sacrament.  These bodily individuals who make up the ecclesia, both constitute 
and are constituted by the eucharistic action that makes the Church the Church.  It is 
in this communion that the Eucharist and the Church are each given its highest 
expression.
In  Being as Communion, Orthodox  theologian John Zizioulas seeks  to 
construct a Christian ontology based upon the Eucharist.  Zizioulas asserts, as implied 
in his title, that true being is only found in communion with God and neighbor (all 
humankind).   Zizioulas distinguishes between  personality  and  personhood, or in 
Greek terms, hypostasis and persona.  To attain true being, one must move beyond the 
individuality of personality into personhood and community through relationship to 
the ‘other.’   According to Zizioulas, ‘A human being left to himself cannot be a 
person.’
95  For Zizioulas, God is the ‘other’ in relation to whom our being is grounded. 
However, this in no way negates the necessity of human relationships, for one may 
only commune with God communally.  As God has been revealed as the communion 
of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—it follows that ‘the being of God could 
be known only through personal relationships and personal love.  Being means life, 
and life means communion.’
96  Neither does this relationality negate difference:
The mystery of being a person lies in the fact that here 
otherness and communion are not in contradiction but 
coincide.    Truth   as   communion   does   not  lead   to   the 
dissolving of the diversity of beings into one vast ocean of 
being, but to the affirmation of otherness in and through 
love.
97
Ultimately, for Zizioulas, authentic being means participation in the life of God, 
which is only possible through the incarnation of Christ.   Since ‘Christ Himself 
95 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), p. 107. Martin Buber makes a similar observation in I and Thou 
(2nd ed.; London and New York: T & T Clark, 1994): ‘Individuality neither shares in nor obtains 
any reality’ (p. 64).
96 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 16. 
97 Ibid., p. 106.52
becomes revealed as truth not  in  a community, but  as  a community,’
98  (i.e. the 
Church), it follows that ‘[the] eucharistic community is the Body of Christ  par 
excellence simply because it incarnates and realizes our communion within the very 
life and communion of the Trinity.’
99
Therefore it is only through the communion of the Church, conceived as the 
‘eucharistic community,' that individuals may become persons.  Via the Eucharist, 
Christian persons are made into a community called Church.  A rich passage from de 
Lubac helps articulate this:
For,   in   the   same   way   that   sacramental   communion 
(communion in the body and the blood) is always at the 
same time an ecclesial communion (communion within the 
Church, of the Church, for the Church...), so also ecclesial 
communion always includes, in its fulfillment, sacramental 
communion.  Being in communion with someone means to 
receive the body of the Lord with them.  Being united with 
the saints in the Church and participating in the Eucharist, 
being part of the common Kingdom, and sharing in the holy 
mysteries go together in tandem and it can be said that they 
are one and the same thing.   It is what will later be 
succinctly   expressed   in   the   formulation:  Christian 
communion.
100
Clearly, the sacramental and ecclesial bodies of Christ cannot be separated.  This 
communion runs deeper still, for according to Zizioulas, ‘The eucharist is the only 
historical context of human existence where the terms “father,” “brother,” etc., lose 
their biological exclusiveness and reveal, as we have seen, relationships of free and 
universal love.’
101  As we welcome the replacement of our biological or ‘natural-born’ 
hypostasis with a new ecclesial identity based on love without exclusion, it becomes 
clear that ‘[it] is in the eucharist, understood properly as a community and not as a 
98 Ibid., p. 115. 
99 Ibid., p. 114. 
100 H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p. 21.
101 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 60. 53
“thing,” that Christ is present here and now.’
102
Zizioulas   demonstrates   that   ‘To   be  and  to   be   in   relation  becomes 
identical...Here is certainly an ontology derived from the being of God.’
103  As true 
being requires the integration of the one into the many, it follows that this same 
ontology applies to the relationship of local Churches to  the  Church.   ‘Thus the 
Church becomes Christ Himself in human existence’, just as ‘every member of the 
Church becomes Christ and Church.’
104  Local congregations acquire authentic being 
as the Church in communion.  As ‘the Church has bound every one of her acts to the 
eucharist,’
105  it is the Eucharist that creates the Church, and makes the Church 
catholic.
Thus far Zizioulas has provided us with a concept of Church as the eucharistic 
community, and of being that requires relationship to God via the eucharistic 
community, as it is the Eucharist itself that makes individual personalities into 
persons, and makes the Church (into) the body of Christ.  As such, we agree with 
Zizioulas when he writes that ‘the eucharist constituted the Church’s being.’
106  From 
a Western perspective, Rahner put it thus: ‘She [the Church] is most manifest and in 
the most intensive form, she attains the highest actuality of her own nature, when she 
celebrates the eucharist.’
107   And in The Shape of the Liturgy, Anglican monk and 
liturgical scholar Gregory Dix traces the evolution of the Eucharist beginning with 
Christ’s last supper with the twelve and in the life of the early church, concluding that 
‘the primitive church did not create the eucharist.  It would be less untrue to say that 
102 Ibid., pp. 213-14. 
103 Ibid., p. 88. 
104 Ibid., p. 58. 
105 Ibid., p. 61. 
106 Ibid., p. 21. 
107 K. Rahner, Church and Sacraments, p. 84. He states elsewhere that the Eucharist “the highest actual 
fulfilment of her [the Church’s] own being” (p. 66).54
the eucharist created that primitive church which preached the paradox of 'Messiah 
crucified.’
108   In this history, Christ’s exhortation is that the breaking of bread and 
sharing of the cup – a fellowship meal quite familiar to his disciples – would from this 
time on be done ‘in remembrance’ of him, of his broken body and shed blood. 
Through the early Church’s keeping of this command to remembrance, the Eucharist 
develops into a distinctive and definitive event in Christian worship.  The emerging 
ritual will eventually settle into a ‘four-action’ shape, in which the sacred elements are 
taken (offertory), blessed (consecration), broken (fracture) and given (distribution or 
communion).     This   liturgical   embodiment   of   Christ’s   redemptive   death   and 
resurrection by the eucharistic community is intrinsic to the Church’s identity.
In this way, the Eucharist is always the activity of the whole church, with 
Christ as its head.  In doing so we ‘become what we are’, for as Dix asserts, ‘It is by 
the sacraments that you receive ‘what you are’, your true christian being; it is by your 
life that you must 'become' what they convey.…The church is in the sight of God the 
Body of Christ; at the eucharist and by the eucharist for a moment it truly fulfils this, 
its eternal being; it becomes what it is.’
109  Furthermore, it is never a Eucharist we 
celebrate, but always the Eucharist – one ritual, infinitely repeated – for when we 
experience anamnēsis, we are transported into ‘something altogether beyond time, 
which yet “comes” into time – the Kingdom of God.’
110  This is ‘eucharistic time’, 
wherein ‘there is no room for the slightest distinction between the worshipping 
108 Dom Gregory Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy (2nd ed; London and New York: Continuum, 2003), p. 
77. 
109 Ibid., p. 267. Cf. Augustine’s statement from Sermon 7 on the New Testament: 'by being digested 
into his body and turned into his members  we may be what we receive' [italics added] (§7); 
available online at <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/160307.htm>, accessed 12 March 2010. 
Augustine makes this point again in Sermon 227, an Easter homily for the newly baptised, when he 
writes of the eucharistic elements, 'If you receive them well, you are yourselves what you receive'; 
quoted in Owen F. Cummings,  Eucharistic Doctors: A Theological History  (New York and 
Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2005), p. 77.
110 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 75.55
eucharistic community on earth and the actual worship in front of God’s throne.’
111 
The Church’s present communion also includes both past and future, gathering 
together Christ and the twelve at the last supper along with the eschaton, the assembly 
of all humankind at Christ’s feet, in the single moment of the eucharistic event. 
Hence, Dix reminds us that ‘all eucharistic worship is of necessity and by intention a 
corporate action—‘Do  this’ (poieite, plural).’
112   Furthermore, the ‘doing’ of the 
Eucharist is not an act of cognition or feeling, but the action of a community that 
knows where its real life is found.   The eucharistic community, therefore, is a 
representation of the life of God in Christ, and is rightly called “eucharistic” not 
simply because it gathers as a community around the sacramental celebration, but 
because it is  constituted as a community,  as a  people, in the first instance, by 
participation in the communal life of the Triune God.  Communion is the expression 
that the life of God is personal, relational.  Here we begin to understand that nothing 
exists without sharing in the life of the God who loves in freedom.  As God is love, 
and being is grounded on communion with God, Zizioulas is right to ultimately 
conclude that ‘Being depends on love.’
113
1.6 The Eucharist Breaks the Church
We have seen how the Eucharist makes the Church: how in her eucharistic 
action, the Church receives not only the means of grace but her very being from 
Christ himself.  We have also seen, in our consideration of Rahner, that the Church-
as-Church  has both a sacramental function and a sacramental form – it is the 
111 Ibid., p. 233. 
112 G. Dix, Shape of the Liturgy, p. 1.
113 J. Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 97.  However, as Jean-Luc Marion has shown, the God whose 
Being is Love  empties Godself  of Being in the outpouring of that Love, first in the eternal 
perichoresis of the Triune Godhead, and then in creation; hence God is “without Being” in being 
given to and for an other (cf. God Without Being, pp. 45-49)56
foundational sacrament, following the primordial sacrament, the incarnate Christ.  D. 
M. Baillie calls the mystery of the Incarnation 'the climax of all the Christian 
paradoxes.'
114  Correspondingly, as the incarnate Christ is both subject and object of 
liturgical celebration,
115  'the very act of worship, particularly corporate worship, 
involves the use of words and thoughts about God, and to think or speak of God at all 
is to run into antinomy, dialectical contradiction, paradox.'
116   This observation 
suggests  that every  aspect  of  the Christian  faith,   be it  spiritual,  liturgical or 
theological, is riddled with paradox.  This is not to the discredit of the Christian faith. 
To be clear, by “paradoxical” we refer to those tensions within Christian thought and 
practice, those seeming contradictions which arise from an honest interpretation of the 
Incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth.  These tensions must not be smoothed over 
or entirely explained away; they must be held together and maintained.
From its earliest enactment the Eucharist paradoxically both sustains and 
scandalizes the Church.  The tendency of the sacrament to simultaneously establish 
and disestablish the  ecclesia,  to simultaneously manifest the real presence of the 
Divine by making possible a participation in Divine absence, is evident from the very 
beginning, even within the narrative into which the Eucharist is inscribed.
117   This 
dialectical characteristic is definitive of sacrament in such a way that has been 
overlooked or even deliberately repressed in the history of Christian sacramental 
theology and practice.  So let us return to Rahner's conception of the sacramental 
structure of the Church.  For Rahner, the Church is a sign, but a sign that appears to be 
exempt from one universal characteristic of signs, per our Tillichean model – the 
114 D. M. Baillie, God Was In Christ (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 110.
115 Cf. James B. Torrance, Worship, Community and the Triune God of Grace (Toronto, Buffalo, NY 
and London: U of Toronto P, 1996).
116 D. M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 108.
117 E.g. the two travelers' encounter with the risen Christ along the Emmaus road, and the meal that 
followed (Luke 24). We will return to the Emmaus narrative in Chapter 3.57
susceptibility to change:
because the Church  is  the  sign  of  the grace of  God 
definitively triumphant in the world in Christ, this sign can 
never – as a real possibility – become a meaningless 
symbol.  As an historical and social entity, the Church is 
always unchangeably the sign which brings with it always 
and inseparably what it signifies.
118
This thinking requires a leap of faith, for if the Church can never become a 
meaningless symbol, as Rahner asserts, then it is inappropriate to regard it as either a 
symbol or a sign.  According to the understanding of signs considered above, it is a 
structural feature of the sign to remain open to the possibility of change, and 
according to Tillich, even to the possibility of becoming meaningless, because the 
significance of the sign is always based upon convention or social agreement, and it 
always remains at a  distance  from what it signifies.   Furthermore, as Rahner 
acknowledges, the Church receives its nature as a sign of the grace of God from 
Christ himself, who as the Word (Logos) is also the sign of God.  Therefore, to deny 
the possibility of change (or even disappearance; dissolution into meaninglessness) in 
the case of the Church is to alter the basic understanding of the necessary mediation 
of the grace of God, and perhaps even to deny the totality of the Incarnation of God in 
Christ.
We find that Chauvet provides a useful corrective here to Rahner's triumphalist 
conception of the Church: 
those   who   live   too   comfortably   in   the   Church   also 
misunderstand it: they are then in danger of forgetting that 
the Church is not Christ and that if, in faith, it is recognized 
as the privileged place of his presence, it is also, in this 
same faith, the most radical mediation of his absence.  This 
is why to consent to the sacramental mediation of the 
Church is to consent to…the presence of the absence of 
God.  The Church radicalizes the vacancy of this place of 
God.  To accept its mediation is to agree that this vacancy 
will never be filled….Those who kill this sense of the 
118 K. Rahner, Church and Sacraments, pp. 18-19.58
absence of Christ make Christ a corpse again.
119
In this rich passage, which deserves further unpacking, Chauvet makes the point that 
the Church, as a sign or symbol of the grace of God, is unique in that it mediates the 
presence of Christ, without becoming identical with Christ, while paradoxically and 
radically demarcating the location of his absence or vacancy.  With this correction, we 
can say with Rahner that 'the Church is always unchangeably the sign which brings 
with it always and inseparably what it signifies,' because what it signifies is 'the 
presence of the absence of God'  (Chauvet), the paradox of the God who is fully 
disclosed in the crucified, resurrected and ascended Christ and yet whose absence is 
(re)narrated in the Church's sacramental celebration as presence.
Rahner seems to allow for a more radical sense of the Church when he 
concedes that a trace of sacramentality exists within gracious action even outwith the 
ecclesia.  He suggests that 'any grace-giving event has a quasi-sacramental structure 
and shares in Christ’s character as both divine and human.'
120   By distinguishing 
between “quasi-sacramental” events and “sacraments in the proper sense,” Rahner 
acknowledges that the line between the two is, for him, nothing more or less than the 
boundary between the Church and everything else.  This slipperiness is telling, in fact, 
for such a strong assertion of this boundary indicates that its integrity is in question, 
just as the need to differentiate ‘proper’ sacraments from quasi-sacramental grace-
giving events at the very least reveals a kind of theological anxiety that the distinction 
between ecclesially “sanctioned” and “unsanctioned” sacramental experiences of 
grace might become blurred.  Also, this reference to “sacraments in the proper sense” 
implies that the sacraments  proper  are the property or possession of the Church, 
which flies in the face of Nathan Mitchell's assertion that sacraments are less about 
119 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 177-78 [italics in original].
120 K. Rahner, Church and Sacraments, p. 22. 59
possession and propriety and more about dispossession or being possessed by the 
grace of God.
121   The economy is, and must be, that of the gift, gratuitously given 
without limit or condition.
Rahner calls the Eucharist 'the highest actual fulfilment of [the Church’s] own 
being.'
122  But what is that being?  Rahner goes on to suggest that 'the moment when 
this community grasps her own innermost nature, in the ritual celebration of that death 
which is her true life.  That is the eucharist.'
123  It is a coincidentia oppositorum, a 
conjoining of life and death, of presence and absence, of the material and the spiritual, 
of humanity and divinity, of heaven and earth.  What we have begun is a radical 
reinterpretation of the Eucharist as irreducibly scandalous, and of the eucharistic 
community as an assembly (ecclesia), a gathering, which is con-voked, called 
together, by this scandal.  In this sense, the Church, or any assembly which might be 
interpreted as eucharistic, is a community founded upon a scandal, and it is this 
scandal which necessarily un-founds and up-roots this community.  A community that 
is properly called eucharistic is not one which possesses the Eucharist, but one which 
is possessed by the Eucharist, which is consumed by Christ even as it consumes his 
Body and Blood.  This possession necessarily entails a risk that can never be avoided, 
a risk of abandonment and irrevocable loss, of being offered up to be broken and 
poured-out so as to be given to and for an/Other.  Indeed, the central symbol of the 
eucharistic community is not first and foremost the cross, but rather is the broken 
body of the Crucified One.   It is this symbol of brokenness which unites the 
Church,
124 as it has done so throughout the ages, and by which the Church is called, in 
121 N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, op cit.
122 K. Rahner, Church and Sacraments, p. 66.
123 Ibid., p. 79.
124 The 1982 liturgy of the Scottish Episcopal Church encapsulates this in the words spoken by priest 
and congregation at the moment of the fracture: (celebrant) 'The Living Bread is broken for the life 
of the world.' (congregation) 'Lord, unite us in this sign.' (See ch. 4.)60
like manner to Christ, to empty itself for the life of the world, emptying itself of every 
vestige of power and possession.  This “dispossession” is nothing less than the loss or 
“letting-go” of the Church as an institution of power and authority.
125   But we can 
understand this only by understanding the Church as a community that grounds its 
very being in death – a very particular death.  The Church, then, has an entirely 
different perspective than the world, one that understands death-as-presence and 
resurrection-as-absence.  This is the scandal of the Eucharist today, a scandal which 
has been repeatedly domesticated by the Church, but which must be continually 
sought and upheld as essential to the very be(com)ing of the Church as the Body-of-
Christ in the world.
1.7 Sacrament as God's Body/Language
As we have sought to show in this chapter, the concept of sacrament must be 
understood against the backdrop of the broader categories of sign and symbol. 
Christian sacraments must also be understood as pointing ultimately to the entirety of 
the Christ event, from whence they are given their meaning.  The Church as the Body 
of Christ must be seen as deriving her identity, and her sacramental form and function, 
from Christ himself, specifically through participation in the sacrament of his broken 
body and and shed blood.  As such, the Church is both founded and unfounded – both 
made and broken – in her eucharistic celebration.  In this way, the Eucharist has both 
a   stabilizing   and   de-stabilizing   effect   on   the   recipient,   both   individually   and 
corporately.
125 We are indebted here to J. David Belcher's unpublished master's thesis “Baptism into the Poor Body 
of Christ: or, How to Possess Nothing and Yet Have Everything” submitted to Vanderbilt University 
in May 2007, provided to us by the author, which examines the sacrament of baptism according to 
the theme of dispossession. David Jasper also briefly attends to this theme in the final chapter of 
The Sacred Body, exploring the possibility of 'liturgical living' as 'dwelling'; he writes, 'To dwell 
ascetically with nonpossession is to subvert the “natural” tendency to acquire and, above all, to 
acquire power for the self....To abandon all totalitarian tendencies is to find freedom in the most 
deeply human encounter with the Absolute' (p. 178).61
In the two chapters to come, we will attend to the scandal of sacramentality as 
a dual scandal of language and of the body.  David Power articulates this well when 
he writes, 'Word and thing merge in sacrament.'
126 Thus far we have begun to glimpse 
the confluence of these two themes.  Sacraments are signs/symbols which embody the 
real presence of God in Christ; yet sacraments come to us via language, in both the 
narratives of scripture and in the creative Word (Logos) of God, by which creation 
was spoken into being – the Word that became Flesh in the person of Jesus Christ. 
We continue, then, to wrestle with sacramentality as the very challenge to theological 
thinking posed by the Body/Language of God.
126 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 57.62
~ Chapter Two ~
“The Word...”:
The Problem of Language
The   Christ   event   being   necessarily   present   in   the 
manner of historically conditioned symbol (word and 
sign)   is   not   present   in   itself,   but   in   a   variety   of 
historically   conditioned   symbolizations.     It   is   thus 
absent, even in its being present.
127
Words fail, always fail, for they inscribe the absence 
they seek to erase.
128
2.1 Mediation and Language
In the previous chapter, we have shown that the scandal of sacramentality 
derives first from Christ himself, the Word of God made flesh, crucified on Calvary, 
which St. Paul calls a 'stumbling-block' (skandalon).   Sacraments are visible and 
tangible, yet they mediate to us the invisible and intangible saving grace of God, 
which   is   resident   within   the  material,   created   order   precisely  because  of   the 
incarnation of God in Christ Jesus, the Word of God made flesh.   Through 
participation in this mediation, the ecclesial community is both constituted, made into 
the body of Christ called Church, and unmade: fractured, broken, de-stabilized and 
stripped of any power or possession it might hold as a body politic.  Thus sacrament is 
127 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 58.
128 Mark C. Taylor, “Unending Strokes,” in Robert P. Scharlemann, ed., Theology at the end of the 
Century: A Dialogue on the Postmodern. (Charlottesville, VA: Virginia UP, 1990), p. 142.63
a scandal to faith and practice, theology and Church.   As God's body/language, 
sacraments call for participation and must be entered into via language and the body.
In this chapter, we shall begin by establishing sacramental signs/symbols as 
both part of language – that is, part of the system(s) of signification by which meaning 
is conveyed – and as the particular language of God's saving grace.  An assessment of 
the relationship between language and sacramental theology would be incomplete 
without attending to the liturgical movement leading up to and encompassing the 
reforms of the Second Vatican Council, which implicitly wrestles with some of the 
same concerns about language that captivate postmodern thought.  In what may at 
first seem a strange maneuver, we will consider the “death of God” theology of 
Thomas   Altizer   alongside   the   critiques   of   language   which   emerge   from 
poststructuralist and postmodern thought, exemplified for us by Jacques Derrida.
129  In 
their own ways, both of these intellectual trends point to the absence of any 
transcendent guarantee of linguistic meaning.  Then, guided by Paul Ricoeur's theory 
of metaphor, we will demonstrate that the struggle with sacramental language stems at 
least in significant part from Jesus' instituting  words at the Last Supper, his 
metaphoric speech which ruptures semantic associations and confounds interpretation. 
This eruptive tendency, which breaks open a plurality of meanings, we call the 
“de/constructive core” of sacramentality, the “/” indicating a simultaneously de-
constructive and constructive movement or tendency.
130
129 To be clear, we are not attempting to draw a direct connection between Altizer's “death of God” and 
the crisis of signification characterized by Derrida as the death of the “transcendental signified,” nor 
trace them to some common source or catalyst (though Nietzsche could be cited as a common 
influence).  However, we suggest that these two intellectual impulses, emerging around the same 
time, share a more or less theological concern for language and and the problem of signification.
130 Our point of reference for this use of the “/” (which can be written but not spoken) is Mark C. 
Taylor's use of it when he writes about “a/theology,” which is not, he maintains, simply atheistic, 
but rather ‘marks the limen that siginifies both proximity and distance, similarity and difference, 
interiority and exteriority. This strangely permeable membrane forms a border where fixed 
boundaries disintegrate’; see Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago and London: U of Chicago 
P, 1984), p. 12.  In similar fashion, we employ the “/” in “de/constructive” to indicate the liminal 
character of sacramentality. When we refer to sacramentality's “de/constructive core,” then, 
something simply or crudely destructive is clearly not implied. Instead, as is the case even in a more 64
At the heart of the eucharistic liturgy lies the institution narrative, which 
echoes Paul’s instructions to the church at Corinth (I Cor. 11:23-26) as well as the 
Last Supper accounts in the three synoptic gospels.  Beginning with the earliest gospel 
account in Mark 14, according to both the biblical text and the words of the Church's 
liturgy, Jesus takes bread, offers thanks to the Father, breaks it and gives it to his 
followers, addressing them with the words 'Take it; this is my body' (Mark 14:22). 
The passage continues: ‘Then he took the cup, gave thanks and offered it to them, and 
they all drank from it. “This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for 
many,” he said to them’ (Mark 14:23-24).  These two statements, taken together as 
one – this bread is my body; this cup of wine is my blood – encapsulate the twofold 
scandal of eucharistic theology which occupy this chapter and the following: the 
scandal of the Word and the scandal of the Flesh, which come together in Christ, the 
‘Word made flesh (Logos sarx egeneto)’ (Jn. 1:14).   In the next chapter, we will 
examine the scandal of corporeality, that of the body, of the flesh, of the paradox of a 
God Incarnate within the materiality of God’s own created order.  But first, we shall 
attend to the linguistic, the verbal and the textual: word before flesh.  While we do not 
mean to imply the significance of one over the other, the biblical creation narrative 
provides our template for beginning with the problem of language.
Before creation, the Word (Logos) of God existed: ‘In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’ (Jn. 1:1).  The writer of 
the Fourth Gospel, playing intertextually upon the theme and poetic style of the 
Creation narrative in Genesis 1, observes that prior to the speech-act of Creation, 
which in scripture is in the first instance a verbal act, the Word of God always already 
purely Derridean sense, deconstruction (even without the “/”) always refers to a never-ending 
process of breaking down, or exposing the brokenness of, our certainties and structures of language 
or thinking, precisely to break open the possibility for a constructive moment “to come.” This is the 
basic   argument   Simon   Critchley   makes   on   behalf   of   deconstruction   in  The   Ethics   of 
Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).65
exists in and as the eternal communion and communication of the Godhead: ‘Through 
him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made’ (Jn. 
1:3).  God’s first interaction with creation, with something other than Godself, takes 
place in an act of speech: ‘And God said, “Let there be light,” and there was light’ 
(Gen. 1:3).  Prior to this moment, scripture tells us, all is abyss, 'formless and empty, 
darkness' (Gen. 1:2).  Then, into this abyss, God speaks, and in speaking, brings about 
matter, bodies: celestial, terrestrial, and eventually human.  But as Slavoj Žižek has 
observed, this act of creation is itself a scandal to Godself:
The   very   notion   of   creation   implies   God's   self-
contradiction: God had first to withdraw into Himself, 
constrain His omnipresence, in order first to create the 
Nothing out of which He then created the universe. By 
creating the universe, He set it free, let it go on its own, 
renouncing   the   power   of   intervening   in   it:   this   self-
limitation is equivalent to a proper act of creation.
131
This theological conception of the impact of creation on Godself is further evinced, 
from the standpoint of the biblical narrative, in the inscription of God's creation as a 
speech-act.  Language – spoken or written – is never immediate but always entails 
mediation, and so the distance, the gap between God and that which is other than 
God, the necessary mediation between God and creation, is established in this primal 
utterance.  These two accounts of Creation, that of Genesis and of John’s prologue, set 
up not a false binary between language and the body, or the priority of the Word 
(language)  over  the   Body/Flesh   (matter),   but   rather   capture   the   irreducible 
primordiality of language, which is also to say, of the mediation effected by all signs.
We established in Chapter 1 that sacrament is both symbol and sign.   In 
patristic literature, the Eucharist is sacra signum (a sacred sign) and verbum visible (a 
visible word).
132  Sacraments, as signs/symbols, are not only a part of language, but 
131 S.  Žižek, Puppet, p. 137.
132 See Robert W. Jenson, Visible Words: The Interpretation and Practice of Christian Sacraments 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1978), referencing St. Augustine, On Christian Teaching, op. cit., 66
are a language unto themselves, which David Power identifies as 'the language of 
God’s giving.'
133   In his pivotal second chapter, Power offers a detailed analysis of 
different theories and conceptions of language and how this relates to sacrament in 
general and liturgical language in particular. After reviewing the sacramental theories 
of Aquinas, Bonaventure, and the Reformers, Power discusses the work of Rahner and 
Schillebeeckx   (considered   above)   as   examples   of   contemporary   sacramental 
theologies which cast the sacramental sign as 'an act of self-communication, both 
divine and human, and an encounter in grace...[which] works through the symbolic 
action.'
134   Observing that 'all celebration in its use of words, symbols, and rites 
involves the interpretation of the tradition handed on,' Power proposes 'a theology of 
sacrament that brings language to the fore', electing to describe sacraments as 
'language events.'
135  Because, as Power puts it, 'humans find their dwelling place in 
language,'
136 if the grace of God is to come to us in and through sacrament – that is, if 
sacraments are, in Schillebeeckx' phrase, 'the properly human mode of encounter with 
God'
137 – then they must meet us within the language-bound world in which we live.
This conception of sacrament as language and language event is a useful point 
of departure at this stage of our discussion.  As we have seen, sacraments are part of 
the created order, yet point beyond themselves.  For their meaning, sacraments rely 
upon   the   decidedly   pluriform   linguistic   structures   (signs)   of   their   liturgical 
celebration(s), and the somewhat more uniform material elements (also signs) used in 
p. 31.  Nathan Mitchell notes 'the inherent ambiguity of this metaphor. We think of words as 
acoustic events, not visual ones. To put verbum (“word”) and visible (“visible”) together seems 
transgressive, a mistake. Augustine's decision to define “sacrament” as “visible word” embodies a 
metaphoric collision. It suggests that “sacrament” is a ritual experience through which we learn to 
“see with our ears” and “hear with our eyes.” If the root of sacrament is metaphor, then a new 
possibility is opened up for us; we may perceive the audible as visible and the visible as audible'; N. 
Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, p. 198.
133 This phrase is the subtitle of Power's book Sacrament (op cit).
134 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 56.
135 Ibid., p. 51.
136 Ibid., p. 66.
137 E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament, p. 6.67
that celebration.  Thus we defend Tillich's assertion that sacraments are not the Holy, 
but mediate the Holy precisely by delineating the difference between themselves and 
that which they represent.  They are this-worldly artifacts which stand in for, in the 
absence of, that which is beyond the mundane.  As Power reminds us:
The language event of sacrament engages us at the level of 
the daily, the bread and the wine, the oil and the water, 
within the time that is the time of living day to day....the 
sacramental   presencing   of   this   event   interrupts,   even 
disrupts, the flow of daily and historical time.
138
Power is right to draw attention to another characteristic of sacrament: its location 
within time. Like language and bodies, time also is part of the created order.  Time, 
which conditions history, is the exact location of this-worldly actions (rituals) and 
artifacts   (symbols)   which   we   experience   in   and   through   language   and   body. 
However, as language events, sacraments interrupt and disrupt time, just as they erupt 
and rupture the simple, univocal meaning of language itself.  Elsewhere Power writes, 
'A ritual or sacramental event relates to an event within time past through the 
capacities and power of language to carry it forward and to allow it to enter afresh 
into lives, however they may have been disrupted and broken.'
139  It is precisely this 
sense of disruption and brokenness to which we wish to call attention and which, we 
argue, is bound up within the scandal of sacrament, the stumbling-block we encounter 
on our way which interrupts and disrupts our journey toward meaning.
This scandal is not something external to language but is in fact an intrinsic 
characteristic of language itself.  In The Trespass of the Sign, Kevin Hart examines the 
problem of signification in light of  the narrative of the Fall of humankind in the 
biblical story of Adam and Eve – a dynamic that Power fails to incorporate into his 
conception of language.  This narrative inscribes not only the Fall of humankind from 
138 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 91.
139 Ibid., p. 75.68
an originary state of perfection, but also encompasses the fall of language.
140 
According to Hart,  Christian theology must concern itself with signs  precisely 
'because it regards God as a presence who, after the Fall, represents Himself and is in 
turn represented by signs.'
141  In his lucid opening pages, he posits that
the view that language fell with man [is an elaboration] 
upon a far more persistent theme – that God guarantees the 
possibility of determinate meaning.  The Fall may establish 
the human need to interpret yet it simultaneously sets firm 
the limits to interpretation.   No longer in harmony with 
God, this world becomes a chiaroscuro of presence and 
absence; everywhere one looks, there are signs of a divine 
presence that has withdrawn and that reveals itself only in 
those signs.
142
For our purposes, as it relates to signs as well as the question of presence and absence, 
this specifically implicates the notion of sacrament, for the tangible signs by which 
this withdrawn divine presence reveals itself in this world are precisely that which we 
call sacraments.  'By dint of Adam's sin, though,' Hart reminds us, 'God is for us an 
absent presence.'
143  The Fall inaugurates, therefore, the brokenness and discontinuity, 
the fragmentation against which our desires for presence, for im-mediacy arise.
However, our systems of signification, our efforts to establish certitude and 
meaning, our sacraments and sacred symbols are in fact susceptible to the very 
brokenness that they themselves endeavor to overcome.  And so, according to Hart, 
'From God’s presence we pass to His absence; from immediacy to mediation; from the 
140 cf. S. Žižek, Puppet: 'We should bear in mind here the central tension of the Christian notion of the 
Fall: the Fall ("regression" to the natural state, enslavement to passions) is stricto sensu identical 
with the dimension from which we fall, that is, it is the very movement of the Fall that creates, 
opens up, what is lost in it' (p. 118).
141 Kevin Hart,  The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1989), p. 7. 
142 Ibid., p. 4.
143 Ibid., p. 7. This notion of an “absent presence,” or “the presence of the absence” of God disclosed 
within the sacraments that constitute God's saving activity in the word, is most fully articulated in 
Louis-Marie Chauvet's sacramental theology; e.g. '...to consent to the sacramental mediation of the 
Church is to consent to…the presence of the absence of God.  The Church radicalizes the vacancy 
of this place of God.  To accept its mediation is to agree that this vacancy will never be filled…' 
(Symbol and Sacrament, p. 178).69
perfect congruence of sign and referent to the gap between word and object; from 
fullness of being to a lack of being; from ease and play to strain and labour; from 
purity to impurity; and from life to death.'
144    While signs mean, point to, and 
participate in something beyond the sign itself, according to Hart, 'what we mean by 
‘sign’ is that it is what it is in the absence of its animating presence.'
145   In other 
words, the distance or gap between the sign itself and its referent – its animating 
presence, that from which the sign derives its meaning – is  the exact locus of the 
sign's meaning.  The sign means by demarcating this difference, by revealing itself as 
other than that to which it points.  In the absence of the real thing – the physical, 
historical body of Christ, which after being raised from the dead, ascended to the 
Father – sacraments mediate, stand in for, a real presence, which in the sacred sign of 
the Eucharist is (un)veiled as a real absence.
So we encounter the Eucharist first as a linguistic – both verbal and textual – 
scandal.   In the poetic speech of Jesus at the Last Supper, 'take, eat, this is my 
body...my blood,' we are immediately enrapt in the problem of language, in the 
paradox of a metaphor, to be precise.
146   But before we more closely examine 
sacramentality as a scandal of language and the problem of Jesus' metaphoric speech, 
let us pause to consider the problem of linguistic mediation within the context of 
liturgical language. The 20
th century liturgical movement, culminating in the Second 
Vatican Council's task of translating the liturgy from Latin into vernacular languages, 
is an embodiment of this wrestling with language, with signs and their meanings, 
which persistently trip us up and confound understanding.   Here we witness a 
144 K. Hart, Trespass, p. 5.
145 Ibid., p. 12. Explicating Derrida’s thought, Hart continues: 'No context can circum-scribe a sign’s 
meaning; the sign’s meaning will alter if repeated in a different context; but the sign is structurally 
open to repetition: therefore, alterity is a structural feature of the sign' (p. 13).
146 We note the possible objections to understanding Jesus' statement 'This is my body/blood,' or the 
Eucharist as a whole, in terms of metaphor.  These concerns will be addressed in due course.70
demonstration that liturgical and sacramental language are not exempt by any means 
from the brokenness, fallibility, and confounding tendency characteristic of all sign 
systems.
2.2 Vatican II and Liturgical Language
The limitations of this project permit no more than an overview of the relevant 
features of the liturgical renewal and the Second Vatican Council.  In the first chapter 
of Christian Sacraments in a Postmodern World, Catholic theologian Kenan Osborne 
provides a concise summary of the major contributions of the liturgical renewal, 
which have contributed to the shape of our sacramental theology as we attempt to 
figure and refigure it for the third-millennium.  He concludes:
Not only was the need for liturgical reform a product of this 
intense activity [of the liturgical movement], but in official 
and unofficial ways, liturgical reforms were already taking 
place prior to Vatican II.  This change in liturgy, with its call 
for the use of vernacular language, for more participation 
by the lay person, for a better understanding of the history 
of liturgical practices and rituals in the Christian-Catholic 
tradition was a tremendous catalyst for the revolutionary 
renewal of the church's sacramental life.
147
The  revolution,   according   to   Osborne,   was   the   re-situation   of   the  interest  in 
sacramental and liturgical theology away from the isolation of the academy and into 
the practical life of the  ecclesia.   Also significant to our purposes is Osborne's 
recognition of the influence of 20
th-century philosophy upon many of the individual 
Catholic thinkers who contributed to Vatican II: 'existentialism, phenomenology, 
process thought, Marxism, linguistics, semiotics, and postmodern philosophy' all 
feature prominently, as well as 'technological advancement.'
148  Osborne summarizes 
that subjectivity (the 'return to the subject'), historicity (the historical contingency or 
147 Kenan B. Osborne, Christian Sacraments in a Postmodern World: A Theology For The Third 
Millennium (New York and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1999), p. 12.
148 Ibid., p. 15.71
relativity of truth), and epistemology (the limitations of human knowing) comprise the 
three major implications of these philosophical trends.
149  It is on the basis of this new 
or renewed emphasis on subjectivity, historicity, and epistemology that the most 
significant result of Vatican II, at least for the liturgical life of the faithful, emerged: 
the complete overhaul of the Roman Rite and the translation of the Mass into local 
vernacular languages.
Today, when one thinks of “pre-Vatican II” Catholicism, the Latin mass 
immediately comes to mind.  The first official statement of the council was “The 
Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy” (“Sacrosanctum Concilium”; hereafter  SC), 
published on 4 December 1963.   We are interested in this document for several 
reasons, which should be outlined.  First, as this statement calls for the revision and 
translation of the liturgy, we expect to glimpse something in this document the 
council’s conception of religious (broadly) and liturgical (specifically) language. 
Second, the contention, which lingers even still, that the replacement of the Latin rite 
with the vernacular mass destroys the beauty and mystery of the liturgy intrigues us; 
for even as critics might blame Vatican II for bringing about the “end” of liturgy,
150 the 
council seems to understand the “ends” (telos) of liturgy quite specifically, and their 
intention is to bring the liturgy back into a condition that supports those ends. 
However, in stark contrast to such nostalgic objections to the liturgical reforms of 
Vatican II, we shall consider in some detail Catherine Pickstock's “radical orthodox” 
criticism of the replacement of the Roman Rite with vernacular masses, which on the 
whole we find to be a convincing and accurate proposal accounting for both the 
challenges of postmodernism as well as the historical tradition(s) of the Church.
149 Ibid., p. 16.
150 e.g. Mark Drew, ““The Spirit or the Letter?: Vatican II and Liturgical Reform,” in Stratford 
Caledott, ed., Beyond the Prosaic: Renewing the Liturgical Movement (James McLehose and Sons: 
Glasgow, 1998), pp. 48-68.72
In the first article of  SC, the Council recognizes the need 'to adapt more 
closely to the needs of our age those institutions which are subject to change'
151 – an 
acknowledgment that the liturgy, like all signs and sign systems, is indeed subject to 
change, as well an admission of the historicity ('the needs of our age') and cultural-
contextuality of the liturgy.   A key phrase for the council is 'full and active 
participation'
152 of the faithful in the liturgy, evidenced by the fact that variations on 
this phrase are scattered throughout the text of SC and emerge as a kind of benchmark 
by which to determine whether the liturgy is achieving its goal.  This 'full and active 
participation,'   then,   supports   and   reinforces   the  telos  of   liturgy,   which   is   the 
transformation and sanctification of the people of God.  In fact, the Council writes 
that the liturgy itself demands this: 'all the faithful should be led to take that full, 
conscious, and active part in liturgical celebrations which is demanded by the very 
nature of the liturgy.'
153  The revisions are to be carried out with the understanding that 
the liturgy is the 'source from which the faithful are to derive the true Christian 
spirit.'
154  In other words, as we have already come to understand from Augustine, Dix, 
and Zizioulas,
155 in the liturgy, the Church receives its very being; both the corporate 
body and individual persons become the Body of Christ in and through the liturgical 
enactment of the Eucharist.  It appears thus far that the Council's vision of the liturgy 
is at least somewhat historically and culturally fluid, and that to a large degree the 
locus of liturgical meaning is the congregation.
Toward this end of full and active participation, the Council approved the 
translation of the Tridentine Mass from Latin into vernacular languages, with the 
151 SC, Art. 1, p. 117.  In Flannery, ed. Vatican Council II.
152 SC, Art. 14, op. cit. p. 124.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 See Chapter 1 of the present work.73
conviction that 'The rites should radiate a noble simplicity.  They should be short, 
clear, and free from useless repetition.  They should be within the people’s powers of 
comprehension,   and   normally   should   not   require   much   explanation.’
156    The 
implication is, of course, that the existing liturgy is not short or clear, is not within the 
cognitive grasp of the people, and might even be characterized by 'useless repetition,' 
thus hindering the congregation's participation in and comprehension of the Mass.  A 
great emphasis is placed on 'clarity,' which we take to mean first semantic and then 
theological clarity.  The laity's understanding of the liturgy is essential.  The Council 
believed 'both texts and rites should be ordered so as to express more clearly the holy 
things which they signify.  The christian people, as far as is possible, should be able to 
understand them easily.'
157  And so, in what Osborne calls a 'watershed for the renewal 
of the sacraments,'
158  in Article 36(B), the translation into and use of vernacular 
languages is approved: 'since the use of the vernacular, whether in the Mass, the 
administration of the sacraments, or in other parts of the liturgy, may frequently be of 
great advantage to the people, a wider use may be made of it, especially in readings, 
directives and in some prayers and chants.'
159
However convinced and convicted the Council may have been about the 
legitimacy of these liturgical reforms, they have not passed without critique.  The 
conservative (for lack of a better term) arguments which simply wish to preserve the 
status quo are largely rooted in a nostalgia that is of no particular interest to us. 
However, more radical criticisms exist, perhaps the most significant of which is the 
one offered by Catherine Pickstock in After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation 
156 SC, Art. 34, pp. 129-130.
157 SC, Art. 21, p. 126.
158 K. Osborne, Christian Sacraments, p. 17.
159 SC, Art. 36. pp. 130-31.74
of Philosophy.
160  After Writing is a dense work, and Pickstock's analyses are nuanced 
and wide-reaching, touching on Derridean postmodernism, semiotic theory, medieval 
Christian thought, and liturgical and eucharistic history and theology.  A full-fledged 
engagement with her book would very nearly require its own book-length study. 
Additionally, hers is to date perhaps the most immediately relevant study to the 
present work, and as such it shall reappear continually throughout this project, so for 
now, we shall limit our consideration only to her critique of Vatican II.
Pickstock argues that the basic problem with the liturgical reforms of Vatican 
II is precisely the Council's effort to simplify the complex structures of the Roman 
liturgy that had served the Church since the Middle Ages.  To Pickstock, this indicates 
a failure on the Council's part to realize that the liturgy's 'theological struggle to 
articulate itself,' is precisely 'the crisis of articulation by which liturgical expression 
can be seen as a critique of secular modes of language and knowledge.'
161  Vatican II 
contributors Jungmann, Bouyer and others propose the unburdening of the liturgy all 
that hinders the understanding – again, the 'full and active participation' – of the laity. 
She posits that 'The Roman humiliation of the worshipper before God, together with 
the inclusion of various ceremonial accretions, confirmed [the Council's] suspicion 
that the Rite contained interpolation from secular court ceremonial and emperor 
worship, betokening a dubious politicization of the Eucharist.'
162   But the problem 
with the Vatican II reforms, according to Pickstock, is that they 'ironed-out the 
160 After John Milbank's Theology and Social Theory, Catherine Pickstock's After Writing is regarded 
as somewhat definitive of “Radical Orthodoxy,” which she describes as a 'new theological 
imperative' offering an alternative between postmodernism's shutting down of rationalist humanism, 
on the one hand, and its own indisputable nihilism on the other: 'Radical orthodoxy...has offered a 
third alternative: while conceding, with postmodernism, the indeterminacy of all our knowledge 
and experience of selfhood, it construes this shifting flux as a sign of our dependency on a 
transcendent source which “gives” all reality as a mystery, rather than as adducing our suspension 
over the void' (After Writing, p. xii).   See also the edited volume  Radical Orthodoxy: A New 
Theology, eds. J. Milbank, G. Ward and C. Pickstock (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 
which contains essays by many scholars whose work extends this theological program.
161 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. 177.
162 Ibid., p. 172.75
liturgical stammer and constant re-beginning; they simplified the narrative and 
generic strategy of the liturgy in conformity with recognisably secular structures, and 
rendered simple, constant and self-present the identity of the worshipper.'
163  
Pickstock's account of the inevitable failure of the Vatican II reforms is rooted 
in her understanding of the church and its liturgical practice in the Middle Ages.  Of 
the Church's uniquely sacramental and liturgical identity, she reminds us that  
it was the Eucharist, rather than any other sacrament, from 
which all other activities flowed, because...for mediaeval 
thought, the Eucharist gives the Church, the Body of Christ, 
and as such, the Church alone legitimates politics, and 
provides  the  restoration   of  our  genuine  being  through 
salvation.
164
Furthermore, the Eucharist as such must be viewed against the backdrop of a 
pervasively liturgical culture.
the liturgy of the Middle Ages was embedded in a culture 
which was ritual in character.  This was a time when the 
Offertory gifts were not disconnected from the produce of 
every life; indeed, the category itself of “everyday life” was 
perforce   a   thoroughly  liturgical  category.     For   the 
community was not something which existed prior to, or in 
separation from, the Eucharist as a given which simply met 
at regular intervals to receive the Sacrament.  Rather, the 
community as such was seen as flowing from eternity 
through the sacraments.
165
The Mass, in other words, was not simply a textual or theological abstraction, offered 
as a beneficial or even salvific supplement to the lives of medieval folk, but rather 
was the basis of medieval life itself.   Medieval life and medieval identity, both 
communal and individual, were premised upon participation in the sacramental and 
liturgical life of the ecclesia.  
While Pickstock bypasses the accounts of medieval history which focus on the 
cultural “profanation” of the sacred that emerges out of this deeply liturgical 
163 Ibid., p. 176.
164 Ibid., p. 147.
165 Ibid., pp. 170-71.76
worldview – such as that of Johan Huizinga, who reminds us that medieval religion 
was an 'entirely externalized religion,'
166  characterized by a  ‘profaning overflow’ 
resulting from an 'overabundance of devotional content’
167 – her account of medieval 
theological error (e.g. the nominalism of Duns Scotus), arising from within the 
Church itself, seeks to explain the basis for this shift toward immanentism and 
materialism.  For this reason, Pickstock refers to 'the destruction from within of the 
liturgical city.'
168  While she admirably supports her attribution of this 'destruction' to 
Scotist thought, she also acknowledges the role played by the 'unique intensification 
of   piety   which   paradoxically   segregated   the   sacred   from   the   secular,   for   by 
concentrating sacrality in a singular and exclusively holy event or place, any location 
beyond that focal intensity was effectively secularized.'
169  In her account, the former 
leads directly to the latter.  However, other viable accounts of the medieval shift from 
transcendence to immanence, from spirituality to materiality, might be noted as well. 
Johan Huizinga, for example, places more emphasis on Pickstock's secondary cause 
when he writes,
Life was permeated by religion to the degree that the 
distance between the earthly and the spiritual was in danger 
of being obliterated at any moment.  While on the one hand 
all of ordinary life was raised to the sphere of the divine, on 
the other the divine was bound to the mundane in an 
indissoluble mixture with daily life.
170
166 Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1996), p. 
203.
167 Ibid., pp. 220-21. The more carefully one follows Huizinga's reading of medieval history, the more 
apparent the differences between his account and Pickstock's. In fact, Pickstock all but admits this, 
albeit in passing, when she remarks: 'None of this account is supposed to imply that a liturgical 
order was perfectly realized in the high Middle Ages; the claim is rather that certain social and 
intellectual conditions of possibility for such an order were present' (After Writing, p. 157). 
Huizinga's history, which unlike Pickstock's is laden with concrete/practical examples from 
medieval life, seems much more attuned to, and much more comfortable with, the profane and 
profaning tendencies that grow out of the highly ritualized and sacralized medieval zeitgeist. His 
work provides additional insight in our literary explorations in Part Two of this study.
168 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. 121.
169 Ibid., p. 147.
170 J. Huizinga, Autumn of the Middle Ages, p. 179.77
Observing this thoroughly intermingled liturgical purview of medieval society, 
Pickstock suggests that the liturgy cannot be simply translated, or indeed translated so 
as to be simplified, because the liturgy is 'as much, or more a cultural and ethical 
phenomenon, as a textual one.'
171  In other words, Pickstock directs us to the truth that 
the struggle with language is not simply a struggle with textuality or with speech as 
such, but with the very social and historical contingency of language itself, which is 
so easily forgotten or simply passed over.  She explains:
criticisms   of   liturgical   reform...are   often   dismissed   as 
conservative or nostalgic.   But because the Vatican II 
reforms of the mediaeval Roman Rite failed to take into 
account the cultural assumptions which lay implicit within 
the text, their reforms participated in an entirely more 
sinister conservatism.   For they failed to challenge those 
structures of the modern secular world which are wholly 
inimical  to  liturgical purpose:  those  structures,  indeed, 
which   perpetuate   a   separation   of   everyday   life   from 
liturgical enactment.  So the criticisms [offered here] of the 
Vatican II revisions of the mediaeval Roman Rite...far from 
enlisting a conservative horror at change, issue from a 
belief that the revisions were simply not radical enough.  A 
successful  liturgical  revision   would   have   to   involve  a 
revolutionary re-invention of language and practice which 
would challenge the structures of our modern world, and 
only thereby restore real language and action as liturgy.
172
In light of this illuminating summary of Pickstock's dissatisfaction with the Vatican II 
reforms, we realize that her critique is not based upon a reified conception of 
language that wishes to preserve the liturgy's semantic content from some bygone 
generation, somehow protecting it from perversion for generations to come.   As 
Pickstock points out, the Council 'failed to realize that one cannot simply “return” to 
an earlier form, because the earlier liturgies only existed as part of a culture which 
was itself ritual (ecclesial-sacramental-historical) in character.'
173  Rather, we suggest 
171 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. 171.
172 Ibid., p. 171.
173 Ibid., p. 176.78
that her critique appears to be based upon an underlying belief that liturgical 
language, precisely as mediate and imperfect, is “impossible,”
174 as it is linked to the 
originary creative speech of God, which as we have stated above, introduces the very 
gap between God and creation upon which the necessity of mediation is based. 
Consistent with Kevin Hart's reading of the relationship between the Fall of Adam and 
'fall of language,' Pickstock asserts that 'liturgical expression is made “impossible” by 
the breach which occurred at the Fall.'
175  While she never puts it quite in these terms, 
it seems to us that undergirding Pickstock's conviction that 'liturgical language is the 
only language that really makes sense,'
176  is the acknowledgment that language, 
heightened to its significatory capacity nowhere more than in sacramental celebration, 
comes to us as gift from a God who empties and absents Godself for creation.  It is in 
this divine  kenosis, in the linguistic act of creation, by which our capacity for 
language, and our irreducible mediacy, is given.   In the liturgy itself the Church 
repeats and participates in this  kenosis  when the  faithful are called to ‘offer 
themselves,’
177 the out-pouring and offering of not only the souls of the faithful but 
their bodies as well.  They present their bodies at the altar to receive the elements into 
their bodies, even as they are grafted into Christ's ecclesial Body by their reception of 
Christ's sacramental Body.  All of this takes place within the linguistic structure of the 
liturgy, not merely as an abstracted textual artifact but, as Pickstock has shown, as a 
socially-bound and culturally-embedded language event that can never fully be 
174 See C. Pickstock, After Writing, pp. 169-219, esp. pp. 176-92
175 Ibid., p. 177.
176 Ibid., p. xv.
177 SC, Art. 48 (p. 135); cf. oblation in the 1982 liturgy of the Scottish Episcopal Church, which puts it 
thus: ‘made one with Him, we offer you these gifts, and with them ourselves, a single, holy, living 
sacrifice.’  The congregation along with the gift(s) of the eucharistic elements together comprise the 
singular offering or sacrifice of the liturgy; both are offered and both are consecrated.  In this way, 
the SEC liturgy admirably portrays the Augustinian truth about the Church receiving, in the 
Eucharist, that which it is. When the priest says, 'the gifts of God for the people of God,' he refers 
not only to the gifts of bread and wine, but also the gift of  personhood  which, having been 
consecrated/sanctified, is in the Eucharist offered back to the congregation once again as gift.79
circumscribed by language or comprehended even by the most astute participant.
We have examined the liturgy as one site of our wrestling with the problem of 
language.  Yet, in our postmodern era, the credibility of language itself is called into 
question.  Sign systems collapse.  The relationship between the sign and its referent is 
revealed as not only conventional – the result of social agreement and tradition – but 
in fact arbitrary.   This revelation has been the source of considerable theological 
anxiety, for as George Steiner reminds us at the outset of  Real Presences,  ‘any 
coherent understanding of what language is and how languages performs,...any 
coherent account of the capacity of human speech to communicate meaning and 
feeling is, in the final analysis, underwritten by the assumption of God’s presence.’
178 
So what happens to language, then, when God is understood to be an  absent 
presence...'the presence of an absence'?   How do we make sense of language, 
religious, liturgical or otherwise, in a ‘postmodern’ era characterized by the “death,” 
or at the very least, the absence of God?
2.3 The Death of God
Keenly aware of the absence of God were the contributors to the “Radical 
Theology” of North America in the 1960s, who sought to articulate what they 
perceived as the “Death of God.”
179  Radical Theology was less a theological program 
178 George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1989), p. 3.
179 Thinkers associated with Radical Theology and/or the Death of God include theologians Thomas J. 
J. Altizer, William Hamilton, Gabriel Vahanian, and Harvey Cox, biblical scholar Paul Van Buren, 
and Jewish theologian Richard Rubenstein (see Bibliography for selected works). For a definitive 
collection of essays, see Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton, Radical Theology and the 
Death of God (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966). Simplifying ad absurdum, Paul Tillich is a key 
theological forebear to the Death of God theologians; followers, who to some degree carry on the 
mantle of Radical Theology, include Carl Raschke, Mark C. Taylor, Robert Scharlemann, and 
Charles Winquist.  For evidence of the lingering relevance of the kind of thinking initiated by these 
theologians, see Clayton Crockett, ed., Secular Theology: American Radical Theological Thought 
(New York and London: Routledge, 2001). In the UK, the writings of Anglican Bishop John A. T. 
Robinson, especially Honest To God (London: SCM, 1967), caused a similar stir on the cultural 
landscape, and might be viewed as a British counterpart to the North American “death of God” 
impulse, albeit from a less academic and more practical and even traditionally ecclesial perspective.80
or “school” and more a general impulse arising during this tumultuous era in Western 
history.  
Thomas J. J. Altizer and William Hamilton’s publication of Radical Theology 
and the Death of God in 1966 marks the first expressly theological attempt to account 
for the experience of the death of God upon the horizon of contemporary life.  Like 
Hegel, Nietzsche and others before them, Altizer and Hamilton attempt to make sense 
of a world without God – a world which had by that time endured the trauma of two 
world wars and, with America’s involvement in Vietnam, found itself potentially on 
the cusp of another.   In their introduction, the co-authors lay out ten possible 
interpretations of what is meant by the “event” of the death of God.  We need not 
catalog them all; a few examples will suffice.
1. That there is no God and that there never has been.
2. That there once was a God to whom adoration, praise and 
trust were appropriate, possible, and even necessary, but 
that now there is no such God.
3. That the idea of God and the word God itself are in need of 
radical reformation.  Perhaps totally new words are needed; 
perhaps a decent silence about God should be observed.
4. That our traditional liturgical and theological language 
needs an overhaul. [...]
10. …that our language about God is always inadequate and 
imperfect.
180
So, while the death of God may be understood variously by these thinkers,
181 ranging 
180 T. Altizer and W. Hamilton, Radical Theology, pp. 14-15.
181 The first book to employ the phrase in its title is Gabriel Vahanian’s The Death of God: The Culture 
of Our Post-Christian Era  (New York: George Braziller, 1961), a title which is far more 
provocative than its contents.  For Vahanian, the death of God is a purely cultural phenomenon, 
marked by the extreme immanentism and secularism that arise in late-modernity. However 
conservative its claims, the title and subtitle flag up (almost prophetically) two very important 
concepts for us: that of the death of God, and that of a Post-Christian age/era/culture. See also 
Vahanian’s No Other God (New York: George Braziller, 1966). Interestingly, the death of God, as a 
movement and as theme for theological thinking, has largely passed into obscurity, having enjoyed 
an intense but brief day in the sun.  The phrase Post-Christian, however, has shown more staying 
power, and continues to be debated and discussed. It has been employed variously to describe 
everything from sociological interests in declining church attendance in parts of Europe, e.g., G. 
Davie,  Religion in Britain  (op cit.)  and C. Brown,  Death of Christian Britain  (op cit.),  to 81
from a general tenor of contemporary secular culture to an actual ontic event in the 
life of God, of particular interest to us is the radical theology of Thomas J. J. Altizer, 
whose very theological poetics inscribe the death of God in such a way that enacts 
this event within language itself.   For Altizer, specifically, the death of God is 
inextricably bound to Christ’s death on the cross, making his a gospel of profoundly 
Christian, and deeply christological, atheism.
In The Gospel of Christian Atheism, Altizer’s thesis is that a new and radical 
form of Christianity must be adopted which is free of the tyranny of a judicial God, an 
originary sacred divine which transcends all time.
182  If God is to have come in the 
Incarnation of Christ – the kenotic movement of God from detached divinity into self-
annihilation in the crucifixion of Jesus on the cross as the definitive and supreme act 
of love for the redemption of the world – and if this Incarnation is the basis of 
Christian faith, we must begin to purge faith in Christ from subjugation to the 
“Christian God.”  The atonement, therefore, is essentially the freeing of humanity 
from God, understood variously as the institutional church, moral law, the sacrificial 
system, and so on.
Drawing much from Eastern thought, especially in his early work, Altizer 
points out that by default, entrenched as we are in Western thinking, we tend to place 
positive emphasis on ‘being’ and resist ‘non-being’ as something inferior or negative 
– an observation that will be echoed in Derrida's critique of logocentrism and the 
Western propensity to construct intellectual and moral structures comprised of 
binaries of oppositional terms.  Ultimately, it is God’s self-negation, which in radical 
theological proposals of something like a Bonhofferian “religionless Christianity,” e.g., Daphne 
Hampson, After Christianity (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997), and Don Cupitt, 
After All: Religious Without Alienation (London: SCM, 1994), to the more philosophically nuanced 
thinking of G. Vattimo, e.g. After Christianity (op cit.) and Mark C. Taylor, e.g. After God (Chicago 
and London: U of Chicago P, 2007).  While we do not take up the theme explicitly here, the notion 
of   “post-Christian   sacraments/sacramentality”   is   a   potentially   fruitful   avenue   for   further 
exploration.
182 Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (London: Collins, 1966).82
theology becomes another reversal, the negation of negation, that is the redemptive 
act: the God that is Spirit becoming wholly and irreversibly flesh in Christ, and being 
‘obedient to the point of death’ (Phil. 2:8).  Consistent with the Christ who, according 
to this hymn, 'emptied himself' (ekenōsen; Phil. 2:7), Altizer's is 'a fully kenotic or 
self-emptying theology,'
183 a theology wherein God empties Godself, and one that can 
only be written as the theologian empties, piece by piece, his own self as well.  It is 
the kenosis of God, first in Creation and later in the Incarnation, brought to 
completion in the “It is finished” (Jn. 19:30) at Calvary, which frees us from the 
anxiety and bondage of that satanic God who demands satisfaction and sacrifice.  This 
kenosis makes possible the (re)union of the Word and the Flesh, and our (re)union 
with the Word-made-Flesh that Altizer has sought throughout all his work.
184
This could simply be seen as a post-Enlightenment reinscription of Meister 
Eckhart's famous statement: ‘Man’s last and highest parting occurs when, for God’s 
sake, he takes leave of god.’
185  However, the death of God, to Altizer, is more than 
this.   Altizer is unwilling to allow theological constructs to “smooth over” the 
interminable problems created by the uniquely Christian conception of God.   He 
refuses to flinch away from the truth he finds at the heart of the Christian narrative: 
that the God who comes in Christ in fact irreversibly dies, sacrifices Godself, on the 
cross of Calvary.  So while for Eckhart, for God's sake, we take our leave of “God” – 
a name or concept that has the potential to be idolized – for Altizer, God has not only 
taken leave of us, but has in fact died, and has died for our sake, to liberate us from 
God.  And while the death of God, in this sense, is understood as God's own action – 
183 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Living the Death of God (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006), p. 12.
184 'Above all, the radical Christian seeks a total union with the Word, a union abolishing the priestly, 
legalistic, and dogmatic norms of the churches, so as to make possible the realization of a total 
redemption, a redemption actualizing the eschatological promise of Jesus'; T. Altizer, Christian 
Atheism, pp. 25-26.
185 Meister Eckhart, “Distinctions Are Lost in God,” in Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1941), p. 204.83
God's self-negation – still we must say an emphatic ‘No’ to God because God has 
ceased to make Godself present to us, and thus God’s presence can only be known or 
experienced as God’s absence.
186
However, Eckhart is an appropriate figure to draw into this chapter, in fact, for 
as Oliver Davies points out in his “Introduction” to Eckhart's Selected Writings 
language itself...(as Eckhart knew) is a fundamental part of 
the problem.  Language mediates the world to us with all its 
finiteness in space and time.  And when we use it of God, it 
gets in the way by making an object of him, clothing him in 
concepts   and   images   which   are   inappropriate   to   his 
uncreated nature.  But if language is the obstacle, it is also 
paradoxically   the   place   of   our   redemption.     Through 
purifying language into its most abstract and internal forms, 
through   using   wildly   metaphorical   language   of   God...
[Eckhart offers] a disruptive critique of language.
187
Like Eckhart, Altizer’s theological works consistently push the limits of language 
(theological or otherwise) to a breaking-point rarely approached elsewhere.  His is not 
a systematic theology by any means.  It is a poetic theology, worked out within all the 
muddle and mess of the language by which we perpetually try, but always fail, to 
circumscribe God.
188   In  Total Presence, one of Altizer's most potent works, he 
addresses the issue of language in relation to the parables of Jesus.   As Altizer 
describes it, we detect an almost sacramental quality to the parabolic speech of Jesus: 
'Perhaps we could say that the intention of the parable is to realize an enactment of 
speech wherein a totality of speakable or realizable identity is wholly present and 
immediately at hand....In this sense parable, or pure parable, is present only in its 
186 T. Altizer and W. Hamilton, Radical Theology, p. 137.
187 Meister Eckhart, Selected Writings, ed. and trans. by Oliver Davies  (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1994), p. xxxv.
188 Reading Altizer is more akin to the experience of reading poetry than theology; indeed, it is difficult 
for us to imagine the prospect of reading Altizer in translation. In a certain sense, we might say his 
writings are “liturgical,” in that they are not meant to be understood or intellectualized so much as 
performed, participated in, entered into. Liturgical language is mute prior to enactment, and this 
enactment is communion. In this sense, such poetics as Altizer’s are perhaps sacramental.  While 
not a primary aim, we hope this claim will be substantiated by this thesis as a whole.84
enactment, only in its telling or saying.'
189  Similarly, according to Kenan Osborne, 
'Sacraments only exist in the doing, in the celebrating.'
190  To Altizer, the language of 
Jesus' parables is unique in that it is im-mediate; and yet this 'total presence,' as he 
calls it, is at once a speech that is the antithesis of silence, and a speech which speaks 
about nothing at all
191 – and in this way is beyond economy and utility.
To demonstrate the problem of language as it is embodied in Altizer's writing, 
which is at once a poetic theology and a theological poiesis, we must consider a 
longer, representative passage which wrestles with the capacity of language to express 
theological content:
True parabolic speech is the speech of world itself, a speech 
wherein   and   whereby   world   is   totally   actual   and 
immediately at hand.  Then speech is world and world is 
speech at once.  Such speech calls its hearer out of a world 
which   is   silent   and   apart  and   into   a  world   which   is 
embodied in the full actuality of voice.  The silence of the 
world ends in parabolic speech, and ends because parabolic 
speech gives utterance to the full actuality of time and 
world.   It is precisely the absence of metaphorical and 
allegorical distancing which makes possible this full and 
immediate presence of speech.  Then the act of speech is an 
incarnation of world, an incarnation of world in the pure 
immediacy of voice.
192
We will not, and need not, endeavor to explain this impossible passage,
193 for like the 
medieval liturgy as interpreted by Pickstock, 'this impossibility does not...indicate a 
suspension over the abyss, but rather, the  occurrence  of the impossible through 
Christological mediation, which reveals the void as a plenitude, impossibly manifest 
189 Thomas J. J. Altizer, Total Presence: The Language of Jesus and the Language of Today (New 
York: The Seabury Press, 1980), pp. 3-4.
190 K. Osborne, Christian Sacraments, p. 12.
191 T. Altizer, Total Presence, p. 3, 7.
192 Ibid., 7-8. For a closely related passage, see ch. 4 (“Incarnation”) in The Self-Embodiment of God 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1977), beginning on p. 63, passim.
193 The 'postmodern a/theology' of Mark C. Taylor, which is in many ways the intellectual heir of 
Altizer's death of God and Derrida's deconstruction, exhibits a similar theological poetics: 
'a/theology cannot merely write about this impossibility but must write this impossibility itself.  The 
writing of this impossibility is never complete but always fragmentary.  The fragment inevitably 
disappoints, for it inscribes the failure of language' (Taylor, “Unending Strokes,” p. 144).85
in the very course of deferral and substitution.'
194   The mediacy of language is always 
theologically problematic, as it tempts us both to believe we can circumscribe God 
within the words that we assign to God, and to look to God as a constant guarantor of 
meaning.  However, our only access to God occurs through language, distilled most 
potently in the belief in Christ as the 'Word (Logos) made flesh' (Jn. 1:14), for as 
Altizer has written, 'Christianity and Christianity alone knows a Word or speech 
which   is   the   absolute   antithesis   of   silence.   Here,   Word   speaks   finally   or 
eschatologically,   and   Word   speaks   finally   because   Word   irreversibly   becomes 
“flesh.”’
195   And so language, as mediation by signs, is, like the Cross itself, the 
stumbling-block that is also the locus of our experience of salvation.
By   considering   the   thinking   and   writing   of  Altizer,   we   encounter   the 
possibilities of the death of God understood variously as a humanistic or cultural 
rejection of the concept of God; as an event of self-sacrifice or kenosis in the life of 
God; and, in his writing, his poetics, as the linguistic impossibility of im-mediate 
encounter with the divine.  So, if our language fails to make God present to us, or is 
only capable of re-presenting God in the mediacy and void of language itself; and if 
linguistic meaning is no longer underwritten by the assumption of God's presence, 
how do we “make sense” of anything at all?  Upon what is the meaning of any sign 
based?   How can we be certain a semantic message will hit its mark, will be 
understood by the recipient (reader or hearer) of the message?  Can we trust language 
to provide the medium in which communication may take place?   And if not 
communication, upon what basis could any communion possibly occur?  If we cannot 
trust language, can it possibly contain truth?
196
194 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. 178.
195 T. Altizer, Total Presence, p. 2-3.
196 These questions should have clear implications for the Word-made-Flesh whose silent testimony, 
when confronted with the question 'What is Truth?' (Jn. 18:38), bore witness to that Truth which 
does not come as a word or statement, but as a Person.86
2.4 The Crisis of Signification
These characterize some of the preoccupying questions asked by the thinkers 
and theorists associated with poststructuralism, an intellectual trend that came of age 
in the 1960s primarily within continental philosophy,  closely linked with and 
somewhat characteristic of postmodernism.
197  At the forefront of poststructuralism is 
the late French philosopher and literary theorist Jacques Derrida, whose notion of 
deconstruction typifies the postmodern struggle with language and meaning.  But to 
understand Derrida, we must first review the semiotic theory of Ferdinand de 
Saussure.
198   In his Course in General Linguistics, Saussure distinguishes between 
fundamental   elements   of   the   system   of   signification,   determining   that   words 
essentially have an arbitrary relationship to their objects.  However, lest we regard this 
as a uniquely modern critique, Nathan Mitchell points out,
The Saussurian denial of any real or essential relation 
between “sign” and “signified” – between what scholastic 
theology called signum et significatum – was not itself new. 
Such a rupture was already well under way in the West 
197 Some clarification is in order here about our use of  postmodern  in its various forms.  For us, 
postmodernity  refers   to   the   contemporary   cultural   condition   of   the   technologized   West, 
acknowledging that this description is irrelevant to those segments of the global community that 
never experienced Western modernity as such. We take postmodernism to describe the loose matrix 
of intellectual trends, especially in philosophy, sociology and literary/critical theory, that follow and 
supersede   modernism   and   maintain   a   critical   posture   toward   the   Enlightenment   (e.g. 
poststructuralism, post-colonialism, much gender theory, etc).  We agree with Gavin Hyman's 
assessment in The Predicament of Postmodern Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 2001) that postmodernism is 'a negative and parasitic term that depends on the negation of 
something else for its self-definition. This negation and parasitism empty the term of any weight or 
substance. It is the  post-script to something else and has no content or definition of its own'; 
furthermore, 'there [are] at least as many postmodernisms as there were modernisms' (p. 11). Any 
discussion of the postmodern should acknowledge the first use of the term “postmodern” in 
architectural theory and criticism in Charles Jencks' The Language of Post-Modern Architecture 
(rev. ed.; New York: Rizzoli, 1978). Some of the defining works on the postmodern include Jean-
François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester 
UP, 1984), Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: 
Verso, 1991), and the work of Zygmut Bauman, e.g. Imitations of Postmodernity (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992). 
198 Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959) survives 
only as a composite of lecture notes. As a starting point, see the excerpt in Mark C. Taylor, ed., 
Deconstruction in Context: Literature and Philosophy  (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 
1986), pp. 141-68.  Taylor’s introductory comments on pp. 13-14 are also helpful.87
during the late medieval and early modern periods, and it 
would result in a severe challenge to traditional Catholic 
understandings of the  real  relation between “signs” and 
“things signified” in sacramental rites (the basis for the 
assertion that signs “really contain and impart” what they 
signify).
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Likewise, this consists with the Augustinian understanding of signs which we 
examined in the previous chapter.  Recall that already present in Augustine's semiotic 
theory is the essential difference between the sign and its referent, and the distance at 
which the sign places the interpreter of the sign from the reality to which it refers.  In 
Saussurian semiotics, this difference and distance is taken a step further.  Saussure 
identifies that the sign itself can be broken down into two components: the signifier, 
which describes the sign’s material component – how the word sounds when verbally 
articulated and processed aurally, or how the word appears when printed on the page 
and processed visually – and the signified, which refers to the conceptual component 
of the sign – not the thing itself but the mental concept of the thing to which the sign 
refers.   These two components, the signifier and the signified, only when taken 
together make up the linguistic sign.
Saussure identifies that it is not the thing to which the sign refers that gives it 
its meaning, but rather all of the things which it is not – that is, the difference between 
a given signifier and every other signifier in the system of signification.  In other 
words, the sign “hat” – the signifier, comprised of the letters “h-a-t” in written 
(grapheme) or spoken (phoneme) sequential combination, and the signified, or the 
mental concept of a covering for the head – is only meaningful because of the 
difference  or  dissimilarity  “hat” bears to the sign “bat,” “pat” and so on, both 
phonetically/graphically and conceptually (i.e. the concept of a hat is distinct from a 
scarf or a shoe).  In a language system that relies purely on differences – definition by 
199 N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, pp. 14-15, fn. 27.88
negation – only negative, and no positive, terms exist.   This breakdown of the 
linguistic system reveals the unravelling of all structures of signification.   Hence 
meaning is exposed as arbitrary, fluid, duplicitous, pluralistic.  For Saussure, thought 
and  language are  coextensive,   and  so  there  can  be no  pre-linguistic thought. 
Therefore, since language contains within itself its own negation, all thought, spoken 
or written, is subject to this fundamental flaw.
Derrida's reading of Saussure
200  leads him to identify a characteristic of 
Western thought he calls logocentrism,
201 or the deference to and reliance upon the 
intrinsic truth of the Word as the arbiter of presence.  'Logocentrism,' Derrida has 
stated, 'is also, fundamentally, an idealism. It is the matrix of idealism.'
202  The result 
of the idealistic delusion that words and language contain some concrete, univocal 
meaning is a binary, oppositional system of hierarchies in which one term is always 
privileged over another, such as light to darkness, transcendence to immanence, 
presence to absence.  This is evident also in the elevation of the perceived immediacy 
of speech over the mediate nature of writing, which is cut off from its author and 
requires interpretation.
203   Derrida traces the primacy of speech back to Plato’s 
Phaedrus, which he reads deconstructively to show how speech is susceptible to the 
same critique Plato ascribes to writing; in the end, Derrida elevates the written word 
200 For a concise but helpful description of Derrida’s application of Saussure, see Stephen D. Moore’s 
Post-structuralism and the New Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994), pp. 14-16.  It is noteworthy that Saussure's Course in 
General Linguistics is only preserved in textual form as a collection of the lecture notes of his 
students; in other words, it did not begin its life as a proper “book” but rather as speech, as oral 
presentations transcribed and later compiled by his students.  This might be borne in mind when 
considering Derrida's reading of Plato's  Phaedrus  as a text which seeks but ultimately fails to 
demonstrate the primacy of speech over writing; see “Plato's Pharmacy” in Dissemination (London 
and New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 67-186.
201 See J. Derrida, Of Grammatology.
202 Jacques Derrida, Positions (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1981), p. 51.
203 According to Roland Barthes, all writing entails the “death of the author,” which gives rise to the 
“birth of the reader.” This understanding of textuality is crucial to poststructuralism, as the author is 
no longer the final arbiter of the meaning of his text; rather, the reader creates a plurivocity of 
interpretations. See Barthes' essay, “The Death of the Author,” in  Image Music Text  (London: 
Fontana: 1977), pp. 142-48.89
over the spoken.  Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, Derrida suggests that 
this problematic nature applies to all structures of language and, by extension, all 
structures of thought.
To sufficiently outline the development and implications of post-structuralism 
and deconstruction would require a separate study.
204  However, a basic knowledge of 
deconstruction is crucial to the remainder of this chapter.  With Derrida’s work, the 
possibility of absolute truth seems to disintegrate, giving rise to the duplicity and 
plurality of meaning – this is what Pickstock is reacting to when she criticizes the 
nihilism and 'necrophilia' of postmodernism, or Derrida's conception of language as 
resulting in a situation where 'meaning is indeterminate and abyssal.'
205  As a result, 
the innate power structures and hierarchies within Western thought are exposed as 
ultimately biased and oppressive.  The epistemological yardstick is turned on its head. 
The   philosophical   contribution   of   deconstruction   is   often   thought   of   as   the 
overturning of logocentrism, but this description is overly simplistic.  Rather than a 
simple reversal or inversion, deconstruction produces the rupture of meaning, which 
is not purely destructive but is also constructive, generative, for what deconstruction 
finally discloses is that meaning is always unavoidably the product of the construction 
of meaning – meaning requires that we “make sense” of signs and symbols that 
populate our world.
206  However, in the absence of the transcendental signified – that 
is, some originary essence or source of meaning – all meaning is understood in terms 
of difference.  Derrida employs the term différance, coined from the French for for “to 
differ” and “to defer,” thereby bringing together the ideas that meaning is not only 
204 For a thorough analysis, see Jonathan Culler’s  On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after 
Structuralism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1982).
205 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. xv; see also chapter 3, “Signs of Death” (pp. 101-18).
206 Mark C. Taylor puts it well: 'Meaning is relative or relational. It arises from the play, the interplay 
of   identity   and   difference,   presence   and   absence,   light   and   darkness,   voice   and   silence'; 
Deconstructing Theology (New York: Crossroads / Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982), p. 116.90
based on an unstable relationship of  differences  but that meaning is also, as a 
consequence, indefinitely deferred.
207  It is, in what John Caputo has recognized as a 
sort of messianism,
208 always “to come” (a venir).
Différance, for Derrida,  is actually no-thing in and of itself, but always 
already exists within the matrix of signification, a description of the absence of an 
origin or an originary presence.  While Derrida attempts to maintain that his project is 
non-theological, not the same as negative theology, and even famously claiming that 
différance  ‘blocks   every   relationship   to   theology,’
209  the   implications   and   the 
application of his work nonetheless have a profound impact on theological thinking.
210 
Derridean thought, ‘which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms freeplay.’
Turned toward the lost or impossible presence of the absent 
origin, this structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is 
therefore the saddened, negative… side of the thinking of 
play   whose   other   side   would   be   the   Nietzschean 
affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the 
world of signs without fault, without truth, and without 
origin which is offered to an active interpretation.   This 
affirmation then determines the non-center otherwise than 
as loss of the center.
211
207 J. Derrida, Positions, p. 27.
208 John D. Caputo, “After Jacques Derrida Comes the Future” in Journal of Cultural and Religious 
Theory Vol. 4.2 (Spring 2003), online <http://www.jcrt.org/archives/04.2/caputo.shtml> [accessed 
15 March 2010]; see para. 14. Prof. Caputo was a Robertson Lecturer at the University of Glasgow 
in 2005 and delivered an address entitled “Circumfession: The Jewish Augustinianism of Jacques 
Derrida” (which as far as we are aware remains unpublished in that particular form). We cite this 
public lecture as our first exposure to this messianic quality in Derrida's thought.
209 J. Derrida, Positions, p. 40.
210 For a concise overview, see Carl A. Raschke, “Á-Dieu to Jacques Derrida: Descartes’ ghost, or the 
Holy Spirit in secular theology,” in Clayton Crockett, ed., Secular Theology: American Radical 
Theological Thought  (New York and London: Routledge, 2001),  pp. 37-50; and Kevin Hart, 
“Jacques Derrida: The God Effect,” in Blond, ed., Post-Secular Philosophy, pp. 259-80. Derrida's 
impact on theology and religious thought is best seen in the work of Mark C. Taylor, cf. esp. Erring, 
passim, and of John D. Caputo, esp. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without 
Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana UP, 1997), passim. This is to say nothing of 
the profound influence of Derrida and deconstruction upon biblical criticism.
211 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (New York and London: Routledge, 1978). pp. 369-70. 
From our perspective, the Derridean notion of 'the lost or impossible presence of the absent origin,' 
which 'determines the non-center otherwise than as loss of the center,' does not seem too far 
removed from what Pickstock names when she writes:  'the liturgical stammer bespeaks its 
admission of distance between itself and the transcendent “real.”   It is this very admission of 
distance which permits a genuine proximity with God.'  This is the liturgical instantiation of 'the 
impossible through Christological mediation, which reveals the void as a plenitude, impossibly 91
Throughout   his  oeuvre,  Derrida’s   work   outlines
212  –   or,   perhaps   more 
accurately, performs – what he calls deconstruction, which is not so much a literary 
critical approach as a recognition of the inherent movement within texts, and by 
extension all of language, to undermine the very system(s) of signification upon 
which they rely for meaning to be conveyed and communication to occur.
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures 
from the outside.  They are not possible and effective, nor 
can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those 
structures.  Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one 
always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect 
it.  Operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the 
strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old 
structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without 
being   able   to   isolate   their   elements   and   atoms,   the 
enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls 
prey to its own work.
213
Here Derrida confesses the very characteristic for which deconstruction is most often 
criticized; namely, that it is subject to its own critique.  So when Pickstock critiques 
Derrida 'for his exaltation of absence and postponement' which 'turns out to be but the 
inevitably nihilistic conclusion' of an indifferent, modernist rationalism,
214 she misses 
what Raschke and other heirs of Altizerian “radical” (but not “radical  orthodox”) 
theology have no trouble grasping; that
The shattering of every orthodoxy is not nihilism, but 
manifest in the very course of deferral and substitution' (After Writing, p. 178, ital. added).  We 
suspect that it is resonances of this sort that leads Carl Raschke to claim that 'Radical orthodoxy is 
far more Derridean than it can confess' (C. Raschke, “Á-Dieu to Jacques Derrida,” p. 46.).   To 
borrow a phrase from John Caputo, while Pickstock and Derrida come at the question from very 
different points of faith (and different patterns of religious thinking and praxis), they both appear to 
be 'Apostles of the Impossible' – or perhaps better, poets of the Impossible; cf. Caputo, “Apostles of 
the Impossible: Derrida and Marion,” in God, the Gift and Postmodernism, eds. John D. Caputo and 
Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 185-222.
212 See J. Derrida, Of Grammatology; Writing and Difference; and Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: U 
of Chicago P, 1982), which contains the essay “Différance” (pp. 3-27; also excerpted in M. C. 
Taylor, ed. Deconstruction in Context, op. cit., pp. 396-420). See also Derrida's essential essay, 
“How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Languages of the Unsayable, S. Budick and W. Iser, eds. 
(Stanford: Stanford UP: 1996), pp. 3-70.
213 J. Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 24.
214 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. 47.92
eschatology.  In its very conception eschatology betokens 
the overcoming of the metaphysics of presence by the 
Presence alone.   The presencing of Presence means the 
smashing of the onto-theological pattern of writing as 
presence, of inscription as the double sentence, of the 
regime of being itself.   Eschatology is both “the end of 
theology” and the end of all “orthodoxies” that purport to 
stand   in   for   the   Father,   that   usurp   the   throne   of 
signification.
215
Derrida, while revered and maligned in seemingly equal measure, must be 
credited as an impeccable and imaginative reader of texts.  His work consistently 
demonstrates his central insight: the ultimate failure of language to comport singular, 
univocal meaning.  Elsewhere he refers to this failure as stemming from the death of 
the “transcendental signified” – some point of reference outside the sign-system, and 
immune to the critique of signification, which guarantees linguistic meaning.  These 
are complex assertions put forward in nuanced writings, and such a brief outline does 
them no justice.   However, it should be noted that according to our Tillichian 
framework, sacraments, as sacred signs or religious symbols, must be regarded as 
containing the same de/constructive tendency intrinsic to all sign-systems; this 
challenge must be taken seriously.   Sacrament, as a theological construct and a 
liturgical  act,   must  be reimagined   in  light of  this   de/constructive  core.    The 
consequences for both Christian theology and liturgy of this reimagination will be 
explored more fully in the discussion to come.
This is an all too brief outline of some of the major contours of the postmodern 
era, characterized by poststructuralism and the crisis of signification as well as by the 
advent of Radical Theology and the death of God.  It is by no means comprehensive. 
Rather, we have highlighted those characteristics of postmodernity that are relevant to 
our understanding of sacraments and sacramentality as signs and language events. 
Those features include the disintegration of language systems as a sure-fire reservoir 
215 C. Raschke, “Á-Dieu to Jacques Derrida,” pp. 44-45.93
of meaning and truth, and a preference for pluralism and paradox over univocity and 
simplicity.  Additionally, the sense of the absence of God, especially after the Second 
World War,
216 emerges as a disconcerting characteristic of this cultural epoch as well. 
These   hallmarks   of   postmodernity,   taken   together,   call   forth   the   exploration 
undertaken here to open new avenues for sacramental thinking and experience.  It is 
our proposal that in a manner not dissimilar to the poststructuralist crisis of 
signification and Altizer's vision of the death of God, the liturgical reforms of Vatican 
II also enact within the arena of language a kenosis or emptying of meaning.  
2.5 “This is (not) my Body...”: the Living Metaphor
Let us turn now to the eucharistic liturgy and consider how the language of the 
liturgy discloses within itself the same struggle with, and for, meaning that is an 
intrinsic characteristic of all language.  At the center of the liturgy of the Eucharist lies 
the institution narrative.  Indeed, in a certain sense, the most critical words of the 
entire narrative – indeed the entire liturgy
217 – are Jesus' metaphoric declaration This 
216 It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the Second World War – chiefly the Jewish 
holocaust and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – to any authentic understanding of 
postmodernity.  In Imagologies: Media Philosophy (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), his 
experimental   collaboration   with   Finnish   philosopher  Esa   Saarinen,   Mark   C.  Taylor   writes, 
'Modernity ended on August 6, 1945.  The postmodern condition we are living is not simply the 
result of having been raised on television.  As the children of Hiroshima, we have always known 
that modernity is a nightmare from which we must awake'; see § “Telepolitics,” pg. 2 [bold in 
original]. In light of this, it also must not go unnoticed that many of the major contributions to the 
intellectual make-up of postmodernism come from thinkers of Jewish descent, e.g.  Walter 
Benjamin, Emmauel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida.
217 We recognize the potential problem of claiming that certain words or phrases of the liturgy are more 
critical than others; it is best to regard the liturgy as a kind of symphony, in which every note played 
by every instrument is crucial to the desired effect of the music.  However, it might be said that 
without the institution narrative, and without the statements ‘This is my body; this is my blood’ in 
particular, the Eucharist has not be enacted, even according to the earliest biblical/ecclesial 
instruction of Paul to the Corinthians and to the most basic of liturgical formulae. Furthermore, we 
recall those parts of the Mass that even such a liturgical reformer as Cranmer insisted must remain 
in Latin so as to preserve their sacral and mystical character, e.g. in the 1548 “Order for 
Communion in English,” the priest is instructed that the prayer of consecration/epiclesis 'without 
the varying of any other rite or ceremony in the Mass.' Further, Cranmer notes that 'the Bread that 
shall be consecrated shall be such as heretofore hath been accustomed...if it doth so chance that the 
Wine hallowed and consecrate doth not suffice or be enough for them that do take the Communion, 
the Priest, after the first Cup or Chalice be emptied, may go again to the Altar, and reverently and 
devoutly prepare and consecrate another, and so the third, or more likewise, beginning at these 
words, Simili modo postquam conatum est, and ending at these words, Qui pro vobis et pro multis 94
is my body and This is my blood.  The importance of these two statements is attested 
in the gravitas with which the priest commonly delivers these words, and heightened 
by the fact that the church teaches that the celebrant speaks these words not in his own 
“voice,” as though a narrator or story-teller, but rather in persona Christi, in the voice 
of Christ himself.  These two statements, taken together, are the fulcrum around which 
the entire liturgy moves.  Without them, the drama of the liturgy grinds to a halt; the 
words and actions that precede these metaphoric statements and proceed from them 
become incoherent if this central declaration is negated.  So we must undertake a 
consideration of metaphor and fiction.
218
In  The Rule of Metahpor,
219  Paul Ricoeur offers a concise definition of 
metaphor as ‘the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that 
certain fictions have to redescribe reality.’
220   We immediately encounter a tension 
here; perhaps metaphor is not, after all, the way into a discussion of Jesus’ ‘This is my 
Body/Blood’ when in fact the bulk of the Christian tradition has ardently fought to 
maintain that the bread and cup are not mere ‘fictions’ which have the power to 
‘redescribe reality,’ but are in fact the Corpus Verum, the true Body of Christ; the res 
(reality) itself, not simply a redescription of reality.  However, we must not be so 
effundetur in remissionem peccatorum […].' This is evidence that at least certain parts of the liturgy 
are held to be uniquely sacred, and should be preserved in the ancient language of the church.
218 Graham Ward disagrees: 'The literary nature of this demonstrative identification cannot be 
accurately catalogued. There is no avowed element of similitude or comparison: it is not a simile, it 
is not a metaphor. There is no element of substitution or proportion to indicate synecdoche or 
metonymy: it is not a symbol....The phrase has the literary structure of allegory or irony: something 
which seems to be the case is so, but otherwise' (Cities of God, pp. 82-83). In departing from Ward's 
understanding of the eucharistic 'is' as non-metaphorical and outside the known grammars of 
identification, our goal is not to reduce Jesus' eucharistic statement to metaphor (contra Ward) but 
rather to show how Ricoeur's understanding of the 'living metaphor' resonates with our conception 
of sacrament. We agree with Ward that this scandalous 'is' is not a metaphor insofar as he means 
what Ricoeur would call a 'dead metaphor.'  But we contend that Jesus' statement is an instance of 
la métaphore vive, and that by extension, the living metaphor betokens a sacramentality.
219 We appreciate Prof. David Jasper pointing out to us the questionable English rendering (The Rule of 
Metaphor) of Ricoeur’s French title, La Métaphore Vive, which alludes more to the notion of the 
living metaphor – or perhaps even the exclamation: The Metaphor Lives!
220 P. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 595
quick to denigrate ‘fiction’ to the status of ‘mere fiction,’ just as we must not demote 
‘symbol’ in a similar fashion.   We must not strip ‘fiction’ of its association with 
‘truth,’ for as Douglas Templeton has explored at length in The New Testament as 
True Fiction, the opposite of fiction is not truth but rather fact.
221  He writes, ‘Fiction, 
while it does not state, nevertheless embodies truth... Fiction, the term “fiction”, is 
wider than fact, because it can include fact.’
222  Templeton’s broad engagement with 
the writings of the New Testament study is helpful in that he provides a framework 
within which to deal with the New Testament scriptures, especially the gospels, as 
literary texts rather than historical chronicles, and indeed that such an understanding 
is an elevation of the scriptures, rather than a diminution of their status.  He observes 
that   ‘Fiction   differs   from   history   as   the   possible   differs   from   the   actual.’
223 
Furthermore, ‘Literature differs from history as fiction differs from fact…History and 
literature are equally modes of dealing with, of finding language for, reality.’
224 Or as 
Ricoeur states of metaphor, ‘Reality remains a reference, without ever becoming a 
restriction.'
225  Following Templeton, we may conclude that the best – which is to say, 
most fruitful, most expansive – way to regard the gospel accounts is as ‘true fictions,’ 
for they are more interested in possibility, in the possibility of the impossible, than 
they are in facts and actualities.
226  As literature, we are still firmly within the realm of 
221 See D. Templeton, New Testament as True Fiction, p. 29
222 Ibid., p. 29.
223 Ibid., p. 107.
224 Ibid., p. 305.
225 P. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 47 [ital. added].
226 To be clear, Templeton does not focus on the idea of sacrament or the Eucharist in particular. 
However, near the end of the book, Templeton makes this provocative suggestion: 'What if fictions 
can be  true  fictions? What if more or less historical fictions…can be  true  fictions?   What if 
Baptism, Temptation, Transfiguration, the Entry into Jerusalem, the Institution of the Eucharist…
are true fictions of this kind? What if each is, within a work of art, a work of art?' (True Fiction, p. 
336) We wish to claim, following Templeton’s lead, that the Eucharist is indeed a work of art, 
contained both within the work of literary art that is sacred scripture, as well as within the work of 
ritual art that is Christian liturgy – in all its diversity and through all its development across 
centuries of Christian practice.   The Eucharist is a true fiction that re-presents not so much a 
historically verifiable moment as a poetic moment of possible impossibility.96
truth and reality, but rather than stopping with the actual (which remains inaccessible 
to us), we move beyond into the realm of the possible.
Returning to metaphor, it is nevertheless important to note that this ‘power...to 
redescribe reality’ around which Ricoeur builds his definition of metaphor is an 
inherent characteristic of ‘certain fictions’ – not all fictions, perhaps, but neither does 
Ricoeur mention anything other than fictions which hold this power.  A metaphor is a 
language event wherein one thing is taken for another: for example the winter wind is 
a knife, or in the Eucharist,  this bread is my Body.   According to Ricoeur, ‘The 
metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is not’ and ‘is like.’  If this is really so, we are 
allowed to speak of metaphorical truth.’
227  We should note that this view of metaphor 
is by no means unique to contemporary thought.  St. Augustine proposes that:
Signs are either literal or metaphorical.   They are called 
literal when used to signify the things for which they were 
invented....They are metaphorical when the actual things 
which we signify by the particular words are used to signify 
something else.
228
And so an additional layer of remove or mediation is added to the metaphorical sign. 
If there is only one interpretive “step” between the literal sign and its referent (i.e. the 
word “bread” for a loaf of bread), at least two interpretive steps exist between the 
metaphorical sign and the 'something else' to which it points (i.e. the loaf of bread, 
conjoined with the words 'this bread is my body' to refer to Christ's physical body). 
‘The bread retains its function as bread, and in this sense it is not the body of Jesus; 
but the bread also becomes the body of Jesus, and in this sense it is no longer ordinary 
bread.  Paradoxically, for Jesus as for the believer, the eucharistic bread is and is not 
bread, it is and is not the body of Jesus.’
229
227 P. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 6.
228 Augustine, On Christian Teaching, p. 37 [italics added].
229 Xavier Léon-Dufour, Sharing the Eucharistic Bread: The Witness of the New Testament (New York 
and Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 12897
Catholic theologian Nathan Mitchell describes metaphor in related terms, 
which we also find useful: 'Metaphor's first movement always appears to be a mistake, 
a transgression within speech.'
230   Within the metaphorical 'is' resides a 'conflict – 
caused by putting two things together that don't belong – [which] cannot be resolved 
at the literal level...We are thus compelled to imagine a new possibility – something 
true that differs from both...yet illumines the significance of both.'
231  Metaphor, then, 
in its very irresolvable character, generates meanings without end.  Not only can this 
metaphorical conflict not be resolved at the literal level, as Mitchell remarks, but in 
fact, at the literary level its resolution is not a closing down but rather a rupture, an 
opening up, of meaning.   At the heart of metaphor resides this paradox, the 
concurrence of ‘is’ with ‘is not.’  Like Picasso’s statement about art, a metaphor is a 
lie that tells the truth.
232  For the metaphor to ‘work’ it must be acknowledged on a 
certain level that the two things the metaphor compares are, in fact, not the same, and 
as Ricoeur demonstrates, when ‘is not’ passes into nonrecognition, the metaphor 
becomes mundane, conventional, and ceases to be a living metaphor.
To consider another aspect of Mitchell's description, cited above, a metaphor 
is categorically a transgression.  As Ricoeur writes:
If metaphor always involves a kind of mistake, if it involves 
taking one thing for another by a sort of calculated error, 
then metaphor is essentially a discursive phenomenon.  To 
affect just one word, the metaphor has to disturb the whole 
network by means of an aberrant attribution.
233
The metaphor requires, according to Ricoeur, an aberration, a mistake, for ‘metaphor 
230 N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, p. 196.
231 Ibid., p. 196.
232 See “Picasso Speaks (Statement to Marius de Zayas)” The Arts (New York, May 1923), pp. 315-26: 
'Art is a lie that makes us realize truth, at least the truth that is given us to understand.' Available 
online at <www.learn.columbia.edu/picmon/pdf/art_hum_reading_49.pdf> [accessed 3 July 2009]. 
See also, N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery: 'a metaphor can tell the truth only by lying' (p. 195).
233 P. Ricoeur, Rule of Metaphor, p. 23.98
does not produce a new order except by creating rifts in an old order.’
234  To mean 
anything at all, metaphor must paradoxically violate the entire linguistic system upon 
which meaning relies.  Metaphor represents by redescription – to paraphrase Emily 
Dickinson, it 'tells all the Truth but tells it slant'
235 – and so is generative of new 
meanings, even by means of misdirection.  As Mark C. Taylor puts it, 'Metaphors and 
parables are stumbling-blocks,'
236 language events which trip us up, quite deliberately, 
on the way to meaning. This is what we refer to as the  de/constructive core of 
sacramentality: a movement within sacrament, in part the result of its basis in 
metaphor,   which   'conceals   even   while   revealing,   and   reveals   even   while 
concealing,'
237  destabilizing interpretation and negating simple, univocal meaning. 
But always this de/construction leads to construction, to the eruption of a plurivocity 
of meaning and interpretation without end.
238
2.6 The De/constructive Core of Sacramentality
It is not, then, inappropriate to speak of Jesus’ statements as poetic – and 
indeed, Jesus’ command to ‘This do [poieite] in remembrance of me’ which follows 
the metaphoric declarations about his Body and Blood, places the Last Supper 
account clearly within the realm of poetry.  Just as Jesus uses “fictions” (parables) to 
teach his followers about the Kingdom of God,
239  Jesus uses poetic speech to 
234 Ibid., p. 24.
235 Emily Dickinson, “Tell all the Truth but tell it slant” (Poem 1129), in Thomas H. Johnson, ed. The 
Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson (Boston, New York and London: Little, Brown and Company, 
1960), p. 506-07.
236 Mark C. Taylor, Deconstructing Theology (New York: Crossroads / Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 
1982), p. 122.
237 Ibid., p. 119.
238 cf.  'A Beginning,' in  Andrew Hass,  Poetics of Critique: The Interdisciplinarity of Textuality 
(London: Ashgate, 2003), wherein Hass suggests that deconstruction's time has passed, and now is 
the time for reconstruction and recreation.
239 Templeton writes, ‘Why does it seem natural to think of the artist as a kind of liar?  Why does the 
artist, why does Jesus use “is not” to tell us what “is”…?'  (True Fiction, p. 87); cf. also Robert 
Scharlemann's   two   seminal   essays,   “The   Being   of   God   When   God   is   Not   Being   God: 
Deconstructing the History of Theism” (ch. 3) and “Being 'As Not': Overturning the Ontological” 
(ch. 4) in Inscriptions and Reflections: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Charlottesville, VA: UP 99
redescribe or transgress reality: this bread is (not) His Body, and his Body is (not) this 
bread; this wine is (not) his Blood, and his Blood is (not) this wine.  Furthermore the 
command to 'do this as often as you eat/drink it' (1 Cor. 11:24-26), implies that, to 
some degree, all bread and all wine should henceforth be regarded as having this 
paradoxical connection to His body and blood.  Jesus' words startle his listeners, as 
they have many times before.
240  Spoken in the context of this particular meal, on the 
eve of his own execution, the words of the Word made Flesh rend asunder the ‘old 
order’ – the sacrificial system of the Jewish Passover – to inaugurate a new covenant. 
Like all metaphoric and poetic speech, Christ's words punches a hole in the mundane 
(bread, wine; language), creates tears and exposes openings, reveals cracks and fault 
lines, through which wholly (holy?) new meaning(s) may erupt – life bursting forth 
from the vacant opening in a stone-hewn tomb.
And yet this eruption is also a kenosis, as we have seen – an out-pouring of 
meaning.  Our language not only harbors this kenosis, but calls us toward the same 
end, as David Power has remarked: 'The self-emptying, or kenosis, of Christ on the 
Cross calls forth the self-emptying of those who are his disciples, a self-emptying 
which acknowledges the limits of all representation and is ready to cross out whatever 
representations hinder the gift of love and its testimony in the breadth and universality 
of God's giving.'
241  God's giving begins in creation in the giving of language, speech, 
and the responsibility of naming.  This giving is the giving of Godself, in and through 
the language of sacrament, which we can now say is also in and through language 
of Virginia, 1989), pp. 30-65. As David Klemm explains in his introduction to Scharlemann's 
“Being 'As Not'”: 'God shows Godself in the deep structure of language (“God is God as word”); 
and the essence or deep structure of language shows itself as the word  God'; Klemm, ed., 
Hermeneutical Inquiry (1986), p. 272.
240 Ricoeur observes that ‘Instead of comparing two things, metaphor contrives a verbal short-
circuit...and  the more unexpected their combination, the more striking and surprising is the 
metaphor’ (ibid., p. 139, italics added).   Jesus ‘Bread of Life’ discourse in John 6, a highly 
eucharistic passage, creates a similar ‘short-circuit’; see our discussion of this passage in Ch. 5.
241 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 82.100
itself as sacramental.
All meaningful human experience is mediated by the language(s) and the body 
that we have been given and, far more than belonging to us, to which we belong.  We 
are beginning to see that the struggle with the concept of sacrament stems precisely 
from sacrament's this-worldliness, its materiality, and its mediative nature.   Our 
desire, our longing is for an im-mediate presence which is impossible because of the 
irreducible distance between the creation and Godself.  All that we know and are able 
to experience of God comes to us through the material, which is to say, sacramentally. 
To again quote Schillebeeckx, 'every supernatural reality which is realized historically 
in our lives is sacramental.'
242   The two-fold scandal of sacramentality, as we are 
tracing it, is identifiable as the problem of language and the problem of the body.  To 
be clear, when we refer in this thesis to the “problem” of language or the body, we do 
not wish to connote something purely negative (although negation is involved), in the 
sense of a problem for which a solution must be found.   Rather, we are calling 
attention to the inescapable condition common to all humanity by which we are 
simultaneously bound together and distanced by our language(s) and our bodies.  This 
condition cannot, and need not, be “solved” or overcome.
However, in humanity's aspiration to transcend its present reality, in our desire 
to possess that which we can never grasp, sacraments knock us back down to earth, to 
our material, historical reality which is comprised of the signs and symbols without 
which meaning is entirely inaccessible to us.  Our struggle, then, with sacrament is at 
least in part that sacrament points us beyond itself to a supernatural reality that is 
paradoxically present within and as the natural, historical, material reality to which 
we are bound, and which is otherwise utterly absent.  In other words, in sacrament, 
we are confronted with the irreducible mediacy of our creatureliness, encompassing 
242 E. Schillebeeckx, Christ the Sacrament, p. 5.101
both language, as we have seen, and the body, to which we now turn.102
~ Chapter Three ~
“...Made Flesh”:
The Problem of the Body
...faith cannot be lived in any other way, including what 
is most spiritual in it, than  in the mediation of the 
body...What is most spiritual always takes place in the 
most corporeal.
243
When the body appears to be endangered,
it becomes an obsession.
244
3.1 Mediation and the Body
We have thus far established that the central corporate act of the Christian 
ecclesia, from which the Church derives its identity as the Body of Christ and its 
sacramental structure, is the Eucharist, the participation in Christ's broken body and 
shed blood.  The Eucharist not only points toward the Cross of Christ but toward the 
entire narrative of the Incarnation of God in human body of Jesus of Nazareth.  We 
glimpse the central stumbling-block – what St. Paul calls a skandalon – of Christian 
faith and practice: ‘we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and 
foolishness to Gentiles’ (1 Cor. 1:23).  Paul discloses the root of the skandalon: ‘Jews 
demand miraculous signs’ – they require visual or tangible evidence – ‘and Greeks 
look for wisdom’ – some sense of knowledge, grasping, comprehension.   Yet the 
243 L-M. Chauvet, The Sacraments, p. xii.
244 Mark C. Taylor, Hiding (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1997), p. 129.103
Cross of Christ provides neither.  Indeed, it leaves a double absence: a dead body, 
emptied of its spirit, and then a tomb absent its corpse.   Even between Christ's 
resurrection and ascension, his is an elusive body that can be touched but not grasped, 
a body that will not submit to the categories of knowledge or the scrutiny of human 
wisdom.  This is a radical reversal where life is found in death and death becomes life.
In Chapter 2 we focused on the scandal of sacramentality as bound up with the 
problem of language itself.  We established that sacrament must be understood as an 
event within language insofar as sacrament takes on the structure of symbol and, as 
we have seen following Ricoeur, the rule or “logic” (or 'illogic,' as Mark C. Taylor 
names it)
245 of the living metaphor in particular.  Sacrament is a way of proclaiming 
what  is  by what  is not.   It is a poetic rupturing of language which protects the 
ineffability of the divine by opening up a distance between the signified and the 
signifier, and revealing this distance or gap to be internal to sacrament itself.  In 
sacrament, language, as symbol and metaphor, mediates the Sacred, providing us with 
the means by which material elements of creation may be re-inscribed as the location 
of the divine.  However, by pointing us toward the created order, which is irreducibly 
other than and at a distance from the divine, rather than beyond it, sacraments open 
the possibility of participation in divine absence, an absence symbolized as a real 
presence in the sacramental celebration.
The symbol also leads us back to the body as the site of sacramental 
encounter; as 'the primordial and arch-symbolic form of mediation, as well as the 
basis for all subjective identification.'
246   Guided chiefly by Louis-Marie Chauvet's 
eucharistic theology, will continue our effort to cursorily diagram the anatomy of 
245 'Language has within it, however, an illogical element, the metaphor. Its principal force brings 
about an identification of the nonidentical; it is thus an operation of the imagination'; M. Taylor, 
Deconstructing Theology, p. 119; quoting Jacques Derrida, “The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy 
before  Linguistics,” in J. V. Harari, ed.,  Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 
Criticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1979), p. 83. (Note: Derrida is quoting Nietzsche.)
246 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 111.104
sacrament  by  turning   our   attention   now   toward   the   irreducible  materiality  of 
sacrament – sacrament as a body which is given to bodies, and gives a Body.  Chauvet 
is sensitive to the tension between the biblical injunction to worship God 'in spirit and 
truth' (Jn. 4:24) and the material, ritual trappings of the liturgical (which is to say 
'bodily') encounter with God,
247 for as Nathan Mitchell points out, 'liturgies have no 
content other than the body itself in prayer, the body-as-prayer.'
248  Chauvet reminds 
us 'On the basis of faith in the incarnation of God in Jesus, Christians confess that 
they go to God not in spite of the heavy ambiguity of their humanity, but at the very 
core of it; not in spite of their bodies...but in their very bodies.'
249   This is a 
pronouncement of the final and irreducible mediacy of sacramentality, which infuses 
the entire creation.
250
Among the various mediations of the faith, the sacraments 
are the highest figure of the impossibility for faith to be 
lived in what is most spiritual in it – as adoration of the 
Father “in spirit and truth” – outside the most “bodily” and 
most “religious.”   The sacraments thus serve as a  buffer 
which repels every temptation Christians might have to 
ignore body, history, society in order to enter without any 
mediation into communication with God.
251
Despite our tendency to denigrate the body and our desire for an experience that 
transcends our “locatedness” within space and time, sacraments remind us that such 
experience is inaccessible.  Communication, relationship, of any sort, whether with 
God or fellow creatures, is impossible apart from the mediation (which can be called 
sacramental) of language and the body.  So our dominant themes continue to arise: 
mediation and distance, presence and absence, signs and symbols, language and 
meaning.  Our experience of the world is not only linguistic but also, and perhaps 
247 cf. Jean -Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man 
(New York: Fordham UP, 2004), esp. § 8 “Liturgy as Transgression,” pp. 20-22.
248 N. Mitchell, Meeting Mystery, p. xv.
249 L-M. Chauvet, The Sacraments, p. 113-14.
250 K. Osborne, Christian Sacraments in a Postmodern World, pp. 74-83 on “The World as a Possible 
Place of Sacramentality.”
251 L-M. Chauvet, The Sacraments, p. 114.105
even more fundamentally, an experience of being in the body.
252  Our bodies mediate 
our world to us, and indeed, if scripture and Christian teaching is to be believed, we 
were created as bodily creatures, to exist for eternity in the body,
253 for even as Job 
cryptically declared, 'after my skin has been thus destroyed, then in my flesh I shall 
see God' (Job 19:26).
254  Even in death, the Christian hope in the resurrection of the 
body, with which is inextricably bound up our belief in the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of the bodily Jesus – the 'living bread who came down from heaven' (Jn. 
6:51) who may be eaten unto eternal life (Jn. 6:58) – as well as our faith in the 
efficacy of the Eucharist to sanctify us unto eternal life ('the bread of life; the cup of 
salvation'): all of this attests to the unerasable Christian conviction that bodies matter. 
The God who formed bodies from dust also took on a human, fallible body, so as to 
redeem all bodies, as Gregory of Nazianzus  understood: 'That which He has not 
assumed He has not healed.'
255  Indeed, sacraments 'teach us that the truest things in 
our faith occur in no other way than through the concreteness of the “body.”
256
252 We simply acknowledge here that even those persons who do not possess the capacity for language 
still live in-the-body and encounter the world as mediated by the body. Yet we wonder how, without 
language, a body is able to apprehend or interpret bodily experience? (Answering this question in 
any meaningful way would require the contribution of sciences of the mind which are beyond both 
our ability and the purview of this project.) Cf. Chauvet's excursus on the film The Gods Must be 
Crazy, in The Sacraments, p. 9.
253 cf. 1 Cor. 15; see N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the 
Mission of the Church (New York: Harper Collins, 2008). See also David Jasper's characterization 
in The Sacred Body of the 'scandalous body – so blatantly displayed in the insistent “this is my 
body,” and in the “wildly counter-evidential, counter-cultural claim” that “in my flesh, I shall see 
God”' (p. 114). Jasper is referring to the final passage of Margaret Miles' The Word Made Flesh: A 
History of Christian Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), p. 391; cf. The Sacred Body, p. 33.
254 We say 'cryptically' because the Hebrew meaning of this verse is ambiguous. According to the 
translators' footnotes in  The New Oxford Annotated Bible  (NRSV), the Heb. could also imply 
'without my flesh.' The editors' annotations state: 'The meaning of v. 26 is too uncertain a one on 
which to base a firm conclusion, but the rendering of this verse in the NRSV would allow the 
possibility of a resurrected Job.  The doctrine of the resurrection, however, appears late in Hebrew 
thought...and nowhere in the rest of the book does Job seriously consider the possibility' (p. 646 
OT). It occurs to us that, resurrection or no, whether in life or in death, Job's statement implies that 
the encounter with God occurs firmly in the body, and in Job's case in particular, the body broken.
255 Gregory Nazianzen, “To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers,   Series   II,  Vol.   7,   ed.   Philip   Schaff   (Edinburgh:  T  &  T  Clark)  Available   online 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf207.iv.ii.iii.html> [accessed 28 Mar 2010]
256 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 140-41 [ital. in original].106
To pursue the question of the body, of sacrament as an irreducibly corporeal or 
“bodily” experience, and of the sacramentality of the body itself, we shall begin by 
tracing the Church's struggle with the conception of and the relationship between the 
various 'bodies' of Christ – that is, his historical, sacramental and ecclesial bodies. 
Henri de Lubac's unsurpassed study Corpus Mysticum will guide this discussion.  We 
shall also look to the biblical text, focusing especially on the account of Jesus' 
encounter with the two travelers on the road to Emmaus (Lk. 24) as a literary 
exploration of eucharistic theology which provides insight into the early Church's 
conception of both the body (or bodies) of Christ and the Eucharist as the sacrament 
of His body.  We will arrive at the conclusion that sacraments are, as Chauvet has 
named it, 'the grace of God at the mercy (au risque) of the body,' or perhaps better, at 
the risk of the body.  In sacrament, precisely because of its corporeality,
257 both God 
and we are placed at a profound risk: the risk of dispossession and death.
David Power has guided our thinking about sacrament as language and 
language event, as 'the language of God's giving.'  But this is not to say he is unaware 
of the corporeality of sacrament, both in the sense of the material sacramental 
elements and of the bodies of the recipients; indeed, 'People enter into sacrament first 
through their bodies.'
258   Word bodied forth in action; the intangible given form in 
tangible elements; the confusion of the material with the immaterial, the visible with 
the invisible – these are several ways to describe what happens in sacrament.  But 
there is no sacramentality apart from this corporeal basis.  In the broad sense, there is 
no sacrament without a body, just as in the narrower Christian sense, there are no 
sacraments without the Body – that is, the historical body of God incarnate in Jesus 
257 We are using corporeality in the sense of 'bodiliness,' what it means to be in-the-body.  Chauvet 
uses the term corporality to talk about the same thing, e.g. 'the human being does not have a body, 
but is body' (p. 149), which he conceives as the 'triple body' – social (within culture), ancestral 
(within tradition), and cosmic (within nature/the universe); cf. ibid., p. 149-52, passim.
258 D. Power, Sacrament, p. 149.107
bodied-forth in the liturgical/sacramental action of the ecclesia.
Sacrament involves a poetic making or doing within language, yet in which 
linguistic   meaning   is   not   detached   from   material   elements   and   embodied 
performance.  In this sense, sacraments exist as concrete artifacts incorporated into 
physical human action.  In the grammar of traditional Christian liturgy, sacraments 
involve tangible elements like water, bread, wine, oil, the laying on of hands, the 
giving and receiving of a ring or a kiss, and so on.  One of the many paradoxes of 
sacrament is that it exists as a symbolic or linguistic event, and yet not simply so, for 
a symbolic/linguistic event that is not adjoined by tangible elements or embodied 
ritual is not rightly described as a sacrament in the strict sense.  A linguistic utterance 
devoid of any physical instantiation, however gracious and grace-giving, can only be 
named sacrament(al) to the disservice and dilution of the concept of sacramentality I 
general.  The corporeal must accompany the linguistic.  'The Word became flesh' – 
flesh and word, together.
3.2 Sacrament and Performative Utterance
This observation helps to differentiate sacrament from various 'speech act' 
theories in the philosophy of language, in particular from J. L. Austin's conception of 
performative utterance.  This may at first appear to be a backtrack into the question of 
language.   However, any linguistic utterance springs forth from the body, and 
performance implies embodied action, and so, as Austin claims, 'if a person makes an 
utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing something rather than merely 
saying something.'
259   This is a helpful concept for thinking about sacrament, for 
several reasons.   First, sacramental rituals are performances, the bodying-forth of 
259 J. L. Austin, “Performative Utterances,” in Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed., (London: Oxford UP, 
1970), p. 235 [ital. added].  Austin cites such examples as saying “I do” at a wedding; saying “I 
apologize,” “I bet you…,” or “I promise…”; and the christening/naming of a ship.108
prescribed   words,   gestures,   postures,   actions,   movements,   etc.     Second,   the 
sacramental liturgies of the Church indeed contain performative utterances; to use an 
example from the eucharistic liturgy, the priest’s declaration, echoing Jesus’ words at 
the Last Supper, 'This is my body...this is my blood,' in the institution narrative, as 
well as the words of consecration spoken over the elements, fits the criteria of 
performative utterance.  Third, we find that the notion of performative utterance does 
not go far enough to sufficiently describe sacramental activity in toto, as should soon 
become apparent.
Interestingly, in his discussion of performative utterances Austin seems adapt 
one common definition of sacrament when he writes, 'In the case of promising…it's 
very easy to think that the utterance is simply the outward and visible (that is, verbal) 
sign of the performance of some inward spiritual act of promising.'
260   Despite this 
reference to the spiritual, Austin does not reflect substantially on examples of 
religious language as performative utterance, and surprisingly (at least to us), he never 
uses the word sacrament or even symbol in the essay.  However, Austin does enlist as 
one example of performative utterance the “I do” in the ceremony of marriage, which 
is regarded as a sacrament by many, but not all, Christian churches, but which Austin 
seems to regard more from the standpoint of a secular/legal institution.  For Austin the 
couple's “I do” is a performative utterance because in that moment, the bride and 
groom do not merely state or recite their vows, but enact that which they state, in that 
moment   taking   the   other   as   her/his   lawfully-wedded   spouse.     The   minister's 
declaration 'I now pronounce you husband and wife' bears a similar status.   This 
pronouncement is, in a certain sense, the carrying out of the marriage itself.  These 
words literally wed the couple, for without them, a marriage has not taken place, at 
least in the eyes of any legal or ecclesiastical authority.   And yet, per Austin's 
260 Ibid., p. 236.109
conception, it is the “I do” itself, devoid of any material element or physical gesture, 
which qualifies as performative utterance.
261
A  clear   relationship   exists,   however,   between   even  Austin's   “secular” 
examples, which might be played out in the social or legal sphere (promising, betting, 
apologizing), and similarly performative utterances within the Church's sacramental 
life.  Examples might include the priest’s absolution in the sacrament of reconciliation 
('God almighty forgive you and free you from your sins...'), the words spoken at one’s 
ordination into Christian ministry, accompanied by the laying on of hands, as well as 
various moments of the baptismal liturgy ('I baptize you...', or accompanying the oil 
of chrism: 'you are sealed with the Holy Spirit and marked as Christ’s own forever') or 
the reaffirmation of baptismal vows.   Differences do exist even between these 
examples of performative, sacramental words or phrases.  The “I do” in a wedding is 
a chiefly linguistic pronouncement with no necessary material accompaniment, 
although we would point out, and Austin would doubtless admit, that the phrase “I 
do” outwith the wedding ceremony is decidedly not the enactment of marital vows, 
but rather, its meaning relies upon and must be taken as part and parcel of the 
wedding ceremony as a whole, which includes such material elements and embodied 
actions as the exchanging of rings and the kiss, as well as the secular/legal acts of the 
signing of the registry or marriage license.  Confession and absolution also take place 
primarily within language, although it is common to kneel to confess (bodily posture) 
and make the sign of the cross (physical gesture) along with the priest as the 
absolution is pronounced.  In the latter example, the body of the priest, which speaks 
and touches, might be regarded as the “elemental” synonym to the bread and wine of 
261 We are thankful to Troy Carter for reminding us that the sexual union of the couple is in fact the 
physical instantiation of the marriage, from both a legal and religious standpoint, insofar as 
consummation may be held up as evidence as to whether a marriage actually exists.   This is 
significant to the sacramentality of marriage, but does not factor into Austin's conception of 
performative utterance.110
the Eucharist or the water of baptism, deriving this sacramental status via the 
sacrament of holy orders (ordination), which is a chiefly eucharistic vocation in the 
first instance.
However, the other examples we have outlined from sacramental rites all 
require not only a verbal or linguistic but also some kind of material instantiation: the 
laying on of hands (ordination), the immersion in or application of water (baptism) or 
the oil of chrism (baptism, unction), the paten and chalice containing the bread and 
the wine which are given to to the congregation to see and touch and taste (eucharist). 
Here Austin’s example of a ship's christening (a word which itself hints at the buried 
religiosity of this action) is helpful: words must indeed be uttered, but tradition holds 
that a bottle of champagne is to be broken over the ship’s bow as the naming is 
carried out.   In this way, while the performative utterance (the words spoken) is 
carried out within language, it is reinforced and given material, visible form as well: it 
is embodied.  Like Ricoeur's living metaphor, which contains the power to redescribe 
reality, the words – again, not a mere saying but a doing – are not only inextricably 
intertwined with action, but quite literally are actions.
However useful it is to note these commonalities, sacrament exceeds Austin's 
concept   of   performative   utterance   by  failing   to   fully   incorporate   embodiment 
(materiality and physicality) into his concept.   From the standpoint of Christian 
sacraments, the entire ritual comprises the sacrament; there is no sacrament apart from 
the   liturgy   as   a   whole   (which   admittedly   may   contain   certain   essential   and 
nonessential elements).  The liturgy, in its most essential form, may contain several 
moments of performative utterance.  So for example, the sacrament of marriage has 
not occurred without the entire wedding liturgy, and all that it entails.  Of course, a 
wedding ceremony may involve additional, non-essential elements (contemporary 
rituals, musical selections, etc), but without certain prescribed and easily identifiable 111
ceremonial elements (e.g. declaration of intent, vows, pronouncement of the couple, 
etc), the sacrament of marriage has not occurred.  The wedding ceremony, as it might 
be printed in a liturgical manual, is the textual repository of those essential elements 
that ensure the officiant and participants, and generations to come, that the sacrament 
has legitimately come to pass.  But the printed wedding liturgy is not the sacrament of 
marriage, for as Kenan Osborne reminds us, 'Sacraments only exist in the doing, in 
the celebrating.'
262  So we may conclude that while sacraments bear resemblances to 
performative utterances, and will  de facto  contain liturgical moments which fit 
Austin's description of performative utterance, they are not synonymous terms.  The 
difference, primarily, is the essential corporeality of sacrament, the materiality of its 
element(s) and the physicality of its celebration.  However, while not of necessity 
constituting a sacrament, we can permit the possibility that every performative 
utterance has a  sacramental  quality, which derives from its incorporation of both 
word and action, language and embodied performance.
3.3 Corpus Mysticum, Corpus Verum
This   excursus   on   the   relationship   between   sacrament   and   performative 
utterance is intended to further clarify the distinctiveness of sacramentality.   A 
sacrament imparts grace (however that might be conceived), and so not just anything 
can be construed as sacramental or as a sacrament.   But it is also unique in the 
difficulty that arises in our attempt to understand what sacramentality is and does. 
The confusion that surrounds the notion of sacrament, as language event and 
embodied action, is not simply a recent development arising from the postmodern 
critiques of language and fixations on the body.  As we shall see, it permeates the 
262 K. Osborne, Christian Sacraments: 'Indeed, the only time that one can speak of baptism or eucharist 
is in an actual baptismal ritual or in an actual eucharistic celebration.  These actual, localized, 
existential events of liturgy are the only moments when baptism, eucharist, confirmation, and so on 
exist' (p. 12).112
entire history of Christian thought.  What we are tracing here is the detachment in the 
Middle Ages of the notion of Christ's “mystical body” (corpus mysticum) from the 
Eucharist, and its gradual transposition to the Church as its referent, which results in 
the demystification of the sacrament and what Pickstock calls the 'decline of the 
liturgical order'
263  or the 'destruction from within of the liturgical city.'
264   It is 
important to see both sides of this transposition as well, for as the sacrament is de-
mystified, regarded increasingly as the “real” or true body (corpus verum), and as it 
becomes a focal point of analysis for medieval scholasticism, so also the Church 
begins to be conceived less as a concrete, social entity and more as a mystical 
(spiritual, cosmic, etc) body.  The social and political consequences  of this shift are 
too vast to examine thoroughly here, but amongst other things, this movement is 
intrinsically linked to the privatization of religion; to the belief (which will survive the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment) that religious practice is an inward act of 
devotion or piety, and not the performance of a public, corporate action; and to an 
increasing concern in Christianity over the souls of the faithful to the neglect of their 
bodies.
265   Indeed, as Regina Schwartz points out, by the early years of the 
Reformation this culminates in the mystification or mysticalization of the political 
body of the State.
266  William Cavanaugh has observed that 'the increased localization 
of the sacred in the Eucharistic host in effect secularized all that lay beyond it.'
267  As 
such, this is one episode in the immanentizing or secularizing movement of sacrament 
263 C. Pickstock, After Writing, p. 135 passim.
264 Ibid., p. xii, 121.
265 cf. William T. Cavanaugh,  Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ 
(Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), esp. pp. 151-252.
266 See R. Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics, pp. 20-22, 30-35. Schwartz cites Ernst Kantorowicz's The 
King's Two Bodies, which while not examined here, also informs the theo-political narrative as 
articulated in William Cavanaught's Torture and Eucharist (see pp. 207-21). C. Pickstock's After 
Writing traces this narrative as well, focusing more on the influence of Scotist thought not only on 
the political realm, but also economy, law, social and civic bonds of kinship, etc (see pp. 135-58).
267 W. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, p. 214.113
as it becomes distanced from its original sense of mystery.
Let us pause momentarily and clarify our position on this “secularizing 
movement” we have been tracing since Chapter 1.   We are on the one hand 
ambivalent about the value (positive or negative) of this movement, as it appears to us 
to be, to a greater or lesser extent, the natural progression of what was a co-opted 
secular concept in the first place.  This distancing from the sense of mystery that 
accompanied the shift from mystērion to sacramentum seems to lead naturally to the 
conception of sacraments as signs/symbols (and ultimately 'mere' signs/symbols, in 
the   wake   of   the   Protestant   Reformation),   requiring   for   their   meaning   and 
comprehension the hermeneutical and theological task of interpretation, leading to the 
incisive theological analysis of the medieval scholastic thinkers, reaching a boiling 
point   in   the   Reformation-era   debates   about   the   Eucharist   (and   by   extension 
ecclesiology), and so on to the extreme plurivocity of Christian sacramental praxis 
and theology such as may be observed across Christian traditions today.  In short, our 
intention is not necessarily to read this narrative as inherently negative, a loss to 
correct (á la Pickstock or Schwartz), nor as a liberating positive in the progression of 
human thinking (á la Hans Gumbrecht),
268 but rather as the historical outworking of 
the implications inherent to the concept itself. In this sense, what sacrament is is the 
culmination of the struggle with and stumbling-up-against the concept of sacrament 
throughout history.   Miri Rubin's conclusion to her study of the late-medieval 
Eucharist expresses a conviction and impulse behind her narrative that resonates 
considerably with our own:
It may be sometimes exasperating in allowing for no causal 
268 We have not said much thus far about the work of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, who in Production of 
Presence wrestles with the task of thinking “presence” from a nonreligious standpoint (i.e. beyond 
metaphysics and meaning); cf. esp. his discussions of the Eucharist on pp. 28-30 and 85-86. Near 
the end of the book, Gumbrecht considers his own thinking in relation to Radical Orthodoxy and 
Catherine Pickstock in particular, concluding that his affinities are more of the ilk that Radical 
Orthodoxy critiques and ultimately rejects; see pp. 146-49.114
drive – no narrative of the Rise of the Individual, no 
Secularisation,   no   Decline   of   the   Church...And   yet   a 
process   is   suggested   by   the   material,   not   a   story   of 
causation   and   directed   growth,   but   one   of   unfolding 
capabilities, a story about  the filling unto density of a 
symbol through the testing of its possible meanings and 
uses.
269
We do concede unreservedly, on the other hand, that there are consequences of this 
progression that can be read as positive or negative depending on the vantage point of 
the reader (e.g. the destruction of the liturgical city is calamitous from the perspective 
of high-church ecclesiasticism, although it might be regarded as something to be 
celebrated by secular humanism).  The conviction underlying this entire thesis is that 
for sacramentality to be meaningful at all the present day – whether as a literary 
and/or artistic motif, as a purely ecclesial concept and action, or as a desire or 
aspiration within post-ecclesial culture for an experience that transcends the mundane 
– such a sacramentality must be radically (re)imagined as a part of the communicative 
and significatory fabric of our common life and as deeply grafted into the materiality 
of the body.
Whatever our interpretation of the historical out-working of the (il)logic of 
sacramentality, or the present state of affairs, the Church's wrestling with the Body of 
Christ, both conceptually and concretely, has been a preoccupation down through the 
ages, as Henri de Lubac has shown in great detail.   Looking specifically to the 
medieval period, in 'an inversion that only came about by degrees,'
270 the traditional 
“three-fold” conception of the body of Christ – his historical body born of the Virgin 
which hung on the cross; his sacramental body in the Eucharist; and his ecclesial 
body, the Church – is reduced to a dichotomous, two-fold conception (a binary) 
269 cf. Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge UP, 1991), p. 361 [ital. added]. We relate this also to Ricoeur's famous observation that 
'the symbol gives rise to thought'; cf. the conclusion of The Symbolism of Evil (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1967), pp. 347-57.
270 H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p. 9.115
wherein the historical and sacramental bodies are undifferentiated and both regarded 
as the “true body” (corpus verum) of Christ.  This shift begins in the 9
th century in the 
writings of Ratramnus and St. Paschasius Radbertus, at which time 'mystical body' 
(corpus mysticum) still refers, as it did originally, to the Eucharist.  But gradually this 
terminology is transferred over exclusively to the Church, a trend that has persisted 
even through the 20
th-century.
271  As we showed in Chapter 1 (sec. 1.5), the implied 
belief here is that the Church is the Church in its celebration of and participation in 
the Eucharist; the true body is the means by which the Church may be legitimately 
called the mystical body.
272   But words mean things and shape realities, and as we 
shall see, this semantic shift is not without consequence for both ecclesiology and 
sacramental theology.  Further, this is not merely a semantic debate, once again setting 
us back into the linguistic realm (although, indeed, we find it difficult to move past 
the problem of language, which arises perpetually even in our discussion of body), but 
rather a theological struggle, played out in language (writing), with the distinctions 
between the different modalities of Christ's body, or rather, the three planes on which 
the one body of Christ seems to operate.
At any point in the history of Christian thought, a distance must be recognized 
between the historical body of Christ, which was born, died, rose again, and ascended, 
and the presence of Christ in the Church and in the Eucharist by which each is 
ascribed with the name corpus Christi, body of Christ.  The original theological unity 
in the conception of the sacramental and ecclesial bodies, as distinct from Christ's 
historical body, is lucidly expressed in de Lubac's analysis.  As such, Christ's ecclesial 
271 The conception of the Church as the  corpus mysticum  is present in the 20
th-century Catholic 
theologians we have considered above (Rahner, Schillebeeckx), as well as in the documents of 
Vatican II. Contemporary Catholic theologians have begun to critique this conception, notably, 
William Cavanaugh in Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the Body of Christ (Oxford 
and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998); see pp. 123-281.
272 See William Cavanaugh's helpful synopsis of this narrative in Torture and Eucharist, pp. 212-13; cf. 
also C. Pickstock, After Writing, pp. 158-66.116
body the Church, and his sacramental body in the Eucharist, 
are not so much used to describe two successive objects as 
two simultaneous things that make one whole. For the body 
of Christ that is the Church is in no way other than the body 
and the blood of the mystery. And properly speaking, this is 
not a piece of word-play. Through the Eucharist each 
person is truly placed within the one body. It unites all the 
members of it among themselves, as it unites them to their 
one head
273
that is, Christ.  But eventually, according to de Lubac, 'the very foundation of the 
distinction that was once made between the 'body which hung on the wood' and the 
'Body which is immolated in the mystery' for the large part disappeared.'
274   Thus 
Christ's true body (corpus verum) comes to refer to both his historical and sacramental 
bodies.  As increased priority was given to the belief that the bread and wine of the 
Eucharist actually transform into the body and blood of Christ, 'the invasion of true 
caused mystical to give way.'
275   This maneuver is not difficult to grasp, given the 
ardent belief of the medieval Church that the Eucharist made present the actual, 
historical body and blood of Christ, concealed under the accidents of the bread and 
the wine.  And lest we are tempted to downplay this literalist understanding of the 
Eucharist which dominates the period, or pass over it quickly as a novelty of a bygone 
era, Caroline Walker Bynum testifies to the late-medieval belief that 'What we eat in 
the Eucharist is so truly the flesh born of Mary,' the historical body in the three-fold 
schema, 'that we might indeed see it bleed and be then “horrified to touch it with our 
lips.”'
276  (However, this eucharistic realism is a striking contrast to the conception, 
273 H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p. 23.
274 Ibid., p. 164.
275 Ibid., p. 221. De Lubac claims, in defense of the Christian tradition, that 'This evolution should not 
be imagined as a rupture or a sudden deviation' (p. 256). Instead, he proposes that this is simply a 
result of the ebb and flow of time, of different viewpoints disclosing different aspects and truths but 
maintaining 'a real doctrinal continuity' (p. 257); and while we do not deny a continuity, we would 
point out that de Lubac never makes the point we wish to make: that this struggle with the 
conception(s) of the bodies of Christ is as much a struggle with the problem of the body and of 
language writ large as it is of parsing nuanced theological concepts.
276 Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 (New 117
which is present quite early, of the Eucharist as a 'bloodless' or 'unbloody' sacrifice.
277)
Over time, however, the gap between the Church as Christ's mystical body, on 
the one hand, and Christ's true body – a conflation of the historical body born of the 
Virgin and the body made present in the sacrament – on the other, becomes an 
interminable distance.  According to de Lubac, 'sacramental and mystical, which until 
recently had still been considered synonymous, and are basically the same word, were 
now separated and placed in opposition to one another.'
278 And so de Lubac concludes: 
Of the three terms: historical body, sacramental body and 
ecclesial body, that were in use, and that it was a case of 
putting into order amongst each other, that is to say, 
simultaneously to oppose and unite them to one another, the 
caesura that was originally placed between the first and the 
second, whereas it subsequently came to be placed between 
the second and the third.  Such, in brief, is the fact that 
dominates the whole evolution of Eucharistic theories.
279
The implication here is that the Church's tendency throughout her history to stumble 
over sacrament, and by extension stumble over her own very identity as a corporate 
body (Church), may be reduced, ad absurdum, to the difficulty of the body to be 
circumscribed by language, and the difficulty of language to convey the relationship 
between these three distinct conceptions or 'incarnations' of the body of Christ. 
Instead of making the unity or the continuity of the three-fold body clearer, language 
problematizes   this   relationship   by  inserting   into   the   analysis   a   necessary  and 
irreducible layer of mediation between the descriptor (signifier; e.g. “historical body,” 
“true body,” “mystical body,” etc) and thing itself (res) the reality of its referent 
York: Columbia UP, 1995), p. 149, citing Honorious' L'Elucidarium et les lucidaires, and pointing 
out that 'the idea is found in Paschasius Radbertus' (see fn. 106).
277 e.g. throughout The Divine Liturgy of James the sacrifice of the mass is referred to as a 'bloodless 
sacrifice,' as well as a 'sacrifice of praise,' a 'spiritual and bloodless sacrifice,' etc; see A. Roberts, J. 
Donaldson, and A. Coxe, eds., ANF, vol. 7 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1995), pp. 537-50.
278 H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p. 103.
279 Ibid., p. 256. This idea of caesura is helpful to illustrate this movement. Basically the conception of 
Christ's bodies shifts from “historical  (corpus Christi verum)  – sacramental/ecclesial  (corpus 
mysticum)” to “historical/sacramental (corpus verum) – ecclesial (corpus mysticum).” Chauvet also 
provides a helpful review in The Sacraments, pp. 139-40.118
(signified; e.g. the body born of the Virgin and crucified on Calvary; the eucharistic 
host; the Church as a local and/or cosmic entity).
280  The only way to analyze these 
concepts and their unity and/or difference is within the realm of signification; and yet, 
it is precisely the mediacy of the body and of language which scandalizes our 
theological thinking by revealing the very distance and difference we endeavor to 
overcome.
And yet, in highlighting what at first appears to be simply a semantic struggle, 
we also uncover at its core the problem of the body, of materiality or corporeality. 
Indeed, these theological ideas, and the language by which they are expressed, would 
never present a problem if it were not for God's coming in the historical body of Jesus 
of Nazareth
281: born of a Virgin, hung on a cross, raised from the dead, ascended to the 
Father, perpetually given as the sacramental body, the tangible eucharistic elements of 
bread and wine, giving birth to a visible, ecclesial body, the local-yet-universal body 
of Christ called Church.  The Word became Flesh; the body became word, the word of 
scripture and the word of sacrament.
3.4 The Present Absence of the Resurrection Body
We turn now to the corpus of scripture, the body of the text(s) about Jesus. 
From the epistles of St. Paul to the gospels, the authors of the New Testament 
280 De Lubac writes: 'Through the stages that have been described, the expression mystical body passed 
from the Eucharist to the Church: and once again there was, in an analogous sense, a mystery of the 
body.   The  mystical body  was the mystery that described this ecclesial body by means of the 
sacrament, and, in its radical meaning, it could strictly speaking be described as being 'contained' in 
the Eucharist.  Then, from the mystery of the body it developed into being a body in [the] mystery; 
from the signification itself to the thing signified.  Thus the Church is the mystical body of Christ: 
that is to say, quite simply, that it is the Body of Christ signified by means of the sacrament' 
(Corpus Mysticum, p. 250).
281 It appears to us that de Lubac somewhat makes this point, if in passing, when he writes: 'between 
the Father and the Son there is a personal distinction, which, in any event, is the foundation of this 
ambiguity in the language' (ibid., p. 317). This resonates with what Žižek calls the 'gap' that is 
internal to God: 'It is the very radical separation of man from God that unites us with God, since, in 
the figure of Christ, God is thoroughly separated from himself--thus the point is not to "overcome" 
the gap that separates us from God, but to take note of how this gap is internal to God Himself' 
(The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 78).119
scriptures are already plagued with the problem of the body of Jesus, present in both 
life  and even in death, but profoundly absent  both in resurrection and ascension. 
Nowhere in the gospels is this paradox more apparent than in Luke's account of the 
encounter between the Risen Christ and the two travelers along the road to Emmaus. 
This narrative has been developed theologically most fully by Chauvet,
282 but has also 
been read by Marion, and our reflections here draw upon their considerable insights. 
Our primary focus is on the Emmaus story (Lk. 24:13-35), culminating in a meal that 
takes the form of a Eucharist.  We will relate this intertextually with John's gospel, 
beginning with Jesus' encounter with Mary near the empty tomb, and climaxing with 
Thomas's declaration of belief (Jn. 20).  Attention will be given to the ways in which 
both the text(s), and the characters therein, struggle to apprehend the present absence 
of Jesus' body subsequent to his death, entombment and resurrection.  We are also 
interested   in   how   these   post-resurrection   encounters   with   Jesus'   body   relate 
intertextually to the gospels' narration of Christ's pre-resurrection body (and bodily 
actions) as “eucharistic,” as well as to the Church's liturgical enactment of the 
Eucharist.
Perhaps we should begin with a clarifying comment about our terminology. 
We regard the difference between absent presence (or absence of the presence) and 
present absence  (or in Chauvet's usage,  the presence of the absence
283) to be an 
important   one.   Like  Aristotle's   distinction   in  The   Poetics  between   'probable 
impossibilities,' which are preferable to 'implausible possibilities,'
284  we consider 
present absence to be the more profoundly paradoxical and thus preferable way to talk 
especially about bodies in general, and Christ's historical, sacramental and ecclesial 
bodies in particular.   To illustrate the importance of using these terms carefully, 
282 See L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 161-70, and The Sacraments, pp. 20-28.
283 cf. L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 62-63, 404-05, passim.
284 Aristotle, Poetics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996), p. 41.120
especially when applied to the body of Jesus, consider this passage by Stephen 
Moore:
Jesus’ living presence among his disciples precipitated 
confusion; the absence of his dead body at the tomb 
precipitates   confusion.     The   climactic   scene   of 
comprehension   in   Mark   –   the   centurion’s   confession 
(15:39) – follows Jesus’ desolate cry of abandonment at the 
apparent absence of God (15:34).  At the moment in which 
Jesus departs his body, becoming absent, the centurion 
realizes in whose presence he has been, recognizes Jesus as 
an absent presence.
285
In this passage, the terms  presence  and  absence/absent  are tossed around rather 
loosely. Jesus as an absent presence is neither profound nor paradoxical: what was 
once present as a living body is now simply absent (dead).  First, Moore contrasts 
Jesus' living  presence  to the  absence  of Jesus' corpse in the tomb – a tangible, 
physical body in life and in death.  But then Moore seems to miss the point when he 
declares Jesus absent – 'Jesus departs his body,' by which we assume he implies a 
dichotomy, i.e. Jesus 'spirit' vacates his 'flesh' – when in fact his lifeless body is still 
profoundly present.  This seems to violate the concepts of presence and absence by 
reducing them to spiritual rather than material (bodily) categories.  However, as we 
shall see, the gospel accounts of the post-resurrection encounters with Jesus, which 
bear an intertextual relationship to the sacramental praxis of the Church, wrestle with 
a body that is present as an absence, and this absence is narrated or interpreted to be a 
present presence: a new form of bodily presence which is manifest as and contains 
absence.
The Emmaus narrative, as both Chauvet and Marion observe, has embedded 
within it the structural features of the liturgy itself.
286  First, we have, by inference, an 
ecclesia; there are two disciples, Clopas and another, allowing Jesus to fulfill the 
285 S. Moore,  Mark and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspective, p. 39
286 Jean-Luc Marion, “They Recognized Him; and He Became Invisible To Them,” Modern Theology 
18:2 (April 2002); L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 161-70; The Sacraments, pp. 20-28.121
promise that 'where two or three are gathered in my name, I am there among them' 
(Mt. 18:20).   Second, they tell the story of Jesus; though he is present, to their 
perception he is absent, and yet he is the focal point of their discourse.  Third, there is 
a clear opening and interpretation of the scriptures, a hermeneutical moment, as 
evidenced by 24:27: 'Then beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted 
(diermeneuen) to them the things about himself in all the scriptures.'  Fourth, the 
liturgical connection which eventually formed between the Word and the Sacrament is 
embedded within the narrative: first, Jesus “breaks” open the scriptures to the two 
travelers; then, he sits down with them to “break bread,” which turns out to be their 
moment of recognition, of anagnoresis, the same moment in which his physical body 
disappears from their sight.     Fifth, the meal itself resembles the shape of the 
Eucharist: Jesus 'took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to them' (Lk. 24:30).
287 
Sixth, this eucharistic meal indeed becomes an encounter with the Risen Christ who is 
'made known to them in the breaking of the bread' (24:35).   The correspondence 
between the Word and the Bread of life manifests itself in the notion of both the 
scriptures and the sacrament – as de Lubac attests, 'the breaking of the host and the 
opening of the scriptures'
288 – as a locus where revelation or understanding occurs. 
Finally, there is a dismissal, a 'sending out,' as 'they got up and returned to Jerusalem 
(Lk. 24:33) to share the good news with the rest of the disciples.  As the word 'gets 
out,' meaning(s) break forth in the signs, the linguistic signs of scripture and the 
sacred signs of the sacrament, simultaneously veil and unveil the divine mystery they 
287 L-M. Chauvet,  Symbol and Sacrament: ‘to speak of a “breaking of bread” at Emmaus is a 
“revealing anachronism; it is a phrase taken from the Christian liturgy,” showing that “the story is 
intended to be understood in the time of the Church”’ (p. 164). Edward Yarnold also draws the 
connection between the Emmaus narrative and the Eucharist, asserting that 'Whatever the intention 
of St Luke, the Church came to read a eucharistic meaning into the disciples' recognition of our 
Lord at Emmaus in the breaking of bread'; see  The Awe-Inspiring Rites of Initiation, 2
nd  ed. 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark,  1994), pp. 51-52. However, Paul Bradshaw cautions against  a 
hermeneutic that reads later, more established practice back into the biblical text; see The Search 
for the Origins of Christian Worship, 2
nd ed (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 2002), pp. 47-56.
288 H. de Lubac, Corpus Mysticum, p. 68.122
represent.
Let us unpack this further.  Christ's body is first present via remembrance, then 
via interpretation, and finally he is fully disclosed to them 'in the breaking of the 
bread.'  In this way, as these verses unfold, Christ’s risen body seems to gradually 
come into focus for the two disciples; yet we only know this when we reach the end 
of the narrative, after Jesus has vanished from sight, when the disciples exclaim to 
each other 'Were not our hearts burning within us while he was talking to us on the 
road, while he was opening the scriptures to us?' (v. 32)  The irony of course is that he 
is absent to their perception, even though he is physically present.  By the end of the 
narrative, this conception is reversed – Jesus moves from being absent, even in his 
corporeal presence (he is there; they do not perceive him), to being a presence, even 
in his corporeal absence (in their moment of recognition, he vanishes).  Put otherwise, 
'Jesus the Christ is absent as “the same”; he is no longer present except as “the 
Other.”'
289
In Deconstructing Theology, Mark C. Taylor also reflects on this narrative. 
Taylor connects the problem of the present-absence/absent-presence of Jesus' body to 
language: 'When Jesus was present, he was absent, when absent, present.   Why? 
Because he is Word.'  The disciples 'see, but do not see; they hear only the silence of 
an empty tomb.'
290  Marion notes that for the two disciples, like the eleven to whom 
they take the news (Lk. 24:33) and to whom Jesus subsequently appears (Lk. 24:36), 
the problem is not any physical impairment of their vision, but rather their lack of 
hermeneutical categories by which to comprehend the physical presence of the risen 
Christ: 'The obstacle...[is] the deficiency of concepts and significations: they do not 
have the rational means to think that of which they have sensible intuition.'
291  What 
289 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 170.
290 M. Taylor, Deconstructing Theology, p. 124.
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they see runs up against everything they know and believe.
They do not recognize him because they cannot even 
imagine that this is really him, Him, who has rejoined them, 
so far do their poor, cobbled-together, honest-to-goodness 
concepts find themselves outstripped by “events” that leave 
them petrified within a matrix of irrefutable prejudices. Not 
that they would not want to believe: they simply do not 
even imagine the other hypothesis, it never crosses their 
minds, even for an instant. The dead man is dead, period.
292
In that subsequent encounter with the eleven, what Jesus presents as evidence is not 
the hermeneutical categories or concepts of signification that they lack, but rather his 
body: '“Look at my hands and my feet...Touch me and see; for a ghost does not have 
flesh and bones as you see that I have.” And when he had said this, he showed them 
his hands and his feet' (Lk. 24:39-40). 
The  skandalon  runs deeper still, as Chauvet has made clear in a lengthy 
passage that deserves to be quoted fully,
the stumbling block for a Jew was not that God could 
resuscitate someone, for a majority of Jews at the time of 
Jesus did in fact believe in a final resurrection of the dead; 
nor was it that God could resuscitate someone before the 
day of general resurrection….Rather, it centered on a more 
radical point: Could God still be God, our God, the God of 
our ancestors, if he raised up someone who had been justly 
condemned to death for having blasphemed against the Law 
of God given to Moses, that is, against God himself?  Could 
God contradict himself?  Could it be, as Paul puts it, that 
someone who had died cursed by God…would later be 
recognized as in fact God’s blessing on all the nations? 
What kind of God would allows his own Christ to die, and 
then, in raising him up, vindicate him against his own Law? 
Could it be, finally, that God himself rolled such a rock of 
scandal away from the mouth of Jesus’ tomb?  One gets an 
inkling of the depth of the necessary conversion: for the 
two disciples it is a question of accepting the possibility 
that the word of God, according to the Scriptures, has come 
to “deconstruct” their best established evidence concerning 
the “reality” of God.
293
18:2 (April 2002), pp. 151.
292 Ibid., p. 147.
293 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 168.124
This rich passage deserves more attention than space permits here, but Chauvet calls 
attention to the way the entire resurrection event scandalizes God himself.  And yet 
this risk was taken first in the incarnation, in which God took on human flesh, 
becoming irreversibly 'body' for us, so as to redeem all bodies.  The entire Christ 
event is a means of grace, from incarnation to ascension, and extending even to the 
continual sacramental mediation of God through the materiality of creation.  This is 
what Chauvet means, at least in part, when he conceives of sacrament as 'the grace of 
God at the mercy (au risque) of the body.'
294
At the end of the narrative, the two travelers and Jesus arrive at the house at 
Emmaus.  Jesus seems ready to continue on, while the two disciples intend to stay and 
rest.  They invite Jesus to come in and eat with them, and he accepts their invitation. 
Another reversal takes place wherein the guest becomes the host: Jesus, who is the 
stranger, is the one who takes, blesses, breaks and gives the bread.  The text tells us 
'their eyes were opened, and they recognized him; and he vanished from their sight' 
(Lk. 24:31).  'Hoc est corpus meum [This is my body],' Taylor writes.  'Hocus-pocus: a 
vanishing act that really opened their eyes!'
295  In Chauvet's reading, ‘Their eyes open 
on an emptiness – “he vanished from their sight” – but an emptiness full of a presence' 
– a plenitudinous void.
296  All attempts to pin (or pen) Jesus down to a metaphysic of 
presence will only result in the grasp of a dead body – the only encounter we can have 
with a Living Lord/Risen Christ is an encounter with the presence of his absence.  As 
Taylor writes, 'They see his presence in absence.  But to do so, they must likewise see 
absence in their presence.'
297
294 L-M. Chauvet, The Sacraments: The Word of God at the Mercy of the Body (the French subtitle 
reads parole de Dieu au Risque du corps).
295 M. Taylor, Deconstructing Theology, p. 124.
296 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 170. Recall from the previous chapter what Pickstock 
refers to as the ' the occurrence of the impossible through Christological mediation, which reveals 
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John's gospel takes this a step further by depicting Jesus' body materializing 
inside a locked room (Jn. 20:19).  The climax of the account, and in many ways of the 
entire book, is the moment Thomas's doubt turns to belief when he not only sees but is 
invited to interpenetrate Jesus' body.  The invitation is striking especially in light of 
Jesus' command to Mary outside the empty tomb: “Do not hold on to me” (Jn. 20:17). 
But Jesus does not invite Thomas to grab hold of his body – to  grasp  him (the 
cognitive parallel should not go unnoticed).  Instead he is instructed to reach out his 
hand and place it in the wound in Jesus' side, into the gaping void which is the 
symbolon of his having passed through death.
298  This body, which cannot be grasped 
or even touched,
299 is the same Jesus, but different.  These two bodies – the one that 
was placed in the tomb, and the one encountered after the tomb was found empty – 
bear a (dis)continuity that is neither similitude or identity.  “This is (not) my body.”  
The disciples still struggle to accept the veracity of this in-credible body, 
which does not operate according to any of their expectations and confounds their 
comprehension.  Jesus' statement to Thomas is “Do not doubt but believe” (Jn. 20:27). 
It is important to note that nothing in the text, not even Thomas's declaration of faith 
(“My Lord and my God!” Jn. 20:28), implies that his doubt was replaced with 
knowledge or certitude, but rather that it was converted into believing.
300  So finally, 
to prove once and for all, Jesus requests food, and in an act that defines his entire 
ministry, in ways more often scandalous than not, he eats with them.
301  Spirits and 
298 Recall that fracture, brokenness, is inherent to the original meaning of  symbolon, and to its 
conceptual structure as we have framed it vis-a-vis Tillich and Chauvet (see ch. 1).
299 J-L. Marion, ibid., p. 151.
300 Michel de Certeau has called attention to the weakness of believing in La Faiblesse de Croire 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987); a portion of this work has been translated by Saskia Brown as “The 
Weakness of Believing: From the Body to Writing, A Christian Transit,” in Graham Ward, ed., The 
Certeau Reader (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 214-43.
301 The preceding observations are also indebted to Marion's essay. He points out that the fish Jesus 
consumes in their presence connects this encounter to Jesus' multiplication of the loaves and fishes 
in the feeding of the multitude (cf. Lk. 9:10-17, Mt. 14:13-21, Mk. 6:30-44, Jn. 6:1-14).126
ghosts do not eat; bodies do.  The body that will become sacramental food partakes of 
their food to demonstrate his corporeality.  And so Jesus offers (again) his body as the 
sign and symbol of the grace – gracious and gratuitous – of God in and through the 
body.
3.5 (Trans)corporeality
In light of the preceding discussion, it appears it is a mistake to regard Jesus' 
body as subject to the limits of bodies as we generally understand them.  This is a 
body which incorporates both presence and absence.  It is tangible without being 
graspable, visible without being circumscribed by what is seen.  In Cities of God, 
Graham Ward uses the term  transcorporeality  to describe the 'displacement' of 
Christ's body and its 'intratextuality' to all other bodies.
302  For Ward, the 'displaced' 
body of Christ is endlessly disseminated in and through other bodies, 'physical bodies, 
social bodies[,] institutional bodies, ecclesial bodies, sacramental bodies.'
303   The 
transcorporeal body 'is fractured endlessly, by the Spirit, and yet also, simultaneously, 
gathered into the unity of the Word and the unity of the Word with the triune God. 
The eucharistic 'This is my body' performs that first act of dissemination, that first 
transcorporealism.'
304  And so we see that transcorporeality is also, for Ward, a way of 
talking specifically about the eucharistic body, which 'does not dissolve or ab-solve, it 
expands  en Christo.'
305   This is a useful concept to the present discussion as we 
attempt to understand the difficulty – what Ward calls the 'ontological scandal' – of 
the body of God in the incarnate Christ.  We will continue to use corporeality as a 
302  cf. G. Ward,  Cities of God, pp. 81-116; cf. esp. pp. 92-96 and ch. 4, passim. While space limits us 
from engaging Ward's conception as fully as it deserves, his writings have significantly informed 
the present work as it engages the question of body, and will continually illuminate the discussion 
that follows, not only in his chapter, but in Part Two as well.  
303 Ibid., p. 93.
304 Ibid., p. 92.
305 Ibid., p. 95.127
synonym for 'bodily-ness,' but will begin to employ Ward's term transcorporeality to 
indicate certain characteristics of the body of Christ – its brokenness, its displacement, 
its textuality and sexuality, and its operation as nourishing food and drink.
We have seen in the gospels of Luke and John that Jesus' resurrection body, in 
the way it inhabits space and interacts with other bodies, does not operate according 
to our expectations of bodies.  But is this characteristic also of Jesus' body prior to his 
crucifixion and resurrection?  To answer this, we must return to the text of John's 
gospel, which is also a jumping ahead as this text that will be considered more fully in 
Chapter 5.  In John 6, the 'bread of life' discourse that creates such consternation for 
Jesus' listeners ('This teaching is difficult; who can accept it?' Jn. 6:60), John has 
Jesus narrate his own body according to the figure of the manna of the Old Testament. 
We will not at this time explore all of the details or intertextual connections of this 
passage.  However, illuminated by Chauvet's theological reading of this (inter)text, we 
find that it makes a significant contribution to our thinking about bodies and about 
Jesus' body at this stage in the discussion, in particular about the way Jesus' 
resurrection body, and by extension his sacramental body, is located outside all 
coercive economies of value and possession.
After Jesus feeds the multitude in Jn. 6:1-15, the crowds return, expecting him 
to provide more bread to fulfill their bodily needs (6:26).  Jesus tries to redirect their 
focus from 'food that perishes,' to 'food that endures for eternal life' (6:27), but they 
demand a sign, which is yet another demand for bread: 'What sign are you going to 
give us then, so that we may see it and believe in you?   What work are you 
performing?  Our ancestors ate the manna in the wilderness; as it is written, 'He gave 
them bread for heaven to eat'' (6:31).  Jesus gently corrects their interpretation in vs. 
32-33, saying that it was God and not Moses who gave the bread, '“For the bread of 128
God is that which comes down from heaven and gives life to the world.”
306  They said 
to him, “Sir, give us this bread always.” Jesus said to them, “I am the bread of life”' 
(Jn. 6:34-35).  Thus the symbolic connection is made between Jesus' body-as-bread 
and the manna upon which Israelites fed in the wilderness.
Chauvet highlights the characteristics of manna which place it outside the 
realm of market-value and exchange.  If we read Chauvet's commentary against the 
backdrop of John ch. 2, Jesus'  cleansing of the temple, we see that each text 
illuminates the other.  Jesus drives the money changers out of the temple and chastises 
them for making His 'Father's house a marketplace!' (2:16).
307  This might at first seem 
disconnected to 'the bread of life' discourse, but Jesus' body is implicated here as well 
in at least two ways.  First, when the Jews demand some explanation or authority 
upon which Jesus has created this commotion, he remarks, 'Destroy this temple, and 
in three days I will raise it up' (2:19).  In an aside, John immediately interprets this for 
his reader: 'he was speaking of the temple of his body' (2:21).  Hence the crucified and 
resurrected body is of interest here, as throughout the text.  Second, Jesus' connection 
of his own body as the 'bread of life' with the manna of the Old Testament places his 
'bread-body' precisely outside the economy of the marketplace, and so it is perhaps 
revealing that Jesus drives a wedge between the market and the house of prayer, the 
place of worship, which in John's explanation, is also being given a symbolic link to 
his body – destroy this temple...the temple of his body.  So as zeal consumes him, he 
not only purges the temple (and/of his body) of the marketplace, but also by inference 
purges the market of the bread (and/of his body).
The economy of the marketplace has no place in Jesus' temple-body, and his 
306 Jesus finally becomes exasperated with them and  destroys  the symbolic connection previously 
drawn between his body and the manna of old: 'This is not like that which your ancestors ate, and 
they died' (Jn. 6:58).
307 Interestingly, the parallel texts in the synoptic gospels (Mt. 21:12-17, Mk. 11:15-19, Lk. 19:45-48) 
fall much later in the timeline than John's chronology.129
bread-body has no place in the market economy.   This is the nature of grace, of 
gratuitous gift, which cannot be bought or sold, possessed or hoarded.   'Like the 
manna in the desert, which is perhaps its most beautiful biblical expression,' writes 
Chauvet, 'grace is of an entirely different order from that of value or empirical 
verifiability.'
308  As it cannot be 'known' – it is irrational – neither can it be 'possessed'; 
it has no lasting value.  'It appears literally as given free of charge, always free of 
charge, since it defies the laws of calculation….It also defies the laws of capitalization 
and stockpiling: those who, disobeying Moses’ order, tried to store some for the 
morrow saw that “it bred worms and became foul.”'
309   In fact, similar to what we 
have been arguing about the structure of sacramentality, this uncircumscribability of 
the manna is not just a feature of its operation, but according to Chauvet it intrinsic to 
the structure of the manna itself: 'Its very name is a question: Man hu?  Its name is 
“What is it?” Its consistency seems to be that of a “something” which has all the traits 
of “nothing.”'
310  As a prototype of Jesus' sacramental body in the Eucharist, this is 
fitting, for it manifests the present absence of the one who 'emptied himself' – became 
nothing – 'taking the form of a servant,' which John also shows us in chapter 13 when 
at the Last Supper Jesus humbles himself and washes his disciples' feet.
In Christ, God  becomes man in an act of ultimate  kenosis  – a movement 
consistent with the God who is the gratuitous, ever-given gift of love.
311 God, being 
continually self-emptying, taking on the form of a servant in the person of Jesus 
Christ, whose body, even in life, is ever out of reach.  Even Christ’s followers struggle 
to grasp and grapple with him – he speaks to them, teaching them, telling them 
stories, telling them that his flesh and blood are the food and drink that lead to eternal, 
308 L-M. Chavuet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 44-45.
309 L-M. Chauvet, The Sacraments, p. 88.
310 L-M. Chavuet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 45.
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interpenetrative life.  Yet his teaching offends them (Jn. 6:61), offends their desires for 
certainty, for possession, for bodies that are fixed and whole.
It is in the Eucharist, as the host is taken that it might be blessed, and fractured 
that it might be distributed, that we, too, are taken, blessed, broken and given.  To be 
taken requires dispossession of self.  It must always be that we are Christ’s broken 
body, for without this celebratory fracture, we cannot participate in God as the ever-
given gift by also be(com)ing given, be(com)ing like God in God's givenness.  These 
fragments constitute a community that is by its very nature elusive, illusory.  The 
Church is visible as a community despite fragmentation.  We are caught in a double-
mediation.   God, ever elusive, ineffable, invisible, offers to humanity communion 
with Godself by be(com)ing man in the person of Jesus Christ – this is the first 
mediation – and then, in Christ’s death, resurrection, and ascension offers to humanity 
through sacramentality the real presence of the Divine, which is actually an absence – 
this is the second mediation.   In both cases, the mediation is Christ: in the first 
instance, Jesus’ singular, physical person, embodied historically, and in the second 
instance, the universal Body of Christ, the community of faith that is the Church, 
gathered to partake of this communion.  'In Christ's ascension,' Graham Ward writes, 
'his body is expanded to become a space in which the Church will grow.'
312  
3.6 Reading and Writing the Body
I am a body, yet my body is not all there is of me.  I am bodily, yet my body is 
not my “possession”; I have no, or little, mastery over it.  I am not my own (1 Cor. 
6:19).  My body narrates my story even as my story is inscribed onto its skin, its 
scroll.   The body is a text that cannot avoid communication, that demands to be 
312 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 94.131
read.
313 Ward reminds us that
Communication is embodied giving, and what I give is 
consumed by the others to whom I give.  I touch upon their 
bodies by the presence of my own body heard and seen, 
smelt and sometimes tasted by them.  The fluidity of time 
itself is the fluidity of identity.  ‘This is my body.  Take eat. 
This is my blood.  Drink.’  The body is always in transit, it 
is   always   being   transferred.     It   is   never   there,   as   a 
commodity I can lay claim to or possess as mine.  This is 
the ontological scandal announced by the eucharistic phrase 
– bodies are never simply there (or here).
314
Like language, the body places us at a distance from others, from every Other, 
including God, and even including my Self.  But we have begun to understand this 
distance as contained within Godself.  'It is the very radical separation of man from 
God that unites us with God, since, in the figure of Christ, God is thoroughly 
separated from himself – thus the point is not to "overcome" the gap that separates us 
from God, but to take note of how this gap is internal to God Himself.'
315   Žižek 
reminds us here that this gap is the irreducible condition not only of human 
experience, which we posit as a consequence of language and body, but is a 
characteristic of the God in whose image we are created and by whose Word, all that 
is came into being.  (Comm)union with God, which is the purpose of sacrament, is 
only possible by learning to dwell within this gap, this wilderness.  In the liturgy, we 
offer ourselves up to be consecrated, along with our material gifts of bread and wine: 
'made one with Him, we offer you these gifts, and with them, ourselves – a single 
holy living sacrifice.'  And it is by our participation in the Eucharist that 'our life and 
yours [God's] are brought together in a wonderful exchange.  He made his home 
among us that we might for ever dwell in you.'
316  This concept of liturgical dwelling 
313 Writing these last two sentence, we are reminded of Peter Greenaway's provocative film The Pillow 
Book (1996), which is obsessed with the body as text/writing, and writing (on) the body.
314 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 91.
315 S.  Žižek, Puppet, p. 78.
316 “Scottish Liturgy (1982) with Alternative Eucharistic Prayers,” p. 6 (The Scottish Episcopal 
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David Jasper has shown to be precisely and universally 'the life of struggle with and 
in the body.'
317  Liturgical dwelling waits.  It keeps vigil.  It is outside the sphere of 
work, of production.  Yet liturgical dwelling begins with a profound sense of being in-
the-body, being a body in-the-world; this as the condition of possibility for any 
encounter with the Absolute.
318
Throughout the biblical text, Jesus' body is ever moving, ever slipping through 
people’s ever-grasping hands.   Only occasionally is Jesus ‘caught,’ as when the 
woman with the issue of blood touches the hem of his garment and is healed; Jesus is 
aware that ‘power has gone out’ of him in this instance (Lk. 8:43-48). To grasp Christ 
is to receive his power, to enter into a parasitic relationship with this unusual body. 
Even in his capture, trial, torture and execution, Jesus’ body cannot be handled in the 
usual way.  This body defies all convention.  It sweats blood in the agonies of deepest 
prayer.
319   It requires a kiss to even be apprehended by the authorities, the kiss of 
betrayal masquerading as brotherhood, or perhaps vice versa.  During his trial, Jesus’ 
body remains equally illusory, seeming to waver in and out of focus, to flare and fade 
before the very eyes of his accusers; his dispossession of his very self, represented in 
his silence, keeps his body just out of reach.  It seems the only way his enemies can be 
sure that Jesus is even bodily at all – for remember, it has been said that this man is 
God’s son, which would certainly call the physicality of his body into question – is to 
enact violence upon his body.  In all the drama of the Passion, Jesus’ corporeality is 
317 D. Jasper,  The Sacred Body, p. 175 (see  pp. 175-185).  This thematic originates with Martin 
Heidegger's essay “Poetically Man Dwells,” in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1971), and is developed considerably by Lacoste in Experience and the Absolute.
318 cf. Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolutely: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man 
(New York: Fordham UP, 2004).
319 Oliver Davies, “The Sign Redeemed: A Study in Christian Fundamental Semiotics.”  Modern 
Theology 19:2 (April 2003), p. 221: 'We can already see this [radically dislocated subjectivity] 
prefigured in the accounts of Jesus’ Todesfurcht  in Gethsemane where, according to the vivid 
language of a Lukan variant, “his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the 
ground” (NRSV). I think it is important, however else we see these life-giving words, that we do 
not lose sight of their disturbing quality.'133
perhaps only realised as a sure thing, but only for a moment, in his torture, as whip-
straps meet with flesh, thorns sink into head, nails impale hands and feet, and as an 
unwieldy piece of wood, the instrument of his impending death, is dragged by this 
ghost of a man up the hill toward the site which will simultaneously be his execution 
and his exaltation.  In his execution, Jesus’ body once again slips from within reach as 
it is taken from the cross and caringly placed in a borrowed tomb.  The more Jesus’ 
body is broken, the more fractured and fragmented it becomes, the more elusive it 
becomes – he is not here (Lk. 24:5).  These fragments are too minuscule and yet 
simultaneously too vast, larger-than-life, to be held by human hands.  And yet the 
more fractured and elusive this body becomes, the more real it becomes, for as the 
crumbs of Christ’s bread-body and the wine of his blood run through grasping human 
fingers, a stain is left behind that will not wash away.
As we conclude Part One of this study, it should be apparent that the initiative 
of God to meet us in and through the material mediation of sacrament entails an 
interminable risk.  This passage from Don Saliers puts it well:
That is, if the practice of Jesus' memory and the calling 
upon God to make real the signs of bread and wine is to 
constitute our primary theology as Christians, is this not a 
most fragile foundation?...There is no need to deny the 
fragility of sacramental actions of the Christian assembly 
seen from a human point of view.  Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, 
and   others   rightly   see   the   weakness   and   human 
vulnerability in these practices.   For them such practices 
are, amidst a world such as ours, an illusion.   But the 
Eucharist   and   Baptism   are   precisely   the   divine 
vulnerability.   For at the heart of the Eucharist are the 
broken symbols of suffering and death – God's humanity 
made visible and palpable.   The risk is both divine and 
human.   At the center of this limit, the self-emptying 
(kenosis) of God in human form and death.
320
320 Don E. Saliers,Worship As Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1994), p. 61.134
PART TWO:
Literary and Theological Perspectives135
~ Chapter Four ~
Fracturing:
Brokenness and Sacrament
Continually   called   to   move   beyond   itself,   the 
transcorporeal body itself becomes eucharistic, because 
endlessly fractured and fed to others.  It becomes the 
body   of   Christ,   broken,   given   resurrected   and 
ascended....The   transcorporeal   body   extends   in   its 
fracturing, it pluralises as it opens itself toward an 
eternal growth.  Only as such, can the wounding, can 
the differences, be redemptive.
321
4.1 Fracture: “This is my Body, broken”
In Part One, the skandalon of sacramentality was established as a two-fold 
scandal   of   language   and   the   body.     Beginning   with   language,   this   raises   a 
hermeneutical problem: how to determine meaning, significance, from speech or text. 
But the skandalon of the body is also a hermeneutical problem: how to “read” the 
body, especially the present absence of Christ's 'displaced' body, which overextends its 
bounds and incorporates all bodies.  In both cases, we encounter a plurisignificance 
that is unsettling.  It seems there is no possibility of singular or univocal meaning. 
However,  it is here that the eruptive truth of sacramentality arises, which is 
necessarily plural.  The texts and practices that take on a sacramental character in 
postmodern life are means of grace precisely because their meaning cannot be nailed 
or narrowed down to a unity.  When the body is broken, torn, rent asunder, so as to be 
321 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 95136
given as nourishment, as food to be eaten, ingested, received into one's own flesh, the 
body can no longer be regarded as a pure or unadulterated unity, but only as a 
plurality.  The body – Christ's human body, and ours, as well as the mystical body of 
the eucharistic host – is itself a text, presenting and representing itself to be read, 
consumed, digested.   This thematic – the eucharistic body as a body fractured, 
consumed, and eroticized – will occupy us in Part Two of this study.   The Eucharist 
demonstrates the body at the point of utter abasement, abjection, abandonment and 
absence, and renarrates this body as most really present precisely in this absence, this 
moment of extreme kenosis – 'he made himself nothing' (Phil. 2:7).  
By now, we have seen that, just as the body can be read as text, so also the text 
is a body: the corpus is a corps (in the sense this word has in French).  However, 
though incorporating death (in) itself, it is not a dead letter (corpse) but a living Story 
(corpus), a growing Body of work, as well as a community, a corporate body – a corps 
of writers and readers of the Body of the Word, and of the text of the Body.  The Story 
that gives content to the form of the Eucharist is bodied forth in and as text: biblical 
and liturgical, certainly, but also the text of body-language, of ritual action and 
collective performance, the body-at-prayer and in communion.   And so we must 
attend to the body itself, its ineradicable materiality, endlessly and irreparably 
fractured, as a site from which the Eucharist derives its meaning, its plurisigificance.
For the remainder of this opening section, we shall engage the 1982 Liturgy of 
the Scottish Episcopal Church, which textually inscribes and liturgically performs a 
most unique moment of fraction.
322  We will progress from there to an excursus on the 
degradation of the eucharistic body of Christ, which incorporates the historical body 
which 'hangs as one accursed,' as well as the resurrection body that we touched on in 
322 We are using fraction to indicate the liturgical moment of the breaking of the host in the Eucharist, 
and fracture more generally as a synonym for 'breaking' or 'brokenness.'137
Chapter 3.  This will set the stage for three literary explorations of the sacramentality 
of the body broken in contemporary fictions: Graham Greene's Monsignor Quixote, 
Ron Hansen's Mariette in Ecstasy, and Chuck Palahniuk's Fight Club.
In the Christological Prayer of the 1982 Scottish Liturgy, emphasis is placed 
on not simply the historical reality of the incarnate Christ, but echoing Jesus' 'bread of 
life' discourse in John 6 (which we will consider more fully in the next chapter), the 
emphasis is on flesh: 'the gift of your Son, born in human flesh.'
323  This phrase is only 
included in Eucharistic Prayer I, which is non-occasional and the most commonly 
used.   Not only is the language of flesh used, in contrast to other less visceral 
language (form, likeness, body), but immediately the connection is made to the Word, 
as in the prologue to John's gospel: 'He is the Word existing beyond time, both source 
and final purpose, bring to wholeness all that is made.'
324  The liturgy, then, inscribes 
this paradox, that the eternal Logos, which is both beginning and end, 'source and 
final purpose,' is also the baby born at Bethlehem, taking on helpless, infant flesh in a 
supreme act of kenosis.  As St. Athanasius famously stated, 'He was made man so that 
we might be made God.'
325   This basic christological dictum is often taken to mean 
that he took on our humanity so that we could put on his divinity – and it is fairly 
certain that this is precisely what the author meant.  However, Christ is not only 
divine, but both fully human and fully divine.  And though created in God's image, 
and siblings with Christ by adoption through baptism and new birth into His Body the 
Church, we are not divine, but fully and irreducibly human.  Which leaves us to ask, 
what did it really mean for Christ to become like us, in our humanity?  And what what 
323 SL 1982, p. 7
324 SL 1982, p. 7
325 St. Athanasius, “On the Incarnation of the Word (De Incarnatione Verbi Dei)” 54.3 (trans. by 
Archibald Robertson) From  Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 4. Edited by 
Philip Schaff and Henry Wace. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1892.) online at 
<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2802.htm> [accessed 31 March 2010].138
does it really mean for us to be like him in his humanity?  How do we 'incarnate' the 
kenotic, all-too-human flesh of Christ in our own bodies?
The Scottish Liturgy provides one clue in in the prayer of Oblation: 'Made one 
with Him, we offer you these gifts, and with them ourselves, a single, holy, living 
sacrifice.'
326  The moment of fraction, which we will soon consider, must be viewed 
against the backdrop of these words.  The implication here is that because the Word 
became flesh – because the Son became incarnate in the baby, who went on to suffer, 
die and was raised – what is being offered in the gifts of bread and wine, the symbols 
of Christ's broken body and shed blood, is both Jesus' life, which is intertwined with 
Godhead in the perichoresis of the Trinity, but our lives as well, 'brought together in a 
wonderful exchange' because of the incarnation.  So this offering of bread and wine – 
not mere grain and grape – is, in the words of the Alternative Offertory Prayer, both 
that which 'earth has given and human hands have made...fruit of the vine, and work 
of human hands.'
327  We offer what we have made, the product of our own poiesis, our 
making or doing, our “work.”  And yet our work is premised upon the original work 
of God in creation.  Just as the creator is part of the creation and the artist is part of 
the art, so the offerers are part of the offering.  When we give, we give of ourselves, 
and we give ourselves.  This is true of the God who was in Christ as well.  And yet, in 
each case, there remains a distance, an other-ness.  When the congregation offers up 
their gift to be consecrated, blessed, broken and given, offered back to them as food 
that is both spiritual and yet very much real (what they eat is still wholly bread and 
wholly wine, whatever else it might be), what they offer is part of the created order, of 
which they are a part, all of which is the poiesis of the creative Word of God – in the 
326 SL 1982, p. 8.  The prayer of oblation is identical in Eucharistic Prayers I-IV. Eucharistic Prayer V 
is an anomaly. The same idea is present, but without the language of sacrifice: 'together with him 
we offer you these gifts: in them we give you ourselves.'  Oddly in form V, these words are spoken 
only by the priest and not the congregation.
327 SL 1982, p. 27.139
words of the Nicene Creed, 'Through him all things were made.'
328  The materiality of 
this bread and this wine, 'the gifts of God for the people of God' as other liturgies 
state, is bound up with our corporeality, initially insofar as human labors produce 
bread and wine from grain and grape, and then as we receive it back and incorporate 
into our bodies the food upon which we feast.  As the ancient fathers understood, we 
are being consumed in this act of consumption, “metabolized” into the body of Christ, 
individual members 'made one with him,' even as the elements are metabolized into 
our physical flesh and blood.
329
All of this hinges on what we suggest is the pivotal moment in the 1982 
Scottish Liturgy: the fraction.  After the celebrant breaks the host into two (or more) 
pieces with the words, ‘The living bread is broken for the life of the world’, the 
congregation responds, ‘Lord, unite us in this sign.’
330  In our survey of eucharistic 
liturgies, past and present, across a myriad of traditions, we found little precedent for 
these words spoken at the fraction.  The only reference points we uncovered were in 
some Eastern (Byzantine) liturgies, wherein the priest is instructed to say ('in a low 
voice') at the fraction: 'The Lamb of God is broken and distributed; broken but not 
divided. He is forever eaten yet is never consumed, but He sanctifies those who 
partake of Him.'
331  Whether the SEC commission that produced the 1982 liturgy was 
328 SL 1982, p. 4.
329 cf. Louis-Marie Chauvet, “The Broken Bread as Theological Figure of Eucharistic Presence,” in 
Boeve and Leijssen, eds.,  Sacramental Presence in a Postmodern Context  (Leuven, Paris and 
Stirling, VA: Peeters, 2001), p. 248.
330 SL 1982, p. 20.
331 Cf. the Byzantine Liturgy of St. Basil and its successor, the Liturgy St. John Chrysostom, both of 
which date to ca. 800 and remain in use in Orthodox churches today (see R. C. D. Jasper and G. J. 
Cuming, eds. Prayers of The Eucharist: Early and Reformed, pp. 114-15, 129-30). Both liturgies 
contain similar instructions at the fraction. However, in contrast to the SEC liturgy, there is no 
congregational response, and scant implication in the language that it is this brokenness – 
paradoxically 'broken but not divided...forever eaten yet never consumed' in these Eastern rites – 
which is the sign of the unity in and of the ecclesial Body of Christ. The profound christological 
paradox is present, but absent is the sense that, in this sacramental act, the Church receives its 
(comm)union with and as the Body of Christ in a symbol of brokenness. See also, C. Jones, et al, 
eds. The Study of Liturgy (Revised Edition), pp. 252-63.140
drawing upon another source is uncertain,
332 but even here we encounter words of 
profound paradox, for how can something be 'broken but not divided'? 'eaten yet 
never consumed'?  This is impossible insofar as we understand what bread is and 
means and what the body is and means; and yet, in the sacramentality of the liturgy, it 
becomes im/possible.  Returning to the Scottish Liturgy, for all the flexibilities and 
alternative forms included by the commission, there is no alternative to these words at 
the fraction, and no indication (as there is elsewhere in the liturgy) that this moment, 
this enactment may be omitted.  It is in the sign of profound brokenness, of fractured 
humanity – ours becoming Christ’s and Christ’s becoming ours – that the Church is 
given her true identity as the Body of Christ, an identity that is not a foundation but a 
gift, freely given, one of brokenness, of kenotic outpouring for the life of the world. 
The ecclesia misunderstands both the nature of its identity and the gravitas (in the 
sense not only of weight but of immanence, corporeality, this-worldliness) of its 
calling and mission when it neglects or seeks to domesticate this symbol of fracture, 
instantiated in every eucharistic liturgy even apart from the words of the Scottish 
Liturgy that interpret the symbol so explicitly.  We are united as a Body – bodies 
given a Body – in a sign that is irreducibly and irreparably a sign of brokenness.
333
332 In the Eucharist of the 1929 Scottish Prayer Book, ceremonial instructions seem to be given for two 
fractions. The first takes place during the institution narrative, the celebrant “acting out” with the 
elements the words 'he took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake it...'; then after the 
Lord's Prayer, the Presbyter is instructed to break the consecrated bread, saying: 'The peace of the 
Lord be with you all; (Answer) And with thy spirit. (Presbyter) Brethren, let us love one another, 
for love is of God.' Precedent for the 1982 words is absent in the 1970 liturgy as well, which more 
or less follows the 1929 form: '(celebrant) The peace of the Lord be always with you. (people) And 
with thy spirit. (celebrant) Beloved, let us love one another, for love is of God.' The implied basis 
for these words is the understanding of the Eucharist as an agape meal, a love feast. The 1982 
commission betokens a radically different reading of this moment of the liturgy.
333 We recognize that the general interpretation of liturgical scholars is to view the fraction as mostly if 
not purely practical to the distribution/communion which follows, rather than symbolic. However, 
Geoffrey Wainwright admits some validity to a symbolic interpretation of the fraction: 'In Churches 
in the BCP tradition, recent revision have removed the Fraction at the Prayer of consecration...and 
have restored it as a distinct 'action' between thanksgiving and communion...the tendency is not (as 
it long was in the Reformed tradition) to associate the Fraction with the 'breaking' of Christ's body 
on the cross (see John. 19.36! 'Broken' at 1 Cor. 11.24 is secondary), but rather to see the Fraction, 
in so far as it is at all symbolic, in terms of the many and the one (1 Cor. 10.16-17)'; C. Jones, et al, 
eds. The Study of Liturgy, p. 332. See also E. Yarnold, Awe-Inspiring Rites, pp. 51-52.141
We have observed some celebrants in the SEC interpret this moment through 
gesture and body-language as well.  With the words 'The living bread is broken,' the 
host is snapped equally in two, and the priest spreads her arms widely apart, placing 
as much distance between the two halves as her body will allow.  Less commonly, but 
occasionally,   the   celebrant   will   bring   the   two   halves   back   together   with   the 
congregational response, the host appearing momentarily to once again be a unified 
whole.   Yet the faultline cannot be repaired.   The paradox of brokenness that is 
wholeness, wholeness that is brokenness, is interminable.  The living bread is broken. 
The paradox reaches out and incorporates us.  Lord, unite us in this sign, this symbol 
of fracture, this broken symbol, which all symbols (symbolon) are.
334  Our wholeness, 
as liturgical subjects, is fractured.  Our unity, as a Body, is fragmentary.  We are one, 
and we are many.  Our (w)holiness is ripped through, our holes are exposed.  The 
openings, the gaps, the distance not only between each individual and every other, but 
even within our divided Selves,
335 is acknowledged and enacted in the breaking of the 
bread.  It is no longer a loss to be mourned or overcome, but a celebration of our true 
humanity, broken yet redeemed, in Christ's fractured Body.
4.2 The Degradation of the Body of Christ
Christianity, in its theological, liturgical, and artistic imaginations, cannot but 
be haunted by the image of Christ's broken body.  Friedrich Herlin's painting Christ 
with Ear of Wheat and Grape Vine (1469)
336 (see Appendix), depicts a grotesque body, 
exposing its gaps and fissures precisely as the location of the Eucharist.  The body of 
Christ in this painting is the abject, emaciated body of the crucified Jesus, skin 
334 See chapter 1 of the present study.
335 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1992).
336 This painting is reproduced in  Caroline Walker Bynum's  Holy Feast, Holy Fast, (plate 4) and 
Fragmentation and Redemption (fig. 3.9, p. 107). We discuss this painting further in the following 
chapter in relation to the body of Christ as food. See Appendix (p. 266) for a copy of the image.142
stretched taut over the ribcage, arms and legs disproportionately slender.  The crown 
of thorns is on his head, and blood trickles down from his brow to his breast.  The 
wound in his side is visible and flows the blood and (we assume) water to which 
scripture and tradition attest.   Almost imperceptibly, this trail of blood from the 
wound in Christ's side also flows down and then out from underneath his loincloth, 
and almost halfway down the inside of his right leg.  According to Bynum, who draws 
upon Leo Steinberg's  The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and Modern 
Oblivion, the link is made here between Christ's first wounding, his circumcision as 
an infant Jewish male, and his final wounding in the spear-pierced side on the cross.
337 
From this wounded side, as has been interpreted by the early Fathers and modern 
readers alike, flows the waters of Baptism, the sacrament of initiation or identity, and 
the blood of the Eucharist, the sacrament of sanctification.
338
Paradoxically, these openings in Jesus' body are simultaneously negative – the 
marks of his crucifixion are wounds, aporias, negations – and positive, generative, 
life-giving.  Jesus eyes are open, penetrating the viewer – see what you've done to 
me? - even as they indicate a certain serenity – perhaps rather than the former, the 
gaze says to us, this is what it means to 'bear in the body the marks (stigma) of the 
Lord Jesus' (Gal. 6:17).  This is what incorporation into Christ's body looks like – I 
am the vine, you are the branches (John 15:5).  This decimated body, full of holes, is 
the holy body of Christ that gives life to the world.  It is a dying but not-yet-dead 
body, yet one from which life springs forth, the Tree of Life growing past the limits of 
337 C. Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, p. 84, 89; Leo Steinberg, The Sexuality of 
Christ, pp. 58-61, 160-62.  In brief, Steinberg's thesis is that much medieval painting is fixated on 
the genital sexuality of Christ – his “male-ness” - as an indication of his true humanity in the 
incarnation. Bynum's response is that medieval theology, expressed in the art of the period, is also 
interested in Jesus' body as (allegorically) female: as a mother who nourishes the Church at her 
lactating breast, and the wound in Christ's side as the womb from which the Church is birthed in the 
sacramental symbols which spill forth; cf. Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, pp. 79-117.
338 cf. G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 97-116; e.g. 'The medieval Church bears witness to this ambivalence 
in finding it appropriate to gender Jesus as a mother at this point, with the wounded side as both a 
lactating breast and a womb from which the Church is removed' (p. 105; Ward cites Bynum here).143
the crucified body, abandoned and nailed to the tree.
Herlin's visual representation of Christ's eucharistic body is consistent with 
Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin's characterization of the body's degradation 
in what he calls the 'grotesque realism' of the literature of Rabelais:
Degradation here means coming down to earth, the contact 
with the earth as an element that swallows up and gives 
birth at the same time.  To degrade is to bury, to sow, and to 
kill simultaneously, in order to bring forth something more 
and better.  To degrade also means to concern oneself with 
the lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the 
reproductive organs; it therefore relates to acts of defecation 
and   copulation,   conception,   pregnancy,   and   birth. 
Degradation digs a bodily grave for a new birth; it has not 
only a destructive, negative aspect, but also a regenerating 
one.  To degrade an object does not imply merely hurling it 
into a void of non-existence, into absolute destruction, but 
to hurl it down to the reproductive lower stratum, the zone 
in which conception and new birth take place.  Grotesque 
realism knows no other level; it is the fruitful earth and the 
womb.  It is always conceiving.
339
Christ's degraded body, as depicted in the Herlin painting, is grotesque, characterized 
by its 'protuberances and offshoots.'
340  But in the crucifixion and resurrection, it is a 
reproductive body – the seed must fall to the ground and die.  Christ is almost always 
shown wounded, bleeding – his is an 
unfinished and open body…not separated from the world 
by   clearly   defined   boundaries;   it   is   blended   with   the 
world…It is an incarnation of this world at the absolute 
lower   stratum,   as   the   swallowing   up   and   generating 
principle, as the bodily grave and bosom, as a field which 
has been sown and in which new shoots are preparing to 
sprout.
341
These transgressions of bodily integrity and closed unity characterize the crucified, 
eucharistic body as a grotesque body, and, we wish to claim, vice versa: the grotesque 
339 Mikhail Bakhtin,  Rabelais and His World  (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1984), p. 21. 'The 
essential principle of grotesque realism,’ Bakhtin writes, ‘is degradation, that is, the lowering of all 
that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the material level, to the sphere of the earth 
and body in their indissoluable unity’ (pp. 19-20).
340 Ibid., p. 29.
341 Ibid., p. 26-7.144
body as a eucharistic body.  Therein lies the truth of the cross and of the liturgy, but in 
such a way as is unrecognizable from within the (theo)logic of the liturgy itself – it 
can only be recognized from the outside, by revelers and blasphemers, by the unruly 
masses outside the Mass – from within the profane framework of festival and 
carnival.
342   Indeed, as both Bakhtin and Huizinga make explicit,  ‘Nearly all the 
rituals of the feast of fools are a grotesque degradation of various church rituals and 
symbols and their transfer to the material bodily level: gluttony and drunken orgies on 
the altar table, indecent gestures, disrobing.’
343
And yet, what Bahktin indicates in his study, which Huizinga is sensitive to as 
well in his reading of the period – and, it stands to be said, which the theologians of 
Radical Orthodoxy, who elevate the eucharistic practice of this period as the pinnacle 
of the transcendent sacramentality of the liturgical city, completely overlook – is that 
provinces of literature and the arts are capable of exploring these themes in a way that 
the 'sanctioned' discourses of Christian theology and liturgy seem unable to sustain. 
For   example,   Catherine  Pickstock   follows   her   teacher,   John   Milbank,   who 
characterizes this as the period prior to which the secular did not exist in binary 
opposition to the  sacred.   If we follow this school of thought, we come to the 
conclusion that some “purity” of liturgical and sacramental doctrine and practice that 
characterized the Middle Ages was somehow destroyed by the Enlightenment and the 
solipsism that accompanies modernism; at best, this lost purity may be retrieved in 
postmodernity through a kind of second naiveté.  Of course, as Jean-Francois Lyotard 
has explained, the postmodern and the premodern mirror one another in a kind of 
anamnetic remembrance,
344 which itself bears a liturgical resonance.  Recognizing the 
342 cf.  Ibid., pp. 74-85, passim; see also Harvey Cox, The Feast of Fools: A Theological Essay on 
Festivity and Fantasy (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
343 M. Bakhtin, Rabelais, pp. 74-75.
344 In “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?,” Lyotard writes: 'Post modern would have 
to be understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo)'; in The Postmodern 145
pronounced re-emergence of the body, the theologians of Radical Orthodoxy accept a 
qualified postmodernism as a way of retrieving a harmonious rather than dichotomous 
understanding of immanence and transcendence, materiality and spirituality.
345  In this 
effort, their project is both successful and useful.  However, Radical Orthodoxy fails 
to fully account for the fundamental paradox of the Middle Ages, the historical era 
they idealize for the high emphasis placed upon liturgy and the Eucharist as central 
features of civic life.  For as Huizinga suggests, it is medieval culture which seems to 
most fully comprehend the fusion of the sacred and the profane.  While perhaps not 
immediately   apparent,   Huizinga's   conclusion   stands   in   stark   contrast   to   John 
Milbank's assertion that 'Once, there was no 'secular.''  Milbank explains further:
And the secular was not latent, waiting to fill more space 
with the steam of the 'purely human', when the pressure of 
the sacred was relaxed.   Instead there was the single 
community   of   Christendom,   with   its   dual   aspects   of 
sacerdotium  and  regnum. The  saeculum, in the medieval 
era, was not a space, a domain, but a time – the interval 
between fall and eschaton where coercive justice, private 
property and impaired natural reason must make shift to 
cope with the unredeemed effects of sinful humanity.
346
In Milbank's vision (which lays  the groundwork for most subsequent Radical 
Orthodox thinking), there was no sacred/secular dichotomy in the Middle Ages 
because life was defined by and derived all meaning from Christian liturgy, the 
Eucharist in particular.
347  Milbank's thesis is that the modern conception of the sacred 
and the secular as opposing 'spaces' or 'domains' had to be constructed (falsely) or 
imagined, as the two in fact existed in harmony during Christendom (Christendom 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge  (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1984), p. 81.
345 Here we limit our characterization of “Radical Orthodoxy” as a whole to the three editors of the 
defining  volume  Radical Orthodoxy  (op  cit.), John  Milbank,  Graham Ward  and  Catherine 
Pickstock: cf. for Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, The Word Made Strange; for Ward, Cities 
of God; and for Pickstock, After Writing.
346 J. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 9.
347 Catherine Pickstock has articulated this conviction even more fully than Milbank in her book After 
Writing. See ch. 2 of the present work for a fuller engagement with her work.146
being a positive designation to Milbank and most all Radical Orthodoxy theologians). 
The secular, as a “between-time,” was the historical location of the sacred, in other 
words, the sacred in time.  Similarly, transcendence and immanence did not exist in 
binary opposition from one another, for in the Eucharist, heaven and earth, our lives 
and the Divine life, meet in the 'wonderful exchange.'
348   However appealing this 
might sound from the theological or liturgical viewpoint of Christianity (a somewhat 
conservative, Anglo-catholic Christianity at that), Huizinga casts this dynamic in a 
less beatific light when he characterizes the Middle Ages thus: 
Life was permeated by religion to the degree that the 
distance between the earthly and the spiritual was in danger 
of being obliterated at any moment.  While on the one hand 
all of ordinary life was raised to the sphere of the divine, on 
the other the divine was bound to the mundane in an 
indissoluble mixture with daily life.
349  
In fact, as we have been trying to argue, the “profanation” of the Eucharist as a 
symbol is inevitable, as it is built into the structure of language itself, and as Huizinga 
observes, 'the most tender of all mysteries, the Eucharist, is threatened in this way,' 
through profane customary language itself.
350
It occurs to us, however, that this “profane” and “profaning” tendency within 
the Eucharist is not only built into the structure of language (recall that the Eucharist 
is on one level a linguistic event, the work of the Divine logos), but is indeed inherent 
to the symbolism of the Eucharist, for in the complex metaphor Christ has given us, 
sacred and profane, presence and absence, divinity and humanity, life and death, 
abjection and glorification, are inextricably intertwined in a coincidence of opposites 
– this is the fundamental mystery of the Incarnation of God in Christ, represented 
most profoundly and paradoxically at Golgotha, where hangs the ruined, lifeless 
348 SL 1982, p. 6.
349 Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996), p. 179.
350 Ibid., p. 178.147
divine body which invites us to feast upon it, not just with our eyes but actually 
consume it, flesh and blood.  In this sense, that which “threatens” the Eucharist is 
derived from within the Eucharist itself: what we have called the de/constructive core, 
or what Mark C. Taylor might call the a/theological core, of sacramentality.
The tendency of sacramentality to exceed its ecclesially defined strictures 
issues in the appearance of sacramental traces within the practices of everyday life. 
‘The mind was filled with Christ to such a degree that the Christological note 
immediately began to sound whenever any act or thought showed even the slightest 
congruence with the life or suffering of the Lord,’ writes Huizinga.  For example, ‘A 
poor nun who carries firewood to the kitchen imagines that she is carrying the Cross. 
The notion of carrying wood by itself is enough to bathe the activity in the bright 
glow of the highest act of love’ – Huizinga calls this a ‘profaning overflow’ which 
‘was equally the result of that overabundance of devotional content’ characteristic of 
the period.
351 The distinction between the sacred and the mundane, the heavenly and 
the earthly, becomes so blurred that it was not uncommon for folk to refer generally to 
the eucharistic host as “God.”  In fact, Huizinga gives an account that if a priest were 
to pass by on a donkey, transporting the eucharistic host, a common person might 
exclaim the passing of “un Dieu sur un asne” (“a God on an ass/donkey”),
352 
exemplifying this ‘profanation.’  Elsewhere he makes reference to satirical literature 
of the period which might include word-play on saint/seins (bosoms) and make sexual 
innuendos out of  devotion  (submission,  piety),  confessor,  bless/blessed  ('bénir', 
pregnant).  These ‘obscene meanings’ are indeed a parody of religious and liturgical 
speech, but in fact they are less a rejection or subversion of the religious as a 
de/constructive outworking of religious language itself.
353  In Huizinga's words, ‘Here 
351 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
352 Ibid., p. 178.
353 Ibid., p. 182.148
is well demonstrated something of the dangerous contact between the religious and 
the erotic that the church, with good reason, so feared...The profanation of daily 
religious practice was almost without bounds.'
354
We will return to the relationship between the religious and the erotic in due 
course (Chapter 6).  However, here we simply wish to note the confluence – in the 
medieval as well as the postmodern imagination – of the sacred with the secular, the 
mundane, and even the profane.  This confluence is dependent in no small measure 
upon the liturgy as a defining medieval cultural form; indeed, it makes no sense apart 
from the rhythms of life as shaped by the liturgical assembly and ecclesial feasts, 
festivals and fasts.  As Huizinga writes, ‘In all these sacrileges of the holy through the 
unabashed intermingling with sinful life there is more naive familiarity with liturgy 
than open godlessness.  Only a culture that is thoroughly permeated with religiosity 
and that takes faith for granted knows these excesses and degenerations.’
355   In other 
words, Milbank’s ‘once there was no secular’ is precisely equivalent to saying ‘once 
there was no sacred’ – because if at the height of the 'liturgical city,' the two were 
indistinguishable,   then   neither   sacrality   or   secularity   has   any   real   meaning.
356 
Huizinga speaks of an ‘entirely externalized religion,’ which at first resonates with the 
emphasis Radical Orthodoxy places on materiality.   However, superstition and 
supernaturalism abound in the Middle Ages.  He reads the veneration of the Eucharist 
not as a exaltation of materiality (as Pickstock or Milbank might want to see it), but a 
profound materialism.  As Huizinga explains about this period, ‘the urge to worship 
the Lord in a visible sign soon found a different and sanctioned form: the monstrance, 
which displaced the Host itself as an object of veneration.’
357   Throughout his 
354 Ibid., p. 182.
355 Ibid., p. 186 [italics added].
356 cf. Ibid., pp. 199-202.
357 Ibid., pp. 234. We suspect that Pickstock would disapprove of this displacement.149
narrative of the period, which differs considerably from Pickstock's idealized (though 
perhaps not theologically spurious) reading, Huizinga observes:
The process is one of ongoing reduction of the infinite to 
the finite; the miracle is reduced to atoms.  To every holy 
mystery, there attaches itself like a barnacle to a ship, a 
growth of external elements of faith that desecrate it.  The 
miracle of the Eucharist is permeated with the most sober 
and material superstitions: that one cannot go blind or 
suffer a stroke on the day one hears a mass or that one does 
not age during the time one spends at a service.  The church 
has to be constantly on guard so that God is not brought too 
close to earth.
358
We believe Huizinga, along with capturing the spirit of the Middle Ages through a 
myriad of concrete examples from folk culture, he  has almost captured what we are 
calling the de/constructive core of sacramentality as well.  What he, too, fails to make 
explicit is that which we have been arguing all along: that this tendency of sacrament 
is not the product of 'a growth of external elements of faith that desecrate' the 'holy 
mystery,' but rather, that this movement, this de/constructive core resident is within 
sacramentality itself.   Indeed the outworking of the implications of the Eucharist's 
profound immanence reaches a certain height in the Middle Ages, before it is 
demolished by the Cartesian shift toward the disembodied thinking subject.
And so the sacred is profaned.   The profane is sacralized.   The degraded, 
fractured Body of Christ, which is present as an absence in the sacramental body of 
the Eucharist, and in the ecclesial body of the Church gathered to celebrate the 
sacrament, cannot be circumscribed to these rituals.
359  It is a body which pours itself 
out into even the most mundane tasks of everyday life.   Every meal becomes a 
Eucharist.  Every bath becomes a baptism.  Is not this spill-over of the sacramental 
into the mundane both inevitable, inasmuch as it is the outworking of the inner logic 
358 Ibid., p. 177. 
359 'The rite of the breaking of the bread is of primary importance in this respect, in that it manifests 
that if the presence of Christ is indeed inscribed in the bread and the wine, it is not circumscribed 
there'; L-M. Chauvet, “The Broken Bread as Theological Figure of Eucharistic Presence,” p. 259.150
of sacramentality itself, and thereby even desirable?  It is precisely this tendency 
towards excess and ‘spillage’ or ‘slippage’ that indicates the sacramentality of the 
Sacraments, and this is  precisely  the scandal at the heart of the Eucharist: the 
scandalous risk of mediation which necessarily entails a process of seemingly endless 
secularization, insofar as the ‘sacred/secular’ distinction is maintained at all.
We now turn to three contemporary literary explorations of the sacramentality 
of the body broken.  Our aim is to demonstrate how these novels are attuned to this 
dynamic, this sacramental imaginary, in ways that Christian theology and liturgy dare 
not think.
4.3  Imagining the Eucharistic Body in Monsignor Quixote
We begin at an ending.  An old priest staggers into the chapel of a monastery. 
He is under sedation, having previously suffered an automobile crash.  He approaches 
the altar as his caretakers rush in after him, rightfully concerned about his condition. 
They watch as he begins to mumble from his broken memory the remaining 
fragments of the Mass, the performance of which has so profoundly shaped his 
clerical life.  When the time comes for the Eucharist, his delirium prevents him from 
realizing that the communion elements are absent.  He consecrates an imagined wafer 
and chalice, and then extends this imaginary sacrament to a single communicant.  The 
unlikely recipient has been the priest's faithful companion throughout the narrative, 
the Marxist ex-mayor of their village, an avowed atheist who yet in this moment 
kneels and partakes in an act not of faith but of friendship, in the hope that it may 
provide comfort to his compañero in these final moments.  The priest’s fingers press 
against his tongue, the felt presence of the really absent Host.  The monsignor's final 
act: this errant eucharist.  His dying words, ‘By this hopping...’ – this leap of faith – a 
phrase he never completes, as he had previously in the story: ‘by this hopping...you 151
can recognize love.’
360   The priest collapses into the arms of his friend, his body 
broken, his heartbeat now as absent as the literal bread and the wine.
Where is the ‘real presence’ in this imaginary Eucharist, shared between a 
defrocked, delirious priest and an ardent atheist?   Professor Pilbeam, a character 
brought in near the end of the novel to play the role of skeptic, claims there is none: 
‘There was no consecration....There was no Host and no wine.’  But Father Leopold, 
the man of faith, challenges him: ‘are you sure?...[we] saw no bread or wine...But 
Monsignor Quixote quite obviously believed in the presence of the bread and 
wine....Do you think it's more difficult to turn empty air into wine than wine into 
blood?  Can our limited senses decide a thing like that?’
361   It is not a question of 
reality – ‘Fact or fiction – in the end you can’t distinguish between them – you have 
just to choose’
362 – but rather of truth, as are all questions of theology, a question of 
truth and fiction, framed within a fiction, a doubly-fictional Eucharist that somehow 
becomes a ‘true fiction.’
363  At the heart of this event is love, the greatest of the three 
Christian virtues according to St. Paul (1 Cor. 13:13).  The ‘infinite mystery’
364 of this 
imaginative (which is perhaps not to say imaginary after all) Eucharist becomes for 
the unbeliever a true sacrament in his communion with and remembrance of his 
friend, the good priest, and an inkling of openness to the possibility of salvation 
extended not in spite of but by virtue of his fractured body and broken imagination.
Monsignor Quixote presents a narrative which challenges our understanding of 
communion and extends, if not obliterates, the boundaries of community.  Graham 
360 Graham Greene, Monsignor Quixote (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), pp. 246-51.
361 Ibid., p. 253-54.
362 Ibid., p. 238.
363 'Doubly-fictive' because it is a 'fiction' (work of imagination) in the novel's narrative, which is itself 
also a fiction. Again, however, we would make much of Douglas Templeton's conception of 'true 
fiction.' (cf. The New Testament as True Fiction).
364 G. Greene, MQ, p. 254.152
Greene's   novel,   which   arises   from   a   profoundly   Catholic   imagination,   raises 
significant   questions   about   the   nature   of   the   Eucharist,   about   friendship   and 
‘communion’, and in a subtle way posits that the real presence found in this Christian 
practice is, in truth, the presence of the ‘other’ – an emphasis on the connection 
between persons, and the sacrality of human relationships.  The novel, which on one 
level is a delightful intertextual conversation with Cervantes’ Don Quixote, recounts 
the journey of these two companions, the Priest and the Mayor: both misfits of sorts, 
both men whose identifying roles – for one religious, for the other political – have 
been stripped from them.  Yet these two men, both of whom in their own way have 
spent their lives in the service of the people, find in communion with one another the 
identification of which they otherwise have been robbed.
Early in the novel, the Priest states that ‘Habits can be comforting, even rather 
boring habits’
365; indeed, almost as if to prove this, after we have witnessed Father 
Quixote’s unmaking (a de/construction of sorts), his final comfort lies in the 
performance of his oldest and most identifying habit – the celebration of Eucharist. 
Near the novel's conclusion, when as Father Quixote staggers toward the altar to 
begin his fragmentary liturgy, it occurs to us that, even in this most broken condition, 
the Priest remains in possession of  only  his identity as eucharistic celebrant, a 
vocation which is of course performed in persona Christi and is therefore not his 
possession at all – rather he is the one possessed.  Hence, even in his delirium, Father 
Quixote’s words to his friend, the Mayor, are both poignant and prophetic, perhaps 
spoken in persona Christi as well: ‘I don’t offer you a governorship…I offer you a 
kingdom.’
366  Today you will be with me in paradise.
Monsignor   Quixote  is   also   a   work   of   social,   political   and   religious 
365 Ibid, p. 33.
366 Ibid, p. 213.153
commentary, written by a novelist who maintained rather tenuous relationships with 
each of those three spheres.  Similarly, the titular character functions on multiple 
levels.  He is a simple parish priest who nevertheless poses a threat to the ecclesial 
authorities.  He is a faithful follower of Christ who becomes an unwitting radical – 
like Christ, by association.  He is a saint who regards himself a sinner, and who treats 
sinners as though they were saints.  The good priest is suspended between two realms, 
the here-and-now and the Kingdom-coming (‘here, not yet here...now-and-not-yet’, to 
borrow a phrase
367), between the material and the mystical (hoc est enim corpus 
meum, which appears as hocus pocus
368).  Wittingly or not, he draws those around him 
into another world, one which is sacramental, shaped according to the shape of the 
liturgy.  Likewise the novel which tells his story, a work of fiction, draws the reader 
outside the ordinary and into the extra-ordinary, a fictional realm made no less ‘real’ 
by its existence within imagination.  This is precisely what poetic language does: it 
takes the mundane – common words, ordinary materials – and imbues it with wholly 
new significance.   Jesus does this at the Last Supper,
369  at the institution of the 
Eucharist, when he took bread and wine, common elements at any meal, the most 
basic elements of human subsistence, and radically transformed their meaning, 
altering his followers’ perception immediately and for centuries to come.  We, like 
they, submit to the power of the poetic through the willing suspension of our disbelief, 
which constitutes poetic faith.
370  By this leap of faith, ‘this hopping...’, we enter a 
367 William H. Willimon and Stanley Hauerwas, Lord, Teach Us: The Lord’s Prayer and the Christian 
Life (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1996), p. 57.
368 M. Taylor, Erring, p. 103.
369 For the synoptic accounts, see Mt. 26:26-29, Mk. 14:22-25, Lk. 22:14-20; see also 1 Cor. 11:23-29 
for St. Paul’s instructions to the church in Corinth.
370 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. Nigel Leask, Everyman Paperback Classics 
(London: J. M. Dent, 1997), p. 179.  See also C.H. Holman (ed.), A Handbook to Literature, 4
th ed. 
(Indianapolis,   IN:   Bobbs-Merrill,  1980),   which   describes   ‘suspension   of  disbelief’  as   ‘The 
willingness to withhold questions about the truth, accuracy, or probability of characters or actions in 
a literary work.   This willingness to suspend doubt makes possible the reader’s temporary 
acceptance of the vicarious participation in an author’s imaginative world’ (p. 435).154
narrative world where we are transformed.   There is always an element of risk 
involved, but ‘when one has to jump, it’s so much safer to jump into deep water.’
371
In his dying action, Monsignor Quixote’s very body becomes sacramental, the 
present absence of his life standing in for the absent bread and wine.  It is his body 
which, throughout the narrative, has been taken, even as it has been forsaken; blessed, 
even as it has been cursed; broken, even as in death it is restored to eternal life; and 
finally given.  His suffering body is a visible challenge to the Powers of the World, 
which have sought to strip him of his ecclesial identity, the essence of his persona.  In 
this final act, their failure is exposed.  Even in his delirium, he breaks their rules and 
recites the Mass – re-sites the liturgy in his very body – extending communion to a 
professing atheist, an ex-communicant, one who for decades has avoided confessing 
his manifold sins.  In his death, however, the lingering trace of his body becomes a 
sacrament, to the discomfort of his unbelieving communicant, who would prefer to 
discount the efficacy of this strange communion: ‘once when I was young I partly 
believed in God, and a little of that superstition still remains.  I’m rather afraid of 
mystery...’
372  And so, at the end of the novel, the Monsignor’s lifeless body is taken 
away, but his atheist companion is haunted, not by the real presence of the risen Christ 
in whom he does not believe, and not by the fear that he has eaten and drank of his 
own condemnation (1 Cor. 11:29), unworthy recipient though he is, but by ‘the love 
which he had begun to feel for Father Quixote, [which] seemed now to live and grow 
in spite of the final separation and the final silence – for how long, he wondered with 
a kind of fear, was it possible for that love of his to continue?  And to what end?’
373 
Of this imaginative, doubly-fictive Eucharist that concludes the novel, David Jasper 
asks: 'Can we ever do more than this even with the fragments of bread and the drop of 
371 G. Greene, Monsignor Quixote, p. 238.
372 Ibid., p. 254.
373 Ibid., p. 256.155
wine, touching for a moment the deepest interiority of the body – our bodies – with 
the divine absent presence in an act of pure remembrance?'
374
4.4 Mariette in Ecstasy: Stigmata as Sacrament
We turn now to another novel that is the product of a Catholic imagination, 
profoundly shaped by the Eucharist.  Ron Hansen's Mariette in Ecstasy is the story of 
a young, beautiful postulant who shortly after taking her vows and entering the priory 
receives the stigmata, the marks of Christ's wounds on her flesh (cf. Gal. 6:17).  Her 
body, as we shall see, becomes a sacrament to some, and a horror to others, upsetting 
the liturgical life of the community.  The novel is part mystery, part romance, and part 
what we would like to call a 'theo-poetic' excursus on faith, in particular faith in-the-
body – that is, faith as realized and practiced in-the-body, and the body as the object 
of faith.
Mariette is seventeen years old when she enters the priory as a postulant.  Just 
before the High Mass in which she will be received into the convent, we find her in 
her room, preparing to go away forever, to be wedded to Christ.  She is a commixture 
of brimming sexuality and fervent spirituality.   Her body, precisely in its sexual 
potential and appeal (even to her!), is the locus of her spiritual devotion.
She stands and unties the strings at her neck so that the pink 
satin seeps onto a green Chinese carpet that is as plush as 
grass.  And she is held inside an upright floor mirror, pretty 
and naked and seventeen.  She skeins her chocolate-brown 
hair.  She pouts her mouth.  She esteems her full breasts as 
she has seen men esteem them.  She haunts her milk-white 
skin with her hands.
Even this I give You.
375
She gladly offers herself as a living sacrifice, a consecration of the erotic to God by 
374 D. Jasper, The Sacred Body, p. 111.
375 Ron Hansen, Mariette in Ecstasy (London: Macmillan, 1991) pp. 8-9.156
denying herself and others of her body's potential for sexual fulfillment.  Her body is 
her offering, her sacrifice.  All the while her father, Dr. Claude Baptiste, broods in the 
kitchen below her, ‘looking outside as if his hate were there.’
376   Like Graham 
Greene's Professor Pilbeam, he a man of science and reason, serving the narrative as a 
foil to faith.  He does not – cannot – understand Mariette's religious vocation.  He has 
already “lost” one daughter to the convent, Mariette’s sister Annie, 20 years her elder, 
known at the priory as Mother Céline, the Prioress of the Sisters of the Crucifixion. 
In the end, he does not attend Mariette's reception.
According to author Ron Hansen, Mariette Baptiste is a fictional composite of 
several late 19
th and early 20
th century female stigmatics: Saint Thérèse de Lisieux, 
Anne Catherine Emmerich, Louise Lateau, Theresa Neumann and Gemma Galgani.
377 
Hansen, a devout Catholic, explains in his essay “Stigmata” that 'Mariette Baptiste 
was, for me, the real thing, a stigmatic; but I inserted an element of questionableness 
because in my research that seemed standard even in those instances in which the 
anomalies seemed authentic and all medical science could do was scratch its head in 
puzzlement.'
378  In this essay, Hansen betrays the very ambiguity his fiction maintains; 
and yet, if we are to avoid the intentional fallacy, we must consider Hansen’s 
statement alongside the beliefs and conclusions drawn by every other reader of the 
text.  For, even granting that he is the author of the text, the character of Mariette, and 
the events he describes, are not  his own possession  in any ultimate sense; as 
inhabitants of the narrative, they take on a life of their own.  Even the author must 
stand outside this text and interpret, just as every reader must decide (or decide to 
376 Ibid., p. 9.
377 Ron Hansen, A Stay Against Confusion: Essays on Faith and Fiction, pp. 8-9.  Hansen’s first essay 
in the collection, “Writing as Sacrament” (pp. 1-13) briefly discusses the novel; herein he explains 
about the historical figures which comprised his character Mariette.  He discusses the phenomenon 
of the stigmata, and his novel, in more depth in the essay “Stigmata” (pp. 177-191).
378 Ibid., 177-78. 157
remain agnostic) whether Mariette is ‘the real thing,’ as Hansen chooses to believe, or 
simply an attention-seeking, hyper-sexed hysteric; whether she is the ‘holy girl,’ the 
‘cause’ of the showers of blessing Sister Catherine describes,
379  or a clever and 
manipulative ‘flirt.’
380   In the end, Père Marriott, who is called in to assess the 
disruption caused by Mariette's situation, is convinced of her authenticity; Mariette’s 
father, Dr. Claude Baptiste, maintains his skepticism: ‘You all have been duped,’ he 
tells them.  ‘Christ talks to her...The Devil strikes her when she tries to pray.  She is 
always saying preposterous things; that’s why we don’t get along.’
381   The clash 
between the spiritual/mystical perspective and the scientific/medical mind is evident 
here – again, reminiscent of the final pages of Monsignor Quixote, the discussion 
between the priest (believer), the professor (skeptic) and the Mayor (atheist), who in 
the end opens himself up to a kind of  mysterium tremendum et fascinans  toward 
which he had previously remained closed.
Mariette's religious devotion is fully embodied, even prior to her receiving the 
stigmata.  The day she enters the convent as a postulant, she is directed to the haustus 
room and instructed to remove all her worldly clothing, which she now exchanges for 
her habit.
She uneasily gets out of her dress and underthings and she 
is a girl again, four years old and staring at the Christ in her 
mother’s room.  She touched his pink mouth, the pink rent 
in his side, and then she touched her own mouth.   She 
touched underneath her skirt.
382
In this passage, Mariette's childhood memory floods onto her present in an anamnēsis 
379 R. Hansen, Mariette, p. 73.  Sister Saint-Denis describes Mariette thus: ‘Christ shines from her. 
She is Christian perfection.  She is lovely in every way’ (p. 68).
380 This accusation comes later in the narrative; even after Mariette receives the stigmata and therefore 
takes on a more serious and even revered personae within the community, Sister Marguerite accuses 
‘dear sweet child’ Mariette of being a ‘flirt’ (pp. 69-70).  On the other hand, in her interview for 
Father Marriott’s investigation, Novice Sister Philomène states simply: ‘I think she is a saint’ 
(Mariette, p. 62).
381 Ibid., p. 173. 
382 Ibid., p. 16. 158
of bodily intertextuality, her early impression of the symmetry between Christ's 
transcorporeal body and her own.  We recall this chapter's earlier discussion about the 
femininity of Christ's body, as characterized by Bynum: his lips, her lips...the labial 
opening in his side, the one between her legs.   The Christic body informs her own, 
transgressing the boundaries of time, place and even gender.  Immediately following 
this recollection, she kneels and is soon thereafter found in a state of religious ecstasy, 
‘unclothed and seemingly unconscious as she yields up one hand and then the other 
just as if she were being nailed like Christ to a tree.’
383  Her body, blessed and cursed, 
as the recipient of the wounds of Christ.
However, early in the novel, Mariette demonstrates that she can also coyly 
play the role of provocateur.  Upon joining the religious community, many of the 
other sisters are instantly taken with her beauty and kindness.  An interesting scene 
occurs when a few of the sisters are, by their own admission, “being bad,” which 
consists of stealing away to a secret location and talking about old boyfriends from 
their past lives before entering the convent.  One sister recounts an occasion when, 
from the window of their secret place, they watched a young woman and a man in 
soldier’s uniform having a picnic in a nearby field and, after the meal, kissing on a 
green plaid blanket.  To the bemusement and intrigue of the other sisters, ‘Mariette 
smiles tauntingly and says, “You don’t suppose it was me, do you?...Are you sure it 
was a green picnic blanket?”’
384  
Hansen deliberately leaves to the imagination the question of Mariette’s sexual 
experience prior to entering the convent, and likewise any surviving traces of carnal 
desires may or may not be genuine to her character; indeed they may only appear as 
such to those less holy than she.  Even the significant question of her virginity is 
383 Ibid., p. 16. 
384 Ibid., p. 36.159
addressed   with   brilliant   ambiguity  in   Hansen’s   prose  when   Mariette   is   being 
examined by Sister Aimée, the Infirmarian.
“Weren’t you going to ask if I’m a virgin?”
Sister Aimée assesses Mariette.  “I assume you are.”
Mariette says nothing and then she says, “Yes.”
“Isn’t that interesting,” says Sister Aimée, and she simpers 
as she puts towels away.
385
Mariette’s seeming eagerness for this question to arise – followed by her hesitation – 
and finally the knowing ‘simper’ with which Hansen colors Sister Aimée’s response 
all heighten the sense of inconclusiveness contained within the scene.  Is she proud of 
herself for remaining chaste?  Is she even telling the truth?  Hansen’s third-person 
narrator is decidedly not omniscient, and avoids any temptation to psychoanalyze or 
speculate.  The narrator reports events with an almost journalistic prejudice toward 
the observable facts.  It is the characters themselves who disclose emotions, question 
motivations, and subjectively approach the psyche.  The narrator simply tells us what 
happens: Mariette is discovered in states of religious ecstasy; she develops bleeding 
wounds in the palms of her hands, which later inexplicably vanish.  What this means 
– how to interpret these happenings – remains inconclusive.  Her body becomes a 
mysterious text to be read, studied, interpreted and even consumed.
Part One of the novel concludes with an excerpt of Mariette’s writing.  In 
response to her ecstatic ‘experiences,’ she is given pen and paper and instructed by 
Père Marriott to write truthfully about her experiences.  But her description is one not 
of God’s overwhelming presence, but of the absence and even abandonment of the 
Divine.  She writes of Christ’s promise to her of trials and suffering to come.  Christ 
speaks to her, and his words are anything but comfortable.
385 Ibid., p. 22.160
You will be punished and humbled and greatly confused, 
and Heaven will seem closed to you, God will seem dead 
and indifferent...you will seek me fruitlessly and without 
avail for I shall hide in noise and shadows and I shall seem 
to withdraw when you need me most...And yet you will 
believe, Mariette, but as if you did not believe; you will 
always hope, but as if you did not hope; you will love your 
Savior, but as if you did not love him...
386
This confluence of presence and absence, of belief and disbelief – this reversal and 
coincidence of opposites – resonates with the story of the meal at Emmaus, and of 
course with the very heart of the Eucharist.  At Emmaus, Christ is no more than a 
stranger – the crucified Christ is utterly absent to the two travelers – until that moment 
of anagnoresis, recognition in the breaking of the bread.  Then they know him, realize 
and experience his unmistakable presence, but at the very moment when he vanishes 
from their sight.   In this sense, as Chauvet has argued, what the two travelers 
experience is the presence of the absence of Christ; or, put otherwise, they experience 
his absence as a presence, and renarrate their experience of this absence as presence 
in yet another reversal.  They rush to tell the other disciples that they have been with 
Jesus, when in fact, when they were with him, they knew him not.  This confluence of 
presence and absence, this ‘as if’ quality is characteristic of how Christ is experienced 
in the sacrament – as absent (bodily), but an absence which is peculiarly experienced 
and (re)narrated as presence in symbols received, consumed as if they are Christ’s 
body and blood.
Sister Hermance, the first to show Mariette around her new home, becomes 
particularly devoted to the new postulant.  She is unflatteringly described as ‘a sweet, 
fat, toad-eyed novice’ who ‘trundles’ down the corridors of the convent.
387  The non-
linear structure Hansen’s prose intercuts the narrative of Mariette’s entry into and life 
within the convent with snatches from a future conversation – we later regard it as a 
386 Ibid., p. 43-44 [ital. in original].
387 Ibid., p. 19.161
kind of debrief or exit interview upon Mariette’s dismissal from the convent – 
describing and analyzing the events that have taken place, reminiscent, again, of the 
epilogue to  Monsignor Quixote.   In a snippet of the later dialogue, Mariette’s 
interviewer tells her that Sister Hermance was in love with her, news which Mariette 
receives with nonchalance.
388   Against this backdrop, we are taken through several 
events involving both Mariette and Sister Hermance which deliberately blur the 
already ambiguous lines between the sexual and the spiritual.  The most potent occurs 
in a scene where we find Sister Hermance nursing Mariette, whose degraded body has 
been ravaged by the effects of the stigmata.  Like Monsignor Quixote during his 
strange final Mass, Mariette is delirious, drifting in and out of consciousness, her 
capacity for speech obliterated.  Sister Hermance
lifts up the postulant’s hand and presses it into her habit as 
she considers Mariette.  “We aren’t amazed.  We thought 
you were different from the first.”
She pets  Mariette’s  wrist  and kisses a knuckle.     She 
whispers, “We are so privileged.”  She holds the palm open 
and kisses it.   “You have turned your face from me too 
often.  You have been frightened by my affection.”
With reverence Sister Hermance licks the blood inside the 
hand wound.   “I have tasted you.   See?”   Tears streak 
shining paths down her cheeks as she says, “Ever since I 
first met you, I have loved you more than myself.”
Half a minute later she says, “You know this is true.”
She stares at Mariette’s sleep and whispers, “You have been 
a sacrament to me.”
389
Mariette is an object of sexual desire, a mysterious body/language to be interpreted, a 
sacramental presence and a horrible and horrifying curse to the community.   She is all 
of these things.  However, the locus of her body's sacramentality hinges primarily 
upon the manifestation of the stigmata, which, like the wounds of Christ which they 
388 Ibid., p. 22.
389 Ibid., p. 121. 162
mediate, are present  absences  – holes, aporias in the flesh, tears in the fabric of 
embodied humanity.  We turn now to examine one more example of contemporary 
fiction which, unlike our two previous examples, does  not  arise from a Catholic 
imagination, and incorporates no explicitly sacramental or even Christian content, and 
yet is fixated on the sacramentality of the body broken.
4.5 Sacramental Self-annihilation: Fight Club as Eucharistic Community
Chuck Palahniuk’s novel  Fight Club
390  expresses a particular theological, 
perhaps more appropriately a/theolgoical, vision: in a God-forsaken world, where 
identity is based on jobs, cars and clothes, the only way out of this mind-numbing 
cycle   of   acquisition   is   destruction,   beginning   with   the   societally-conditioned, 
acquiescent self.  This powerful novel offers a disturbing and challenging indictment 
of   contemporary   society,   including   aspects   of   religion,   gender,   sexuality, 
corporatization and materialism.   In conversation with Palahniuk’s novel and the 
postmodern a/theology of Mark C. Taylor, this section will explore the a/theological 
visions of these two writers.   What emerges is an ontology based on  human 
brokenness, incarnation, mortality and sacrifice.  As these themes are embedded in 
the theology of the Eucharist, the Church, as a eucharistic community, should realize 
the universality of these themes – brokenness leading to wholeness, death giving way 
to life – which are personified in the life and message of Jesus Christ.  Identity will be 
found in communitas based on common belief and practice, whether in the sanctuary 
or, as in Fight Club, after-hours in the basement of a bar.  If the Church purports to 
offer true ‘being’ found in a community gathered around the image of the broken, 
crucified   Christ,   she  must  reach   out  and   touch   the  body's   brokenness   within 
390 Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club (London: Vintage, 1996). Cf. the excellent film adaptation, dir. David 
Fincher, starring Brad Pitt as “Tyler Durden” and Edward Norton as the nameless narrator.163
contemporary society.
In Mark C. Taylor’s postmodern a/theology, the concept of  erring  stands 
within a subversive tradition that includes the person of Jesus Christ and his 
followers.   Erring is a ‘praxis’ of sorts; it must be actively practiced.  This is for 
Taylor not simply theory but something that we must  do, in which we must 
participate.  
The   a/theologian   asks   errant   questions   and   suggests 
responses that often seem erratic or even erroneous.  Since 
his reflection wanders, roams, and strays from the “proper” 
course, it tends to deviate from well-established ways.  To 
traditional   eyes,   a/theology   doubtless   appears   to   be 
irregular, eccentric, and vagrant.  At best it seems aimless, 
at worst devious.
391
It   is   not   for  idle  wanderers,   but  aimless  wanderers   engaged   in   ‘ceaseless 
wandering.’
392  We become the James Dean, the ‘rebel without a cause’, as we know 
that ‘such erring is purposeless, [although] it does not necessarily represent desperate 
exile.’
393
Taylor continues to draw upon the figurative image of the ‘carnival’ as the 
celebration of our incarnation, mortality, and death.  We celebrate our incarnation in 
the same way we celebrate the incarnation of the W/word.  Just like Jesus, we are 
incarnate; we are carnal, fleshly, made of meat.     And as we wander ‘along the 
margins of the carnival, the body appears to be grotesque…’
394  While others might be 
ashamed of this, errers relish their incarnation, even the bodily functions that 
demonstrate their mortality – sustenance, defecation, procreation.   Like John and 
Jesus, we will be called deviant, perverse, or worse – crucified perhaps (but ‘blessed 
are you…’).  Walter Brueggemann describes the ‘church as an alternative community 
391 Ibid. p. 13. 
392 Ibid. p. 71.
393 Ibid. p. 15. 
394 Ibid. p. 162. 164
in the world…as a home for the odd ones.’
395  In a sense, Christianity should never be 
able to escape the wilderness, for its very instantiation is as a community of outsiders, 
rebels, wanderers, ‘(ab)errant’ ones, whose lives model the life their founder.  His was 
a life that never escaped the margins: birth in a barn, quarantine in the desert, life on 
the move, death on a cross, and a disappeared body that, in the end, vanishes like a 
phantasm.   And the death of the Word that became flesh, this  particular  death, 
contains the marks of the errer, the piercings, the markings, the brokenness and 
degradation of the body, and the mutilation of the flesh.  It is a spectacle on display 
for a voyeuristic mob – seeming to be simply ‘aberrant entertainment provided by 
aliens and freaks.’
396   Recall the grotesque body of  Fight Club’s anti-hero Tyler 
Durden, hitting rock-bottom at the novels end (and its beginning), face bruised, the 
corners of the mouth split into ‘a jagged smile from ear to ear.’
397   We are both 
protagonist and antagonist in this drama.  ‘Maybe self-improvement isn’t the answer,' 
he posits; 'Maybe self-destruction is the answer.’
398
Palahniuk’s narrative begins where it actually ends – with the final act of self-
destruction.  But the story begins with an insomniac, to whom ‘everything is so far 
away, a copy of a copy of a copy.’
399  Our main character should be happy with his 
395 Walter Brueggemann, The Bible and Postmodern Imagination: Texts Under Negotiation (London: 
SCM/Augsburg Fortress, 1993), p. 36. Granted, Brueggemann remains committed to a concept of 
God as an ‘originary’ source, which places him within a much more conservative theological 
framework.   But in this instance his critique of the role and function of the church is not far 
removed from Altizer’s and is conducive to our purposes.
396 M. C. Taylor, Hiding, p. 95. 
397 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club, p. 207.
398 Ibid. p. 49.
399 Ibid. p. 21. Taylor also discusses this notion of abysmal mimesis: ‘Since the human subject’s full 
realization of the imago dei necessarily entails the imitatio christi, the self is actually an image of 
an image, an imitation of an imitation, a representation of a representation, and a sign of a sign.  By 
becoming a copy of a copy, the self paradoxically becomes itself.  In struggling to relate itself to 
itself, the human subject attempts to enact the complex movement of repetition that would fulfill 
the divine mandate: “Become what you are!” The aim of this imitative repetition is self-
appropriation.  By means of the activity of self-relation, the subject attempts to take possession of 
itself and to secure its identity.  The interplay of image, imitation, and identity reveals that the 
stages on life’s way that comprise the believer’s journey to selfhood repeat the stations of the cross 
marked by Christ’ (Erring, p. 40).165
perfect life: he is single, has a well-paying (if ethically questionable) job as a risk 
assessment manager for a 'major' auto manufacturer, and a 1700-square-foot condo 
equipped with all of the trendiest accoutrements, ‘full of condiments but no real 
food.’
400  On the sarcastic recommendation of his doctor, he begins attending support 
groups for people with various diseases and maladies, hoping this will cure his 
inexplicable insomnia.  He discovers that if he can succumb to the emotion of these 
meetings – the crying, the hugging, the guided meditation – he is suddenly able to 
sleep like a baby.  Our ‘hero’ finds temporary comfort in these ‘communities’, these 
decaying groups holed up in church basements sharing their deaths with other dying 
strangers.  While he attends many such meetings, his primary group is ‘Remaining 
Men Together’ for men with testicular cancer – many of whom have had their 
testicle(s) removed.  This seems to be the solution to his problem, for he discovers in 
these groups, with his little healthy life surrounded by so much death, that ‘losing all 
hope   was   freedom…every  evening,   I   died,   and   every   evening   I   was   reborn. 
Resurrected.’
401   But this quasi-religious ‘fix’ does not last long, especially when, 
upon returning home from a business trip, he discovers that his condo has been 
destroyed in a mysterious explosion.  This is when he becomes acquainted with Tyler 
Durden, who up until the end of the novel is written as a distinct character, but who 
turns out to be an insane, risk-taking, totally repressed facet of our narrator’s 
fragmented persona.
Tyler helps the narrator along a journey toward enlightened self-discovery via 
self-annihilation.  They seek to cultivate their repressed, primal nature as both animal 
and man through their creation of ‘fight club.’  This support group does not meet in 
the stale basement of a church but rather after-hours in an obscure bar.  This support 
400 Ibid. p. 45. This description of the contents of the narrator’s refrigerator is, in a way, a metaphor for 
his entire life. 
401 Ibid. p. 22. 166
group has not been emasculated but is rather is being re-masculated (testicles remain 
intact).   This  support group does not hug and say prayers and submit to guided 
meditation but rather beats the shit out of each other just for the sake of doing it—
nothing personal.
You aren’t alive anywhere like you’re alive at fight club. 
When it’s you and one other guy under that one light in the 
middle of all those watching.   Fight club isn’t about 
winning or losing fights.  Fight club isn’t about words…
There’s grunting and noise at fight club like at the gym, but 
fight club isn’t about looking good.   There’s hysterical 
shouting in tongues like at church, and when you wake up 
Sunday afternoon you feel saved.
402
Fight club is the anti-church, or it is the church for the anti-hero.  They evangelize by 
keeping it all a secret—‘The first rule about fight club is you don’t talk about fight 
club.’
403  (This is also the second rule.)  ‘You don’t say anything because fight club 
exists only in the hours between when fight club starts and when fight club ends.’
404 
These men who congregate in their bar-basement sanctuaries in the wee-hours of 
Sunday mornings, searching for something deeper, something meaningful, even in 
pain and destruction, breaking the rules of the outside world and making their own 
rules; these men find access to another world, another kingdom, where everything is 
upside-down.  They increase in numbers because they find others like them.
You have a class of young strong men and women, and they 
want to give their lives to something.  Advertising has these 
people   chasing   cars   and   clothes   they   don’t   need. 
Generations have been working in jobs they hate, just so 
they can buy what they don’t really need.
We don’t have a great war in our generation, or a great 
depression, but we do, we have a great war of the spirit. 
We have a great revolution against the culture.  The great 
depression is our lives.  We have a spiritual depression.
405
402 Ibid. p. 51.
403 Cf. the “Messianic Secret” in scripture – Jesus' instructions that his followers “tell no one” of his 
identity as the Messiah. This appears most notably in Mark 8:27-30; cf. Mark 1:43-45.
404 Ibid. p. 48.167
Their ‘counter-evangelism’ is effective.  Fight clubs are set up first all over the city, 
then in most major cities throughout the country.   Their ‘little acts of rebellion’ 
organize and develop until fight club becomes ‘Project Mayhem’, the goal of which is 
‘the complete and right-away destruction of civilization.’
406   A community in the 
purest sense emerges; Tyler knows that ‘everything is more fun as a shared activity.’
407 
To be a part of Project Mayhem means first the complete relinquishment of personal 
identity and property.  To become ‘disciples’ the members shave their heads and burn 
their fingerprints off with lye.
408  Have they read the gospel of St. Matthew? ‘If any 
want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and 
follow me, for those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their 
life for my sake will find it’ (Mat. 16.24-25).  The apostles’ creed of fight club goes 
something this:
You’re not how much money you’ve got in the bank. 
You’re not your job.  You’re not your family, and you’re not 
you who tell yourself…
You’re not your name…
You’re not your problems…
You’re not your age…
You are not your hopes…
You will not be saved…
409
The outcome of the novel is not necessarily the point here.  Our aim in bringing this 
fictive work into dialogue with Taylor’s a/theology is to construe Chuck Palahniuk’s 
‘community’  Fight Club  as one that errs, and one that deliberately transgresses, 
commits  errors,  and most significantly celebrates the sacramentality of the body 
broken.  The fight club community embraces death and destruction; they reveal and 
revel in their bodies, their carnality – even, by necessity if not intention, their 
405 Ibid. p. 149. 
406 Ibid. p. 76, 125. 
407 Ibid. p. 84. 
408 Ibid. p. 160. 
409 Ibid. p. 143. 168
criminality.  Fight club is out to destroy civilization, to turn the status quo into status 
perversum.  The members know they will never be content with the world as they 
know it; they must establish an alternative, a world in which death is life, in which the 
goal is not getting ahead but “hitting rock bottom,” in which bodies are beaten and 
broken and blood is spilled.   This is their ritual.   This is their celebration, their 
Eucharist.  That which is incarnate cannot be perfected.  This community is formed in 
the shape of a cross, this symbol of death – Golgotha, marked by the X of the skull 
and bones, is the location where everything is turned on its head.
410  Death is life.  Up 
is down.   Sacred is profaned and the profane is sacralized.
411   The words of the 
tempting serpent are, ‘You will not surely die’ (Gen. 3.4).  Contrarily, the words of 
Fight Club's prophet are, ‘Believe in me and you shall die, forever.’
412  'I die daily' are 
St. Paul's words (1 Cor. 15:31 NASB), in the steps of the the one who gives the 
invitation, 'Take up the cross.'
413
Can any direct interface exist between these visions of eucharistic brokenness 
and our understanding of the Christian church as a ‘eucharistic community’?
414  The 
Christian ecclesial community is defined by, and in a sense created by, the practice of 
and participation in the sacrament of the Eucharist, celebrating the death of Christ for 
the salvation of the world.  In the Eucharist, Christians do not merely recall but enact 
and embody Christ’s redemptive crucifixion.  The Eucharistic meal is a celebration of 
Christ’s broken body and shed blood, poured out freely, willingly, sacrificially.  ‘This 
is my body, which is given for you.  Do this in remembrance of me’ (Lk. 22.19, ital. 
410 M. C. Taylor, Erring, p. 62. 
411 Ibid. p. 160-61.
412 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club, p. 145. 
413 Mt. 10:38, Mt. 16:24-26, Mk. 8:34-36, Lk. 9:23-24, Lk. 14:27, Lk. 17:33.
414 William Cavanaugh uses this phrase throughout Torture and Eucharist: Theology, Politics, and the 
Body of Christ (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998). While Torture and Eucharist deals 
primarily with the Eucharist as a response to the destruction of physical bodies via state-sanctioned 
torture in Chile under Pinochet, Cavanaugh’s text resonates with our purposes in its description of 
the Eucharist as subversion, as an act of resistance to the this-worldly “powers-that-be.”169
mine).  We are called upon to act; this is praxis.  We can speak or write, for these are 
certainly actions as well, but in the Eucharist, ‘what happens…doesn’t happen in 
words.’
415  It is the performance of this sacrament which instantiates and gives life to 
the community.  It is the breath of life that is also the dying breath, the death-rattle, 
(re)creating the community as the imago dei which is only realized in the imitatio 
Christi.
The word eucharist means literally ‘a giving of thanks’, but the Greek root 
cha’ris  (‘favour, grace, thanks’) is also akin to  chai’rein  (‘to rejoice’).   In this 
celebration, body and blood are bread and wine.  Taylor’s carnival is the venue for 
this celebration in which ‘the blood of the incarnate word appears to be intoxicating 
wine, the bringer of riotous revel.’
416  As solemn an event as it is in most places of 
Christian worship, the repressed logic of the Eucharist calls out to be a Dionysian 
celebration not of life but of death.  (Would we commemorate Christ in such a way if 
it were not for his death?)  This death in all its senselessness is the only passage into 
life, into meaningful existence.  Meaninglessness yields meaning ad infinitum.  Only 
infinite death produces authentic life and true salvation.  This is the rationale, which is 
of course completely unreasonable, for our festivity, for our feast of fools.
The Eucharist seems to be transignificant with much of what we have 
discussed so far.  That is, in remembering Christ’s sacrifice through this sacrament, in 
this communal longing after a ‘real presence’, the Eucharistic community is faced 
with the reality of  absence.   For Taylor, these two are brought together in an 
a/theology in which there is only absence, in which everything is dispossessed of its 
identity; similarly, the characters of Fight Club are a generation of men longing for a 
God  and father, a God who is truly Father.
417   In this subversive celebration, we 
415 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club, p. 51.
416 M. C. Taylor, Erring, p. 160.
417 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club. ‘If you’re male and you’re Christian and living in America, your father is 170
acknowledge that these mere symbols are all we have.  Divinity is lost and God, our 
father, is dead.  ‘When God is dead,' writes Taylor, 'it becomes clear that “not only is 
the only true paradise the paradise that we have lost, but the only regained paradise is 
in the final loss of paradise itself.” This loss is grace.’
418  Like the members of fight 
club accessing their ‘alternative kingdom’ (but only during the hours of fight club), 
the Eucharist is but a brief foray into another world (but only in that mystical 
moment), a world that is very different from the one we now know.   ‘[In] the 
Eucharist,' Cavanaugh writes, 'the church deconstructs the world and is caught up in 
to the Kingdom…the church anticipates the Kingdom…’
419  The kingdom is not of 
this world.  Nor is this a simple reversal or inversion of the structures and powers of 
this world; rather, it is the rupture of this world, a deconstruction that gives way to 
(re-)construction.  ‘The result is a “confusion” of the spiritual and the temporal, and 
invasion of worldly time and space by the heavenly, and thus the possibility of a 
different kind of social practice.’
420  This is not merely a glimpse of what is to come, 
but a momentary window of access to it.  It is the kingdom coming, here but not yet. 
This practice constructs its broken, fragmented practitioners into a community that, in 
the absence of Christ on earth, literally becomes the body of Christ, the Church—
beaten until near death, yet still a sanctuary for the ‘odd ones.’
421   ‘They all know 
what to do…No one guy understands the whole plan, but each guy is trained to do one 
simple task perfectly.’
422  Only our combined efforts can effect change or work toward 
a common goal.  The goal is the upheaval of the world; this is what it means to 
your model for God.  And if you never know your father, if your father bails out or dies or is never 
at home, what do you believe about God?’ (p. 141).
418 M. C. Taylor, Erring, p. 169. Taylor is quoting Thomas J. J. Altizer in Total Presence, p. 94.
419 W. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, p. 250.
420 Ibid. p. 251. 
421 W. Brueggemann, The Bible and Postmodern Imagination, p. 36.
422 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club. 130. See also Paul’s account of the Body of Christ in 1 Corinthians 
12:12-27.171
“Eucharitize” the world.
423
This is subversive; this goes against the grain.  ‘[Our] culture has made death 
something wrong.’
424  Death is to be avoided by all means possible, sparing no effort 
or expense.  But this is the way of the world, the way of humanism; this is not the way 
of Christ or his followers.  On the contrary, salvation is only achieved through death. 
‘The first step to eternal life is you have to die.’
425  We wander the margins, live life 
on the edge, far from safety.  ‘…[If] I don’t fall all the way, I can’t be saved.  Jesus 
did it with his crucifixion thing.  I shouldn’t just abandon money and property and 
knowledge…I should be running toward disaster.  I can’t just play it safe anymore.’
426 
We must join in celebrating the deaths of the martyrs, of Jesus and the saints, of Tyler 
Durden and Robert Paulson.
427  ‘As such, martyrdom recalls into being a people…and 
makes their life visible to themselves and to the world.  They remember Christ and 
become Christ’s members in the Eucharist, reenacting the body of Christ, its passion 
and its conflict with the forces of (dis)order.’
428  The Eucharistic meal, partaken by the 
Eucharistic community, is coordinate to Tyler Durden’s ‘little acts of rebellion.’ 
‘Opposition to the powers and principalities of the world is written into the very 
narrative of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ which is commemorated in the 
Eucharist.’
429
Like Taylor in both theory and practice, we play freely with the words, the 
concepts, of the liturgical embodiment of Christ, the Word of God made flesh.  
423 W. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, p. 14. 
424 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club, p. 103. 
425 Ibid. p. 11. 
426 Ibid. p. 70.
427 Ibid. pp. 176-80. This chapter describes the death of Robert Paulson, a casualty of Project Mayhem. 
‘Only in death will we have our own names since only in death are we no longer part of the effort. 
In death we become heroes.’
428 W. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist, pp. 64-65.
429 Ibid. p. 273.172
When freely enacted, the drama of the word proves to be 
self-consuming.  While the incarnation of the divine is the 
death   of   God,   the   dissemination   of   the   word   is   the 
crucifixion of the individual self.   This dismemberment 
inflicts an incurable wound, which gives birth to erratic 
marks and errant traces.
430
In this celebration, we relinquish our own identity; we are brought face to face with 
death.  We are made radically aware of our own mortality, our own carnality and 
'incarnationality.'  ‘To drink the word that has become wine is to suffer death…The 
word is spread through the crucifixion of the self.’
431   St. Paul's words indicate an 
acceptance of this: ‘For to me, living is Christ and dying is gain’ (Phil. 1.21).  We 
must take after our founding member, our Tyler Durden, our Jesus Christ.  Indeed, 
living as Christ lived necessitates death; it requires a self-sacrifice that must be total, 
nothing held back.  ‘From now on, let no one make trouble for me; for I carry the 
marks of Jesus branded on my body’ (Gal. 6:17).  Arriving finally at the end, which is 
not finality but fulfillment, beginning,
432 we may discover that ‘it’s only after you’ve 
lost everything…that you’re free to do anything.'
433
The literary explorations on the theme of bodily brokenness as sacrament 
contained in this chapter are legitimated by the conception of sacramentality set forth 
in Part One.  We have drawn upon the understanding of the (trans)corporeality of the 
body in Chapter 3, the indeterminacy and fragmentary nature of language considered 
in Chapter 2, and the inherent brokenness of the symbol itself in Chapter 1.  We turn 
now to a theme that scandalized the eucharistic practice of the earliest Christians, and 
which continues to echo down through the ages as a reminder of the scandal of 
430 M. C. Taylor, Erring, p. 120.
431 Ibid. p. 142.
432 We are reminded of what David Jasper calls 'a fraction of language' that takes place in the reading 
of James Joyce's Finnegans Wake, in which the final words of the book are not the end, but circle 
back   around  to  the opening line only to  begin  again;  cf.  The  Sacred   Body,  pp.  148-56. 
'Language...truly begins only when conversation and speech are truly impossible, an end that is the 
true beginning, as in Jesus' final word from the cross...”It is finished”' (p. 149).
433 C. Palahniuk, Fight Club, p. 70.173
sacramentality even in recent fictions: the universal taboo of cannibalism.174
~ Chapter Five ~
Consuming:
Cannibalism and Sacrament
Eating the things of the world, including the practices 
of anthropophagy and theophagy...or eating the body 
and drinking the blood of Christ, all belong to one 
obvious and crucial mode of world-appropriation… 
eating the world as the most direct way of becoming 
one with the things of the world in their tangible 
presence....Eating the world, then, will always trigger 
the fear, for humans as bodily parts of the world, that 
they might themselves be eaten.  And this is precisely 
why most human societies make the eating of human 
flesh taboo...
434
5.1 Cannibalism: the Body as Food
In the previous chapter, we examined the traces of sacramentality in the 
broken, fractured body of Christ and the bodies of characters in contemporary 
literature.  In this chapter, we will focus on the skandalon of the Eucharist as it relates 
to bodily consumption.   We deliberately employ the ambiguous phrase  bodily 
consumption  precisely because it implies both eating – the physical, digestive 
processes associated with bodily consumption – as well as the more cannibalistic 
connotation of the phrase: the consumption of the body (as food) as well as the body's 
consumption (of food).  To grapple with the Eucharist as necessarily scandalous and 
scandalizing to Christian doctrine and ritual, the importance of this node in the 
434 H. Gumbrecht, Production of Presence, pp. 86-87.175
referential network from which the Eucharist derives its significance must not be 
underestimated.  For if the scandal of sacramentality is bound up with the materiality 
and corporeality of the body, we eventually arrive at the necessity of food as 
nourishment for the body.
Indeed, eating plays a significant role in the narrative of Jesus in scripture, 
reflecting both the importance of food and dietary practices to the Jewish tradition as 
well   as   the   centrality   of   the   ritual   meals   of   the   early   Christian   movement. 
Anthropologist Gillian Feeley-Harnik makes clear that food was 
one   of   the   most   important   languages   in   which   Jews 
expressed the relationship among human beings and God…
Food was identified with God’s word as the foundation of 
the covenant relationship in scripture and in sectarianism. 
During the inter-Testamental period, as God’s word become 
increasingly identified with the law, food law came to 
represent the whole law.  Sectarianism was expressed above 
all through differing interpretations of the dietary rules. 
Violation   of   the   dietary   rules   became   equivalent   to 
apostasy.
435
This passage indicates a symbolic continuity between food and word, which implies 
the relationship between body and language: food symbolizes law, which symbolizes 
covenant, which symbolizes the very word of God itself.  Food, as a language, is 
without doubt a body/language, as it communicates only by being consumed. 
Similarly, ‘Christians of the first century C.E., as observant Jews, used the language 
of food to establish both the legitimacy of Jesus and the novelty of his interpretation 
of the law.'
436   That the earliest Christians elected to eat a meal together as an 
encapsulation of their fundamental belief in the incarnation of God in Christ and their 
faith in his bodily resurrection was not unusual in itself, for as practitioners (with 
Christ) of the Jewish faith, they were accustomed to dietary practices that were 
435 Gillian   Feeley-Harnik,  The   Lord's   Table:   Eucharist   and   Passover   in   Early   Christianity 
(Philadelphia, PA: U of Pennsylvania P, 1981), p. 165.
436 Ibid., p. 166.176
internally coherent to adherents of the faith, but nonsensical to the surrounding 
culture.
437  So with Feely-Harnik we may establish that food is a language, a system of 
signification.  Like circumcision (a Jewish practice equally absurd to those outside the 
faith), it was a symbol of the covenant relationship between God and Israel.
Doubtless what made this a scandalous practice in the eyes of those outside the 
Christian communities was that this meal was imbued with overtly cannibalistic 
symbolism.  The early church was by no means unaware of this interpretation of their 
liturgical practice, which created a stumbling block from the outset.  Early Christians 
were   accused   of   cannibalism,   incest   and   infanticide,   mostly   on   the   basis   of 
misapprehended liturgical and sacramental practices, an issue addressed by both 
Justin Martyr and Tertullian.   While Justin Martyr attempts to explain away the 
confusion (and with it the scandal), defending Christians as 'good citizens and keepers 
of the commandments,' and describing Christian liturgical and sacramental praxis in a 
way that is credible and defensible to the civic and political powers of the day,
438 
Tertullian's more sarcastic response maintains the scandal, in a way.  Addressing the 
accusations, he writes: 'Monsters of wickedness, we are accused of observing a holy 
rite in which we kill a little child and then eat it; in which, after the feast, we practise 
incest, the dogs—our pimps, forsooth, overturning the lights and getting us the 
shamelessness of darkness for our impious lusts.'
439  Tertullian continues his extended 
farce: 'Come, plunge your knife into the babe, enemy of none, accused of none, child 
of all; or if that is another’s work, simply take your place beside a human being dying 
before he has really lived, await the departure of the lately given soul, receive the 
fresh young blood, saturate your bread with it, freely partake.'
440  The 'reward for these 
437 Henry Chadwick, The Early Church (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 19.
438 Justin Martyr, First Apology, ch. LXV-LXVI. ANF vol. I.
439 Tertullian, Apology, ch. VII. ANF vol. III.
440 Tertullian, Apology, ch. VIII. ANF vol. III. Quoted in Elaine Pagels, Beyond Belief: The Secret 177
enormities,'   Tertullian   tells   his   imaginary   initiate,   is   'the   promise   of   eternal 
life....Initiated and sealed into things like these, you have life everlasting. Tell me, I 
pray you, is eternity worth it?  If it is not, then these things are not to be credited. 
Even although you had the belief, I deny the will; and even if you had the will, I deny 
the   possibility.'
441    In   his   attempt   to   expose   the   absurdity   of   this   pagan 
misunderstanding of the  Christians' sacred rites, he subtly concedes the validity of the 
basis of the misunderstanding by pointing to the murderous and cannibalistic rites 
already prevalent in the culture.  Detailing the bloody practices of various tribes and 
even the Roman arena, Tertullian argues: 'If you partake of food like this, how do your 
repasts differ from those you accuse us Christians of?'
442  In a helpful passage from 
Beyond Belief, Elaine Pagels engages Tertullian’s response to the scandal of early 
Christian eucharistic practice, observing that
early followers of Jesus, like the majority ever since, saw 
the sacred meal in a much stranger – even macabre – way: 
as   eating   human   flesh   and   drinking   human   blood.... 
Tertullian satarizes the reaction of outsiders to this peculiar 
practice...Despite his sarcasm, Tertullian cannot dispel the 
shocking fact that the Christian “mystery” invites initiates 
to eat human flesh – even if only symbolically.   Pagans 
might be repelled by the practice of instructing newcomers 
to drink wine as human blood, but devout Jews, whose very 
definition of kosher (pure) food requires that it be drained 
of all blood, would be especially disgusted.
443
It is evident, then, that a tension is present in the sacramental symbol from the earliest 
stages of Christian worship.  With his biting sarcasm, Tertullian may endeavor to 
dismiss the accusations of cannibalism as ridiculous, but as Pagels points out, his 
attempt to unmask the absurdity of these allegations  simultaneously  reveals the 
inescapable association of the Christian Eucharist with not simply bodily consumption 
Gospel of Thomas (London: Macmillan), p. 18.
441 Tertullian, Apology, ch. VIII. ANF vol. III.
442 Tertullian, Apology, ch. IX. ANF vol. III.
443 E. Pagels, Beyond Belief, p. 18-19.178
(eating) but with the consumption of the body (cannibalism).  In fact, in a footnote 
Pagels suggests the possibility ‘that Paul and his followers adopted this ritual to repel 
traditionally minded Jews and so to set themselves apart from Jewish communities.’
444 
Whether or not this is the case, one thing is certain:
By placing the drama of Jesus’ death at the center of their 
sacred meal, his followers transformed what others would 
see as total catastrophe – what Paul calls “scandal” – into 
religious paradox: in the depths of human defeat they 
claimed to find the victory of God.
445
As we have continuously endeavored to articulate, Pagels attests that ‘the sacred meal 
took on not a single meaning but clusters of meanings that became increasingly rich 
and complex.’
446  It is the outworking of this symbolic matrix that we are calling the 
de/constructive core of the Eucharist, which is but one instantiation of the scandal of 
sacramentality.   The cannibalistic images are not glossed over, and yet this explicit 
association with cannibalism eventually fades into obscurity after the legalization of 
Christianity and its eventual establishment as the state religion in the early 4
th-century, 
with the unveiling of the mystery of the heretofore secret ritual to which only baptized 
Christians were admitted.  And yet, as Pagels points out, ‘despite the weirdness of 
such images – and perhaps because of it – every version of this last supper in the New 
Testament, whether by Paul, Mark, Matthew, or Luke, interprets it as a kind of death-
feast,' but paradoxically 'one that looks forward in hope.’
447
When Jesus gave His Body and Blood for the life of the world, the sacrificial 
system of old was annihilated as well.  No more must flesh be destroyed or blood 
spilled as payment to God for sin.
448  Jesus' identification of his own physical body as 
444 Ibid., p. 194, fn. 36.
445 Ibid., p. 20.
446 Ibid., p. 22.
447 Ibid., p. 25.
448 Cf. L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 290-316. 179
the bread of life, which must be eaten to obtain eternal life, as well as his association 
of himself with the manna that nourished the children of Israel during their wilderness 
wanderings, extracts his given body and blood from the economies of value, exchange 
and productivity that characterize other religious sacrificial rituals by which the gods 
receive   payment   and   are   thus   appeased.     The   Eucharist,   then,   celebrated   in 
remembrance of Christ, while never a “bloody” sacrifice, cannot be understood apart 
from sacrifice (as attested by most Catholic sacramental theology
449), if even in the 
negative, for it is a radical refiguring of the meaning of sacrifice.  However, drawing 
upon   René   Girard,
450  Chauvet   proposes   a   radical   alternative   to   traditional 
interpretations  by  introducing  the  notion  of  'anti-sacrifice,'  which  he calls  'an 
obligatory third term' to mitigate the untenable dichotomy between sacrifice and non-
sacrifice. Chauvet does not dispute Girard's thesis in that Jesus unmasks the hidden 
sacrificial processes and reveals a God who no longer demands sacrifice, but yet he 
stops short of an unconditional acceptance of the thesis.  For Chauvet
“anti-sacrifice” is not the denial of the sacrificial pattern 
that dwells in all of us....The anti-sacrificial regimen to 
which the gospel calls us rests upon the sacrificial, but it 
does so to  turn it around  and thereby to redirect ritual 
practice, the symbolic point of passage that structures 
Christian identity, back toward ethical practice.
451  
The challenge, in Chauvet's figuration, is that anti-sacrifice is 'not the negation of the 
sacrificial...but the task to convert all the sacrificial to the gospel in order to live it, 
not in a servile, but in a filial (and hence in a brotherly and sisterly) manner....[which] 
constitutes the premier place of our “sacrifice.” That is what the anti-sacrifice of the 
Eucharist shows us and enjoins us to do.'
452  However, 'the Church, which is under the 
449 e.g. Michael McGuckian, SJ, The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass: A Search for an Acceptable Notion of 
Sacrifice (Chicago & London: Chicago UP, 2005).
450 See René Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986); Violence and the 
Sacred (London and New York: Continuum, 2005).
451 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 307.
452 Ibid., p. 311.180
anti-sacrificial law of the Spirit, is always in danger of sliding back toward the 
sacrificial.'
453 
Even   keeping   this   sacrificial   system   in   tact,   or   redescribing   it   as   an 
(anti)sacrificial   structure   of   ethical   relations,   as   Chauvet   does,   the   Eucharist 
fundamentally   cannot   be   understood   apart   from  its   symbolic   association   with 
cannibalism – that primordial cultural taboo – and the ritual participation in the life of 
the body, now dead, that is consumed.  This belief is not as primitive as might first be 
assumed, for it was never far from the mind of medieval Christendom, when 
eucharistic realism was at its height.  Caroline Walker Bynum states that one of the 
most often cited late-medieval miracles is the bleeding host, 'in which consecrated 
eucharistic wafers turned into bleeding flesh.'
454 She also recounts an episode in the 
Legenda aurea of James of Voragine wherein 'a woman who doubts the Eucharist sees 
it as the body of Christ. But what she sees lying on the altar at the consecration is a 
finger!'
455  And in Corpus Christi, her historical survey of the Eucharist in the late-
medieval period, Miri Rubin observes:
The body is always a complex image, and eating the body is 
a particularly disturbing one...The juxtaposition of simplest 
natural act, of eating, with the holiest and most taboo-
ridden of nourishments, the human body, associates acts 
and   symbols   which   in   any   other   contexts   would   be 
abhorrent and unutterable.   Cannibalism is never absent 
from any society...But in the eucharist God's body was said 
to be eaten, blood, flesh and all, as a matter of course. 
Heretics homed in on the horror of it, just as Christians had 
once   accused   pagans   of   cannibalistic   excesses...[B]y 
combining the most holy with the most aberrant/abhorrent, 
the routine workings of sacramental power – and image of 
the fulness of life-giving, which dwells in the image of 
utmost transgression – a very powerful symbol was created, 
as awesome as it was promising.
456
453 Ibid., p. 308.
454 Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body 
in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 1996), p. 102
455 C. Walker Bynum, Resurrection of the Body, p. 316.181
As we discovered in the previous chapter, in light of the medieval studies of Huizinga 
and Bakhtin, it is not uncommon in the middle ages for this coincidence of opposites 
to appear as 'the most holy with the most aberrant/abhorrent.'  In the centuries that 
have passed since that time, we have ceased to see what was so apparent at that time 
of most intense liturgical imagination: that the profane, the aberrant/abhorrent, the 
disturbing and unutterable and universally taboo, is in fact the transgression of the 
symbol of the Eucharist from within.  It is endemic to sacramentality.
The writings of French novelist and theorist Georges Bataille, to whose 
literary reimagining of the Eucharist as a sadomasochistic erotic ritual we attend in 
the following chapter, has also contributed to our understanding of cannibalism and 
sacrifice in religious ritual in his theoretical writings.  Bataille observes:
Man is never looked upon as butchers’ meat, but he is 
frequently eaten ritually.  The man who eats human flesh 
knows full well that this is a forbidden act; knowing this 
taboo  to  be fundamental  he will  religiously violate it 
nevertheless.     There   is   a   significant   example   in   the 
communion feast following on the sacrifice.  The human 
flesh that is eaten then is held as sacred....the object is 
“forbidden”, sacred, and the very prohibition attached to it 
is what arouses the desire.   Religious cannibalism is the 
elementary example of the taboo as creating desire: the 
taboo does not create the flavour and taste of the flesh but 
stands as the reason why the pious cannibal consumes it. 
This paradox of the attraction of forbidden fruit will be seen 
again when we come to eroticism.
457 
However, Bataille, whose imagination has been shaped by Roman Catholic ritual and 
doctrine, denies any 'reality' in the ritual representation of Christ's sacrifice in the 
Mass.   In contrast to 'primitive' religions that might have actually engaged in 
cannibalism or actually offered human beings as sacrifices to the gods, it is Bataille's 
observation that ‘Christians have only ever known symbolic sacrifice.'
458   In this, 
456 M. Rubin, Corpus Christi, p. 359-60.
457 Georges Bataille, Eroticism (London and New York: Marion Boyars Publishers, 2006), pp. 71-72.
458 Ibid., p. 88.182
Bataille indicates the irreducible mediacy to which all our primary interlocutors 
(Pickstock, Chauvet, Ward, Power, even Altizer and Derrida) would attest as well.  He 
declares that ‘The sacrifice of the mass is a reminder but it only rarely makes a deep 
impression on our sensibility.  However obsessive we find the symbol of the Cross, 
the mass is not readily identified with the bloody sacrifice....Essentially in the idea of 
sacrifice upon the Cross the very character of transgression has been altered.’
459  This 
alteration is the reduction of the real to the symbolic – transgression as symbolized in 
the sacramental act.  Furthermore, one intuits that to Bataille, this is to the overall 
impoverishment of the Christian religion: ‘It is the common business of sacrifice to 
bring life and death into harmony, to give death the upsurge of life, life the 
momentousness and the vertigo of death opening on to the unknown.  Here life is 
mingled with death, but simultaneously death is a sign of life, a way into the 
infinite.’
460  Yet, Christianity, according to Bataille, has forsaken this essential aspect 
of the transgression.  He sets about reinstantiating this transgression in his fiction – an 
ironic avenue of exploration, given the metaphoric or symbolic operation of fiction 
itself.  But perhaps that is the only possibility ever available to us to truly explore the 
extreme transgression of the God incarnate in Christ, who invites us to feed on his 
flesh and drink of his blood: through the mediation of the imaginative arts of fiction, 
poetry, painting, film, and so on.
Caroline Walker Bynum has given considerable attention to medieval artistic 
depictions of the body of Christ as food.   Typically associated with woman, 
construing the body of Christ as food is one way of conceiving the femininity of 
Christ's transcorporeal body.  To illustrate this, we turn again with Bynum back to 
Herlin's 15
th-century painting  Christ with Ear of Wheat and Grape Vine  (see 
459 Ibid., p. 89.
460 Ibid., p. 91.183
Appendix), which is a medieval vision of Christ's eucharistic body from which we can 
learn a great deal.
461  Herlin's vision is, as Bynum notes, 'a striking illustration of the 
medieval conception of Christ as food.  From the wound in Christ's right foot a stalk 
of wheat grows and pierces his left hand. A grapevine grows from his left foot'
462 
penetrating his right hand.  The stalk of wheat and the grapevine do not simply sit 
atop his feet, as if placed there, but grow from the wounds in his feet and grafted into 
the wounds in his hands.  In this particular painting, these are not cryptic signs.  The 
eucharistic symbolism is made explicit by the artist: a branch from each stalk 
protrudes and hangs over a figure of the chalice and elevated host that sits at Christ's 
right foot.  Jesus' decimated, eucharistic body is presented to be eaten and drunk, the 
food of eternal life.  The grapevine which springs forth from the body of the 'true vine' 
(Jn. 15:1) is heavily laden with succulent fruit, the stalk of wheat bent over under the 
weight of the grain.   The life that is almost absent from Christ's human body is 
paradoxically transfigured in the produce of his wounds.
Bynum also highlights artistic renderings of Christ's flesh as food in which the 
wound in Christ's side is presented as a lactating breast, given as nourishment, a 
theme appearing not only in medieval art, but in mystical writings as well.
463   She 
alludes to such writers as St. Anselm, Julian of Norwich and Catherine of Siena who 
envision Christ nursing humanity at his side, which metaphorically becomes life-
giving milk to the suckling Church.
464  Christ is often depicted indicating or offering 
the wound in his side with gestures which explicitly mirror the Virgin Mary's offering 
of her breast to the infant Christ in other Christian art.  In fact, the experience of the 
461 This painting is reproduced in  Caroline Walker Bynum's  Holy Feast, Holy Fast, (plate 4) and 
Fragmentation and Redemption (fig. 3.9, p. 107).
462 C. Walker Bynum, Holy Feast, plate 4 (after p. 142); cf. Fragmentation and Redemption, p. 103.
463 See C. Walker Bynum, Holy Feast, pp. 270-76, passim.
464 C. Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, pp. 93-98, 205-06, passim.184
body of Christ as food is not even limited to Christ's physical body present in the 
Eucharist; it extends to his scriptural body as well, as Bynum recalls Ida of Louvain, 
who 'was able to eat Christ almost at will by reciting John 1.14 ['And the Word 
became flesh and lived among us...'].  For, whenever she spoke the words Verbum 
caro factum est...she tasted the Word on her tongue and felt the flesh in her mouth; 
when she chewed it, it was like honey.'
465
This complex of signification, as depicted in these literary and artistic 
expressions, is present within the biblical narrative, and continues to capture the 
Christian imagination.   But it continues to capture the postmodern, post-Christian 
imagination as well, where the link between eating, cannibalism and a kind of secular 
sacramentality continues to hold a certain currency as a compelling image of the 
traditional eucharistic themes of celebration, real presence/absence, participation, 
interpenetration, and the body as a means of grace.  This should become apparent as 
we turn now our attention first toward the text of the Fourth gospel and then toward 
contemporary literary and philosophical texts that further engage this thematic.
5.2 “The Bread of Life”: Ingesting the Body
In light of Douglas Templeton's notion of 'true fiction' previously described in 
this thesis, we shall undertake a reading of select passages of John's gospel as literary 
explorations of the significance of the historical and sacramental bodies of Christ as 
food to be eaten and drunk.  Experts continue to debate eucharistic origins, and for 
just about every theory one can imagine, it seems a scholarly text exists to defend it.
466 
We will not mire this project in those discussions, for what we are interested in, as our 
465 Ibid., pp. 130.
466 For one work that seeks to bring as many possible theories and interpretations together, see Paul F. 
Bradshaw,  The Search For the Origins of Christian Worship, 2
nd  ed.  (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford, UP, 2002); as regards the New Testament origins of the Eucharist, see esp. pp. 61-72. 
Liturgical studies is a demanding and detailed field which admittedly exceed our grasp by a wide 
margin. Bradshaw is an able guide as we attempt to navigate these waters.185
title indicates, is the Eucharist in literary and theological perspective.  As we stated in 
the introduction, this project, beginning to end, is a interdisciplinary hermeneutical 
exercise in reading widely across texts to locate both the tensions and the resonances 
in the ways in which the concepts of sacrament and sacramentality are explored and 
wrestled with in those texts.  And so, whether reading liturgies, sacred scripture or 
contemporary fiction, we engage them, as a reader, at the level of their writing.
One could argue (and indeed many have) that the 'eucharistic' passages in the 
New Testament must be read against the backdrop of a forming liturgical practice.
467 
In other words, the assumption is that the gospels are not necessarily 'historical' 
accounts of events as they actually took place, or prescriptions dictating praxis, but 
more likely reflect the existing practices (and beliefs) of the Christian context at the 
time of their composition.  The letters and epistles are a slightly different matter, as 
they address specific contexts and so  do  in some cases give us clues about and 
prescriptions for worship in certain early Christian communities.  However, we would 
rather turn these usual debates between liturgical scholars inside-out and suggest that, 
instead of reading the texts either for reflections of or clues about existing practices, 
or  reading them historical or instructional, our suggestion is that an  intertexutal 
reading is the most fruitful way to read the New Testament texts under consideration 
here.  Another way of putting this would be to say we read them as 'fictions' – true 
fictions to be sure, but fictions all the same.  As we discussed in Chapter 2, according 
to Templeton, 'Literature differs from history as fiction differs from fact.'
468   John's 
467 Cf. P. Bradshaw, ibid., pp. 47-56, on 'panliturgism,' harmonization, etc.  Reading Bradshaw, one 
wonders if arrival at any certainty is even possible in the study of early Christian liturgy. Our 
inference from his exposé  of the problems inherent to every major approach is that  all is 
interpretation.  As   Derrida   famously   declared,   'There   is   nothing   outside   of   the   text'   (Of 
Grammatology, p. 158). We hope this acknowledgment further defends our decidedly 'non-expert' 
engagement with both biblical and liturgical sources.
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gospel,
469 which is the subject at hand, does not appear to be particularly interested in 
'facts,' but rather is deeply engaged from the outset in a full-scale interpretation of 
Jesus' life, death and resurrection.  This is evident from the prologue (1:1-18 – 'In the 
beginning was the Word...'), which is indisputably a poetic and intertextual gloss on 
the creation account of Genesis 1 ('In the beginning God...') intent to narrate 
everything, the whole of creation, in accordance with the Christ event.  And so we 
propose here to take a text which is already an interpretive text, and interpret it further 
to illuminate the scandal of sacramentality.
It appears to us that the whole of John's text is an intertext opening onto itself, 
in some cases onto the synoptic accounts, and perhaps even onto the still-forming 
liturgy of late-1
st-century churches.  In our reading, which is but one possible reading, 
the gospel according to John is as a highly eucharistic text, keenly interested in 
interpreting Christ's historical and sacramental bodies throughout its narrative.  In 
Chapter 3 we made reference to the conclusion to John's gospel – its climax in 
Thomas's declaration of faith, having placed his hand in the gaping hole in the side of 
Jesus' resurrection body, and its figuration of Jesus' body as the living bread that came 
down from heaven' (Jn. 6:51), alluding to and superseding the manna of the Old 
Testament.   Our focal point for this section is Jesus' scandalous 'bread of life' 
discourse, recorded in John 6, in particular the metaphor of bodily consumption 
around which Jesus builds his entire speech.
This discourse must not be taken out of context, and is better served when 
viewed against the background of the multiplication of the loaves and fishes which 
immediately precedes it (6:1-15).  The miraculous feeding follows what many would 
claim is a eucharistic pattern - 'Jesus took the loaves, and when he had given thanks 
469 Acknowledging the contentious nature of this choice, for our purposes we prefer to address the 
author of the Fourth Gospel as “John.”187
[eucharistēsas], he distributed them to those who were seated' (6:11), eliding Dix's 
four-fold shape (taken, blessed, broken, given) into a three-fold shape where the 
fraction and distribution are one and the same act.  Despite the considerable surplus of 
food after this miracle, the implication of the crowd's pursuit of Jesus is that there is 
still a desire for more bread, as Jesus indicates in v. 26: 'you are looking for me, not 
because you saw signs, but because you ate your fill of the loaves.'  Jesus begins to 
teach those who come to him seeking bread, like the bread that he (re)produced the 
previous day in such gratuitous measure, desiring food to fill their bellies.   They 
request further signs that Jesus is sent by God, drawing an intertextual connection to 
the narratives of their tradition: 'Our ancestors ate the manna in the wilderness; as it is 
written, 'He gave them bread for heaven to eat'' (6:31).  Jesus gently corrects their 
interpretation, saying that it was God and not Moses who gave the bread, 'For the 
bread of God is that which comes down from heaven and gives life to the world' 
(6:32-33).  Just as circumcision can be seen as a Jewish prototype for the Christian 
sacrament of initiation (baptism),
470 so may the manna be regarded as a figure of 
sacramental grace and a prototype of the Eucharist, as Louis-Marie Chauvet has 
shown in some detail.
471
When the crowd finally asks for this bread, Jesus identifies himself, his own 
body, as  precisely that for which they ask – an identification that troubles them 
greatly, and causes them to 'complain' (6:41).   However, Jesus does not explain 
himself in such as way as to silence their complaints, but continues along the same 
line that has already caused their consternation:  l
470 'In him also you were circumcised with a spiritual circumcision, by putting off the body of the flesh 
in the circumcision of Christ; when you were buried with him in baptism, you were also raised with 
him through faith in the power of God, who raised him from the dead' (Col. 2:11-12); Cf. Rob L. 
Staples, Outward Sign and Inward Grace (Kansas City, MO: Beacon Hill, 1991), pp. 124-25.
471 L-M. Chauvet, The Sacraments, pp. 87-88. See also Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, pp. 44-45, 
222-24, 279. Both works make similar observations.   In  Symbol and Sacrament, the passage 
connecting manna to Jn. 6 is found on pp. 222-24 in a section wonderfully titled “Chewing the 
Book.”188
I am the bread of life.  Your ancestors ate the manna in the 
wilderness, and they died.   This is the bread that comes 
down from heaven, so that one may eat of it and not die.  I 
am the living bread that came down from heaven. Whoever 
eats of this bread will live forever; and the bread that I will 
give for the life of the world is my flesh. (6:48-51)
Jesus is doubly-offensive to his listeners’ sensibilities: he not only makes the 
correspondence between himself and the manna in the wilderness – so significant a 
story of God’s gracious action toward the people of Israel – but goes so far as to offer 
himself as a replacement for that bread of old, and a superior one at that.  The manna, 
though graced and gracious, did not provide eternal life.   This bread, which Jesus 
reveals as his own flesh, will cause those who eat it to live forever.
Scripture tells us that Jesus’ words cause the Jews to dispute amongst 
themselves over the meaning of his statement: “How can this man give us his flesh to 
eat?” (6:52).  Jesus heightens the scandal further by refusing to explain away his 
meaning in symbolic or metaphoric terms:
unless you eat [phagēte] the flesh of the Son of Man and 
drink his blood, you have no life in you. Those who eat 
[trōgōn] my flesh and drink my blood have eternal life, and 
I will raise them up on the last day; for my flesh is true food 
and my blood is true drink.   a Those who eat [trōgōn]  my 
flesh and drink my blood abide in me, and I in them. (53-6)
We could even regard Jesus’ words as offensive on yet another level, for this blatantly 
(and, one assumes, deliberately) cannibalistic imagery would have been nothing short 
of horrifying in light of Jewish dietary customs, which forbade the consumption of 
blood.  Indeed, taken literally, it is no less acceptable in the present day.
It is also of considerable interest that Jesus shifts his choice of verbs from 
phagēte ('to eat') at the beginning of the passage to trōgōn (lit. 'to chew, gnaw, nibble, 
munch') at the end, and continues to use this form throughout verses 57-8.  This 
semantic shift appears to function to 'offset any Docetic tendencies to ‘spiritualize’ the 
concept so that nothing physical remains in it, in what many hold to be the language 189
of the Lord’s Supper.'
472  Whatever the intention, Jesus’ words conjure for his listeners 
a noisy, animalistic manner of eating, like cattle chewing their cud.  Jesus confronts 
them, through his choice of words, with a repulsive image: the physical, bodily – and 
not merely metaphoric – consumption of his flesh.
In the sacrificial system of old, the blood of the creature was synonymous with 
its very life; the spilling of blood is the outpouring of life.  For this reason, Jews were 
forbidden to consume blood – the animal had to be drained of its blood before its flesh 
could be consumed as food.  But Jesus scandalizes the sensibilities of his religious 
zeitgeist: “unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no 
life in you” (6:53).  Jesus knows the dietary customs of his own religion, and knows 
this teaching will offend his listeners, including his faithful twelve.  Many of his 
disciples turn away at this point and follow him no longer (6:66).   Jesus further 
elaborates, but far from explains, his meaning to the twelve: “It is the spirit (pneuma) 
that gives life (zōopoieō)
473; the flesh (sarx) is useless. The words that I have spoken 
to you are spirit and life” (6:63).  It would be easy to interpret these words of Jesus as 
an admission of his 'secret' meaning, reserved only for his closest disciples: after all of 
his emphasis on the physical eating of his bodily flesh, Jesus’ intention seems at first 
to turn out to be spiritual rather than physical.  It is not flesh he is concerned with 
after all, but spirit.  However, the relationship between flesh and spirit in John's gospel 
must not be regarded as a dichotomy.  Instead, the ontology at work here is one of 
unity: the flesh animated by the creative spirit/breath/speech of God.
Let us look even more closely into the biblical text.  As we have already 
established, John's prologue makes clear from the outset the symmetry he is drawing 
472 See “τρώγω” in Arndt (et al), eds., A Greek-English lexicon of the New Testament and other early 
Christian literature (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996, c1979).
473 It appears here that the spirit is a poet (zōopoieō) of sorts, perhaps justifying at least a thematic link 
with the creative Word (Logos) of John's prologue.190
between his gospel narrative and the creation narrative(s) in Genesis.  In the priestly 
creation account in Gen. 1, the spirit/wind (ruwach in Heb.; pneuma in the LXX) of 
God sweeps over the face of the waters, animating them and co-participating in God's 
creative speech.  The Yahwist account in Gen. 2 depicts God forming man from dust, 
but his body remains inanimate apart from the creative and life-giving spirit/breath of 
God.
474  In light of the prologue – The Word became flesh, sarx – Jesus' statement that 
'the flesh is useless,' cannot be taken to mean that only the spirit, and not the flesh, is 
all that really matters.   Matter  matters  in John's gospel.   Thus it appears Jesus' 
conception of the flesh as useless apart from the spirit is by no means a negation or 
denigration of the flesh but rather an affirmation of the animating breath of the spirit 
in-dwelling the flesh.
475  Death is the rending apart of flesh and spirit, a perversion of 
God's intention for creation, as we see in Jn. 19:30 when Jesus gives up his spirit 
(pneuma),   leaving   only  his   useless,   destroyed   body  stretched   upon   the  cross. 
Furthermore, a purely spiritualist reading of Jesus' words here is unsustainable after 
Jesus'  bodily  resurrection, where flesh is restored and (re)inhabited by the spirit. 
However, just as Jesus' wounds remain part of his resurrection body, the separation 
between flesh and spirit which death effects is not entirely overcome in by the 
resurrection, as Chauvet reminds us:
The word does not come forth except as fractured, just as 
the Word of the cross is fractured, even when this Word is 
expressed, as it should be, starting with the resurrection. 
For the resurrection creates a tear in the fabric of language. 
474 It is noteworthy that the animating “breath” of God in Gen. 2:7 is not ruwach as in Gen. 1:2 (cf. 
Ezk. 37:8-9, 14) but nĕshamah (pnoen in the LXX; used also in Acts in ref. to the Holy Spirit). The 
verb naphach ('breathed into his nostrils') is translated enephusesen in the LXX (used also in Ezk. 
37:9: 'O breath (ruwach)...breathe (naphach) upon these slain'). The only time this verb is used in 
the New Testament is at the conclusion of John's gospel, when Jesus appears to the disciples post-
resurrection: 'he breathed (emphusao) on them and said to them, ‘Receive the Holy Spirit 
(pneuma)'' (Jn. 20:22). Cf. Arthur W. Pink, Exposition of the Gospel of John (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan, 1975), p. 1100. The deliberate intertextuality in John is perhaps clearest here, 
emphasizing in his Prologue the connection to the first creation, and now the new creation in Christ.
475 Cf. Jesus' words to Nicodemus in Jn. 3:6: ‘What is born of the flesh is flesh (sarkos sarx), and what 
is born of the Spirit is spirit (pneumatos pneuma).'191
One cannot speak of it without leaving open the interstice 
which both separates and unites opposites: flesh and spirit, 
to appear and to disappear, to touch and not to touch, 
presence and absence.
476
The cross of Jesus is the coincidence of such opposites as flesh and spirit, life and 
death.  Flesh is (not) spirit, and spirit is (not) flesh.  The spirit gives life to the flesh, 
and the flesh is the living bread gives life to all who consume it.  On the other hand, 
the flesh is useless in that it exists outside the provinces of use and function.  As we 
discovered in Chapter 3, it is nothing, literally no-thing that can be appraised of value 
or commodified for exchange.  Like the manna of old, it is pure gift, and can only be 
received as grace.  His body is broken so that it may be eaten as food.  His blood is 
shed that its life may flow into all who drink it.  And even in the resurrection – 
especially in the resurrection – the body of Jesus maintains this transcorporeality, so 
that even raised to new life, flesh and spirit restored, his flesh and blood may be 
perpetually dismembered and disseminated as food and drink for the life of the world.
We have given considerable attention to the text of John's gospel as a highly 
eucharistic text, one intensely determined to interpret to its reader Jesus' body, his 
flesh and blood, as existing beyond the normal limits of bodies: as water (Jn. 7:37-
39), as light (Jn. 1:4-5, 8:12, 9:5), as the creative Logos (1:1-4), and most centrally to 
this chapter, as food to be eaten.
477  The cannibalistic connotations are not buried at 
476 L-M. Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament, p. 527 [ital. added].
477 Lest we focus all our attention on bread, note that Jn. 6 should be viewed against the backdrop of 
Jn. 2, wherein Jesus performs his first miracle by turning water into wine at the wedding at Cana 
(2:1-11); no other account of this miracle appears in the gospels. It is significant here because while 
the narrative gives greater attention to Jesus' body as both one that makes bread (the miraculous 
feeding of the 5000) and  is  bread, the 'living bread that came down from heaven' (6:51), this 
vignette connects Jesus body to wine as well. This connection is again made during Jesus' last 
supper discourse (Jn. 15:1-6) where Jesus narrates his body as the 'vine' – again, calling forth the 
image of the Friedrich Herlin painting considered previously. Jesus reads the text of his own body 
as the 'water of life' (Jn. 7:37-39). We have already seen that water can become wine, to say nothing 
of the commingling of water and blood that flow from Jesus' pierced side, a detail which only 
appears in in scripture in Jn. 19:34. This symbolism, the flow of blood and water, emerges as a 
prominent theme in medieval theology and art as the dual figures of baptism (water) and the 
Eucharist (blood) are construed as the allegorical “birthing” of the Church from the wound/womb 
in Christ's side.192
all, but are inscribed precisely at the surface of the text: the Eucharist as cannibalism, 
a scandalous transgression of the most fundamental of social and religious taboos.  If 
the Eucharist is paradigmatic of sacramentality, as the Christian sacrament  par 
excellence, this transgression must be viewed as central to sacramentality.  Our point 
is not to argue that the description or experience of the sacramental must imply or 
employ the theme of cannibalism per se, but rather that, as evident in the cannibalistic 
connotations of the Eucharist, the sacramental stumbling-block is in part a stumbling 
over the a body which transgresses the discreet and comfortable limits placed upon 
bodies by the power structures of this-worldly kingdoms.   This is a body which 
consumes, even as it is consumed.  And this mutual consumption we call communion 
must never stray from its transgressive, de/constructive core, where the gift of the 
body is fulfilled in the body's consumption.  We turn now turn to a contemporary 
literary text which explores the theme of cannibalism in explicitly sacramental terms.
5.3 A Fringe of Leaves: Cannibalism as Eucharist
A Fringe of Leaves, English writer Patrick White’s 1976 historical fiction, is 
on the surface an adventure tale.  Set in Australia during the early Victorian era, it tells 
of a group of travelers making the sea voyage from Van Diemen’s Land back to their 
home in England on a ship called the Bristol Rose.  A shipwreck occurs near the start 
of the journey, and the protagonist, Ellen Roxburgh, along with the other survivors, 
becomes captive of an aboriginal tribe.  Although not an immediately obvious theme 
in the work, White’s incorporation of sacramental imagery into the narrative is of 
interest to us, especially as it is linked to cannibalism and the consumption of the 
body as food.   Early in the novel, as we are becoming acquainted with Ellen’s 
character, the third-person omniscient narrator describes a childhood incident which 
alludes, indirectly, to the sacramental with imagery that is at once baptismal and 193
eucharistic:
Once as a girl Ellen Gluyas had set out walking to St Hya’s 
Well...She walked all morning in what was heat for those 
parts, and tore her stockings on brambles, as well as her 
flesh, till blood ran.
478
On this childhood sojourn, which culminates in a baptism, Ellen's body is broken, her 
blood is shed.  The implication that something mystical is likely to come is indicated 
by the association of this well with Saint Hya.
479
She found the well (or pool, rather) in the dark copse where 
they told her it was, its waters pitch black, and so cold she 
gasped as she plunged her arms.  She was soon crying for 
some predicament which probably nobody, least of all Ellen 
Gluyas   could   have   explained:   no   specific   sin,   only 
presentiment of an evil she would have to face sooner or 
later.  Presently, after getting up the courage, she let herself 
down into the pool, clothes and all, hanging by a bough. 
When she had become totally immersed, and the breath 
frightened out of her by icy water, together with any 
thought   beyond   that   of   escaping   back   to   earth,   she 
managed, still clinging to the bough, to hoist herself upon 
the bank....
For the first time in many years she remembered this 
incident, and how her presentiment of evil had oppressed 
her over months, and then come to nothing, or else she had 
exorcised the threat by immersion in the pool.
480
The reference to exorcism (a traditional component of the rite of baptism) solidifies 
the baptismal imagery of this vignette, as do the two references to her 'immersion' in 
the waters.   Also, a 'presentiment of evil' is mentioned twice in consecutive 
paragraphs, the first time in association with 'sin.'  As well as a foreshadowing of the 
shipwreck to come, which will be for Ellen another plunge into the icy depths, this act 
478 Patrick White, A Fringe of Leaves (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), pp. 97.
479 According to Elizabeth Rees, St. Hya (also 'Ia' or 'Ives') of Cornwall was a 5
th century Irish nun who 
was supposed to accompany St. Gwinear to Cornwall, but arrived late and was left behind. 
However, 'a leaf enlarged itself to the size of a boat and carried her there...Ia's tomb was in St. Ives 
church, and her holy well is in a stone building outside the lower wall of the cemetery';  An 
Essential Guide to Celtic Sites and Their Saints (London and New York: Burns and Oates, 2003), p. 
215. Taking into account that St. Hya was a sea-farer, the foreshadowing of the shipwreck to come 
is even clearer. Further, establishing the proximity of this 'holy well' to the nearby church and to the 
cemetery reinforces on several levels the baptismal imagery at work in this scene.
480 P. White, A Fringe of Leaves, pp. 97-98.194
is also an unorthodox baptism, a self-baptism of sorts, the significance of which is not 
altogether clear, but which in these first hundred or so pages alerts our sensibilities to 
a sacramentality which permeates the narrative, and which will become a defining 
experience for Ellen in particular.  The sacramental quality of this impressionistic 
scene leads us to read Ellen’s presentiment of evil as a foreboding of her later 
confrontation with the ultimate taboo: her participation in cannibalism, which is 
framed in explicitly sacramental terms as well.
Bodies play a significant role in White's novel, both in how they mediate 
experience and their potential to be used as food.  Ellen is pregnant when she begins 
her journey to Van Diemen's Land.   Her condition makes her very aware of her 
corporeality.   After the shipwreck, her body, host to the life within, impedes her 
escape to the lifeboats: ‘Physically she was at her lowest.   She had the greatest 
difficulty in preventing her head from being dragged by its unnatural weight down 
upon her slack breasts, above her swollen belly.’
481  The traumas of the shipwreck and 
its aftermath induce labor prematurely, which Ellen feels within her body before it 
becomes apparent to everyone else.  As the waters overtake their lifeboat and swirl 
around her, she recognizes that the child she has carried as part of herself has become 
something foreign, a ‘creature which had begun to persecute her in its increasingly 
remonstrative form undulating out of time with her own somewhere in the folds of her 
petticoats bunting nibbling at her numb legs this slippery fish was pushing in the 
direction of a freedom to which she had never yet attained.’
482   The lack of 
punctuation in the sentence lends to its sense of urgency, of breathless panic as the 
unborn child is lost.  In the pain of delivery and the degradation of her body, Ellen 
reverts to her lower, ‘primitive’ self.   She instantaneously unlearns all that her 
481 Ibid., p. 200.
482 Ibid., p. 203.195
snobbish, aristocratic mother-in-law has taught her about being a ‘lady’: ''Ohhh!' she 
moaned, or lowed rather...‘Aw, my Gore!’'  The bovine connotations of 'lowed' could 
be seen to imply the reduction of Ellen's body to a piece of meat.   Further, her 
physical anguish in this moment robs her of the linguistic faculty, consistent with 
Elaine Scarry's analysis of the body in pain:
Whatever pain achieves, its achieves in part through its 
unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability through its 
resistance to  language....Physical pain  does  not  simply 
resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an 
immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the 
sounds and cries a human being makes before language is 
learned.
483
In this moment of betrayal –  is her body abandoning the child, or the child 
abandoning her? – she is stripped of speech, unable to communicate, incapable of 
communion. 
As she is reduced to an almost animalistic existence in this circumstance, the 
gap between Ellen and her calloused husband is greatest.  She cries out in primeval, 
incomprehensible speech, while Mr Roxburgh longs for 'his journal, to discuss his 
mood in rational terms, and thus restore a moral balance.'
484  This profound lack of 
empathy, which is more savage than the savages with whom Ellen will soon 
commune, is also revealed by his inner response to her 'positively bestial' sounds 
which 'His sensibility would have shut...out had it been at all possible.’
485   Mr 
Roxburgh is more concerned with pretense and appearances than he is with his wife’s 
laboring to deliver their still-born child: he is ‘startled by her unwonted use of his 
Christian name,' and reacts harshly to Ellen’s ‘whimpering and muttering childishly’ 
with stark indifference toward the miscarriage: ‘‘Then what is it?’ he hissed, as 
483 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford UP, 1985), p. 4.
484 P. White, A Fringe of Leaves, p. 202.
485 Ibid., p. 203.196
desperate as he was irritated.’
486   The lifeless infant body is laid to rest in an 
abandoned piece of luggage, shrouded in a canvas sack, and given a prayer-book 
funeral by the ship's Captain.
Ellen's still-born child is not part of the dramatis personae of the novel, and 
yet the body of this child haunts her.  In a tragedy over which she had no control, this 
life inside her womb, with which she had lived for months, is converted into death 
almost without her knowing.   The life-giving body of the mother becomes the 
sepulcher for an infant corpse.  The baby she has carried within her, a felt presence 
inside her body, she now is only able to know as absence and death.
An abundance of other bodies pass from life to death.  The loss of the child is 
followed immediately by the death of the ship’s steward, Spurgeon, Mr Roxburgh's 
'recently acquired, unsavoury friend.'
487  Spurgeon’s disposal stands in stark contrast to 
that of the child.   It is accompanied by no ceremony whatsoever: 'Spurgeon the 
steward, already stiff, was pitched overboard by his crew mates....Spurgeon, some of 
those present suspect, is the corpse the sharks get.  But who cares, finally?'
488  As their 
situation worsens, the survivors gradually abandon societal formalities.  The tragedy 
of the shipwreck and the ensuing trials degrade and dehumanize all of them to the 
point that dignified funerary rites become irrelevant.  In this way, the novel is overtly 
a kind of regression back toward, but never quite arriving at, a state of primal 
innocence.  The title’s ‘fringe of leaves’ draws a direct reference to Eden and the 
attempt of our First Parents to conceal their nakedness from their Creator and from 
one another after their tragic loss of innocence.  However, it is a post-lapsarian Eden 
to which the characters return, cast out from their innocent idyll.
As Spurgeon's body is tossed into the waters to be food for sharks, Austin 
486 Ibid., p. 203.
487 Ibid., p. 206. The association of (un)savoury with food/taste should not be missed.
488 Ibid., p. 206. 197
Roxburgh’s hidden inner monologue foreshadows the cannibalism to come.   His 
thoughts make explicit the novel’s sense of the sacramentality of the body as food.
As one who had hungered all his life after friendships 
which eluded him, Austin Roxburgh did luxuriate on losing 
a solitary allegiance.  It stimulated his actual hunger until 
now dormant, and he fell to thinking how the steward, had 
he not been such an unappetizing morsel, might have 
contributed appreciably to an exhausted larder.  At once Mr 
Roxburgh’s self-disgust knew no bounds.
489
He immediately recoils at his own indulgence in this secret cannibalistic fantasy, and 
yet does not restrain his indulgence, as his thoughts pass into a dream-like sequence:
This is the body of Spurgeon which I have reserved for thee, 
take eat, and given thanks for a boil which was spiritual 
matter...Austin Roxburgh was not only ravenous for the 
living flesh, but found himself anxiously licking the corners 
of his mouth to prevent any overflow of precious blood.
490
In   Austin’s   fantasy,   Spurgeon’s   ‘unsavoury’  body   –   disintegrous,   permeable, 
grotesque – becomes the eucharistic host.  Even a fluid-filled boil is ‘spiritual matter.’ 
The sacramental cannibalism, considered here but not yet enacted, functions in an 
explicitly nutritional sense, as it will later for Ellen amongst the Aborigines.   As 
hunger takes over and the living body withers, the body of the other becomes the 
object of desire as a potential source of sustenance.   Cultural taboos may be 
suspended in such desperation as one hungers and thirsts for the life-giving body and 
blood of an other.
Continuing this theme, we are moved to the central sacramental scene of the 
novel, which will profoundly shape Mrs Roxburgh and our reading of the narrative as 
a whole.  Mr Roxburgh has been murdered; we find Ellen reduced to her most primal, 
fallen state as a captive of the savages.  This prim Victorian lady now runs naked with 
‘innocent savages’
491 through the Australian wilderness.  She accepts and eventually 
489 Ibid., p. 206.
490 Ibid., p. 206-7.
491 Ibid., p. 243.198
embraces her savage existence, for however long it may last.  Unlike the brambles 
that tear her flesh on the occasion of her childhood baptism at St. Hya's well, now 
even the wildness of nature caresses her as she gives herself over to it: 
Where she had been slapped and scratched at first, she was 
now stroked by the softest fronds.  Shafts of light admitted 
between the pinnacles and arches of the trees were directed 
at her path, if the hummocks and hollows had been in any 
way designed to assist human progress.   But she left 
accepted, rejuvenated.  She was the ‘Ellen’ of her youth, a 
name they had attached to her visible person at the font, but 
which had never rightfully belonged to her...
492
Here Ellen is Eve, the first woman, the name ‘attached to her’ at her Christian baptism 
is finally, fully accepted and acceptable.  No longer is she troubled by a disconnection 
between her body (her ‘visible person’) and her name – through this regression to 
primitivism, she becomes a Self.
Soon she is confronted with the very reality suggested by those secret thoughts 
that earlier had simultaneously obsessed and repulsed her husband.  She awakes one 
morning and stumbles upon the remnants of ritual cannibalism:
...a most delectable smell mingled with the scent of drifting 
smoke.  She altered course in the direction of the voices, 
and eventually came upon a party of blacks whom she 
recognized as members of her tribe....their faces when 
turned toward the intruder wore expressions which were 
resentful and at the same time curiously mystical.   She 
realized she had blundered upon the performance of rites 
she was not intended to witness.  There was no immediate 
indication of what these were; most likely the ceremony 
was over, for she sensed something akin to the atmosphere 
surrounding communicants coming out of church looking 
bland and forgiven after the early service.
493
The reference here ('communicants') to the Eucharist is unmistakable, and Ellen’s 
(and White’s) sensitivity to the shaping influence of Anglican liturgy makes the 
allusion almost second-nature.  Still, Ellen does not yet realize upon what precisely 
492 Ibid., p. 242.
493 Ibid., p. 243.199
she has stumbled.  The previous evening, she had observed an elaborate ritual murder, 
in which two young women in the tribe had fought and one was killed.  The following 
morning, however, she must interpret the aftermath of the ritual.  She notices
an object not unlike a leather mat spread upon the grass. 
She might have remained puzzled had she not identified 
fingernails attached to what she had mistaken for fringes, 
and at one end, much as a tiger’s head lies propped on the 
floor at one end of a skin rug, what could only be the head 
of the [slain] girl...Women rolled up the dark skin, as well 
as gathering the head and what she saw to be a heap of 
bones.  It was easy to guess from the greasy smears on lips 
and cheeks how the flesh had disappeared...
494 
Shockingly, cannibalism, the only cultural taboo to rival incest in extremity and 
universality, is here framed in spiritual and even sacramental terms.  Of course, as has 
been discussed in the practices and scriptures of Christianity, this scandalous and 
scandalizing   aspect   of   the   Eucharist   has   always   been   part   of   a   Christian 
sacramentality; despite efforts to renarrate it as something else, any attempt to erase it 
entirely would be impossible (perhaps even heretical).  As with her childhood self-
baptism at St Hya’s well, Ellen exercises her own volition and initiates herself more 
fully into the tribe by partaking of the remnants of the ritual feast.  The scene is 
narrated masterfully and deserves quotation in full.
she looked down and caught sight of a thigh-bone which 
must   have   felled   from   one   of   the   overflowing   dillis. 
Renewed disgust prepared her to kick the bone out of sight. 
Then, instead, she found herself stooping, to pick it up. 
There were one or two shreds of half-cooked flesh and 
gobbets of burnt fat still adhering to this monstrous object. 
Her stiffened body and almost audibly twangling nerves 
were warning her against what she was about to do, what 
she was, in fact, already doing.  She had raised the bone, 
and was tearing at it with her teeth, spasmodically chewing, 
swallowing by great gulps which her throat threatened to 
return.  But did not.  She flung the bone away only after it 
was cleaned, and followed slowly in the wake of her 
cannibal mentors.  She was less disgusted in retrospect by 
what she had done, than awed by the fact that she had been 
494 Ibid., p. 243.200
moved to do it.   The exquisite innocence of this forest 
morning, its quiet broken by a single flute-note endlessly 
repeated, tempted her to believe that she had partaken of a 
sacrament.
495
As the early Christian Eucharist was (mis?)construed as a cannibalistic feast, here we 
conversely encounter the act of cannibalism construed as sacrament.  The novel is 
finally ambiguous about the motivation behind the act, for although Ellen would have 
certainly been hungry, this tiny morsel of meat left on the bone does not indicate that 
her motivation was to fill her belly.  Rather, it appears both a profane sort of Eucharist 
as well as a sacrament of initiation, driven by a desire to be part of the community of 
the tribe, to be 'one of them' and 'one with them.'  Her relational ties to the 'civilised 
folk' on the  Bristol Rose  having been obliterated, she desires  to speak the food-
language of the tribe, even if she cannot speak their spoken language.  Also, in this 
passage, White seems to use Mrs Roxburgh's ‘proper’ name to highlight just how far 
this lady has erred from her standing in Victorian society.  Her eating is narrated in 
language that recalls that of Jesus in latter part of John 6, not the polite phagēte eating 
but trōgōn, munching, gnawing, 'tearing at it with her teeth, spasmodically chewing, 
swallowing by great gulps.'
Ellen is unable to put the incident out of her mind.  She is later forced to 
recount it in a kind of inquisition after her rescue.  And while in her account she 
(re)narrates her complicity, her willing participation in the act, she is unable to speak 
of the incident in any fully intelligible way, for like any Eucharist, it is beyond 
communicability or comprehensibility.
'I came across some of the members of my tribe, in a forest 
clearing.  I never understood so deeply, I believe, as then.’
‘What were the blacks doing?’
‘It was a secret ceremony.  They were angry with me and 
495 Ibid., p. 244.201
hurried me away.’
‘Because you saw what they were at?’
‘It was too private.  For me too, I realized later.  A kind of 
communion.’
‘If it made such an impression on you, I should have 
thought you’d be able to describe it.’
‘Oh, no!’
496
Thus we grasp that Ellen is unable to convey ‘the sacramental aspect of what could 
only appear a repellent and inhuman act.’
497  A true encounter with the unconditioned, 
the sacred which is absolutely profane, reduces one to incommunicability.  We see 
that, in the final instance, sacramentality is not so much about articulation as 
participation, even and especially when it involves a participation in such a deep and 
all-consuming scandal.   Patrick White's vision maintains an element of mystery: 
Ellen's participation in the cannibalistic ritual may appear repellent to an outsider, and 
yet, deep within the act is a sacramental aspect that affects her profoundly and haunts 
her continually.  She cannot explain it or describe in language, but receiving the body 
into her own body has left its mark on her.  Even as she has consumed the morsel of 
human meat in the ritual, so her body has been consumed  by the tribe – not just held 
captive by force, but now captivated by the sacrament: 'Made one...we offer you these 
gifts, and with them ourselves, a single, holy, living sacrifice.'
498
A Fringe of Leaves  admits the possibility that cannibalism can be both 
construed and experienced as sacrament, bringing into sharper focus one aspect the 
scandal of sacramentality: the symbolism of the body as food to be eaten must not be 
too easily domesticated.  We turn now, albeit briefly, to another contemporary fiction 
which is captivated by the body – the sensuality of the body, in the sense of both the 
496 Ibid., p. 328-9.
497 Ibid., p. 283.
498 SL 1982, p. 8.202
body's  senses  and the sensual body.   Again, an extreme and depraved act of 
consumption of the body is cast in a eucharistic light in a way that confounds our 
understanding of sacraments and sacramentality.
5.4 Perfume: The Eucharistic Body of a Murderer
Patrick Süskind's Perfume is a unusual novel on a number of levels.  It has a 
fabulous quality, like a myth or parable.  It is also a highly sensuous novel, in that it 
brings alive the most overlooked, and certainly least theorized of the five senses: the 
olfactory.   Süskind brings the sense of smell alive through language in a way that is 
unparalleled in literature, writing a central character who literally apprehends the 
world first and foremost not through the eyes but the nose.  Set in 18
th-century France, 
the story revolves around the character of Jean-Baptiste (John the Baptist) Grenouille, 
who is both protagonist and antagonist.
Simultaneously recalling and perverting the Nativity, Grenouille is born into 
horrendous and utter degradation: his unwed mother, a fishmonger in the marketplace 
of Paris's underlings, hardly breaks from her work to deliver him into the filth and fish 
guts on the ground beneath her.  He is born with a gift that is paradoxically also a 
curse: he has an extraordinary sense of smell, but his own body is itself odorless. 
These two unique but interrelated bodily traits, combined with his humble beginnings, 
isolate him from society.  As a child, he is maligned by the priest to whom his mother 
abandons him, and he is maltreated by the wet-nurse who takes him in, as well as by 
the other children in her charge.   He is, as the narrator states near the novel's 
conclusion, 'raised without love, with no warmth of a human soul, surviving only on 
impudence and the power of loathing, small, hunchbacked, lame, ugly, shunned, an 
abomination within and without.'
499
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As a young man, Grenouille's olfactory gift leads to an obsession with 
fragrances, and eventually he becomes an apprentice to a famous perfumer named 
Baldini, who teaches Grenouille the art of distilling the fragrances of inanimate 
objects such as flowers, fruits, and so on.  However, Grenouille is not only interested 
in pleasant smells – he is fascinated by all smells, including those which society 
would regard as repulsive.  Baldini's method of 'capturing' fragrances fails to allow 
the distillation of certain scents Grenouille would like to collect, so he seeks out 
alternative methods, arriving at one that allows him to capture the essence of human 
beings, but only during cellular breakdown shortly after death.  Thus beings the “story 
of a murderer” indicated by the novel's subtitle.  
As Grenouille's begins his murderous career, his endgame and artistic vision is 
to create an extraordinary perfume which will invoke true love.  He concludes that 
such a perfume must be mixed from the essences of virgin girls, who embody purity 
in their undefiled flesh.  His nose tells him that with such a fragrance, he will be able 
to control the entire world.  And while a single drop of his concoction saves him from 
execution for the many murders he has committed, in the end he is despondent.  The 
fragrance which has been his all-consuming passion exonerates him but still brings 
about his destruction.
The novel does not explicitly frame its final few scenes, which we will 
consider here, in sacramental terms, but the implication is present and has been noted 
by theological thinkers who have transgressed these boundaries before.
500   After 
Grenouille is caught by the civil authorities and charged with the crime, it is 
determined that his execution be carried before a large crowd, comprised of gentry 
and common folk alike.  Dignitaries and ecclesiastical officials are present and eager 
500 Robert Detweiler, “Torn by Desire: Sparagmos in Greek Tragedy and Recent Fiction,” in D. Jasper, 
ed. Postmodernism, Literature and the Future of Theology (1993), pp. 60-77; D. Jasper, The Sacred 
Body, p. 26 and p. 191, n. 40; cf. Mark Ledbetter, Victims and the Postmodern Narrative, or, Doing 
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to witness the particularly inhuman method of human disposal planned for Grenouille, 
whose body will be affixed to a St. Andrew's cross and dealt twelve blows with an 
iron rod, smashing all his joints, before then being hanged.  His body, in his death as 
in his birth, is an object of utter revulsion.  Of his origin, the narrator tells us his 
mother 'wanted to put this revolting birth behind her as quickly as possible.'
501  He is 
held in similar regard by the executioner, who is 'disgusted by the murderer.  He did 
not want to regard him as a human being, but only as a victim to be slaughtered.'
502 
Süskind's narrator inscribes on Grenouille's body total rejection as less than human. 
He is not a person, he is a victim.  In the narrative, no explanation is given for this. 
Prior to his murderous acts, what cause could there be for the loathing to which he is 
subjected?  Is there something about his lack of personal odor that makes him so 
detestable to everyone around him?  Perhaps the absence of an aroma symbolizes that 
Grenouille is less than human: for humans eat and excrete, they sweat and seep and 
bleed, and all the while, they give off odors.  The question is left unresolved.
At the execution, Grenouille orchestrates his escape with but a single drop of 
his love-inducing perfume, which actually simply conceals his own lack of a personal 
scent.   As he enters the arena of the execution, 'a miracle occurred.   Or at least 
something so incomprehensible, so unprecedented and so unbelievable that everyone 
who witnessed would call it a miracle afterwards if they had taken the notion to speak 
of it at all.'
503  The miracle is that the crowd's loathing for Grenouille is mystically 
transformed into adoration:  'They were overcome by a powerful sense of goodwill, of 
tenderness, of crazy, childish infatuation, yes, God help them, of love for this little 
homicidal man...They loved him.'
504   An orgiastic scene ensues as these good and 
501 P. Süskind, Perfume, p. 5.
502 Ibid., p. 240.
503 Ibid., p. 244.
504 Ibid., p. 244-45.205
noble people 'abandoned themselves to their emotions...gave free rein to the urges' of 
their hearts.
505  Even the Bishop is powerless over Grenouille's sensuous spell: 'for the 
first time in his life basking in religious rapture, for a miracle had occurred before 
their very eyes.'
506
While Grenouille has succeeded in his effort, his life spared and in the 
perfume in his hands all the power of a god 'to command the love of mankind,'
507 he 
remains unsatisfied.  In spite of his intensely gifted nose, Grenouille's inability to 
smell himself and thus 'know'/perceive himself in the primary way he himself 
apprehends the world – through his nose – makes him doubt, and indeed hate, his own 
flesh.  The odorless Grenouille is separated from himself, his body something foreign 
and despicable to him, however loved it might be by those under the spell of his 
perfume.  Despite the overflowing 'love' (we should perhaps interpret this 'love' as at 
best ironic, based as it is upon the artifice of the perfume) of his intoxicated mass of 
devotees, Grenouille
could not enjoy one second of it....What he had always 
longed for – that other people should love him – became at 
the moment of its achievement unbearable, because he did 
not love them himself, he hated them.  And suddenly he 
knew that he had never found gratification in love, but 
always only in hate – in hating and in being hated.
508
As a 'god' in this moment of supreme control, Grenouille discovers the divine basis 
for the gift of free will: for this offering of love is hollow, without content or meaning, 
because the crowd gives it only under duress of the perfume.  Their senses are as 
corrupt as Grenouille's soul.  Like a perverted, blasphemous figure of Marion's 'God 
without Being,' whose very being is the kenotic outpouring of Love, Grenouille
505 Ibid., p. 246.
506 Ibid., p. 246.
507 Ibid., p. 260.
508 Ibid., p. 249.206
wanted only to empty himself.   For once in his life, he 
wanted to be like other people and empty himself of what 
was inside him – what they did with their love and their 
stupid adoration, he would do with his hate.  For once, just 
for once, he wanted to be apprehended in his true being, for 
other human beings to respond with an answer to his only 
true emotion, hatred.
509
Grenouille's   hate,   the   novel   implies,   is   the   result   of   the   maltreatment   and 
estrangement to which he has been victim throughout his life, and so, while his 
character is clearly diabolical, he becomes in the end an object of at least our pity, if 
not   our   empathy.     His   crowning   achievement,   the   master   perfume   which 
simultaneously reveals his artistry and his evil, only further isolates him from the 
world around him: 'The only one who has ever recognized it for its true beauty is me, 
because I created it myself.  And at the same time, I'm the only one that it cannot 
enslave.  I am the only person for whom it is meaningless.'
510  Paradoxically, his gift is 
a curse that renders him utterly alone, immersed in (self)loathing and the desire for 
death.
In the novel's final scene, he returns to the place of his birth, 'the most putrid 
spot in the whole kingdom,'
511 which is populated after dark by 'thieves, murderers, 
cut-throats, whores, deserters, young desperadoes.'
512  In this stinking charnel house 
overlooking a cemetery, he empties the nearly-full bottle of perfume, anointing 
(baptising? he is Jean-Baptiste after all...) his body head to toe in the eroticizing scent, 
only to be dismembered and consumed by these filthy outcasts of society, who are his 
people, in a way, his (non)community, bound together only by their common 
degradation and alienation.  The mass divides him into thirty pieces, a clear allusion 
509 Ibid., p. 250.
510 Ibid., p. 260.
511 Ibid., p. 4.
512 Ibid., p. 261.207
to Judas Iscariot, the one whom 'Satan entered' to carry out Jesus' betrayal.
513  But this 
is not a betrayal of Grenouille's body; instead it is the fulfillment of his desire. 
Grenouille's body, almost imperceptible in life due to the absence of odor, is finally 
presented as absent in this final consummation, which is narrated as a mystical 
communion of sorts: 'When the cannibals found their way back together after 
disposing of their meal, no one said a word.'
514  Like Ellen Gluyas after her experience 
of ritual cannibalism, and like Mariette, rendered speechless in the ravages of 
religious ecstasy, the crowd cannot speak of this unspeakable act.  However, they feel 
no guilt: 'On the contrary!  Though the meal lay rather heavy on their stomachs, their 
hearts were definitely light.  All of a sudden, there were delightful, bright flutterings 
in   their   dark   souls.    And   on   their   faces,   was   a   delicate,   virginal   glow   of 
happiness....For the first time they had done something out of Love.'
515   The 
capitalization of the this final word of the narrative – 'Love' – calls attention to its 
significance while remaining ambiguous in its meaning.   Is Süskind construing the 
'Love' induced  by  Grenouille's  perfume,  which  drives  the  crowd to  excessive 
debauchery at the would-be execution, and which motivates the mob of criminals to 
feast upon his body, in an ironic way after all?   Or is this presented as a real 
possibility of communion, of these degenerate societal outcasts brushing up against 
the sacramental in this most profane experience?  Is Grenouille's body host to some 
experience of the sacred that he, in his abandonment, has never been afforded?  Or is 
it simply the victim of suicidal self-destruction?
Robert Detweiler interprets the novel as functioning on one level as 'an 
allegory of how cultural achievements are attained at the expense of human lives and 
often accomplished by obsessive personalities whose behavior denies the very 
513 cf. Mt. 26:14-16, Lk. 22:3-6, Jn. 13:2.
514 P. Süskind, Perfume, p. 263.
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grandeur of their art.'
516  However, his analysis is more deeply theological when he 
points out that 
The particularly audacious aspect of this final scene of 
Perfume is that it is presented as having the effects of a 
Eucharist...If the conclusion of Perfume shocks the reader – 
a   finale   in   which   a   corrupt   man   dies   in   style,   is 
dismembered and eaten in an ecstatic ceremony that brings 
communion to those who devoured him – the scandal one 
feels may be a signal that the scandal of Christianity has 
been   interpreted   too   narrowly....The   celebration   of   the 
Eucharist is, after all, at heart an intensely erotic act that 
marks both the presence and the triumph of the scandalised 
and transformed body.
517
Like Süskind's text itself, Detweiler's insightful questioning of our hermeneutical 
limitations leaves open the possibility of how we might interpret 'the scandal of 
Christianity' more broadly.  He hints at the unexplored, or at least under-explored, 
erotic content of the eucharistic symbol, which will be the topic of the next chapter. 
However, the body of Grenouille is, as David Jasper points out, at best the 'perverse 
opposite' of 'the eucharistic banquet whereby, out of pure love, there is mutual 
consuming and consumption.'
518  Yet this perverse opposite is not a negation of the 
symbol of the Eucharist, in Jasper's reading, but rather is a perverse opposite 
contained within the symbol itself, in a 'marriage of heaven and hell' (quoting Blake), 
a coincidentia oppositorum.  Noting the parallel between our consumption of this 
distasteful text and the consumption of the distasteful body contained in the narrative, 
Jasper suggests:
Even to read this passage is hard enough, shocking and 
indigestible to the sensitive reader.  But if to consume an 
angel (and a murderer) is utterly nauseating, what of Christ 
himself?  Yet only in this utterly profane, liturgical moment 
of pure kenosis, of pure consumption as sacrament of the 
actual body, can be glimpsed the kingdom of God...
519
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What kind of kingdom is this, where the most universally taboo, the most 'utterly 
profane,' human act is transfigured as sacred?   Is it only through a kind of 
domestication of the symbol, a watering down of the living metaphor until it is 
drowned and dead?  In John 6, Jesus does not seem to shy away from the visceral, 
'utterly nauseating' image of eating his flesh and drinking his blood, which given 
Jewish dietary customs would have been more than shocking,  As we have seen, 
neither does Tertullian recoil from the startling characterization of the Eucharist as 
cannibalism in his Apology.  All of this begs the question: if the Eucharist as the eating 
and drinking of the real flesh and blood of Jesus is really 'just a symbol,' so easily 
misapprehended   and   potentially   controversial   –  why   has   it   been   maintained, 
practiced, theorized, debated, and defended for two millennia?  Why has it been so 
extensively drawn upon as a literary, poetic and artistic motif?  Could it be in some 
sense due to the way that the Eucharist, as the sacrament par excellence, scandalously 
holds together the sacred and the profane, wholeness and brokenness, holiness and 
depravity, presence and absence, immanence and transcendence, the material and the 
spiritual, and so on?  We suggest that this is precisely the case.
5.5 Consuming the Body as an Act of Love
Elaine Scarry observes that '[Christ] himself, of course, in the Last Supper and 
in the communion ceremony enters the food chain, allowing himself to be taken in, 
now not just as the object of perception but as an object of sustenance.'
520  But Christ's 
body is not the only eucharistic, edible body to which we can point.  A clear tradition 
in Christian mystical writings can be traced which emphasize the body as food to be 
taken into oneself as an act of holy communion.  Almost invariably, the image of 
519 Ibid., p. 26.
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eating the body is simultaneously an erotic figure of interpenetration, of the exchange 
of bodily fluids, or of domination and subjugation. In  The Second Sex, Simone de 
Bouvoir, discussing the phenomenon of female mystics, provides particularly striking 
accounts of Angela of Foligno and St. Catherine.  The former 'drank with delight the 
water in which she had just washed lepers' hands and feet'; quoting Angela, she 
recounts
This beverage flooded us with such sweetness that the joy 
followed us home.  Never had I drank with such pleasure. 
In my throat was lodged a piece of scaly skin from the 
lepers' sores.  Instead of getting rid of it, I made a great 
effort to swallow it and I succeeded.  It seemed to me that I 
had just partaken of communion.
521
Beauvior is of course critiquing and challenging a religion that elicits these sorts of 
practices, wherein women especially are found to be 'imitating the Redeemer who 
saved the flesh by the degradation of his own flesh.'
522   She also tells us of Marie 
Alacoque, who licks up the vomit of a patient she nurses, and of St. Catherine, to 
whom Jesus gives the foreskin removed at his circumcision as a wedding ring.
What might it mean to give, or receive, the body as food in an act of love?  In 
the previous chapter, we considered Ron Hansen's novel Mariette in Ecstasy as a 
literary instantiation of the broken body – in this case the stigmatic body – as 
sacramental.  Mariette's body is also consumed in the narrative – not ripped apart and 
eaten like Grenouille, but tasted – by Sister Hermance, who we know has a sexual 
attraction to Mariette.   In the central scene where Mariette's body is revealed as 
sacramental, her broken body is being nursed my Sister Hermance, who unwraps the 
bandages from her hands, unveiling the wounds of Christ, and 'With reverence Sister 
Hermance licks the blood inside the hand wound. “I have tasted you. See?”'
523 
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Mariette's body, broken, her blood, the blood of Christ, poured out for the sake of 
many.   The blood of Christ, shed for you.   Sister Hermance tastes, drinks the 
miraculous blood, incorporating Mariette into her own body.  '“Ever since I first met 
you, I have loved you more than myself,”' she tells the semi-conscious Mariette.  She 
partakes of the offering of Mariette's body as a sacrament – “You have been a 
sacrament to me” – and as an act of love.   Yet there is another sense in which 
Mariette's body is consumed in the novel in an act of love.  As Mariette presents her 
body to Christ – 'Even this I give you'
524 – she is simultaneously consumed by him.
In this chapter, we have examined writings that are concerned with the body 
that eats and is eaten, especially the Body on the altar, the transcorporeal body which 
presents itself to us to be eaten as bread and drunk as wine.  This body, the edible 
body, is part of the scandal of sacramentality, because it is bound up with the 
skandalon of the Word made flesh, which was stretched on to a cross, poured out for 
the life of the world.  This kenosis is the nature of Love, the nature of the God who is 
love.  In the next and final chapter, we shall explore one more theme related to the 
scandal of sacramentality, manifest in the symbolic matrix of the Eucharist: that of the 
erotic body.
524 Ibid., p. 9.212
~ Chapter Six ~
Penetrating:
Eroticism and Sacrament
Penetrating things and bodies – that is, body contact 
and sexuality, aggression, destruction, and murder – 
constitute a second type of world appropriation, in 
which the merging of bodies with other bodies or with 
inanimate things is always transitory and therefore 
necessarily opens up a space of distance for desire and 
for reflection.  This, I think, is the context that explains 
why sexuality allows for such a strong connotation of 
death,   of   overwhelming   another   body  or   of  being 
overwhelmed by it.
525
6.1 Eros: The Eucharist as an Erotic Act
Although we have thus far avoided the language, it should be clear by now 
that the mediacy and materiality of sacramentality is another way of saying that 
sacraments are sensuous – they engage us, and we participate in them, at the level of 
our senses.   We see, taste, touch and smell the bread and the wine; we hear the 
fraction of the host and the pouring of water and wine into the chalice.  And relatedly, 
sacraments are sensual – they gratify the senses, in a way that might almost connote 
carnality.    As we concluded the previous chapter, we began to move from the 
conception of the body as food and drink, received for sustenance, life-giving 
nourishment, to the consumption of the body as an act of communion based upon and 
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evocative of love.  Indeed, to take the body of another into oneself is the deepest form 
of human intimacy, and in this way, ritual cannibalism, even when the victim is an 
enemy, is a deeply sacred act.
However, eating is not the only way to receive another's body into one's own 
body.     In   the   interpenetration   of   bodies,   including   but  not  limited   to   sexual 
intercourse, we encounter the profound paradoxes of closeness and distance, life and 
death, violence and intimacy, and sacrality and profanity.  Bodily interpenetration is 
also a central characteristic of the Eucharist.  As we have seen that eating Christ's 
flesh and drinking his blood is not reducible to a 'spiritualist' interpretation – the 
materiality   of   Christ's   body   and   our   bodies,   made   one   metabolically   in   our 
consumption of the physical bread and the wine – neither is our consumption of His 
body reducible to a utilitarian meal.   The mystics  savor  Christ's flesh, tasting its 
sweetness.   In communion, bodily fluids are exchanged, our saliva, His blood, 
commingled in our mouths.  Recall from our discussion in Chapter 4 that, following 
Bakhtin, the orifices of the body, as the liminal spaces where the body opens itself to 
the world, are the locus of the body's degradation, which is also to say, its incarnation. 
This is the coincidence of the most profane – the body eating, drinking, excreting, 
sweating, seeping, bleeding – and the most intimately sacred – the body kissing, 
caressing, making love.  So it seems appropriate for our discussion of sacrament and 
sacramentality to consider the erotic encounter between bodies.
As we have indicated, experience of the divine as an erotic experience is not 
foreign to Christian mysticism.   Saint Thérèse describes her experience of First 
Communion as an overtly erotic event.  Upon receiving the host, she recounts, ‘Ah! 
how sweet was that first kiss of Jesus!  It was a kiss of love; I felt that I was loved, and 
I said: “I love You, and I give myself to You forever!”...it was a fusion; they were long 
longer two, Thérèse had vanished as a drop of water is lost in the immensity of the 214
ocean.  Jesus alone remained.’
526  Thérèse's religious fervor is a startling confluence of 
eroticism and violence, as when she writes: 
In order to love in one single act of perfect Love, I OFFER 
MYSELF AS A VICTIM OF HOLOCAUST TO YOUR 
MERCIFUL LOVE, asking You to consume me incessantly, 
allowing the waves of  infinite tenderness  shut up within 
You to overflow into my soul, and that thus I may become a 
martyr of Your Love, O my God!
527
This powerful expression indicates another corresponding theme of the present 
chapter: the hidden violence that accompanies the erotic.  René Girard attests to this 
in  Violence and the Sacred, which bears witness to the inseparable relationship 
between the sacred and sacrificial violence.  According to Girard, 'The connection 
between sexuality and religion is a heritage common to all religions.'
528   However, 
'Sexuality is impure because it has to do with violence.'
529  Violence is bound up with 
the sacred, and sexuality, with its violent connotations, is encompassed as well.
530  Of 
course, it is impossible to talk about sacramentality independently of the sacred, and 
so Girard's thesis is clearly relevant.
531  When we look to the symbolic matrix of the 
Eucharist, violence and sacrifice are at the surface, pointing to the cross and the 
passion narrative, the violence inflicted on Christ's  broken  body and  shed  blood. 
Indeed, Catholic eucharistic theology maintains the Mass as a sacrifice.
532
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Georges Bataille, whose fiction we will consider shortly, has also provided us 
with a theoretical foundation for our discussion of the erotic as it relates to 
sacramentality.   First, Bataille and Girard are in agreement that 'the domain of 
eroticism is the domain of violence, of violation.’
533   Bataille also recognizes that 
eroticism – as we have been claiming with regard to sacrament - 'always entails a 
breaking down of established patterns, the patterns...of the regulated social order.'
534 
In Bataille's thinking, human life is characterized by discontinuity; only in death do 
human beings have a sense of continuity.   When Bataille writes of  continuity,  he 
appears to mean something similar to communion – the bond or connection between 
persons,  in  contrast to  our in-born  discontinuity  or  fragmentation.     From the 
perspective of the Eucharist, viewed through the lens of Zizioulas and others whose 
thought figures heavily in this study, this is not far off the notion that we are born into 
sin, which is manifest as individualism, but are redeemed through/into communion 
and relationality, which is manifest as true 'being' or authentic personhood.  However, 
in Bataille's more nihilistic view, this is only possible in death.  ‘Eroticism opens the 
way to death,' he writes, and 'Death opens the way to the denial of our individual 
lives.’
535  This 'denial of our individual lives' is, for Bataille, desirable, for it is the 
condition of possibility for any continuity (at one point he calls it 'liberating 
continuity'
536), which is to say communion, to occur between persons.
Most importantly for our purposes, Bataille acknowledges that 'all eroticism 
has a sacramental character.’
537   Bataille is a strange and difficult thinker – like 
Nietzsche, it is at times difficult to distinguish between playfulness and insanity. 
533 G. Bataille, Eroticism, p. 15.
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While we will reflect upon his fictional instantiation of these ideas regarding sacrality, 
sacrifice, eroticism and violence, we are not ultimately undertaking an analysis or 
critique of Bataille's theoretical work.  However, his prose expresses much of the 
inner erotic scandal of sacramentality that we wish to explore in this chapter:
Only   in   violation,   through   death   if   need   be,   of   the 
individual’s solitariness can there appear that image of the 
beloved object which in the lover’s eyes invests all being 
with significance.   For the lover, the beloved makes the 
world transparent....There is something absurd and horribly 
commixed about this conception, yet beyond the absurdity, 
the confusion and the suffering there lies a miraculous truth. 
There is nothing really illusory in the truth of love; the 
beloved being is indeed equated for the lover...with the 
truth of existence.
538
Bataille, like several of the authors considered thus far, is shaped by a Catholic 
imagination, and so the appearance of an explicitly eucharistic term in this passage 
('commixed') should not surprise us.  Further, Bataille seems to be brushing up against 
the kind of experience that in Christian practice is associated with sacramentality – 
indeed the Eucharist could be described as an absurd yet miraculous truth, i.e. that the 
divine became incarnate in Jesus Christ, who died and was raised, and who now offers 
his resurrection body as bread and wine to be eaten and drunk.
However, in all of this exists something shocking, as we have seen already in 
our examinations of the broken body and the body as food.  We again run into the 
skandalon of sacramentality, and must pause to collect ourself.  The living metaphor 
Christ establishes is irreducibly transgressive, not only in its (il)logic – bread and 
wine are not and do not become body and blood – but in its prescription as well: 
human flesh and blood are not to be consumed.  To do so is a violation of a nearly 
universal taboo.  Yet, as Bataille explains, ‘Transgression is complementary to the 
profane world, exceeding its limits but not destroying it...The profane world is the 
538 Ibid., p. 21.217
world of taboos.  The sacred world depends on limited acts of transgression.’
539  The 
Eucharist, as part of the sacred world, which is naturally intertwined with the profane, 
is such a limited act of transgression, for we celebrate the sacraments – the Eucharist 
(thanks-giving) in particular – and as Bataille points out, celebration is 'the time of 
transgressing taboos.'
540
We have drawn upon Bataille to get us to this point in the discussion, and to be 
fair to his theory, we should make mention his view of the Christian religion as it 
relates to eroticism – for it differs substantially from our own.   To Bataille, 
Christianity fails, and reveals itself to be 'the least religious'
541 of the religions of the 
world, because of the symbolic character of the Mass.  Bataille concludes, therefore, 
that Christianity has a fundamental misunderstanding of the sacrality of sacrifice and 
transgression, rooted in Christianity's aversion to law-breaking, which domesticates 
the original transgression, the sin, of the cross: 'the sin of the crucifixion is disallowed 
by the priest celebrating the mass....The echoing liturgy is in harmony with the deeps 
of primitive human thought but strikes a false note.'
542  This is a contentious claim on 
a number of levels, and a full critique of Bataille's reading of Christianity lies outwith 
the scope of this project.  However, we would register our disagreement with Bataille, 
suggesting instead that the bloodless sacrifice of the Mass is in fact an enactment of 
transgressive sacrifice, including the connotations of violence and eroticism which are 
exalted in his essay.  Our close readings of three fictional texts should demonstrate 
this far better than any theological argument.
539 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
540 Ibid., p. 258; quoted in Karmen MacKendrick, Counterpleasures, p. 11.
541 Ibid., p. 32. Indeed, Bataille confesses, 'If it were not for the fact that Christianity is a religion after 
all, I should even feel an aversion for Christianity.  That this is so is demonstrated by the subject of 
the present work...Christianity sets its face against eroticism and thereby condemns most religions' 
(p. 32).
542 Ibid.,  pp. 89-90. He writes elsewhere: ‘Christianity has created a sacred world from which 
everything horrible or impure has been excluded’ (p. 135).218
6.2 The Sacramental Body as Erotic Body: Mariette and Grenouille
We should take a moment to recall two of the fictional bodies considered thus 
far in our literary explorations which, while selected for the ways they respectively 
embodied the brokenness of the body and the body as food, also capture the 
sacramentality of the erotic body.   In  Mariette in Ecstasy, Catholic novelist Ron 
Hansen portrays the body of Mariette Baptiste as both a broken body, wracked by the 
stigmata, but also as an intensely sexual body, which does become the object of erotic 
desire and pleasure for some of the sisters of the Crucifixion.  Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the 'playlet' that Mariette and the sisters put on for one another, acting 
out the Song of Songs.   Hansen's language conjures the violence we have been 
discussing as well as the stigmata that colonize and define Mariette's body in the 
narrative.  As the play begins, he writes: 'Mariette is glamorously there, her great dark 
mane of hair in massacre, like the siren pictures of Sheba.  She's taken her habit and 
sandals off and shockingly dressed her soft nakedness in a string necklace of white 
buttons that are meant to seem pearls and red taffeta robe that is like a bloodstain on 
linens.'
543  This scene, with its absurd dramatic subject matter and gender-bending, is 
simultaneously natural (they are all women, after all), comedic (i.e. Sister Geneviève's 
penciled-in mustache and put-on deep voice), and scandalous: '”We shouldn't be doing 
this,” Sister Philomène says, but no one pays her the slightest attention.'
544  The scene 
is representative of the mystery and ambiguity with which Hansen has deliberately 
written Mariette's character – the vignette from the Song of Songs concludes not with 
consummation but desire unfulfilled, and Mariette turns the attention of the sisters 
away from the sensual whimsy of the playlet toward fervent desire for Christ: 'she 
543 R. Hansen, Mariette, pp. 82-83.
544 Ibid., p. 83.219
gets to her knees below Christ on the crucifix, and one by one the novices get to their 
knees, too.'
545  
However, we know that Mariette is the object of sexual desire for Sister 
Hermance at least, who is in love with Mariette.  Considering the novel in its entirety, 
it is difficult to conclude otherwise than that Sister Hermance's love extends beyond 
agape and indeed transgresses the limits of eros.  The scandal that Mariette creates at 
the priory, leading to her eventual dismissal, at first appears to be a result of the 
stigmata, but in the end, we wonder if it is not also related to her brimming sexuality, 
which arouses erotic desire amongst some of the sisters.  The wounds of Christ are a 
blessing and a curse to she who receives them, but as a visible manifestation of the 
presence and blessing of Christ, should be received by the community as a means of 
grace.  However, erotic desire of sister for sister places the stability of the entire 
convent at considerable risk, a risk that simply cannot be afforded.
In Chapter 4, we attended to the brokenness of the stigmatic body of Mariette, 
and in Chapter 5, she appeared again briefly as a fictional instance of the body as 
food, when Sister Hermance licks the wound in her hand, tasting her blood as a 
sacramental participation in the body of the beloved.
546  In this way, Mariette's body is 
a counterpart to the body of Jean-Baptiste Grenouille, whose body is consumed as a 
love feast by the ravenous mob intoxicated by his perfume.  It is purely coincidental, 
of course, that they share in common the name Baptiste, a reference to the ascetic 
cousin of Jesus, 'the voice of one crying out in the wilderness' (Mark 1:2).  However, 
both Mariette and Grenouille can be understood as ascetic – sacrificial – bodies, and 
so the connection to John the Baptist, while unrelated between the two novels, is not 
insignificant.  Like John Baptiste, Mariette is a harbinger of Christ.  She places herself 
545 Ibid., p. 85.
546 Ibid., p. 121.220
in the role of his unworthy servant.  She claims no carnal desire for the attention her 
wounds   bring   her,   but   only   desiring   to   embody   'Christ's   own   plainness   and 
humility.'
547    Jean-Baptiste   Grenouille,   like   the   Baptizer,   is   an   outcast   from 
mainstream society, a perceived wild man, encapsulated most fully in Perfume in his 
sojourn to the wilderness of his cave, where he transforms himself into the mad 
genius who will emerge to create the monstrous, love-inducing perfume.  Süskind 
makes the reference explicit only once: 'We are familiar with people who seek out 
solitude: penitents, failures, saints or prophets.  They retreat to deserts, preferably, 
where they live on locusts and honey....They act in the belief that they are living a life 
pleasing to God.'
548  However, our narrator assures us that for Grenouille it is nothing 
of the sort; his nominal reference to the one who announced the coming of the 
Messiah is, at best, ironic, and at worst, demonic: 'There was not the least notion of 
God in his head....He had withdrawn solely for his own personal pleasure, only to 
nearer to himself.  No longer distracted by anything external, he basked in his own 
existence and found it splendid.  He lay in his stony crypt like his own corpse.'
549
Ultimately Grenouille's body, whatever challenge it might pose to our thinking 
about sacraments and sacramentality, reveals itself to be an anti-sacrament – not a 
means of grace, but a means of damnation, to the scent-drunk horde of criminals who 
tear him apart and consume his thirty pieces of flesh.  He is Judas Iscariot, Christ's 
betrayer, not the one who proclaimed his coming.   And the one he betrays is 
ultimately himself, for he is the only one for whom he exists.   Grenouille is the 
personification in extremis of the kind of individualism and solipsism that is called 
into question by the transcorporeal body of Christ, which extends beyond itself and 
gives itself to and for others.  This individualism is the carnal state into which we are 
547 Ibid., p. 12.
548 P. Süskind, Perfume, p. 127.
549 P. Süskind, Perfume, p. 128.221
thrown at birth, but following Zizioulas, Pickstock, Chauvet and many of our key 
interlocutors, this isolated individualism is transformed into authentic personhood, 
received as gift, in the act of communion (construed here as widely as possible). 
Sacramentality as we are conceiving it may hold together the paradoxes of sacred and 
profane, life and death, presence and absence, and so on, but we finally are able to 
determine that Grenouille's body is not sacramental but anti-sacramental, for it only 
embodies the negative terms of the paradox.  There is, in the end, no paradox, but 
only nihilism.  There is, in the end, no eros, not even amongst those who consume his 
body 'out of Love,' but only Grenouille's hatred for himself and for all humankind – 
the 'Love' of the mob is at best artificial, their murderous criminality disguised by the 
perfume with which he baptizes himself.  Their insanity is only renarrated as Love 
after the fact.  To use Bataille's terms, Grenouille's existence is discontinuous in the 
most profound way, and even in his spectacular death fails to become continuous, for 
his is self-sacrifice, carried out by those who know not what they do, only to satisfy 
his own desires.  It is a loveless suicide containing no redemptive or grace-giving 
value whatsoever.
We have (re)considered the fictional bodies of Mariette and Grenouille as 
bodies which are broken and consumed out of love (or 'Love').   We will now 
undertake close readings of three fictional texts which take us further in our 
understanding   of   the   erotic   body   as   sacramental,   and   of   the   eroticism   of 
sacramentality.
6.3 Counterpleasures: Ballard's Crash
We turn our attention to J. G. Ballard's novel Crash,
550 a nightmare vision of 
550 The novel was later adapted for the screen and directed by David Cronenberg, starring James 
Spader and Holly Hunter.  For the purposes of this essay, we will consider only the novel.222
violent, post-human sexuality arising from the automobile as a prosthetic extension of 
the human body.  Ballard's novel contains virtually nothing that we would associate 
with erotic or pornographic literature.  The sensuous language characteristic of such 
work is replaced instead with a sterile, objective, mechanistic voice indicative of the 
technological landscape that provides the backdrop for the novel.  Throughout the 
text, sexual acts and organs are consistently referred to not in the seductive, colloquial 
manner often characteristic of erotic literature, but rather in purely technical, even 
medical terms: breast, buttocks, penis, clitoris, vulva, perineum, rectum, anus (and so 
forth) are the human anatomical equivalent to the automobile's bonnet, instrument 
panel, binnacle, dashboard, steering wheel, seat belt, etc.  The novel's aim, it would 
seem, is not to entice or arouse, but provoke and perhaps even to repulse and repel. 
Furthermore, as these technologies strip the human body of its humanity, any hint of 
romance is absent; several times Ballard describes the sexual rituals as 'devoid of 
ordinary sexuality...divorced from all feeling,'
551 'conceptualized acts abstracted from 
all feeling.'
552  Love barely enters into the discussion, and the amorous is replaced by 
violence.  And yet, certainly Crash still should be understood as an erotic novel, for as 
Bataille (to whose fictional work we will turn next) has noted, 'the domain of 
eroticism is the domain of violence, of violation.'
553   This reminder from Bataille 
serves to illuminate Crash's difficult and disturbing vision.  The author's words in the 
introduction are essential to unlocking the riddle of the novel:
Throughout Crash I have used the car not only as a sexual 
image, but as a total metaphor for man's life in today's 
551 J. G. Ballard, Crash (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 161. See also p. 212: 'By some paradox, this sex 
act between us had been devoid of all sexuality.' In the novel, Ballard speaks also of the possibilities 
of a 'new sexuality' emerging (e.g. pp. 35, 102, 119). It appears that, in the novel, reference to 
sexuality connotes a certain “human-ness” that is lost – or transformed – due to the automobile's 
technological   colonization   of   the   human   body.     The   novel's   “post-human”   themes   (body 
modification and extension, automobile as prosthetic, etc) and their political significance merit 
further exploration, but lie outwith the scope of the present study.
552 Ibid., p. 127
553 G. Bataille, Eroticism, p. 15.223
society.  As such the novel has a political role quite apart 
from its sexual content, but  I would still like to think that 
Crash is the first pornographic novel based on technology. 
In a sense, pornography is the most political form of fiction, 
dealing with how we use and exploit each other, in the most 
urgent and ruthless way.  Needless to say, the ultimate role 
of Crash is cautionary, a warning against that brutal, erotic 
and overlit realm that beckons more and more persuasively 
to us from the margins of the technological landscape.
554
The author acknowledges the novel's pornographic quality.  Yet it is pornography in 
service of politics, pornography meant to provoke and even forewarn.  
Crash's plot is difficult to summarize.  In many ways, it breaks the rules of 
fiction by failing to follow the traditional narrative arch of rising and falling action, of 
conflict and resolution.  The key characters consist of a narrator (called “Ballard”),
555 
his wife Catherine, and Vaughan, whose perverse desires and wild genius generate the 
momentum of the narrative.   As the characters engage in their violent, erotic play, 
wherein sexual desire is consummated in automobile collisions, the reader should 
become aware of the ways in which her body has been, and is being, colonized by 
technologies like the automobile, which become extensions of our bodies, inserting an 
additional layer of mediation to our already mediate (bodily) experience of the 
material world.   Now 'relationships,' as Ballard observes, are 'mediated by the 
automobile and its technological landscape.'
556   The novel's erotic liturgies (as we 
shall call them) are as incomprehensible as the world the author has created.  Again, 
as he writes in the introduction, 'Crash  is...an extreme metaphor for an extreme 
situation.'
557
The novel begins with Ballard's account of Vaughan's (sacrificial) death, and 
554 J. Ballard, Crash, p. 6.
555 We presume this is a “fictional” imagining of the author. In fact, the character of the narrator is not 
named as “Mr Ballard” until Chapter 6 (p. 59).  We shall differentiate between “the author” (who 
will be referred to as such) and “the narrator” (Ballard).
556 Ibid., p. 101.
557 Ibid., p. 6.224
then backs up to chronicle the events leading up to his death.   From the first 
paragraph, Ballard's narration employs language that invokes the liturgical: 'During 
our friendship [Vaughan] had rehearsed his death in many crashes, but this was his 
only true accident.'
558  As the narrative unfolds, it becomes apparent that Vaughan's 
dual-obsession is with collisions as well as with the wounds and scars resulting from 
this violence.   Even the terms by which the narrator describes the collisions that 
obsess Vaughan, and into which Vaughan draws his small band of disciples,
559 bear 
resemblances to eucharistic theology.  For example, Vaughan is obsessed with 'two 
cars meeting head-on in complex collisions endlessly repeated in slow-motion films, 
by the identical wounds inflicted on their bodies,'
560 just as theologians have asserted 
that even as the Eucharist is repeated in local churches across time and space, history 
and geography, it is yet one identical Eucharist that is being celebrated, which shares 
symbolically in Christ's last supper with his disciples and in the sacrificial body of the 
incarnate Christ.
561  Vaughan's violent rituals, like the Eucharist, are also erotic rituals: 
'He talked of these wounds and collisions with the erotic tenderness of a long-
separated lover.'
562
Further, Vaughan is an evangelist for these obsessions; he is the high priest 
over what emerges as a sort of erotic liturgical community of car-crash junkies.  The 
narrator recounts that 'Vaughan unfolded for me all his obsessions with the mysterious 
eroticism of wounds: the perverse logic of blood-soaked instrumental panels, seat-
558 Ibid., p. 7 [italics are mine]. In the following paragraph, the narrator refers to the “formula” of 
death, reinforcing this liturgical quality.
559 Ballard refers to Vaughan's “success in converting me into an eager disciple” (p. 190).
560 Ibid., p. 8.
561 When we refer to Christ's body as “sacrificial,” we do not mean to limit this reference to Christ's 
crucifixion.  Indeed, the “sacrificiality” of Christ's body begins with the incarnation of God-the-
Son, as indicated by the Christ Hymn of Philippians 2:5-11 ('[He] emptied himself, taking the form 
of a slave...he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death').  Christ's death is indeed 
sacrificial, but His incarnate life should be regarded as sacrificial en toto.
562 Ibid., p. 8.225
belts smeared with excrement, sun-visors lined with brain tissue.'
563  It is clear that the 
author is at least sensitive to the religious themes buried deep within his profane 
imagination, and is able to draw upon religious/liturgical language to convey his 
pornographic vision.   With language that recalls sacramentality (mystērion), this 
'mysterious eroticism' is opaque to outsiders, but to those who have been initiated – 
have embraced through practice and participation – into its inner logic, this mystery 
edges nearer to reality.  The novel's first chapter, which itself (and the novel as a 
whole) is a kind of anamnēsis (remembrance) of Vaughan's life after the event of his 
death, concludes with a vision of 'the speeding cars, moving together towards their 
celebration of wounds'
564 – celebration serving as a central feature of the Eucharist, as 
Paul Bradshaw has thoroughly explicated in his essay on the topic.
565
Ballard's obsession with the synthesis of sex and car crashes begins with his 
auto collision with Helen Remington and her husband, who dies in the crash.  After 
the accident, as Helen is helped from the car, the narrator offers this reflection:
...all I could see was the unusual junction of her thighs, 
opened towards me in this deformed way.  It was not the 
sexuality of the posture that stayed in my mind, but the 
stylization of the terrible events that had involved us, the 
extremes of pain and violence ritualized in this gesture of 
her legs, like the exaggerated pirouette of a mentally 
defective girl I had once seen performing in a Christmas 
play at an institution.
566
563 Ibid., p. 10.
564 Ibid., p. 18. The language/theme of celebration something of a leitmotif throughout the novel; cf. 
'...celebrated in her husband's death the unity of our injuries and my orgasm' (p. 75); 'The junction 
of her mucous membranes and the vehicle, my own metal body, was celebrated by the cars 
speeding past us' (p. 113); '...as if in celebration, their figures were taking up ever more eccentric 
positions' (p. 126); '...celebrating a new technology' (p. 161); '...celebrating in this sexual act the 
marriage of their bodies with this benign technology' (p. 162); '...celebrating the marriage of his 
own genitalia and the skull-shattered dashboard binnacle...' (p. 169). Perhaps the most richly 
liturgical reference appears on p. 187: '...the entrances  of her flesh to a wedding with himself 
already celebrated across the bloody altar of Seagrave's car' [ital. added]. Compare the notion of 
anamnēsis within celebration: 'In our wounds we celebrated the re-birth of the traffic-slain dead, the 
deaths and injuries of those we had seen dying by the roadside and the imaginary wounds and 
postures of the millions yet to die' (p. 203).
565 P. F. Bradshaw, “Celebration,” in R. C. D. Jasper, ed., The Eucharist Today: Studies on Series 3 
(London: SPCK, 1975), pp. 130-41.226
The reference to the Christmas play in this passage (one assumes a nativity play, 
although this may not be the case) immediately invokes Christianity; suddenly key 
words of the passage – pain, violence, ritualized – beg to be read through the lens of 
Christian imagination.  Clearly, Ballard is hinting at the resonance between Christian 
ritual and this profane, erotic ritual that replaces the symbols of Christ's body and 
blood, or even the cross and the other traditional symbols that comprise Christian 
worship, with automobiles, seat belts, hood ornaments/emblems, instrument panels, 
and human bodies and their interior fluids, made exterior by the penetration of the 
human body by the car's appendages and extremities.  Even the actions of the rescue 
crews, cutting bodies from the cars which have become metal sarcophagae, are 
perceived   in   liturgical   terms:   'Even   their   smallest   movements   seemed   to   be 
formalized, hands reaching towards me in a series of coded gestures'
567 – much as the 
ceremonial preparation for the Eucharist.  The narrator comments that not long after 
the incident, 'Already I felt isolated from the reality of this accident.'  And so his quest 
begins to reclaim some connection to the res, the reality, the transcendence that he 
experienced in this most immanent of bodily experiences, where eros and thanatos 
converge in the stylized ritual of the auto crash.  Gazing at Helen, 'Seated like a 
demented madonna between the doors of the second ambulance,' the narrator reflects:
Already I was aware that the interlocked radiator grilles of 
our cars formed the model of an inescapable and perverse 
union between us.  I stared at the contours of her thighs. 
Across them the grey blanket formed a graceful dune. 
Somewhere beneath this mound lay the treasure of her 
pubis.  Its precise jut and rake, the untouched sexuality of 
this intelligent woman, presided over the tragic events of 
the evening.
568
566 J. Ballard, Crash, p. 22.
567 Ibid., p. 23.
568 Ibid., pp. 24-25. The image of 'presidency' over the collision ritual appears throughout the novel, 
e.g. 'These amiable young women ministered within a cathedral of invisible wounds, their 
burgeoning sexualities presiding over the most terrifying facial and genital injuries' (p. 27); 'Over 
the profiles of her body now presided the metallized excitements of our shared dreams of 227
When considered in relation to ritual theory, the idea of  presidency  has a strong 
eucharistic connotation.  As the priest presides over the liturgy, the narrator suggests 
that, under his gaze, Helen's sexuality (in general) and genitalia (in particular) 
somehow occupy a presiding role in his narration of the crash.   This significant 
placement of the erotic – of the sex-act, the collision and interpenetration of human 
and automotive bodies – in the violent liturgies of Vaughan and his disciples is, 
according to Ballard's vision, precisely that which brings a certain (albeit perverse) 
sacramentality to the car crashes.  We might, then, call this assemblage of “techo-
erotomanes” a liturgical community of sorts: their eucharistic ritual is indeed a 
sharing of body and blood, a communion of bodies, broken and spilled.  However, 
instead of the 'wonderful exchange' in which the divine and human life (and bodies 
human and divine: recall that the risen Christ remains incarnate, bodily) are brought 
together in the Christ event, the divine is replaced here with the technological body of 
the automotive machine.
The novel is far too full of words and phrases that connote Ballard's quasi-
sacramental vision for all of them to be recounted and considered here.  The following 
passage reveals the resonance between the eucharistic doctrine of the real presence 
and the existential reality of the narrator and his fellow techo-erotomanes.
The crash was the only real experience I had been through 
for years.  For the first time I was in physical confrontation 
with my own body, an inexhaustible encyclopedia of pains 
and discharges, with the hostile gaze of other people, and 
with the fact of the dead man.
569
In a perverse way, the violent ritual of the collision, and the presence of death therein, 
brings the narrator into deeper communion with his own body – but it fails to achieve 
anything that could be described as communion with the body of an other – at least in 
technology'  (p. 41).
569 Ibid., p. 39.228
this instance.  This brush with the possibility of death – the extinguishing of life, the 
damaging of the body beyond repair – becomes for the narrator a 'real experience.'
The resonance with eucharistic theology that the author is exploring in the text 
is made most explicit in a passage recounting the characters happening upon a horrific 
interstate car crash.   The scene is littered with spectators, including Vaughan, 
Catherine and Ballard, who cannot help but take in the aftermath of the crash.  As the 
ambulances pull away and the scene is cleared of the bodies and detritus of the crash, 
Ballard narrates: 'This pervasive sexuality filled the air, as if we were members of a 
congregation leaving after a sermon, urging us to celebrate our sexualities with 
friends and strangers, and were driving into the night to imitate the bloody eucharist 
we had observed with the most unlikely partners.'
570  The author's post-ecclesial, yet 
still thoroughly Christian, imagination cannot avoid fusing and  con-fusing the 
traditional rituals of the Christian faith with the violent, mechanistic rituals of 
contemporary life, which take us to the point of death.  Altizer's voice echoes here:
Christianity, even as all religious ways, knows death as the 
way to life, and knows an actual passage through death as 
the way to an actual realization of life. Of course, this way 
is a universal way, and perhaps it is most powerfully 
present in ritual, and above all in that pure or archaic ritual 
which is uncontaminated by modernization, a ritual wherein 
resurrection is wholly illusory and unreal apart from its 
manifestation and realization as crucifixion.
571
Even the most perverse sexual practices explored in the novel are infused with a 
language   and   a   sacrality   drawn   from   the   liturgical   and   theological   arena. 
Furthermore,   in   connection   with   our   earlier   discussion   in   Chapter   4,  the 
sacramentality of the broken, wounded body emerges as a strong theme in the 
narrative.   Vaughan, whose body permanently carries the marks of the many car 
crashes he has (intentionally) experienced, is described in raw, visceral terms:
570 Ibid., p. 157.
571 T. Altizer, Total Presence, p. 92.229
He lounged back, legs apart, one hand adjusting his heavy 
groin.  The whiteness of his arms and chest, the scars that 
marked his skin like my own, gave his body an unhealthy 
and metallic sheen, like the worn vinyl of the car interior. 
These apparently meaningless notches on his skin, like the 
gouges   of   a   chisel,   marked   the   sharp   embrace   of   a 
collapsing passenger compartment, the cuneiform of the 
flesh formed by shattering instrument dials, fractured gear 
levers and parking-light switches.  Together they described 
an exact language of pain and sensation, eroticism and 
desire.
572 
The  textuality  of the wounded, disfigured body is depicted here not merely as a 
personal narrative, but as representative of the entire erotic language that emerges 
from the violent collision of the human body with the automobile.  Further, not only 
does the wounded body possess a language and tell a story, but it also represents an 
entirely different aesthetic which breaks with the traditional understanding of beauty 
in terms of purity, completeness, wholeness, etc.   Both Ballard and his wife, 
Catherine, become scarred in car crashes, and these marks as well become 'sacred' 
sites, the focus of erotic desire.  After watching Catherine and Vaughan engage in 
violent sex in the backseat of the automobile he pilots, Ballard says of his wife, 'I saw 
the weals on her cheek and neck, the bruised mouth that deformed her nervous smile. 
These disfigurements marked the elements of her real beauty.'
573  He continues:
I held Catherine closely, loving her for the blows Vaughan 
had struck her body.  Later that night, I explored her body 
and bruises, feeling them gently with my lips and cheek, 
seeing in the rash of raw skin across her abdomen the 
forcing geometry of Vaughan's powerful physique. My 
penis traced the raw symbols that his hands and mouth had 
left across her skin...marking out the contact points of the 
imaginary automobile accident which Vaughan had placed 
on her body.
574
Vaughan's body is also a body of desire to Ballard and the other characters.  He is 
horrifically disfigured, deeply scarred from countless car crashes.  Ballard remarks, 
572 J. Ballard, Crash, p. 90.
573 Ibid., p. 165.
574 Ibid., p. 166.230
'Vaughan's body, with its unsavoury skin and greasy pallor, took on a hard, mutilated 
beauty within the elaborately signalled landscape of the motorway.'
575
Another body in the narrative, that of a minor character named Gabrielle, is 
unique in that her extensive injuries have crippled her legs, requiring elaborate 
mechanical braces to allow any mobility.  Gabrielle's mechanized body is most like 
the automobiles that the novel romanticizes, making her an object of particular desire. 
In once scene, the narrator accompanies Vaughan and Gabrielle to an auto showroom 
filled with new cars.  Ballard confesses, 'My eyes were fixed on her leg brace, on her 
deformed thighs and knees, her swinging left shoulder, these portions of her body that 
seemed to beckon toward the immaculate machines on their revolving stands, inviting 
them to confront her wounds.'
576  Later Ballard and Gabrielle make love in the rear 
seat of her car, which has been customized to compensate for her physical limitations. 
'Each of her deformities became a potent metaphor for the excitements of a new 
violence.  Her body, with its angular contours, its unexpected junctions of mucous 
membrane and hairline, detrusor muscle and erectile tissue, was a ripening anthology 
of perverse possibilities.'
577  As Ballard undresses her of her braces and harnesses, he 
discovers 'marked depressions, troughs of reddened skin hollowed out in the forms of 
buckles and clasps...corrugated skin...these were the templates for new genital organs, 
the moulds of new sexual possibilities yet to be created in a hundred experimental car 
crashes.'
578   Further, Ballard acknowledges that arousal and excitement is not, for 
them, the product of 'the nominal junction of points of the sexual act' but rather the 
exploration of the wounds and marks and disfigurements of one another's bodies:
Her fingers found the small scars below my left collar bone, 
575 Ibid., p. 171.
576 Ibid., p. 174.
577 Ibid., pp. 175-76.
578 Ibid., p. 176-77.231
the   imprint   of   the   outer   quadrant   of   the   instrument 
binnacle...[She] began to explore the other wound-scars on 
my chest and abdomen, running the tip of her tongue into 
each one.  In turn, one by one, she endorsed each of these 
signatures, inscribed on my body by the dashboard and 
control surfaces of the car....I moved my hand...to the scars 
on her thighs, feeling the tender causeways driven through 
her flesh by the handbrake of the car in which she had 
crashed....I explored the scars on her thighs and arms, 
feeling for the wound areas under her left breast, as she in 
turn explored mine, deciphering together these codes of a 
sexuality made possible by our two car-crashes.
579
Ballard finds sexual fulfillment in 'the deep wound on her thigh,' and states that he 
felt no trace of pity for this crippled woman, but celebrated 
with her the excitements of these abstract vents let into her 
body by sections of her own automobile....in these sexual 
apertures formed by fragmenting windshield louvres and 
dashboard dials in a high-speed impact....I dreamed of other 
accidents that might enlarge this repertory of orifices.
580
As horrific as these images are of the wounded, damaged body, which is 
eroticized precisely in its brokenness, we suggest that a novel like Crash warrants a 
'liturgical' reading.   By this, we mean that the characters and their practices, as 
depicted in the narrative, are best understood, and in many ways only begin to make 
sense, when considered through a liturgical lens.   We are not referring to the 
eucharistic liturgy per se, but rather to the ritual forms by which the characters that 
inhabit the literary world 'make sense' of their existence.   Certainly by now it is 
apparent that liturgies and rituals grant to a people the ability to narrate their identity, 
and this ability is especially powerful in the case of groups, cultures, and societies that 
are particularly disparate or atomized.
581   Ballard's parable describes a thoroughly 
diasporic culture, wherein every person is disconnected from every other.  In response 
to   this   given   condition,   the   characters   of   the   novel   seek   to   overcome   their 
579 Ibid., pp. 178-79.
580 Ibid., p. 179.
581 Here we could consider as one example the conclusions William Cavanaugh arrives at in Torture 
and Eucharist, viz. the Chilean Catholic Church's recovery of the Eucharist as a ritual means by 
which to resist the social fragmentation wrought by the tortuous dictatorship of General Pinochet.  232
fragmentation through sacrificial rituals wherein the violent interpenetration of bodies 
in automotive collisions and sexual intercourse comprise the liturgies by which these 
characters glean meaning and 'make sense' of their otherwise solitary lives.  While we 
do not find it particularly useful to make assertions or assumptions about the author's 
intentions, Ballard's employment of theological and liturgical language and images 
indicates that he is not oblivious to the many parallels highlighted here.  Perhaps more 
than most, Ballard's literary art is keenly aware of the resonance between these 
myriad   expressions   of   sacramentality,   juxtaposing   and   confusing   (seemingly 
deliberately) the sacred and the profane, the immanent and the transcendent, the 
corporeal and the incorporeal, and so on.   And so we emerge with a dystopian, 
horrifying vision of the broken, erotic body, yet one that is still conceived as 
profoundly sacramental.  We will reserve judgment about the value and validity of 
this vision of sacramentality until after our discussion of Bataille's fiction, to which 
we now turn.
6.4 Profaning the Eucharist: Bataille and the Limits of Language
Georges Bataille’s scholarly work, which is itself a strange confluence of 
philosophy,   theology,   anthropology   and   cultural   history,   bears   a   fascinating 
relationship to his fiction.  It occurs to us that Bataille's literary (fictional) language 
seeks to perform that which his scholarly (non-fictional) writings theorize.  And in a 
certain sense, his fiction succeeds – or more nearly approaches its mark – where his 
scholarly language falls short.  As Karmen MacKendrick writes, 'It is Bataille who 
breaks language apart to show us why the erotic and the sacred are the same at base, 
wildly sacrificial and incomprehensibly joyous.'
582  Bataille's Story of the Eye pushes 
the symbol of the Eucharist to its erotic extreme.  The story, which has been heralded 
582 Karmen MacKendrick, Counterpleasures (SUNY Press: Albany, NY, 1999), p. 4.233
as a masterpiece of pornographic literature, demonstrates the ultimate inability of 
language to convey both religious and erotic experience.  It also, in its stunning and 
disturbing conclusion, seeks to unveil a common sacramentality shared between sex 
and the sacred, which as we have established encompasses violence, sacrifice and 
death as well.   The experience of each of these is, of course, inexpressible and 
unsharable.  It is as though Bataille is keenly aware of – and intent on exploring in his 
fiction – the way that each of these experiences are universal (at least potentially), and 
yet at the same time they are also deeply isolated and isolating, insofar as no one is 
able to truly share in the religious or sexual experience of any other person; and 
certainly one cannot experience any death but her own.  This is similar to what Elaine 
Scarry describes in her masterful study, The Body in Pain: all humanity is united in 
the common experience of bodily pain, and yet at the same time, bodily pain is 
absolutely individual and unable to be shared or experienced by any other body.
583
The narrative of The Story of the Eye chronicles the sexual escapades of a 
woman named Simone and an unnamed male narrator, who recounts the events of the 
novel from a vantage point later in life.  An additional male character, Sir Edmund, a 
wealthy and voyeuristic Englishman, enters the narrative midway and plays a 
significant role in the horrific final scene, which will be the subject of our discussion 
here.  The structure is episodic, with little besides the growing depravity and intensity 
of the sexual acts providing cohesion from one vignette to the next.  After several 
chapters providing remembrances of various exhibitionist sexual scenarios, we arrive 
at Chapter 12, entitled “Simone's Confession and Sir Edmund's Mass,” and the 13
th 
and final chapter (“The Legs of the Fly”) where the story ends unresolved; the author 
(Bataille, or perhaps a fictive “Bataille”) providing the final postscript connecting 
583 cf. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford UP, 1985).234
certain characters and events of the novel to his own childhood and family relations.
Throughout the novella, each of the narrator's remembrances of his sexual 
history with Simone seems to involve an increased degree of violence.  The pair's 
early sexual experiences are relatively innocent, but their practices soon turn to 
scatological   play,   sado-masochistic   mutilation,   and   eventually   murder   and 
necrophilia.   In the final two chapters, the three main characters – the narrator, 
Simone, and Sir Edmund – have absconded to Spain, where they visit Madrid, take in 
a bullfight and witness the castration of a bull and the death of a toreador, both of 
which incite erotic pleasure in Simone.   Shortly thereafter, they travel to Seville, 
which Simone wishes to visit 'because of it's reputation as a city of pleasure.'
584 
Simone seems to float through the city as an object of arousal; the narrator recounts 
'Indeed, we virtually never stopped having sex.'
585  However, the descriptions of sex in 
the story eventually begin to lose all meaning; they become numbed and numbing 
repetitions of depravity, in no way sensual or arousing.  The trio eventually enters an 
empty Catholic church, which according to legend (and appropriately to the narrative) 
was founded by the fabled lover Don Juan, whose tomb is said to be located beneath 
the threshold of the church.  Entering the sanctuary, the confessional chamber in the 
church is found occupied, and the trio sit and wait for the penitent – an attractive 
young woman – and the priest, to emerge.  The narrator describes the two in highly 
erotic terms: the woman is 'enraptured: with her head thrown back and her eyes white 
and vacant' and the priest is 'blond...very young, very handsome, with a long thin face 
and the pale eyes of a saint...still gliding in his ecstasy.'
586   The sacrament of 
reconciliation which has taken place inside the chamber is thus conceived as an erotic 
interaction between the penitent and her confessor, perhaps implied as a kind of 
584 Georges Bataille, Story of the Eye, by Lord Auch (London: Penguin Books, 2001), p. 55.
585 Ibid., p. 55
586 Ibid., pp. 57-58.235
power play wherein each party in the exchange is gratified – spiritually but also 
perhaps sexually – despite the absence of touch.
Simone expresses her desire to confess, so she enters the confessional 
chamber, and the profane sex-play ensues.  Unbeknownst to the priest, but apparent to 
the narrator and Sir Edmund, Simone pleasures herself whilst giving her confession. 
She eventually reveals this perversion to the confessor, and then begins to perform 
fellatio and other sexual acts on the passive, unresisting priest.  It is clear that here 
Bataille, through his narrator, is exploring the subversion and utter degradation of the 
Eucharist, as the central act of the Catholic worship that defines his own experience of 
Christianity.   The narrator speaks of the priest in contemptuous terms: he is 
'lugubrious,' a 'sordid creature,' a 'dreadful phantom,' a 'larva,' a 'vile priest,' a 'wretch,' 
a 'swine,' a 'sacerdotal pig' with a 'moronic face,' 'monster,' 'imbecile,' 'beast' and so 
on.  However, it is noteworthy that Bataille, in describing the pitiful, despicable priest, 
places this piece of dialogue in the narrative:
“Senores,” the wretch snivelled, “you must think I'm a 
hypocrite.”
“No,” replied Sir Edmund with a categorical intonation.
It as though the unresisting priest is giving himself over/up as the sacrifice in this 
erotic liturgy, to be raped, tortured, killed and mutilated.  However, while the priest 
perceives   his   willing   participation   in   the   eroto-drama   as   hypocritical   and 
irreconcilable with his religious vocation, Sir Edmund admits no such disconnection; 
to Sir Edmund and the other two players, his passivity and non-interference is most 
natural.  This key passage could be easily passed over without comment, except that 
in the final chapter, the priest is referred to several times as 'victim,'
587 recalling the 
association of Christ as the victim – the subject of sacrifice, but also the victual given 
587 Ibid.: 'Next, Sir Edmund, slipping under his victim...' (p. 64); 'At last, she squeezed so resolutely 
that an even more violent thrill shot through her victim' (p. 65).236
as food – of the Mass.  Bataille tests the ability, or inability, of language to profane the 
most sacred of things, and to con-fuse the sexual with the religious.
As the drama unfolds, the characters drag the priest out of the confessional 
chamber and to the sacristy.  While Simone and the narrator defile the unprotesting 
priest, Sir Edmund discovers the key to the tabernacle, and retrieves the ciborium 
filled with the eucharistic wafers, and the chalice used to hold the wine.  Thus ensues 
the most comprehensive and explicit profanation of the Eucharist found in modern 
literature.   The trio force the priest to urinate into the chalice, which he is then 
commanded to drink.  The narrator's description of this event is paradoxical: 'The 
paralyzed   wretch   drank   with   well-nigh   filthy   ecstasy   at   one   long   gluttonous 
draft...gurgling desperately and revelling in it.'
588   Here again, the passive priest is 
perceived to be enjoying this torturous degradation, these 'miserable sacrileges.'  This 
parallel defilement of both the vicar and the Eucharist finally reaches its extreme 
when the priest ejaculates onto the wafers contained in the ciborium.  In many ways 
this orgasm is also the climax of the narrative; the final chapter is a decrescendo after 
“Sir Edmund's Mass.”  The ritual concludes with Simone strangling the priest to death 
during intercourse; Sir Edmund extracting the priest's eye; and the narrator and 
Simone engaging in additional perverse sex-play with the eye.
589
Bataille could be commended for his daring exploration of this most profane 
imagery bound up together with the sacrality of the Eucharist; for the ritual 
undertaken by the characters in the novella is certainly a liturgy, just as their sexual 
588 Ibid., p. 62.
589 Much could be made of the symbolism of eggs and eyes throughout the narrative, as demonstrated 
by Roland Barthes' critical essay “The Metaphor of the Eye,” included in the Penguin Classics 
edition of Story of the Eye.  However, this symbolism is not of significant interest to the discussion 
at hand of the confluence of the sacred and profane, of the erotic and the sacramental.  We note the 
multiple possibilities of such interpretations (the relationship between eggs, testicles, and eyes; the 
similarity in French between oeil and oeuf; etc.), but elect instead to focus on the story's profanation 
of the vicar and the Eucharist, and in particular Bataille's disclosure of the utterly depraved and 
sacrilegious lurking just beneath the surface of the most sacred of rites.237
acts have held a certain liturgical quality throughout the narrative (albeit rituals 
largely devoid of any love or passion).   We wish to assert that what Bataille 
accomplishes is actually a demonstration of the utter failure of these sexual liturgies 
to fulfill, to satisfy.  If desire is not the desire of fulfillment but rather the desire for 
desire,
590  so the sexual acts in the narrative  obliterate  desire by exploring the 
relentless pursuit of desire even as every desire in the narrative, however perverse and 
carnal, is almost fully instantaneously fulfilled.  As a consequence, the accounts of the 
sexual acts in this pornographic novel are devoid of any eroticism whatsoever – far 
from titillating, the vignettes of the novel are, like Ballard's Crash, a horrifying and 
nauseating experience to read and imagine.
591
Bataille's depiction is a horrific dystopia of unbridled sexual depravity, which 
in the end proves to be all-consuming, insatiable, self-destructive.  In the final scene, 
even the most sacred is profaned; the vicarious, gracious presence of Christ, 
represented by the priest who in the Eucharist acts in persona Christi, and embodied 
in the eucharistic elements, is raped, degraded, massacred, mutilated.  Or, perhaps 
better   put,   the   most   sacred   of   acts   –   the   sexual   and   the   sacramental   –   are 
simultaneously revealed to be indistinguishable from the most utterly profane.  For 
this reason, it seems to us, Roland Barthes describes Story of the Eye as
not a deep work.  Everything in it is on the surface.  There 
is no hierarchy.  The metaphor is laid out in its entirety; it is 
circular and explicit, with no secret reference behind it.  It 
is a case of signification without a thing signified (or in 
which everything is signified), and it is not the least beauty 
590 Bataille writes: 'How sweet it is to remain in the grip of the desire to burst out without going the 
whole way, without taking the final step!  How sweet it is to gaze long upon the object of our 
desire, to live on in our desire, instead of dying by going the whole way, by yielding to the 
excessive violence of desire' (Eroticism, pp. 141-42).
591 In fact, in attempting to categorize the novel according to conventional genres, it may not be 
inappropriate to describe the novel as not only as “pornography” but also as “horror/fantasy.”  The 
gruesome violence of the novel's final scene bears striking similarities to a recent trend in the 
cinema of horror that has been described as “torture-porn”; films exemplary of this genre include 
Hostel,  the  Saw  franchise, and several recent Asian horror films (Old Boy), characterized by 
liturgies of sexualized/eroticized and  voyeuristic violence, dismemberment, cannibalism, etc.238
nor the least novelty of this text that it constitutes...a kind of 
open literature out of reach of all interpretation
592
In this sense, it is a novel that destroys interpretation.  It is 'anti-hermeneutical.'  But 
in a sense, this could be said of the Eucharist itself, which resists – not just confounds 
but renders useless – our most nuanced attempts to interpret.  The Eucharist, in other 
words, is not an object for hermeneutical inquiry: it is a hermeneutic, an interpretive 
grid through which to interpret all of life, yet itself resistant to interpretation.
In her essay “The Pornographic Imagination,” Susan Sontag comments that 
Bataille's 'intellectual project [is] to explore the scope of transgression.'
593  Sontag's 
essay looks further into literature that we will not examine in this study, most notably 
Pauline Réage's The Story of O.
594  We will however consider Sontag's comment upon 
this literary work, for it is in her consideration of this work that Sontag takes note of 
the   sacramental   quality   of   the   sexual   liturgies   recounted   in   such   works   of 
pornographic fiction.  She writes:
Religious metaphors abound in a good deal of modern 
erotic   literature...and   in   some   works   of   pornographic 
literature, too. The Story of O makes heavy use of religious 
metaphors for the ordeal that O undergoes. O “wanted to 
believe.” Her drastic condition of total personal servitude to 
those who use her sexually is repeatedly described as a 
mode of salvation. With anguish and anxiety, she surrenders 
herself...When she has, to be sure, entirely lost her freedom, 
O has gained the right to participate in what is described as 
virtually a sacramental rite.
595
As referenced earlier in this chapter, Bataille acknowledges that 'all eroticism has a 
sacramental character,'
596 and in Story of the Eye, he attempts to demonstrate that there 
592 Roland Barthes, “The Metaphor of the Eye,” in Story of the Eye (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 123.
593 Susan Sontag, “The Pornographic Imagination,” in Story of the Eye (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 
107.
594 Robert Detweiler gives an insightful theological (or, rather, “religious”) reading of Réage's The 
Story of O in his seminal volume Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary Fiction 
(London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 136-45.
595 S. Sontag, “Pornographic Imagination,” pp. 112-13 [ital. are mine].
596 G. Bataille, Eroticism, pp. 15-16.239
is indeed no limit to this claim: all eroticism, no matter how perverse, profane and 
depraved.
It is apparent that the limits of language, located and transgressed in erotic or 
pornographic literature, bear much resemblance to those boundaries transgressed in 
the symbolic grammar of sacramentality.  From the perspective of Christian faith, that 
salvation explored in Réage's fiction, wrought by sado-masochistic submission, 
mirrors almost precisely, albeit perversely, the traditional Christian understanding of 
salvation: one must lose one's life to find it; one must take up one's cross and die to 
self to gain eternal life, for, following St. Paul, to live is Christ and to die is gain.  We 
are baptized into Christ's vicarious death and resurrection; we give up our freedom 
and become willing slaves to the gospel; we carry on our bodies the marks or wounds 
of Christ; and so on.   In the Eucharist, we enact this visceral image of salvation.
No matter how hard Christian theology tries to domesticate this image or make 
it more palatable, the scandalous core of sacramentality will rise to the surface again 
and again.  If theology cannot bear this thought, the skandalon will surface in literary 
and artistic utterances not constrained by or beholden to ecclesiastical dogma.  It is 
our assertion that this is  precisely  what Bataille and Réage accomplish in their 
pornographic fictions: transgressing boundaries that theology cannot bear; speaking 
(and in god-like fashion, in speaking,  creating) that which Christian theology 
considers unspeakable.  To illustrate this, we turn once again to Bataille's narrative: 
when Sir Edmund draws an explicit connection between the whiteness of the 
eucharistic wafer and that of male ejaculate (and even more shockingly,  Christ's 
sperm!), 'The lucidity of this logic was so convincing that Simone and [the narrator] 
required no further explanation.'
597   In many ways, this is the linchpin of novella's 
entire finale, in our view, for here Bataille sums up in one brief statement our entire 
597 G. Bataille, Eye, p. 62.240
thesis regarding the confluence of the sacred and the profane in the inter-relationship 
between the erotic and the sacramental: this connection, so jarringly sacrilegious and 
abhorrent to the reader, is accepted and dismissed as the most sane and obvious sort of 
common sense.   To the characters engaged in this profane erotic liturgy, which 
culminates not simply in aberrant sex-play but in death and dismemberment, the 
symbolic level on which one would connect the eucharistic host to semen (a kind of 
hyper-literalization of the logos spermatikos), or the chalice holding tawny wine to 
urine, requires no stretch of the imagination whatsoever, but instead emerges as 
primary even to the point of being unworthy of significant comment, explanation or 
interpretation by the characters.
In this sense, Bataille succeeds in bringing to light the horrifying commingling 
of the sacred and the profane, of the erotic and the sacramental, of life and death, 
bound up in the Eucharist itself.  By subverting the Eucharist, by profaning its ritual, 
by perverting its liturgy and slaying its principle actor (the priest/vicar), Bataille 
reveals not so much the sacramentality of sex as the eroticism of sacramentality – 
although of course both observations are appropriate.  His narrative both elevates the 
erotic to the level of the liturgical and sacramental, even as it degrades the Eucharist 
to the level of carnality.  And yet, is the former truly an elevation?  Is the latter a 
degradation?  Perhaps these spatial metaphors are no longer useful in this coincidence 
of opposites where each infuses the other: elevation is degradation and vice versa. 
The Second Person of the Triune Godhead becomes incarnate, flesh and blood, in 
Jesus of Nazareth; as divinity assumes humanity, humankind is subsumed into the life 
of the Divine, even as human beings consume the physical body of the Divine in the 
Eucharist itself.   
6.5 Lipstick on the Host: The Sacramentality of Sex
Ballard's and Bataille's fictions present us with horrific visions of bodies 241
engaged in aberrant erotic activity.  In the cases of both their fictions, the erotic, no 
matter how perverse and depraved, is construed in sacramental and even liturgical 
terms.  We want to be clear that our use of these novels in the present discussion is not 
a glorification of violent, pornographic fictions, an attempt to baptize these two novels 
or novelists in sacramentality, nor is it an effort to radicalize our understanding of 
sacramentality such that it may indeed include the kinds of extreme practices depicted 
in these two novels.  Rather, our incorporation of these narratives into the discussion 
is motivated by the way both works draw upon more (Bataille) or less (Ballard) overt 
sacramental and even eucharistic language and imagery to present similar-yet-distinct 
visions of the sacramentality of the erotic body which are unbearable for Christian 
theology of any sort.  The challenge presented to Christian sacramental and liturgical 
thinking (and practice!) by these fictions must not be passed over, even though we 
finally ascertain that the 'sacramental' visions contained in these novels is at best, like 
Perfume's Grenouille, anti-sacramental – for how can we accept these visions as part 
of our understanding of sacramentality when they are devoid of any sense of love or 
authentic, embodied koinōnia?
We will conclude this chapter, and this study, by engaging a fictional narrative 
that we believe offers a constructive and profound vision of the sacramentality of the 
erotic body, and the inner eroticism of the Eucharist, which points the way forward in 
our thematic exploration of sacrament.  Irish author Aidan Mathews’ novella Lipstick 
on the Host tells the story of Margaret (Meggie), an unmarried woman of about 40. 
Meggie, a Roman Catholic herself, teaches literature at a Catholic school.  Struggling 
with her hypochondriac mother, her age, her loneliness and desire for romance, and 
her compulsion to make up stories, our narrator reveals herself to the reader through a 
series of sixteen journal entries, spanning nearly two months of her life around the 
time of her forty-first birthday.  Throughout her journal entires, Meggie is especially 242
candid about her insecurities with her body.  However, she does meet and form a 
romantic relationship with Antony, and this encounter, however brief, sets in motion 
the events into which the story draws us.
The religious and the sensual are never far apart in this story, a hint into the 
sacramentally-steeped, incarnational Catholicism of the Irish literary imagination. 
During Meggie and Antony's first date, their conversation ranges widely: ‘We touched 
on just about everything, and just about everything touched us.’
598  Antony happens to 
be a gynecologist and several years Meggie’s senior.  Writing about their date, Meggie 
reflects on Antony’s body, and her own, in relation to his profession: 
He is a gynaecologist. I should have guessed from his 
hands.  His hands are thoughtful and cared-for.  No woman 
would be afraid of them. They are too fatherly for that. 
Instead of being afraid, you would be the opposite. You 
would buy new underwear and a new outfit for each visit, 
and spray the inside of your thigh with an atomizer when 
the nurse called you in. He would stroke your bump, and 
beam. Then, as his fingers slipped ever so quietly inside 
you, you’d read the Latin diplomas and degrees that hung 
from the picture railing on the opposite wall, and wonder 
why his name didn’t have a H in it.
599
On their date, they also discuss their religious faith and backgrounds; Meggie is 
'Dublin Catholic,' while Antony is low-church protestant.  Antony gives insight into 
his very this-worldly, non-supernatural spirituality:
Of course I’m spiritual....But spirituality...has more to do 
with my brother scampering round the house when he was 
four, shouting “Easter eggs. Christ has risen. Easter eggs.” 
It’s very down to earth, you know.  It’s got its feet on the 
ground. It’s soiled. The odour of sanctity is the stink of the 
laundry bin.
600
Antony here articulates  a  kind of  pervasive spirituality  or sacramentality that 
comprises everyday life.  Distinct from Meggie's high-sacramental Catholic tradition, 
598 Aidan Mathews, Lipstick on the Host (London: Vintage, 1998), p. 240.
599 Ibid., pp. 240-41.
600 Ibid., p. 241.243
Antony represents something less mystical, or perhaps rather, mystical chiefly in its 
mundaneness – 'the stink of the laundry bin.'   His faith, his religious practice, is 
incarnate, 'soiled' even – dirty perhaps, but only in the way that is unavoidable and 
fully a part of our humanity.  There is nothing sinful, after all, about having to wash 
sweaty clothes; it is simply a consequence of being in-the-body.
In class the following day, Meggie makes a questionable remark to her high 
school students about Milton and 'how his use of lovely, long Latin words is a 
compensation for no sex.  It is, actually, a kind of cunnilingus.’
601  She later questions 
the wisdom of making such a sexually charged comment to her class, but her musings 
cut right to the heart of the story, the intermingling of the sacramental and the sexual, 
the sacred and the profane, in the ‘wonderful exchange’ equally present in Holy 
Communion and human coitus.  She writes: ‘Should I have said that?  Perhaps I 
shouldn’t have said that.  You can show them pictures of the electric chair or a baby 
eating blue-bottles in a back-street in Bangladesh, but you can’t tell them that people 
receive each other like Holy Communion.’
602
Later in the story, Meggie accompanies Antony on an errand, after which he 
decides he wants to buy her a dress.  Antony peeks into the dressing room where 
Meggie is changing, and she unflinchingly discloses her naked body to him: 
I opened my bra and took it off, and hung it on a hanger.  It 
balanced beautifully, one cup on each side of the wire.  It 
didn’t tilt, and slip to the ground.  I was so grateful....
I gathered the flowing folds of the gown from where they 
had run like water to my pleated waist, and I drew them up 
slowly over my stomach and the cove of my ribs and my 
bare, unbearable breasts, until I was decent again....
He had seen them.  He had wanted to touch them; not to test 
them,   not   to   handle   or   manhandle   them   with   brisk, 
cellophane fingers, palpating for lumps; but to touch them, 
601 Ibid., p. 249.
602 Ibid., p. 249.244
to squeeze them, to leave the marks of his fingernails 
around the wet stub of the nipple.  He was not thinking of 
lactation then; he was thinking of milk and honey.
603
Meggie presents her body to Antony as a visual feast.  Her body, which has troubled 
her in its age and its isolation, becomes under her lover's gaze a promised land, a 
garden of delight.  It is almost as if through his gaze, but not yet his touch, Meggie 
receives the gift of her own body – her body as an object of desire, but at this stage, 
desire unfulfilled.  Describing these events in her journal, Meggie concludes thus: ‘I 
am very near the world.   I can almost smell it.’
604   The sensuous image recalls 
Antony's brand of spirituality: earthy, grounded, the 'odour of sanctity,' the smell of 
the human body.  Here once again we are flung into not the carnality of this world, in 
the sinful sense, but its in/carnality, its incarnation.   Desire, sacred and profane, 
infuses every action with deeper significance for these two characters and their 
commingled passions.  Like the individual words of a poem, mundane if interpreted 
on their own, the actions and events of life during this phase of newly germinating 
love all become plurisignificant.  For this brief period, particularly because of her 
growing intimacy with Antony, Meggie experiences life with a heightened awareness 
of its wonder, its mystery.  Not that everything is perfect – to the contrary – but 
everything is a swirl of communion, God’s love (agape) and the love of God 
commingling with Antony’s love for her, and her for him (eros) – to the point when, 
in fact, one cannot be distinguished from the other.
At the end of Chapter 5, we briefly considered Simone de Beauvoir's accounts 
of women mystics St. Angela of Foligno, who happily drank the wash-water of the 
lepers she bathed, consuming bits of dead skin like communion, and Marie Alacoque, 
whose love for a patient she nursed led her to clean up vomit with her tongue.  In our 
603 Ibid., p. 268.
604 Ibid., p. 269.245
story, Meggie becomes like these women mystics when she cleans up the morning-
sickness of a secretly pregnant student in her class: 
I picked up the vomit with my bare hands...But I wasn’t 
disgusted.  I wasn’t even indifferent.  Actually, I was quite 
happy.  It made such perfect sense, really....And I think I 
felt joy for the time that it took for the classroom to empty 
around me. I am not quite certain what joy feels like, but I 
think I felt joy.
605
Following this epiphanic experience, a sacred celebration of bodily filth, 
Meggie runs errands and makes preparation for the Antony's visit to her home and the 
inevitable sexual consummation she desires.  She is keenly aware of her body:
I sat in the bath for an hour.  I’ve never been so clean....I 
shaved a lot of myself; I could wear a thong, almost....Then 
I got hard skin off the side of my foot with the edge of the 
scissors.
606
Meggie is readying her body to be presented as an offering to her lover.  She is caring 
for it – grooming it, removing dead skin and hair, soaking and softening it – as a way 
of caring for him.  When he receives her 'like Holy Communion,' she wants to be a 
pleasing sacrifice to his senses.  In her journal entry for Sunday, 25 February, Meggie 
makes her confession about her first love-making with Antony.  She conceives her 
body as text to be read, and as food to be tasted and savored. 
My body was Braille to his blindness.   He read  me 
everywhere.  There are so many parts of my body I have 
never touched, unless they are ill.  They are sick from not 
being touched.  But his tongue toured me.  He opened me 
like a book, and smelled the pages.
607
Meggie's body occupies several different metaphors in this passage.  She is Braille, a 
sign system that is interpreted by touch rather than sight.  She is a book, but not one 
that is read, but rather smelled.  Again we are taken to the image of the laundry bin, 
the  musty  bookstore smell  of pages  which  have  absorbed the  odors  of their 
605 Ibid., p. 272.
606 Ibid., p. 275.
607 Ibid., p. 277.246
surroundings.  She is a map, or a road – a journey to be taken – 'his tongue toured me.' 
This complex of metaphors reveals both the ability and inability of language to 
express erotic experience.  The same is true, of course, with religious experience, 
experience with the sacred, which encompasses the sexual.  The best that she can do, 
with language, with her writing, is tell it in metaphors. 
Bringing to a close what we assume is a lengthy period of sexual deprivation, 
Meggie is confronted with feelings – physical, emotional, spiritual? – long since 
forgotten:
I can still feel him inside me.   Antony, I mean.   I had 
forgotten that, too: the feeling of being filled.   I had 
forgotten how quickly you itch afterwards, and how warm 
the sperm is, and the lines of noughts and crosses on your 
breasts from the weight of their bodies....the theologians 
and the pornographers only know the half of it...How long 
do you feel a man inside you?  It will be twelve hours in 
two hours’ time.
608
The communion between their bodies brings Meggie more fully into communion with 
her own body: its openings and aporias, the impressions on skin, the lingering 
sensation of touch removed.   Her conjoining of the sacred (theologians) and the 
profane (pornographers) – or perhaps it is the dichotomy between theory (theology) 
and practice (pornography) – is both ironic and profound.  What she seeks, what she 
has found, is a third-way, a kind of doxic experience which is more akin to worship or 
mystic ecstasy than anything else.
After their sexual consummation, a few days pass without Meggie hearing 
from Antony, and she reflects in her journal. ‘It is twenty-four hours since I stopped 
feeling him inside me. Now I can only feel his absence.  It’s not as nice.’
609   Her 
experience of being filled by him, of what must seem to her, despite the body's 
mediation, like im-mediacy, is replaced by an experience of absence.  Toward the end 
608 Ibid., p. 278.
609 Ibid., p. 284.247
of this entry, she reveals that a pregnant fellow-teacher (and sometimes-rival) from 
her school – who shares her name ('the other Meggie') – has suffered a late-term 
miscarriage.  Our narrator writes of it in gut-wrenching terms that indicate this is a 
pain that perhaps she has experienced herself; and although she never verifies this 
fact, earlier comments about mid-life child-bearing, and her attempts to convince 
herself, through the popular wisdom of magazine articles, that she is not past her 
prime, seem to disclose a desire – almost an obsession – rooted in loss.  Despite her 
occasional hostility toward the other Meggie, she is clearly touched on a deep level, 
and writes about it in painful, visceral terms:
Meggie’s baby will not be born. It will be disinterred, and 
buried again somewhere else, with the skeletons and the 
signet rings of great-grandparents. It will never kick her 
again; it will only trample her into the ground. It had the 
lifespan of a laboratory mouse or a tin of pears. It was alive; 
now it’s dead. And the little semi-colon in between, that 
tough and tiny waterway between the one and the other, like 
the Panama Canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific, will 
never see it throw a stone and watch the circles spread.
They   say   it’s   been   dead   for   a   week...He   has   been 
decomposing inside her suntan for seven days and seven 
nights,   with   his   thumb   in   his   mouth   and   his   ankles 
crossed...
610
Mathews' poetics in this passage, inscribed in Meggie's voice, are as devastating as 
they are remarkable.  David Jasper wrote of reading the final scene of Perfume that it 
is hard, shocking, 'indigestible.'
611   This passage is exceedingly more intolerable – 
excruciating to read.  Meggie's experience, coping with the absence of Antony, in the 
aftermath of their erotic communion – her feeling of being filled, now feeling only the 
presence of his absence – is juxtaposed with the other Meggie's experience of losing 
the life which filled her womb.  Like Ellen Gluyas' miscarriage and stillbirth in A 
Fringe of Leaves, the  corps  of the mother has become the host to a corpse, 
610 Ibid., pp. 284-85.
611 D. Jasper, The Sacred Body, p. 26.248
'decomposing inside her.'  Mathews, via Meggie, even gives us an additional punch 
when the pronoun shifts – 'it's been dead for a week...He has been decomposing inside 
her.'  The child, the son, is dead – 'it is finished.'  Lest this excursus on the miscarriage 
seem like a detour from our discussion of the sacramentality of the erotic body, let us 
call to mind the erotic act that led to this pregnancy.  The maternal body here, as 
Caroline Walker Bynum has amply demonstrated, is associated with food to be 
consumed, nursing and nourishing the newborn.
612   Additionally, Girard has called 
attention to the relationship of the female body, which spills blood in menstruation 
and is distended and torn in childbirth, with sacred/sacrificial violence.
613  However, 
this account of profound abandonment cannot be theorized or circumscribed.  The 
body of the child is simultaneously present and absent: present body, absent life. 
'Why do you look for the living among the dead...He is not here' (Lk. 24:5).  Like the 
crucified, transcorporeal Christ, he is neither here, nor there – a displaced body.
614
The day following this journal entry is Ash Wednesday, which is of course not 
insignificant – it is the start of Lent, the liturgical season leading up to Easter during 
which the faithful participate in ascetic practices of self-denial and renunciation for 
the sake of deepening their relationship to Christ, participating in his 40-day 
wilderness sufferings, and in preparation to celebrate the Church’s greatest feast of 
Christ’s Resurrection.   Meggie still has not heard from Antony – their sexual 
consummation was the previous Saturday, and she is anxious and frustrated by his 
silence.  On Ash Wednesday, Meggie confesses that she is late for chapel and presents 
herself to receive communion only to realize she is wearing lipstick, and does not feel 
comfortable to partake of the host over painted lips.  She takes the host in her hand, 
and secretly returns to her seat with it to receive after she has wiped her lips clean, but 
612 C. Walker Bynum, Holy Feast, pp. 269-76, passim.
613 R. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 34-37.
614 cf. G. Ward, Cities of God, pp. 81-116.249
she is interrupted and forgets about the wafer, wrapped in a tissue in her handbag. 
Later that evening, it occurs to Meggie:
I had brought the host home with me.  Jesus of Nazareth 
had been in the car beside me all the time...the mystery of 
the world in the palm of my hand....The car-keys had 
bashed it a bit.  One of the sweeteners that I use instead of 
sugar had stuck to it, but I got it off with my nail....I had 
never really looked at a host before.  They are very delicate. 
They break at the wrong touch; they break at a touch, even. 
If you dropped them, they would not fall; they would 
flutter, like flakes of snow.
615
The fragility of the Eucharist is striking in this passage; not only the delicacy of the 
Eucharist, but of the eucharistic body of Christ in particular. Not much explication is 
required to bring to the surface the significance of this vignette in the novella to the 
present discussion.  Meggie is amazed by the delicacy, the wispy translucence, of the 
very sacrament which forms the basis for not only her spirituality, but her entire faith 
tradition, her very Church.  She continues to reflect upon the host as she prepares to 
celebrate her own solitary Mass: 'Nuns make them.  They are made by hand. I wonder 
did the nun who made my host ever love a man, apart from Our Lord, apart from the 
God who mingled with the crowd...that was what God did, I think.  He became naked 
so that we could be nude again.'
616  The God who is present in the sacrament is the 
God who walked this earth, who denuded himself to restore us to innocence and 
regain paradise, yet with a second naiveté where we must wrestle with the paradoxes 
of our language, broken and yet meaning-full – and of our bodies, sexual and 
spiritual, sacred and profane.  Meggie questions, 'Wouldn't it be terrible if my hands 
still smelled of Antony, while I was holding the host in them?  Or would it?'
617  As her 
makeshift Mass unfolds, she administers the sacrament to herself, only to realize that 
yet again, she has forgotten to wipe off her lipstick – the story's title now clearly a 
615 A. Mathews, Lipstick, p. 288.
616 Ibid., p. 288.
617 Ibid., p. 288.250
symbol of the confluence of the sacramental and the sexual.   In her journal, she 
writes:  'I went to Holy Communion then, more than I have ever gone before in my 
life; and it was too late by the time I realised that I had completely forgotten to wipe 
the lipstick off my lips.  There is another world, and it is this one.'
618
As should be clear by now, for a relatively short piece of fiction, Lipstick on 
the Host  is overflowing with sacramentality, constantly testing and exploring the 
visceral   and   bodily   character   of   sacramental   spirituality,   while   simultaneously 
presenting the sacramentality of bodily and erotic experience.  Much more could be 
said about this remarkable story, but we shall attempt to draw our discussion of these 
themes to a close.  The day after her Ash Wednesday Communion, Meggie visits 
Antony's office and discovers the reason for his silence: he has been killed in an auto 
accident.  She grieves his loss, his absence, set against the backdrop of the other 
Meggie's still unfolding miscarriage.  Meggie's pain erupts in an exchange with her 
mother: 'I want to start from the beginning...I want to be conceived....Then I want to 
be passed as a heavy period...I want to be blood in the pedal-bin.'
619   Later, she 
struggles with her doubt, her grief, her loss, reminiscent of the ending of Monsignor 
Quixote, where the Mayor experiences in the absence of his compañero the haunting 
present absence of God.  Meggie writes:
At weekends, I met with God; always at his place, never at 
mine.  We had an arrangement.  Only at the weekends.  He 
was not to ring me at home; he was not to contact me at 
work.  He was not to leave messages.  There was a place 
and a time, for everything.   Now he's broken the rules. 
Now he wants more.  He wants more than my lips and my 
tongue.  He wants me.
620
Her world is turned upside-down, as much by God as by this amorous encounter with 
a man who is now a corpse, who can only be experienced as an absence...much like 
618 Ibid., pp. 288-89.
619 Ibid., p. 292.
620 Ibid., p. 301.251
the God she experiences in the Eucharist.  'I feel him in me like a phantom limb.  My 
toes itch at the end of no leg.'
621  Who is the 'him' in this sentence?  The lover, or God?
621 Ibid., p. 307.252
~ Conclusion ~
In-Conclusion
7.1 Toward a Poetics of Sacramentality
Throughout this thesis, we have wrestled with the question of how to conceive 
of   sacrament  and   sacramentality  in   a   way  that  consists   with   the  postmodern 
imagination.   We have seen that the meaning of the Eucharist, and by extension 
sacramentality, may be derived from the endless matrix of signification within which 
it exists.  In this sense, the Eucharist is not “rooted” in its history, but rather extends 
across history as an endlessly sprawling, endlessly relevant living metaphor.  It recalls 
the Last Supper; it (re)presents Christ's sacrificial death on Calvary; it is ratified by 
the living Tradition of the Body of Christ called Church.  But it is linked as well to 
any “thanksgiving” meal, every break-breaking or cup sharing.  It exists within the 
genealogy of sacrifice and ritual slaughter while also subverting and overcoming 
those structures.   The Eucharist connects us across time and space, history and 
geography, by the incessant relatability of bread, the basic unit of human subsistence, 
and wine, the drink classically related to celebration and revelry but also linked to 
extravagance and gratuity (grace!).
To reiterate, then, this network of meaning is not founded upon or rooted in a 
singular, originary event or meaning or character (etc) but rather demonstrates a 
polyvalence of significance, a  transignificance, which still resonates profoundly 
within the postmodern milieu.   The depth of signs, symbols, and by extension 253
sacraments (and the Sacred in general) has been emptied in postmodernism.  This 
kenosis has already taken place – has always already taken place, even in and before 
the beginning when the Spirit of God hovers over the surface of the deep and the 
creative Logos of God speaks into existence all that is.  Therefore, when discussing 
sacraments and sacramentality, we have endeavored to be cautious about the language 
of  root  and  grounding  and so on.   As we are interested in the question of how 
sacrament appears within the postmodern zeitgeist, and of why the notion of 
sacrament (re)emerges so powerfully and appears so compelling to the postmodern 
consciousness, the conception of sacrament as a more traditional/stable concept 
whose roots can be traced back to some singular source is somewhat contradictory to 
our purpose.  Following Nathan Mitchell, who borrows from Deleuze and Guattari, 
the notion of sacrament is truly  rhizomal.   The anatomy of sacrament we have 
attempted to explore looks more like a web of connections, which is truer to form in 
the postmodern imagination.  The Eucharist, for example, is connected to myriad 
“nodes” in this network of meaning: the Jewish Passover, Jewish table ritual in 
general,   the  Last  Supper,   Jesus'   miraculous  feedings  of   the  multitudes,   Jesus' 
“scandalous” bread-breakings and meals with sinners, the Emmaus encounter (Lk. 
24), Jesus' 'bread of life' discourse (Jn. 6), Jesus physical flesh and blood, the 
crucifixion, the Church, etc.  And yet, as we have seen, the Eucharist is also infinitely 
relatable to the poetic discourses of literature, the arts, and cultural practice.  All of 
these coalesce somehow to comprise the transignificance of the Eucharist.   To 
prioritize any one of these connections as primary or foundational is precisely to miss 
why sacrament continues to capture the postmodern imagination, whether theological 
or poetic.  But none of these “defining” connections (moments, events, entities, etc) 
toward which the Eucharist points is “foundational” in the strict sense; none is the 
“root” or the singular “Signified.”  They all comprise the matrix of connections by 254
which the Eucharist continues to derive its meaning, a process which is ever-shifting 
and never-ending.  As all sacramental liturgies are the result of their own unique 
histories, and as all are located within culture(s), this matrix of connections can be, 
and indeed IS, altered and added to as the Eucharist is practiced (recited) and 
interpreted (re-sited) within ever-changing cultures and by bodies, individual and 
corporate,   which   are   never   circumscribed   but   always   opening   out   onto   new 
possibilities of sacramental living. 
Even as the  ecclesia  is circumscribed and constituted by its sacraments 
(especially Baptism and Eucharist, but Holy Orders cannot be minimized either) and 
derives its sacramental structure from these practices, sacramentality cannot and will 
not be circumscribed by the Church.  And for this reason we might call sacramentality 
“post-ecclesial,” not because it has left the  ecclesia  behind, but because it is 
constantly moving beyond the ecclesia, superseding and transcending its (seemingly 
necessary) limits.  As Graham Ward writes,
The institutional churches are necessary, but they are not 
ends in themselves; they are constantly transgressed by a 
community of desire, an erotic community,  a spiritual 
activity...The body of Christ desiring its consummation 
opens itself to what is outside the institutional Church; 
offers   itself   to   perform  in   fields   of   activity  far   from 
chancels and cloisters.  In doing this certain risks are taken 
and certain fears can emerge within those who represent the 
institution.
622
Throughout this thesis, we have witnessed ways in which the (il)logic of the Eucharist 
spills over into a kind of post-ecclesial sacramentality.   It produces paradox, the 
bringing together of seemingly opposing or contradictory notions, and holding them 
together in an ineradicable tension.  But at the heart of paradox is doxa, like orthodox 
(right belief/worship) and  doxology  (words of glory/praise).   Therefore, when we 
speak of the Incarnation of God in Christ as a paradox, or of the paradoxical nature of 
622 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 180.255
the Eucharist, we use this term in a qualified sense.  While it does stand to reason that 
the idea of the God becoming human, being born of a virgin’s womb, and suffering 
death is indeed paradoxical in the common sense of the term – contrary to the opinion 
or expectation of what constitutes divinity – we employ this term also to mean going 
beyond belief or beyond glory – another way of writing about the im/possibility of 
liturgy, which derives from the nature of sacrament itself, by which we are confronted 
as well with the im/possibility of the Church and of every 'eucharistic community.'  
By this, we wish to indicate the uncircumscribable character – a certain 
“beyond” or “outside” – as well as an internal tension or contradiction inherent to 
every act of doxology, which is at the same time signified or made manifest by that 
act of doxology.  Every utterance of theology or worship, at least from the standpoint 
of Christian sacramentality, necessarily involves ascribing seemingly contradictory 
“glories” to the God revealed in Christ, for this God’s presence is known in and as 
absence; greatness is personified in becoming least, in becoming empty; to be filled 
and full-filled is to be eaten, consumed; real life is achieved and actualized in the most 
real and horrible of deaths.   In other words, the “glory” (doxa) of this God is 
paradoxical and uncircumscribable.   Death is swallowed up in life as true life is 
revealed as possible only by the passage through death.   Absence is negated by 
presence (resurrection), and this negation of absence is revealed as the negation of the 
negation of presence.
As we trace this 'poetics' of sacramentality, the only judgement that this essay 
wishes to pass on the forms of worship undertaken by any particular Christian 
community is based upon a rather simple criteria.  In this thesis we have endeavoured 
to unearth the scandalous nature of the broken body of the Crucified One, which is 
participated in and celebrated in the Church’s eucharistic liturgy.  This broken body 
constitutes the very unity of the Christian Faith, as indicated by the words said at the 256
Fraction in the Scottish Episcopal liturgy: 'The living bread is broken for the life of 
the world: Lord, unite us in this sign.'  'In the breaking,' writes Graham Ward, 'the 
fracturing, the extension beyond a concern with one’s own wholeness, is a sharing 
that will constitute our own true wholeness.'
623   This sign of brokenness which is 
wholeness is an insuppressible scandal for the Christian and for the Church, for it 
indicates an economy that has no place in this world.  In this divine economy, to 
invoke Meister Eckhart, all distinctions are lost: absence and presence are seen as co-
participants in one another, as are immanence and transcendence, or materiality and 
imagination.  Even the distinctions between fact and fiction, faith and doubt, sacred 
and secular become not simply blurred, and certainly not eliminated, but mutually 
inscribed into each other.  The symbolic depiction of this is the Cross of Jesus, which 
stands eternally as a coincidentia oppositorum, a coincidence of opposites, which is 
not a simple harmonization of antithetical elements, but a chiasmic holding together 
in tension of those contradictions.  This is the anatomy of paradox.  Our assessment, 
then, on any particular liturgical formula that calls itself Christian is this: worship that 
has lost this element of paradox, or worse, which seeks to domesticate the scandal of 
the Crucified, fails to offer a true participation in the God who was in Christ in his 
passion and death, his offering of the gift of his very brokenness, his sacrifice of 
ultimate separation from God.  We must realize the truth of what Žižek writes about 
God, and find ways of applying and embodying it in worship, in language and body.
We are one with God only when God is no longer one with 
Himself, but abandons Himself, "internalizes" the radical 
distance that separates us from Him. Our radical experience 
of separation from God is the very feature which unites us 
with Him... only when I experience the infinite pain of 
separation from God do I share an experience with God 
Himself (Christ on the Cross).
624
623 Ibid., p. 174.
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Worship is ultimately about communion with God, and with our fellow 
creatures.  Therefore, if liturgy is “the school of the church,”
625 this means that the 
Church learns not only what it believes but receives who it is in its very act of 
worship.  The problem arises when the Church’s worship has silenced and eventually 
forgotten altogether Jesus’ cry of dereliction, which is central to the Church’s identity 
as the Body of Christ.  The church as the Body of Christ is the Body of the Crucified 
One.  This Body is exalted as it hangs dead and bloody from a Roman cross; this 
Body reveals itself for who and what it really is – the incarnate logos of God, the 
eternally begotten Son and creative Word of the Father – in its moment of profoundest 
annihilation, and again in the most aching absence of the empty tomb.  How does the 
Church re-present this body, this body that is most present in its very absence?  We 
assert that the Church does this, becomes this body, by subjecting itself fully and 
without restraint to the scandal of the broken body of God, our participation in which 
is fully, though not exclusively, made possible in the sacrament of the Eucharist.  As 
Henri de Lubac and John Zizioulas have shown, the Eucharist makes the Church.
626 
However, what the Eucharist makes the Church into is often a matter of discrepancy, 
with often much variety from church to church.  What the Eucharist should make the 
Church into is a community of dispossession, a community which unites itself to 
broken bodies everywhere, a community which risks certainty and stability and even 
life itself to  be(come)  the Crucified and Risen (Absent-Present) Body of Christ. 
Eucharistic liturgies which exclude or gloss over this danger, this scandalous risk, 
offer less than full participation in the story of the salvation of the world, the climax 
of which is Christ’s paradoxical death and resurrection.
625 cf. Philip H. Pfatteicher,  The School of the Church: Worship and Christian Formation  (Valley 
Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1995)
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7.2 The (Im)Possibility of “Eucharistic Community”
To understand the Church as a “eucharistic community” is on the simplest 
level to conceive of the Church's identity as the Body of Christ as that which is 
received as gift through the Eucharist.  This sacramental celebration takes atomized 
individuals and makes a community: takes 'I's and makes a 'We.'  Graham Ward well 
articulates the uncircumscribability of the Eucharistic, and by extension the Church: 
‘The eucharistic We is a pluralised and pluralising body that overspills defined places, 
opening up another space...[and] transgresses institutional bodies that assist in 
defining, but can never confine, the body of Christ.’
627  Ward describes the body of 
Christ as ‘transcorporeal’, as ‘displaced’, a body which passes from the cradle to the 
cross, from the cross to the tomb to the heavens, and is finally (re)incarnated as the 
Church, the universal body of Christ, an erotic community
628 existing to celebrate, to 
reveal and revel in the mystery of incarnation.  In concluding this thesis, we wish to 
suggest something like Ward’s vision, one which is correlational or analogical, one 
which   seeks   to   place   the   Christian   Church   and   its   practices   in   constructive, 
redemptive (which is to say loving) engagement with the culture which the Church so 
often seems to desire to convert but also, paradoxically, holds contemptuously and 
defensively at bay.
In this way, might we see the practices of other texts, bodies, rituals, 
communities, etc, as participating in the same sacramentality that defines (but cannot 
be defined by) the Christian faith?  Cavanaugh has made an excellent point of seeing 
‘the world in a wafer,’
629  locating in the Eucharist the entire significance of the 
627 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 176.
628 Ibid.,  ch. 3, ‘Transcorporeality: The Ontological Scandal’ (pp. 81-96), and also ch. 4, ‘The 
Displaced Body of Jesus Christ’ (pp. 97-116), an earlier version of which is published in  J. 
Milbank, C. Pickstock and G. Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 163-81.
629 W.T. Cavanaugh, ‘The World in a Wafer: A Geography of the Eucharist as Resistance to 
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worshiping Church as Christ’s body, God’s vehicle of redemption in the world.  His 
insight is considerably important, but our interest is slightly different.  We wish to 
explore the possibility of seeing not ‘the world in a wafer’ but the wafer in the world. 
Are there other communities, other bodies, other texts and rites outside the walls of 
the Church, which bear traces or echoes of the body of Christ and which therefore 
might also be regarded as eucharistic?  Although more could be suggested, we will 
briefly propose two broad categories of such cultural incarnations of the body of 
Christ, instances of the wafer in the world – one literary and the other literal – which 
are identified by the sharing of communion and which conform, we propose, to a 
eucharistic shape.
First, as we have seen in this thesis, there is something sacramental about our 
participation in the world(s) of fiction – even when these fictions do not explicitly 
explore sacramentality.  Communities which converge around and within fictional 
narrative worlds – what Stanley Fish calls ‘interpretive communities,’
630 communities 
gathered in celebration of story – might serve as a point of departure for a concept of 
post-ecclesial eucharistic community.   Communal reading necessitates discussion, 
communication, and communion.  But there exists also an invisible community of 
readers, one which transcends space and time.  It has been said that ‘we read to know 
we are not alone,’
631 and indeed, when we read a story we join the ranks of all those 
who have ever participated in its narrative world.  We commune with readers past and 
present, with characters fictional and real (again, the distinctions become difficult to 
trace).  This invisible community is an impossible community, one which can never 
meet together in the material world but is able to experience a sort of mystical 
630 S.E.  Fish,  Is There a Text in This Class?  (Cambridge and London: Harvard UP, 1980), p. 14: 
‘Indeed, it is the interpretive communities, rather than either the text or the reader, that produce 
meanings and are responsible for the emergence of formal features.’
631 Shadowlands (Price Entertainment/Shadlowands Productions/Spelling Films, 1993).  Screenplay by 
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fellowship within the space of the page, which becomes then a sort of sanctuary, not 
as an escape from reality but as a portal to a parallel reality, a fantastic place barely 
hidden beneath the veneer of the ordinary.
Our every attempt to capture meaning or truth from a text is ill-advised; we do 
not capture the text, but rather the text captures us, holds us captive.  Neither do we 
consume  a text without it consuming us.   The hermeneutical task flows in both 
directions: we are read and interpreted, even in our most secret places, as we read and 
interpret.  We are not, however, trapped within ‘the prison-house of language’
632 or 
bound within the ‘reading gaol.’
633  Rather, we are set free, sent on a journey in the 
bound-less wilderness of the page.  The thrill of entering into the fun-house of reading 
is precisely the possibility of getting lost within the text, the narrative world wherein 
our mundane certainties disappear.  As we get lost on this journey of reading, we 
discover that, in Christian terms, the only way to be found is finally to be lost (Mat. 
16:24-25) – abandoning all hope of ever being found.  We wrestle with the text in the 
wilderness, and like Jacob’s encounter with the angel, this wrestling inevitably 
wounds us.  As with every encounter with the Divine, there is a sacrifice, and we 
come away altered.  But ‘it is no sin to limp,’ as Valentine Cunningham points out, for 
the wound we receive is also a blessing: ‘Encounters with this mystery, with such 
mysteries, with stories and texts...are the kind of necessary, painful, laming, struggle 
that...can be redemptive, saving, transforming, healing.’
634  A hint of violence occurs 
on both sides – the writer’s pen, which penned the words we read, is a blade that cuts 
into us, pins us to the page, exposing our weaknesses and leaving us scarred.  But we 
also wield the invasive scalpel of criticism with our interpretive endeavours, tearing 
632 F.  Jameson,  The Prison-House of Language: A critical account of structuralism and Russian 
formalism. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972).
633 V. Cunningham, In the Reading Gaol: Postmodernity, Texts, and History (Oxford and Cambridge: 
Blackwell, 1994).
634 V. Cunningham, ‘It is No Sin to Limp’, Literature and Theology 6:4 (1992), p. 309.261
into the text, sacrificing it on the altar even as it alters us.  Yet, kenotically, the text 
always invites us: ‘Take, read – this is my body, my corpse, my corpus, broken for 
you.’
635
The narrative worlds generated by fictions grab hold of us, transport us from 
the ordinary into the extraordinary.  We might describe this in terms of rapture, from 
the Latin ‘raptus’, meaning to carry off, or to be abducted, carried away by force or 
seized violently (the same root as  rape), a duplicitous  word – the violent sense 
conjuring up horrific images, of us or a loved one raptured, captured, brutalized.  But 
this stands in stark contrast to the more common usage of  rapture  in Christian 
terminology, the dreamy sense which calls to mind the promise of heaven, our reward 
for keeping it clean in this life.   This is  anamnēsis, a memory of the future, a 
remembrance of that of which we have no memory.
Perhaps a qualification is in order, for not every fictive work is equally 
sacramental in the sense we are tracing.  For a story, a work of fiction, to generate 
such a eucharistic community it must be what Stanley Fish calls a ‘self-consuming 
artifact,’ one which ‘signifies most successfully when it fails, when it points away 
from itself to something its forms cannot capture.’
636  Fish has elsewhere reminded us 
that the work (for him, literary, but for our broader purposes, narrative)
is not constrained by something in the text, nor does it issue 
from an independent and arbitrary will; rather, it proceeds 
from a collective decision as to what will count,...a decision 
that will be in force only so long as a community of readers 
or believers continues to abide by it.
637  
635 The reflections in the paragraph are inspired by Stephen D. Moore and Mark C. Taylor.  See S. D. 
Moore, Mark and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspectives, pp. 11-18, and God’s Gym, pp. 37-39. 
Also M. C. Taylor, Erring, op cit.
636 S.E. Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeeth-Century Literature, (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA: California UP, 1972), p. 4.  The quality I am attempting to express could also 
be put in Jean-Luc Marion’s terms: to bring about the emergence of a eucharistic community, the 
work must be an icon, that which directs the gaze beyond itself by becoming invisible, rather than 
an idol, that which freezes the gaze on the object.  See J. Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte 
(Chicago and London: Chicago UP, 1991).
637 S. Fish,  Is There a Text in This Class?, p. 11.262
The status of the work, like the relationship between the interpretative community and 
the narrative world within which it congregates, is tenuous, vulnerable.   It never 
escapes a degree of risk, the risk of its own (the work’s and the community’s) 
dispossession and de-stability.  To embrace poiesis, then, is to accept risk, and so 
these literary communities join the ecclesial community to form ‘a community that 
produces and occupies a space transcending place, walls and boundaries, a liturgical, 
doxological space opening in the world onto the world.’
638
In this way, the Church as a eucharistic community 'is itself a fractured and 
fracturing community, internally deconstituting and reconstituting itself.’
639   This 
fractured and fracturing character places the Church in an inextricable bond with all 
fractured bodies, wherever they may be found.  Hence we suggest a second possibility 
of the ‘sacrificial’ community, which shares in common physical suffering, as a post-
ecclesial   eucharistic   community.    The   experience   of   pain   –   physical,   mental, 
emotional – is something that all of humankind shares in common, and yet, in our 
moment of pain, we are the most profoundly isolated.  In The Body in Pain, Elaine 
Scarry explains that no one can experience the pain of another.  ‘To have great pain,’ 
she writes, ‘is to have certainty; to hear that another person has pain is to have doubt. 
(The doubt of other persons, here as elsewhere, amplifies the suffering of those 
already in pain.)’
640  In this way, one of the few experiences that unites all of humanity 
is at the same time the loneliest and most isolated (and isolating) of experiences.  We 
hear the echoes of Jesus’ words to his disciples: ‘Where I am going, you cannot 
follow’ (John 13:33-36).  Pain captures the imagination and excises a part of the 
sufferer, which is why torture is so effective as a measure of social fragmentation. 
638 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 258.
639 Ibid., p. 154.
640  E. Scarry, The Body in Pain, p. 7.263
Think of the politically disappeared in Latin America: wives, mothers, children, 
returning to empty houses where fathers or brothers should be – bodies that have 
vanished, as if into thin air, usually never to be seen again.   No one touched by 
torture, which touches not only the subject but also every person to whom the subject 
is connected, is ever left unchanged.
641
Communities joined by common suffering congregate in emergency rooms 
and AIDS clinics, in support groups that meet in church rec halls or civic centres.  In 
many cases, these might be created or even imposed community – the l’Arche 
community, the cancer ward, even the leper colony, as recently portrayed in the film 
The Motorcycle Diaries, in which young Che Guevara breaks the rules and the gloves 
come off, literally, so as to share, simply by touch, in the broken bodies of these 
exiles.
642  On one hand, society tends to cordon off such broken bodies into groups, 
for it is easier to deal with ‘the handicapped’ or ‘the mentally ill’ as categories than to 
personally and lovingly engage with ‘the least of these’ (Matt. 25:31-46).  But this is a 
tragic act, for the denial of death, the denial of our mortality, is paradoxically the very 
thing that makes us human.  Scarry notes that the ‘unsharability’ of pain obliterates 
language, rendering suffering incommunicable, and yet, as ‘the act of verbally 
expressing pain is a necessary prelude to the collective task of diminishing pain,’
643 
we wish to suggest that eucharistic language (word bodied-forth in action) works 
toward overcoming the isolation and atomization of pain.  It renders the boundaries 
between our bodies permeable, making possible the impossible act of not just 
experiencing one another’s burdens but also bearing them.  Because Christ suffered 
‘once, for all’ (1 Pet. 3:18), the impossible is made possible: we are able to share in 
641 Torture – not only its social impact but its character as a “liturgy” of the state – is a central theme in 
William Cavanaugh's Torture and Eucharist, to which we are indebted for these insights.
642 The Motorcycle Diaries (Diarios de motocicleta, FilmFour/South Fork, 2004). Screenplay by Jose 
Rivera, directed by Walter Salles.
643 E. Scarry, The Body in Pain, p. 9.264
one another’s suffering by our common participation in his suffering, which is 
memorialised and incarnated in the eucharistic sacrifice.
Further, Christian participation in the Eucharist (not to mention the teachings 
of Jesus) necessarily imposes a responsibility upon the ecclesial community to care 
for and include such suffering bodies within the scope of their fellowship.  Again 
echoing Graham Ward, we assert that communion with suffering communities is 
necessary, for the ‘racked and viral-ridden bodies of the sick’
644 and downtrodden 
serve as visible symbols of the eucharistic sacrifice, Christ’s broken body and spilt 
blood which mystically and real-ly binds us each to another and together to God. 
Since we cannot truly experience their pain or share in their suffering, we must ‘bear 
something   of   their   body   weight   (with   something   of   its   pain)   within   our 
imaginaries.’
645  The ecclesial community, to be truly eucharistic, must be and become 
one which continually seeks to discover, as David Toole proposes, ‘what it might 
mean to view suffering through the lens of the Crucified.’
646   Given our common 
brokenness, we cannot afford to ignore such bodies, for we are inextricably bound 
together in Christ's body, indelibly marked with his wounds.
The character of sacramentality that we have been tracing is therefore finally, 
as James White puts it, 'taking fully seriously our full humanity.'
647  We agree with 
White entirely when he attests that we must develop a sense of sacramentality, that is, 
'a special language in which objects and actions provide a new vocabulary.' To arrive 
at this sense of sacramentality, which should inform all sacramental celebration and 
participation, 'One must begin by observing how humans relate to one another in 
644 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 82.
645 Ibid., p. 96.
646 David Toole, Waiting for Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy, and 
Apocalypse (London: SCM, 2001), p. 87.
647 James F. White, Introduction to Christian Worship, 3
rd ed. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2000), 
p. 201.265
nonverbal ways.  Love, in its demand for visible expression, is our best guide.  In this 
sense, we are dealing with the humanity of the sacraments.'
648  This love must be self-
emptying, existing for the other, existing for the body broken even as it is fuelled by 
the body broken.   It must manifest itself in language, in words and texts which 
express a divine, selfless love to those who do not know love.  It must write itself 
upon the body, which is taken, blessed, broken and given for the other.   While 
inscribed in language and embodied in the flesh, this sense of sacramentality can 
never be circumscribed or contained.   As the foundation of the Church (or any 
community) it is a shaky, unstable foundation at best.   But as Graham Ward has 
observed, ‘The body of Christ lives on, beyond its precincts: each member of the 
eucharistic We writing God’s name elsewhere in the world – redeeming it through 
desire.’
649    In   this   way,   the   community   gathered   around   the   Eucharist  is  an 
(im)possible community – it is possible, yet only by living on  beyond itself, 
transgressing its own boundaries, following the sacramental out from the Church and 
into the world.
And so it seems fitting to conclude, inconclusively perhaps – for if we have 
established anything it is that there is no final word on sacrament – with these words 
from Teilhard de Chardin:
As our humanity assimilates the material world, and as the 
Host   assimilates   our   humanity,   the   eucharistic 
transformation   goes   beyond   and   completes   the 
transubstantiation of the bread on the altar.  Step by step, it 
irresistibly invades the universe.  It is the fire that sweeps 
over   the   heath;   the   stroke   that   vibrates   through   the 
bronze....in a true sense, the sacramental Species are formed 
by the totality of the world, and the duration of the creation 
is the time needed for its consecration.
650
648 Ibid., p. 200.
649 G. Ward, Cities of God, p. 181.
650 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Le Milieu Divin: An Essay on the Interior Life (London and Glasgow: 
Collins / Fontana, 1966), pp. 125-26.266
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